The Method of Anschauung: From Johann H. Pestalozzi to Herbert Spencer

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ABSTRACT: One of the major inventions of modern education is the instructional use of *Anschauung*. It was a kind of experience/based learning and had two major influences – first as a method of instruction which was more effective than mere book-learning and rote memorization, and second, as a rejection of old social arrangements which inculcated traditional values through deductive and authoritarian teaching. In this article I will examine how the implications of appealing to *Anschauung* have changed according to socio-historical changes.

RÉSUMÉ: Une des inventions qui a marqué l'éducation moderne, est la méthode d'enseignement de Anschauung. C'était une sorte d'apprentissage appuyé sur l'expérience et qui exerçait deux influences essentielles. La première, était considérée comme une approche pédagogique plus efficace que n'importe quel livre d'école et que la mémorisation par cœur. La seconde était, elle, considérée comme un rejet des vieilles recettes sociales qui inculquaient des valeurs traditionnelles par le truchement d'un enseignement logique et autoritaire. Dans cet article, j'explique le changement des implications de la méthode fascinante de Anschauung selon une évolution socio-historique.

Introduction

One of the major inventions of modern education is an instructional use of *Anschauung*, and it is called the method (or art) of *Anschauung*.[1] This German term is variously translated as intuition, sense-impression, observation, concreteness, and so on, but it essentially means the direct knowledge of the object without intermediary processes such as reasoning. The most appropriate translation of the term seems to be

Journal of Educational Thought
Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003, 77-99.

intuition, but we have to note that the objects being intuited range from physical objects to abstract ideas. However, in the context of modern philosophy of education, *Anschauung* primarily (but not exclusively) means direct knowledge of the object through the five senses (particularly the optical sense). It implies first, the primacy of the direct experience of the individual, as opposed, for example, to such second-hand experience as reading books or listening to explanations of others. At the same time, it is important to note that *Anschauung* as a methodological principle means more than experiencing or perceiving of objects. So, second, it implies an ordered or organized method of grasping the essential qualities of the object as distinct from the accidental properties. Third, it implies an active power of the individual, as opposed to the mere reception of stimuli or impressions from without.

An appeal to *Anschauung* is a part of the broader scheme of education which trusts the individual's capacity for obtaining knowledge and rationality by using his or her own innate ability, primarily, by means of the five senses. The assumption that every individual is, at least in principle, able to achieve knowledge and rationality using his or her own senses meant the rejection of the old assumption which underlay the authoritarian, speculative, and deductive method of education.

Associated with this change in assumptions concerning the capacity of the individual was a revolt against traditional society; a social movement for democratization and liberalization in the early modern era. The other side of modernization was that the individual could no longer rely on the traditional community which automatically set him or her in a certain path of life by assigning a role in the community. Now liberated from the yoke of the traditional society, the individual became responsible for his or her own life; the individual was now cut off from a traditional, relatively homogenous and stable society, and had to live an autonomous life in a larger, relatively heterogeneous and unstable society. So the most important problem for modern education was to make the individual feel at home in this new kind of society, and to make him or her self-sustaining, which meant (a) that the individual should acquire at least in principle an ability to judge without relying on authority, and (b) that the individual should acquire what is useful for life in the new form of society. The scheme of experience-based education which includes the method of *Anschauung* should be understood in this broader context.

However, with the socio-historical changes between the 17th and the 19th centuries, the implications of appealing to *Anschauung* changed too. In what follows, I will examine the nature of this change by comparing the educational ideas of two major individuals in the tradition of Western education: Johann H. Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Both men tried to apply the method of *Anschauung*: the former is one of the originators of the method, and the latter thought highly of the former's invention, though he also thought certain modifications necessary.[2] Both men thought that the goal of education should be to make self-sustaining, autonomous individuals, and particularly the latter is famous for his concern about the utility of what ought to be learned. So they basically share concerns about what education means or what educational institutions should do. However, by comparing their respective educational ideas and the socio-historical contexts in which they wrote, we cannot help noticing differences in implications of their theories.

As Hara (1976) points out, the method of *Anschauung* had significance in two senses. First, it was above all a method designed to improve the efficiency of teaching and learning. Second, it was also a matter of a rejection of old social arrangements; basing rationality on the individual's own experience or senses meant the rejection of predetermined, authoritarian, *a priori* reasoning which every individual was expected to follow without questioning.

In Pestalozzi, we can observe both these implications. But although Spencer shared with Pestalozzi the ideal of educating the self-sustaining individual, and appreciated the Pestalozzian method of *Anschauung*, he did not share the sort of prospect for immediate social reform which Pestalozzi had. He was not a conservative in the sense of trying to preserve the status quo of existing society, but his belief in *laissez-faire* individualism and his doctrine of evolution prevented him from embracing an ideal of direct intervention in the course of social evolution by means of education. He believed that the process of evolution would take a very long time, and that human intervention in this process of evolution and expectation of immediate change in a generation or two were futile. As a result, in Spencer's scheme, an important aspect of *Anschauung* – the bringing about of social reform – dropped out of sight, and it came to mean exclusively an effective method of instruction – effective in transmitting useful knowledge and in making individuals well-adapted to existing society.

The Method of Anschauung

Pestalozzi and the Pedagogy of Nature

Pestalozzi, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, thought that society was corrupt, and that it should be rectified. The principal means for the improvement of society was, for both Rousseau and Pestalozzi, an education according to Nature. However, Pestalozzi's view differs from Rousseau's in some significant regards. Rousseau said that, of the three sources of man's education – Nature, men, and things – Nature was beyond man's control, so education should be regulated by that inevitable and necessarily good source (Rousseau, 1979, p. 38). Hence his idea of "negative education," that the major part of education is to prevent society's corrupting influences affecting the child's mind and character. On the other hand, Pestalozzi modifies Rousseau's position. As Gutek (1999) suggests, Pestalozzi does not think it possible or desirable to reverse the direction of societal change already occurring. For example, he thought that the industrial revolution could not or should not be reversed (p. 17). His earlier efforts were spent on educating self-sustaining individuals in an institution that combined a farm, factory, and school (hence, combining intellectual, moral, and physical education, and job training). Although he modified his position later and came to regard manual training or occupational activities as a means to general education rather than as ends in themselves, his principal belief was that education, at least in part, should ensure the person acquired useful knowledge and skill.[3]

Pestalozzi's idea of education is to assist or in some cases regulate the work of Nature, and not just regulate everything else according to Nature. Here we can see why Pestalozzi needed to develop a method of education. Pestalozzi, unlike Rousseau, thought schools a principle means of education, so he had to work out a practical method for group instruction. He could not afford Rousseau's individual tutor-pupil education. However, more importantly, he also thought that the existing methods of instruction were fundamentally defective, for example the monitorial system, which was new in his time, was basically a version of the old method of individual recitation (though done in groups).

Pestalozzi, like his predecessors (such as John Locke and Rousseau), accepted the principle of empiricism, that is, all knowledge comes from experience. He, in principle, thought that whatever a person has in his or her mind has its origin in the external world, and it is received through the senses. If the environment in which a child grows up is corrupt, it is likely that the child will accumulate corrupt knowledge and

grow in a wrong direction. However, Pestalozzi added two important insights to this empiricist position. First, though the environment is very important and influential, the environment does not determine everything. A child is not wholly passive. A child has his or her own Nature which is a germ of later development, or, we may say that a child has the potentiality for development. Second, the environment is a mishmash of good things and bad things. Nature may be fundamentally good, but it is careless in its detail or concrete manifestations, and the human mind cannot make sense of it in its totality; the human mind needs a means of sorting out the good from the bad, or of perceiving a comprehensible pattern out of the seeming chaos. Finally, Pestalozzi never confined his educational method and practice to what we may call the cognitive domain. This is obvious from the practice in his own educational institutions as well as from his writings. However, unfortunately, it is usually the case that interpretations of Pestalozzianism exclusively focus on the cognitive domain.

The Method of Anschauung: J. H. Pestalozzi's Educational Theory

Herbert Spencer wrote in his *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (1861/1966), "of new practices that have grown up during the decline of these old ones, the most important is the systematic culture of observation" (pp. 62-63). What he meant by "the systematic culture of observation" was the method of *Anschauung*. Moreover, he particularly had in mind Pestalozzi's version. However, we cannot help noticing, when we read Spencer's book, that Spencer somewhat deformed, or rather focused on only a narrow part of, what Pestalozzi meant to convey. This is also the case with the term "object lesson," which was a popularized version of Pestalozzianism, particularly in England and in the United States. It is true that Pestalozzi, like Rousseau and other modern educational philosophers, opposed mere book-learning separated from the child's first-hand experience. However, while (a) Pestalozzi thought that education must aim at the harmonious development of morality (including religion), intellect/intelligence, and body (health and useful skills); and (b) Pestalozzi meant by *Anschauung* more than presenting real objects to the student in instruction, his followers, notably Spencer and other Anglo-American interpreters of Pestalozzi (such as Charles and Elizabeth Mayo in England, and Edward Sheldon of the Oswego Normal School in the United States), confined the application of Pestalozzianism almost exclusively to the domain of

cognition, and diminished the method of *Anschauung* to mere presentation of objects.[4]

In order to see the nature and implication of this change, we will take a brief look at Pestalozzi's formulation of the method of *Anschauung* in this section; then, in the subsequent sections, we will examine Spencer's appreciation and modification of it.

Pestalozzi basically followed Rousseau's educational ideas, but found several inadequacies in Rousseau's principles for implementation.

There are, in my opinion, two important differences between Pestalozzi and Rousseau. The first is their concepts of Nature. By Nature, they meant both external (physical) and internal (human) Nature; on this much they agreed. However, while for Rousseau, Nature, both external and internal, was perfectly reliable, Pestalozzi did not trust Nature as much as Rousseau. He thought that while Nature as a whole was good, it was "blind" and "confused" in its detail (Pestalozzi, 1820/1894, p.160, 10th Letter).[5] He thought that external Nature might not be fit for the human mind to perceive as it was, and internal Nature, that is, human Nature (which contains "animal nature" too), could develop to be either good or bad according to the way it was educated. Moreover, he thought that human beings should go beyond mere Nature and achieve morality. Thus, the problem of education was not as simple for Pestalozzi as it had been for Rousseau. Rousseau thought that it was necessary was to prevent any artificial and corrupt influences from coming into the environment of the child, and the rest was taken care of by Nature. However, Pestalozzi thought it necessary to have what he calls an "Art" (or Method). Nature, whether external or internal, by itself was not completely reliable. So, Pestalozzi tried everything he could to work out the proper Art of assisting Nature.[6] His solution was a twofold method: the General Method and the Special Method. The latter is known as the method of *Anschauung*.

The second difference is their attitudes toward society. Even though Pestalozzi thought it absolutely necessary for society to be reformed, he did not think it necessary or possible to reject or reverse what was already occurring. Rousseau would have considered this complacency about society abominable.

Accepting, in principle, Rousseau's educational ideas on one hand, and reflecting on the inadequacy of existing principles, methods, and practices of education on the other, Pestalozzi sets out to formulate his own principles and methods of education. At this point we must remember that Pestalozzi was concerned with the education of the

masses. What he found inadequate in the contemporary practice of education for the masses were, first, the atmosphere of fear in schools; second, the emphasis on book-learning and rote memorization; and third, the method of individual recitation in which there was no interaction between peers or between the teacher and the student. Thus, he proposed, and also practiced in his educational institutions, the General Method of establishing emotional security in school, and the Special Method of *Anschauung*. In addition, he preferred a group instruction where peers could interact as opposed to the individualized one-way instructional method of recitation.

Pestalozzi aimed at establishing an education for the balanced development of "head, heart and hand," that is, intellect/intelligence, morality (including religion) and body (health and useful skills). He thought that every child had a germ or potentiality for such development, but he did not think, as Rousseau might have done, that the child would develop in the right direction if negative influences from the environment were not allowed in. He thought that the child could develop in either right or wrong directions, so he thought highly of educational interventions.[7] Moreover, Pestalozzi noticed that the child had already acquired a certain attitude or character from the interaction with the parents, particularly with the mother, before he or she came to school. Thus, Pestalozzi thought that the mother's role was crucial in the education of the child, but he was also aware that the majority of mothers in his era, particularly of the lower classes, could not afford to give what their children needed, that is, affection above all and elementary intellectual instruction.[8] So while thinking highly of the role of both Nature and the mother, Pestalozzi also thought highly of the expertise which teachers had, as professionals who were trained in special techniques and who possessed insights which lay-people, even mothers, may not have, and he also valued the method which was both effective and easy enough for anyone to learn and practice.

Keeping in mind Pestalozzi's emphasis on the General Method of establishing emotional security for children – because many Pestalozzians lost sight of this aspect of Pestalozzianism, and we should not make the same mistake – let us examine his Special Method of *Anschauung*.

Pestalozzi's concept of *Anschauung* is much more sophisticated as a methodological principle than that of his predecessors (see note 2): Unlike, for example, Comenius, who was mostly interested in the primacy of first-hand seeing and not particularly in the right method of

perception, Pestalozzi distinguishes *Anschauung* and the Art of *Anschauung*; the former means simply that the object is placed before the sense(s) for perceiving, but the latter means the method for right perceiving in which essential qualities of the object are distinguished from the accidental ones.

From a careful reading of *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* (Pestalozzi, 1820/1894) we can get a relatively consistent idea of what Pestalozzi meant by *Anschauung* and see clearly that it is vitally important in his whole scheme of education. But it seems that he was not a theorist or an precise thinker, but rather a practitioner or a man of "partial intuition" as Spencer said (1861/1966, p. 70).

Pestalozzi says in *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* that the most important contribution by himself to education is his method of *Anschauung*.

> Friend! When I now look back and ask myself: What have I specially done for the very being of education, I find I have fixed the highest supreme principle of instruction in the recognition of *sense-impression as the absolute foundation of all knowledge.* (1820/1894, p.139, 9th Letter)

What has been translated here as "sense-impression" is *Anschauung* in the original. Appreciation of sense-impression or *Anschauung* as the foundation of knowledge is not new. However, the attempts to formulate a practicable method of education based on it is rather new, and Pestalozzi's methodologizing of "right" perceiving, that is, the "Art" of *Anschauung*, is fundamentally new. He writes, "If we consider sense-impression as opposed to the art of sense-impression or *Anschauung*, separately and by itself, it is nothing but the presence of *the external object before the senses* which rouses a consciousness of the impression made by it" (1820/1894, p. 144, 10th Letter). He thinks that the sense-impressions of essential properties are the crucial foundation for the ultimate purpose of intellectual education, that is, clear ideas. Without it, the individual will not be able to think, judge, or talk clearly and correctly. In emphasizing the necessity of this method for accurate perception, it may be justified to say that Pestalozzi went a little further than Comenius or Rousseau.

Along with the appreciation of sense-impressions, the method of *Anschauung* symbolizes the modern attempt to psychologize instruction. This owes particularly to Rousseau's insight that individual development follows the path of Nature. As the path of Nature is inviolable, the natural development of an individual is also inviolable, and any attempt

to impose artificial patterns of education on a child without regard to this natural law is doomed to fail. Just as a plant would grow according to the law of Nature if only the proper environment was given, a child would develop perfectly according to its internal Nature if only his environment was appropriate (natural). So, Pestalozzi organized lessons or presentation of materials in a graded form, starting from more or less vague perceptions in the direction of clear and distinct conceptions.

This graduated process is of course based on what he believes to be the law of psychology, or the Nature of the human mind. He says:

> I now sought for laws to which the development of the human mind must, by its very nature, be subject. I know they must be the same as those of physical Nature, and trusted to find in them a safe clue to a universal psychological method of instruction. (1820/1894, p. 78, 4th Letter)

Pestalozzi thought, like his predecessors, that all knowledge has its origin in the child's experience (e.g., sense perceptions and feelings). However, the child, without experience and education, is not capable of correct observation; he or she needs to learn "to subordinate the accidental properties of an object to its essential nature" (1820/1894, p. 162, 10th Letter).[9] Thus, we need by instruction gradually to develop or adjust his or her potential so that what the child experiences "unites itself clearly and comprehensively with the power already existing in him, and there is no error behind his views" (p. 162, 10th Letter).

Here is the birth of one of the most important principle and method of instruction. His successors, notably J.F. Herbart (1776-1841) and F.W. Froebel (1782-1852), and also Spencer, attempted to refine what Pestalozzi started.[10] Anyway, Pestalozzi's position is clear in the following statement:

> Neither at the first point nor in the whole series of means of teaching do I leave to chance what nature, circumstance, or mother-love may present to the sense of the child before he can speak. I have done all I could to make it possible, by omitting accidental characteristics, to bring the essentials of knowledge gained by sense-impression to the child's senses and to make the conscious impressions he receives unforgettable. (1820/1894, p. 146, 10th Letter)

Thus, Pestalozzi on the one hand acknowledges the inner Nature of the child, that is, the psychological law of development and the child's spontaneity in learning and experiencing, and on the other hand, he also acknowledges the need to arrange and organize the instruction so that

the child will rise above mere physical or animal nature and achieve "the seeing, spiritual, moral nature of man" (p. 160,10th Letter).

Based on these premises, he proposed some practical principles of instruction which are current even today, such as "from the simple to the complex," "from the near to the far," and "from the concrete to the abstract" (e.g., 1820/1894, p. 78, 4th Letter). He says that the instruction must start from the easiest (simplest, nearest, concretest) "elements," and that such elements are organized in three fundamental categories of number, form, and language/name (p.87, 6th Letter). Some of his methodological proposals are ridiculous, because he was confused about the logical and the psychological element. For example: "The great peculiarity and highest characteristic of our nature, *Language*, begins in the power of making sounds. It becomes gradually developed by improving *sounds* to *articulate words*; and from *articulate words* to *language*" (p.149, 10th Letter).

As Gutek comments, while it is true that a letter or a "sound" is logically more simple than a word, a word is more familiar to a child, hence psychologically more suitable as the element of language learning (1999, p. 95).

Though Pestalozzi seems to have recognized his faults later in his life, his earlier formulation of language learning was to some extent not unlike the old method of repetition which he despised.[11] Silber writes that the exercises which Pestalozzi invented for the teaching of the mother tongue were "highly mechanical and in no way superior to the 'parrot-like jabbering' which he so despised in traditional teaching" (1965, p. 143).

Overall, his principles of education which aimed at the harmonious development of "head, heart, and hand," and the unity of the General and Special Methods were adhered to by Pestalozzi himself and his direct disciples. However, the original aspiration of Pestalozzi was quickly lost in the hands of his successors who were largely interested in reproducible and popularizable methods of instruction. Pestalozzianism degenerated into a method not unlike the old monotonous method of instruction.

On the Improvement of the Pestalozzian Method of Anschauung – Spencer

Historical Context

Many educators from around Europe visited Pestalozzi's educational institutions at Burgdorf (1801-1804) and Yverdon (1804-1825), and some of them brought Pestalozzianism (or what they took to be Pestalozzianism) back to their countries. There were some attempts to establish Pestalozzian schools, such as in the case of William Maclure and Pestalozzi's former assistant at Burgdorf, Joseph Neef. However, these attempts did not have lasting effects. The attempts were made in the early years of the 19th century and it was a few decades before the nation-wide public schools started, so their cases ended up being a few scattered individual attempts, and did not gain popular or political support for the dissemination of the principles and methods. After compulsory public schooling started to spread, for example in the United States, in the latter half of the 19th century, a majority of the schools and teachers did not know about the development of new principles or methods, Pestalozzianism or otherwise.[12] These early schools and teachers were still relying on the old methods of recitation and book-learning.

What Spencer and other educationists of the so-called New Education – from the latter half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century – criticized was this sort of education. They criticized the old, ineffective, and often inhumane education in the early schools. Pestalozzianism and other educational principles and methods almost without exception appreciated the importance of children's own direct experience (as opposed to the second-hand experience of book-learning) and children's spontaneity. There were two lines of criticism: (a) criticism against the lack of efficiency and neglect of utility in schooling, and (b) criticism against inhumane practices at school. Spencer's educational theory can be read in this context. His *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (1861/1966) addressed these issues, and in the chapter on intellectual education, he takes up approvingly the Pestalozzian method of *Anschauung*.

In the following sections, I will examine Spencer's re-formulation of the Pestalozzian method.

Spencer's Educational Scheme

Spencer thought that education should follow a similar course of change as the larger society which had changed from authoritarian to liberal.

As to the content of education, that is knowledge to be learned, he criticized the ineffectiveness of the old curriculum. He argued that curriculum content must be selected according to the relative values of various kinds of knowledge. The most important criterion was utility for the pursuit of "complete living" (1861/1966, p. 8); "utility" meant for him not just for specific cases, but whatever would turn out to be useful in all cases. He wanted "the right ruling of conduct in all directions under all circumstances;" a body of knowledge which would address the question, "how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others – how to live completely?" (p. 8). And his analysis reached a conclusion that it was science that was of most use.

He thought that methods of teaching should change too. The most basic point was the need to depart from authoritarian, dogmatic, and coercive teaching. Specific proposals were (a) the student's reasoning ability (judgment, understanding) should be trusted, which means on the one hand that the old maxim of "believe and ask no questions" should be eliminated, and on the other hand, that learning should proceed from the student's own experience (observation) of concrete facts to generalizations; and (b) teaching should be non-coercive, which means appreciation of the student's spontaneity, pleasure, and happiness.

That he praised the Pestalozzian method of *Anschauung* – though he also said that the method needed to be improved – seems to be in line with his argument above. But what we have to note is that he mentioned a particular interpretation of Pestalozzianism: the "object lesson." I would say that this is a method which emphasizes the Special Method separated from the General Method.

On the Improvement of Pestalozzi's Method

As with his predecessors in the history of modern education, Spencer was concerned with the education of self-sustaining individuals. He disliked methods of education which gave children only the results of other people's thought: book-learning, rote-memorization, dogmatic teaching, knowledge based merely on authority, and so on. His humanitarian perspective played a role (his belief that children are entitled to their own happiness), and he also disliked the old education for its uselessness, its failure to make individuals independent and self-

sustaining.[13] He thought that the individual who was merely given the results of other individuals' thinking and inquiry would be at a loss when he or she encountered an unfamiliar situation. He writes, "to give the net product of inquiry, without the inquiry that leads to it, is found to be both enervating and inefficient" (1861/1966, p. 61).

So he thought that the new method of education which allows the student to use his or her own reasoning abilities while at the same time developing them is necessary. The new method of education which accommodates the student's spontaneity (self-activity), independent thought, inquiry, and discovery should replace the old method of imposing facts and values which made him or her a mere receptacle of what was given.

Among the new methods, Spencer highly appreciated "the systematic culture of the powers of observation," that is, the method of *Anschauung*. He writes with a note of irony, "after long ages of blindness, men are at last seeing that the spontaneous activity of the observing faculties in children, has a meaning and a use" (1861/1966, p. 63). Children, he says, must gain the foundation of all knowledge and thought, "vivid and complete impressions," first of all, through their own "spontaneous activity" of observation.

However, this new method is not without defect; he speaks of "the well-conceived but ill-conducted method of *object-lessons*" (1861/1966, p. 63). While Spencer appreciated Pestalozzi's principle and method of education, he found that students' actual education had not been improved by the use of the object-lessons. If the method is correct, children must above all be joyful and excited in daily lessons, but he found children bored as badly as in the old practice (p. 69). He writes, "the Pestalozzian system seems scarcely to have fulfilled the promise of its theory" (p. 69).

Spencer thought that the failure of Pestalozzianism had two major reasons. First, that it was not necessarily the method or principle's fault, because the success or failure of it, to a large extent, depends on the teacher who applies them to the practice (1861/1966, p. 69). The fact is that the teachers are not adequately trained to apply Pestalozzi's principles and methods. Second, there are problems in concrete application of the principles to the formulation of the actual methods, and Pestalozzi himself was wrong in some cases (p. 70).[14] Spencer concentrated his efforts on the latter problem. He attempted to modify some of the practical methods while keeping the original principles of Pestalozzi (p. 71).

Spencer says that the concrete application of Pestalozzian principles, even in Pestalozzi's own practice, is so deficient and even "unpestalozzian" that it causes pupils "loss of time, labour, and happiness" (1861/1966, p. 71). This criticism shows Spencer's major line of thinking as to the criteria of measuring soundness of instructional methods: efficiency (in achieving what is valuable) and pleasure or happiness (in the process of learning). Particularly, he emphasized the latter. Spencer thought that the psychology available to Pestalozzi was inadequate, and that, according to Spencer's psychology:

> If progression from simple to complex, from indefinite to definite, and from concrete to abstract, be considered the essential requirements as dictated by abstract psychology; then do the requirements that knowledge shall be self-mastered, and pleasurably mastered, become tests by which we may judge whether the dictates of abstract psychology are being obeyed. (p. 100)[15]

The pleasure or happiness that a child finds in the learning process is, for Spencer, a very important criterion of measuring the soundness of the method, because "a child's intellectual instincts are more trustworthy than our [adults'] reasonings" (p. 79). Here, we may find on the one hand a connection with Rousseau and Pestalozzi's idea of education according to Nature, and a hint of the idea of readiness on the other.

Even though there is a difference in the degree of emphasis, Pestalozzi would not have objected to Spencer's emphasis on efficiency and pleasure.[16] However, my concern here is to show that, though they shared a common point of view or similar ideas, their arguments had very different implications.

In the chapter on intellectual education, Spencer lists revisions of concrete applications of Pestalozzian principles. Among them, Spencer's point on education as recapitulation shows most clearly the different implications that their respective arguments led to.

Education as Recapitulation

It is certain that Pestalozzi suggests something like a recapitulation theory in his writing. For example, in *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* he writes, "[in teaching our children to speak] we must then follow exactly the same course that Nature followed with the human race" (1820/1894, p. 149, 10th Letter). However, he does not go any further than this in elaborating a position which may be regarded as a

recapitulation theory. I think that Pestalozzi's emphasis in the above quotation is rather on the word "Nature." Besides he was not interested in justifying the status quo of society (i.e., European civilization) in any way, whereas people who emphasize recapitulation tend to attempt a justification of the status quo as the highest point of human achievement.

Spencer inherited the idea of recapitulation from August Comte, with whom Spencer tends to be associated among a group of theorists known as positivists. Spencer writes in the place where he describes his refinement of Pestalozzian principles:

> The education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind, considered historically. In other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual, must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race. (1861/1966, p. 75)

After stating this recapitulatory principle, he says that we owe Comte the "enunciation of it" (p. 75).

This issue seems to be very important in his whole idea of improving Pestalozzian principles of education ("the methods of Nature.") From the principle of recapitulation, he draws two more principles: the principle "from the empirical to the rational," and the principle of self-development or spontaneity. As to the first (from the empirical to the rational), he writes that human beings, both individually and collectively, are under the necessity to go through concrete experience before reaching abstract generalizations, just as all kinds of science have their origin in practical arts (1861/1966, p. 77).

Similarly, as to the second derivation from the principle of recapitulation he says that "the process of self-development should be encouraged to the uttermost" (1861/1966, p.77). Children should be told what to do as little as possible and should be encouraged to discover as much as possible (p. 77). The reason for this is the same, that is, it should be so because it is the way human progress occurred. He says that "the best results" and progress for human beings as a whole and for individuals have always been achieved by "self-instruction" (p. 77).

What interests me in these points is the difference in the implications which Pestalozzi and Spencer drew from them while adopting similar rhetoric. From our perspective, they both commit what we may call a naturalistic fallacy. Both men postulate "what is," and then derive from it "what ought to be." Both men say that what education ought to be ought to be derived from what Nature is. However,

while Pestalozzi postulated Nature, as his predecessor Rousseau did, as an antithesis to existing society, and argued for the necessity of reforming the society, Spencer located the existing society in the inevitable course of Nature. Thus, he ended up providing a rhetoric of justification for existing society. He writes, "progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial, it is a part of nature" (Spencer, 1850/1954, p. 60).[17]

The status quo which he wanted to preserve needs special attention. It was not the existing regime, but the system or atmosphere of *laissez-faire* individualism. For example, in the principle of self-development, we can observe Spencer's position being in agreement with the *laissez-faire* individualism of the 19th century. Thus, even though they adopt the same type of rhetoric, and commit the same logical mistake of the naturalistic fallacy, the implications they derive are very different.

What Knowledge is of Most Worth?
The Relation Between the Content and the Method

There is also another difference between Pestalozzi and Spencer. While Pestalozzi did not ignore the problem of the content of education at all, he did not specifically address the issue of what exactly ought to be taught and learned. Spencer clearly addressed the issue. Although this has little to do with the Pestalozzian principle, the combination of Spencer's concern with the specific content of education and his concern with the method of *Anschauung*, contributed also to a kind of conservatism – though calling him "conservative" needs explanation – against which philosophers and critics of a generation later (e.g., pragmatists) revolted.[18]

Spencer was not a "conservative" in the sense of trying to preserve the status quo of existing society. He differentiates, for example, between "existing governments" and "a government normally constituted," that is what governments should be (Spencer, 1850/1954, p. 304): he would not hesitate to admit the shortcomings of the existing regime. As to education, he thought "the mere unthinking adoption of the current fashion of education" unacceptable (Spencer, 1861/1966, p. 8). Brameld is correct when he points out that Spencer has "liberal tendencies" as well as "determinism and conformism" (1971, p. 207). Hofstadter is also correct in pointing out that Spencer's social Darwinism lacks "many of the signal characteristics of conservatism as it is usually found" (1997, p. 7). However, Spencer (a) embraced *laissez-*

faire liberalism, which meant in the late 19th century the neglect of the fate of the "unfit" (e.g., the poor), and (b) believed firmly in the inevitability of the force which was moving the course of evolution. By taking such a stance to the social problems, he denied the feasibility and desirability of active intervention in what was going on in the society. This stance was going to be regarded as "conservative" by the end of the 19th century. He writes:

> Reforming men's conduct without reforming their natures is impossible; and to expect that their natures may be reformed otherwise than by the forces which are slowly civilizing us is visionary. It is not by humanly devised agencies, good as these may be in their way, but it is by the never-ceasing action of circumstances upon men – by the constant pressure of their new conditions upon them – that the required change is mainly effected. (Spencer, 1850/1954, p. 314)

This could be interpreted either as a criticism of the policy of the existing regime, or as one of accepting the course of what is actually taking place. In any event, the prospect for immediate social reform as Rousseau or Pestalozzi envisioned is hard to find in Spencer's scheme.

As Cremin writes, Spencer's educational principles are in line with the general thesis of modern philosophers and educators, such as Bacon, Locke, Rousseau, and Pestalozzi, and Spencer agreed with them in that "the aim of education is preparation for life" (1964, p. 93). But Spencer's theory has two distinctive features. First, he spelled out explicitly what sort of life ought to be pursued and what sorts of curriculum content were fit for that purpose. As Cremin puts it:

> 'To prepare us for complete living,' Spencer declared, 'is the function which education has to discharge; and the only rational mode of judging of an educational course is, to judge in what degree it discharges such function.' And what was complete living? Spencer classified it into five categories: (1) those activities ministering directly to self-preservation, (2) those that secure the necessaries of life, (3) those concerned with the rearing and disciplining of offspring, (4) those that maintain proper social and political relations, and (5) those devoted to the gratification of tastes and feelings. The ideal education, he concluded, is simply 'complete preparation in all divisions.' (Cremin, 1964, pp. 91-92)

Spencer's famous question, "What knowledge is of most worth?" and his answer, "science," were meant to address this issue. For all these divisions and in all forms of discipline, intellectual, moral and physical,

Spencer argued, "science was the most efficient and economical study of all" (1861/1966, p. 53).

Second, Spencer differs from his predecessors in applying his concept of "nature" to social and human problems. He agrees with his predecessors in that he believes that the principles of education ought to be derived from the "general observations on the 'laws of nature'" (Cremin, 1964, p. 94). However, as Cremin points out, he differs from them in the following:

> The development of mind, Spencer insisted, follows evolutionary processes. And because evolutionary processes work themselves out over long periods of time, according to laws independent of immediate human acts, education can never be an important factor in social progress. The best the teacher can do is provide the knowledge that will enable people to adapt more readily to the circumstances that surround them. (p. 94)

Here, Spencer's educational, as well as social, philosophy differs in scope from his predecessors'. He separates individual progress and social progress: He believes that, since the process of social evolution (a part of the evolution of Nature) is so slow that human intervention would not produce a visible and meaningful effect in a short term. Thus, he denies the possibility of social improvement by any effort on the part of human beings including education (Pestalozzi, on the other hand, believed that social progress was only possible through individual progress, and that it was both possible and desirable to do so). What education can and should do, for Spencer, therefore, is to make individuals well-adapted to existing society by teaching useful things. The method of *Anschauung* becomes, in this scheme, a method of teaching useful things effectively by an experience-based, non-coercive way.

Conclusion

It is interesting to observe that seemingly similar rhetoric or viewpoints turned out to imply very different things according to the context in which the ideas are elaborated. Spencer tends to be mentioned as a champion of science, and the implication of "science" here is a means of social progress, and not of human development from which advanced and humanitarian pedagogy emerged (with which Rousseau and Pestalozzi are likely to be associated). However, Spencer is definitely in line with such thinkers as Rousseau and Pestalozzi, and at least one important topic in education connects them, the method of *Anschauung*. It is also interesting that Spencer, who is most likely to be associated with the

idea of progress by means of science, had much less interest in causing the progress by means of education, than Rousseau or Pestalozzi. On the contrary, Rousseau and Pestalozzi, who are likely to be associated with the individualistic aspect of education (they tend to be regarded as fathers of the child-centered pedagogy or the New Education), had a rather strong interest in social reform through education.

A concept changes its implications according to the context in which it is discussed. The concept of *Anschauung*, when liberalism and democracy were just emerging, automatically had a strong implication which supported these ideas as opposed to authoritarianism and dogmatism. However, it lost some of its radical implications by the time Spencer took up the concept. Spencer was a figure whose work was read by virtually everyone who intended to pursue philosophy and social theories in the latter half of the 19th century. Philosophies and theories of education in the 20th century were, to a significant extent, born as a result of acceptance of (e.g., appreciation of the spontaneity of children), and revolt against (e.g., concerning the relation between education and social reform), Spencer.

Some remnants of Spencer's ideas are not commonly recognized as his. Child-centered rhetoric is one example; Spencer is not usually mentioned as a philosopher who emphasized it, but it is clear that Spencer, along with other educationists of the New Education, contributed significantly to the cause of the child-centered education. An erroneous association of Spencer, science, and progress is another example of misrepresenting him. As I have said above, Spencer was less optimistic about the prospect of immediate progress or reform by any means of human intervention.

NOTES

1. Cf. Pestalozzi, *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, 1820/1894, p.144. The method of *Anschauung* is also called by Pestalozzi and Herbart as "the ABC of Anschauung."

2. The idea itself was not entirely new. What may be called the method of *Anschauung* was developed as early as Wolfgang Ratke (1571-1635) and J.A. Comenius (1592-1670) in the 17th century. The method is basically a matching of external objects and internal ideas so that (a) the ideas would be clear and distinct in the sense that they reflect accurately the reality, and not be dogmatic, unfounded beliefs, and (b) the ideas could be learned or memorized much more easily. We may well be justified to say that we can find the origin of this principle of experience-based learning much earlier; as early as in Aristotle – "Since according to common agreement there is

nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things" (1931, 432a, 2-10). However, it is difficult to find a direct lineage from Ratke or Comenius to Pestalozzi. For example, the works of Comenius were virtually unknown to educational philosophers until much later than Pestalozzi's time, except for his *Orbis Pictus sensualim* (1658). Cf. Yamauchi, 2000; Keatinge, 1910, pp.100-101.

3. Cf. Gutek, 1978, p. 47; Gutek, 1999, pp. 40, 147.

4. Gutek writes: "Unfortunately the English Pestalozzians, under the influence of Charles and Elizabeth Mayo, lost sight of the cultivation of the love environment of the general method (1999, p. 159).

This version of Pestalozzianism is the one which was imported into the United States in the nineteenth century. It is interesting to note that Pestalozzi himself praises Charles Mayo, among the people who tried to introduce Pestalozzianism to other countries in Pestalozzi's lifetime, for representing the original spirit of Pestalozzianism (Nagao & Fukuda, 1991, p. 180), though clearly the Mayos' version of Pestalozzianism was a diminution of the original.

As to the Oswego movement, Silber writes: "Although the Oswego movement made the name of Pestalozzi known to the American public, it restricted 'the method' to the mere teaching of school subjects based on the observation of natural objects. It thus unduly stressed the sensory side of education without giving sufficient emphasis to its other aspects. The idea that the child is a whole and that his experience are indivisible – that part of Pestalozzi's work which at the end of his life he summarized in the slogan 'Life itself teaches' – was neglected at Oswego and kindred institutions (1965, p. 314).

5. *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children* (Pestolozzi, 1820/1894) is written in the form of 14 letters addressed to Pestalozzi's friend, Gesner. When I refer to passages from this book, I will indicate both page umber(s) and the letter in the passages appear.

6. Pestalozzi writes, "All instruction of man is then only the Art of helping Nature to develop in her own way" (1820/1894, p. 26, 1st Letter). If one disregards the context, and just reads this sentence, this may seem exactly what Rousseau said. But Pestalozzi, while in principle accepted Rousseau's appreciation of Nature, found Rousseau's principles and methods inadequate.

7. When Pestalozzi speaks of human nature, he does not mean a person should simply regain the nature which is buried somewhere inside and (tentatively) forgotten because of the influences of society. He thinks that a person has "primitive animal nature" which has nothing to do with his or her nature as a moral being. Relying on this God-given germ of morality on one hand, and relying on moral education on the other, a person must go

beyond the states of (a) simple animal nature and (b) social convention, and achieve the state of morality. See, Pestolozzi, 1797/1912.

8. Cf. *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, 1820/1894, 10th Letter.

9. Cf. "Nature gives the child no lines, she only gives things, and lines must be given him, only in order that he may perceive lines rightly. The things must not be taken from him in order that he may see only lines" (Pestolozzi, 1820/1894, p. 69, 3rd Letter). This passage clearly shows Pestalozzi's recognition of the importance of both direct experience and the right method of experiencing.

10. For example, Herbart published, immediately after the publication of *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, an essay and a book in which he tried to improve some aspects of the method that Pestalozzi formulated ("Über Pestalozzis neuest Schrift: Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt," and *Pestalozzis Idee eines ABC der Anschauung untersucht und wissenschaftlich ausgeführt*, 1802).

11. Cf. *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, Pestolozzi, 1820/1894, 7th Letter. Pestalozzi explains that the elementary learning of language proceeds in the order of "sound teaching," "word teaching," and "language teaching." In the first stage (sound teaching), he requires the repetition of units of sound. He writes: "After every vowel we added on one consonant after another, from *b* to *z*, and so first formed the simple easy syllables, *ad ab af*, etc., then put those consonants before these simple syllables which actually accompany them in ordinary speech (p. 92).

12. This being so despite the fact that there were a few Pestalozzians in administration and in colleges, for example, Henry Barnard (1811-1900) who was one of the major figures in establishing the American common school. Cf. see, Silber, 1965, Appendix I; Gutek, 1999, pp.161-167.

13. He disliked "the idea of ornament predominates over that of use," and simple "conformity to public opinion." Cf. Spencer, 1861/1966, pp.1-3.

14. For example, Spencer writes: "His [Pestalozzi's] nursery-method, described in 'The Mother's Manual,' beginning as it does with a nomenclature of the different parts of the body, and proceeding next to specify their relative positions and next their connections, may be proved not at all in accordance with the initial stages of mental evolution. His process of teaching the mother-tongue by formal exercises in the meanings of words and in the construction of sentences, is quite needless, and must entail on the pupil loss of time, labour, and happiness. His proposed lessons in geography are utterly unpestalozzian. And often where his plans are essentially sound, they are either incomplete or vitiated by some remnant of the old regime." (1861/1966, p. 71)

15. Spencer writes about the crudity of the psychology available to Pestalozzi. "Pestalozzi's notions on early mental development were too crude to enable him to devise judicious plans" (1861/1966, p. 81).

16. Cf. Silber, 1965, p. 140. She writes, "The most important and essentially new principle for his [Pestalozzi's] time is that of spontaneity or self-activity." Pestalozzi's position as observed by Silber here is in accordance with Spencer's position which stresses the self-development, self-evolution, or self-activity.

17. Spencer's view of evolution is, in a sense, teleologic. He believes that the course of nature (in which civilization is placed) inevitably leads to the perfection. This is the point which divides Spencer's version of evolutionism and Charles Darwin's version, who did not see any teleology in the process of evolution. The latter's view was taken up by philosophers of the next generation who draw on evolution while not subscribing to Spencer's version. See, Cremin, 1964, p.99.

18. Compare, for example, with John Dewey's position concerning the relation between education and society. Dewey writes, "education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform" (*My Pedagogic Creed*, 1897/1972, *The Early Works*, vol. 5, p. 93). As to the contrast between Spencer's position and the position taken by the next generation, see Kloppenberg, 1986, p. 162; Cremin, 1964, pp. 96-100.

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