The Philosophic Pretence of Linguistic Analysis: A Polanyian Perspective on Joe Green 's Drawing Out Paul Hirst's Concept of Reason
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.11575/jet.v20i3.44187Abstract
"Objectivism," the view that valid knowledge can be obtained only by impersonal rules of procedure, constituted, for Michael Polanyi in his theory of "personal knowledge" , the pathology of modem thought. In science objectivism was manifested in the form of positivism, the appeal to the "objective" procedures of observation, testing and experiment. In philosophy, objectivism takes several forms, perhaps the most widespread spread of which is that of linguistic analysis, the appeal to the "objective" rules of usage. This paper attempts to reveal the objectivist premises of a recent example of such analysis, that of Joe Green 's " The Concept of Reason in Hirst's Forms of Knowledge." (The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol. 19, No. 2, August, 1985.)
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