Inconsistent Presuppositions of Dewey's Pragmatism

Auteurs-es

  • Donnie J. Self

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.11575/jet.v10i2.43649

Résumé

This article exposes a fundamental inconsistency between the philosophical presuppositions of certain pragmatist contentions through a critical analysis of the phrase 'good for what'. It notes that in replacing intrinsic value with instrumental value Dewey reduces value concepts to functional concepts. It establishes that functional concepts presuppose an object value structure and that knowledge of it comes through a wider range of experience than just sensory experience; but this is inconsistent with the pragmatist claim to be a strict scientific naturalism which presupposes that there is no objective value structure and that all knowledge comes through sensory experience. Similar results are obtained from the explication of valuation in terms of troubled experience.

Biographie de l'auteur-e

Donnie J. Self

Donnie J. Self holds a joint appointment with the Department of Philosophy at Old Dominion University and the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Eastern Virginia Medical School, Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A.

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Publié-e

2018-05-11

Numéro

Vol. 10 No. 2 (1976)

Rubrique

Articles

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