

courses. Once a teacher closes the door of his/her classroom, only the students and perhaps a few interested parents ever really know what goes on behind those doors. The teacher is very much in charge of his/her own domain.

To blame the fact that there was a move toward the liberalization of a stultifying education system in the 1960s and 1970s, as the authors are somewhat wont to do, is to flog the wrong horse. On the contrary, as they themselves note on numerous occasions, Keegstra was viewed as an effective teacher and as one who maintained excellent control of his classes. His demeanor, his control, his fascism were not all that terribly out of line with a school system which is strongly concerned with discipline and control in the classroom as a measure of the teacher's effectiveness. No one seemed to be overly concerned with the way in which Keegstra taught or with the structure of the classroom and the isolation of the classroom from the community beyond the schoolyard. The students stated that it was not possible to question Keegstra. They were his captives. They did not know what else to do. They had been well-trained. During the 1960s and 1970s efforts were made in some quarters to break down the emphasis on control, to make structural changes in the system, to bring the school into the community. Students in the Prairies were not so fortunate as to be the beneficiaries of alternative schools and classes.

Few school boards and teachers' associations in this country are adequately dealing with the homophobia, sexism, and racism that are a daily part of the lives of Canadians and Canadian classrooms. *A Trust Betrayed* is an important book because it opens our eyes to how easy it is to teach hatred in the classrooms of our schools. The next step is to take this message seriously and to look at not only the content of the materials we teach but also at structures and styles in which we teach them. The medium, after all, is the message.

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Berkowitz, M.W. and Oser, F., (Eds.). *Moral Education: Theory and Practice*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 1985. xi + 454 pp., \$45.00 (hardcover).

As stated by the editors in their preface, the volume is a reflection of the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. The title of the volume should have indicated this. The editors succinctly indicate in the preface that the volume reflects Kohlberg's work in seven predominant ways: (1) It is a presentation of current work from the Kohlberg camp, (2) it presents views of friendly critics, (3) it follows Kohlberg's precept that theory, practice and criticism cannot be separated, (4) the idea of education must be broadly defined and, therefore, presents education in four representative areas: the school, the family, the workplace and clinical-developmental setting, (5) Kohlberg's theory and his approach have always been eclectic; hence, the volume has a multi-disciplinary approach with contributions by philosophers, psychologists, educators and psychotherapists; Kohlberg has always had a particular international orientation; hence, the volume has contributors from the United States, Switzerland, Germany and Israel, areas where the editors say most of the work on Kohlbergian moral education is being done and (7) the volume, as does Kohlberg's work, emphasizes the adolescent.

The volume consists of three parts:

- Part I: *Theoretical Perspectives and Philosophical Foundations*,
- Part II: *Applications and Interventions*,
- Part III: *Critiques and Revisions*

As with many edited books, and, because this book deals primarily with Kohlbergian theory, there is too much reiteration of the theory and explanation of its stages. Some authors write with cohesiveness and clarity, others do not. Some of the material in the volume will be familiar to the reader, e.g. much of what is said by Kohlberg himself, and by Rest and Lickona. What may not be familiar to the reader are the perspectives of two Europeans: Habermas' discourse ethics as discussed by Ofried Hoffe and Eckensberger and Reinshagen's action theory as discussed by Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger.

Having been trained as a clinical psychologist, I found the section on *Clinical Settings* most interesting, particularly the submission by Alexandra Hewer in which she presents two case studies of adolescent males

who have attempted suicide. As she states, the case studies "can be seen as attempts to make evident the reasons that allowed each young person to genuinely believe that his own suicide was justifiable (p. 347). Hewer hopes that her research is applicable to a wider audience than the clinical psychologist and she points out that "there is a common ground shared by clinician and educator Both types of professionals attend to natural processes of development and try to accompany the people living through developmental passages . . . in making sense of what seems to be happening in their lives" (p. 363).

The critics were, for the most part, quite kind. One of the most vocal critics of Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan was notably absent. Interestingly, Kohlberg himself most pointedly dealt with Gilligan's criticisms. Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger presented their own radical interpretation of Kohlberg's theory in which they deal with the relationship between cognition and affect in moral judgment. Their research, as does that of Gilligan, deals with real life conflicts versus hypothetical dilemmas. Overall I agree with the editors that "This collection therefore may best be depicted as a representation of the best of a large body of ongoing research and practice in moral education" (p.5).

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Hare, William., *Open-Mindedness in Education*, Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1985, 121 pp., \$8.95 (paperback).

This book is a sequel to William Hare's *Open-Mindedness and Education* and has all the virtues of its predecessor. Hare discusses matters of philosophical and educational importance and he does so with exemplary clarity, conciseness and unpretentious scholarship. I am not certain that the book advances the case for open-mindedness in education as far as its author would like to think, but it is an impressive achievement for all that.

In *Open-Mindedness and Education* Hare defended a presumptive principle of open-mindedness. The main purpose of the present book is to show that by exposing conceptual confusions in a diverse array of arguments against the possibility or desirability of being open-minded, the presumptive principle is less easily defeated than is often supposed. In the opening chapter, some of the most radical and widely applied objections are considered. Hare shows that the appeal of such objection hinges, at least in part, on mistakes about the meaning of critical comparison and the connections between open-mindedness on the one hand and doubt and detachment on the other. In subsequent chapters, he attempts to debunk a range of arguments against upholding his presumptive principle in various specific contexts ranging from elementary education to scientific research. The book ends with an extremely incisive discussion of censorship in schooling.

Hare is successful in showing that the detractors of open-mindedness have often misunderstood its meaning or its requirements in different areas of human endeavor. Whether or not this substantially enhances his defence of that ideal is not altogether certain. The difficulty he faces is that in so many cases Hare's opponents could re-construct their objections without the conceptual blunders he reveals. For example, in his chapter on open-mindedness in administration Hare establishes that there is no logical incompatibility between decisiveness and open-mindedness. The point is well taken, but it is at least empirically plausible that a high degree of open-mindedness might often induce one to vacillate in situations where irrevocable decisions have to be made promptly and with scant knowledge of likely consequences. To be sure, Hare gives us good reason to want administrators who do not have thoroughly closed minds, but the extent to which practicing open-mindedness is compatible with an adequate degree of decisiveness in administrative roles is an interesting and open empirical question. Hare could doubtless maintain that his focus on conceptual matters is dictated by the limits of philosophy. But whatever can be said about the limits of philosophy, the fact that tricky empirical questions lurk so frequently in the background of this book makes Hare's defence of open-mindedness far less than decisive.

Furthermore, I do not believe that we yet have a sufficiently detailed analysis of what open-mindedness actually is, and in the absence of sufficient detail the strength of any defense of the ideal will be unclear. Hare has noted on several occasions that the degree to which open-mindedness requires one to examine relevant evidence and argument varies from one context to another. If I automatically accept my wife's word that she went shopping this afternoon I merely show that I am a trusting husband; I do not betray a closed mind, at least