who have attempted suicide. As she states, the case studies "can be seen as attempts to make evident the reasons that allowed each young person to genuinely believe that his own suicide was justifiable (p. 347). Hewer hopes that her research is applicable to a wider audience than the clinical psychologist and she points out that "there is a common ground shared by clinician and educator . . . . Both types of professionals attend to natural processes of development and try to accompany the people living through developmental passages . . . in making sense of what seems to be happening in their lives" (p. 363).

The critics were, for the most part, quite kind. One of the most vocal critics of Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan was notably absent. Interestingly, Kohlberg himself most pointedly dealt with Gilligan's criticisms. Villenave-Cremer and Eckensberger presented their own radical interpretation of Kohlberg's theory in which they deal with the relationship between cognition and affect in moral judgment. Their research, as does that of Gilligan, deals with real life conflicts versus hypothetical dilemmas. Overall I agree with the editors that "This collection therefore may best be depicted as a representation of the best of a large body of ongoing research and practice in moral education" (p.5).

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Hare, William., *Open-Mindedness in Education*, Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1985, 121 pp., $8.95 (paperback).

This book is a sequel to William Hare's *Open-Mindedness and Education* and has all the virtues of its predecessor. Hare discusses matters of philosophical and educational importance and he does so with exemplary clarity, conciseness and unpretentious scholarship. I am not certain that the book advances the case for open-mindedness in education as far as its author would like to think, but it is an impressive achievement for all that.

In *Open-Mindedness and Education* Hare defended a presumptive principle of open-mindedness. The main purpose of the present book is to show that by exposing conceptual confusions in a diverse array of arguments against the possibility or desirability of being open-minded, the presumptive principle is less easily defeated than is often supposed. In the opening chapter, some of the most radical and widely applied objections are considered. Hare shows that the appeal of such objection hinges, at least in part, on mistakes about the meaning of critical comparison and the connections between open-mindedness on the one hand and doubt and detachment on the other. In subsequent chapters, he attempts to debunk a range of arguments against upholding his presumptive principle in various specific contexts ranging from elementary education to scientific research. The book ends with an extremely incisive discussion of censorship in schooling.

Hare is successful in showing that the detractors of open-mindedness have often misunderstood its meaning or its requirements in different areas of human endeavor. Whether or not this substantially enhances his defence of that ideal is not altogether certain. The difficulty he faces is that in so many cases Hare's opponents could re-construct their objections without the conceptual blunders he reveals. For example, in his chapter on open-mindedness in administration Hare establishes that there is no logical incompatibility between decisiveness and open-mindedness. The point is well taken, but it is at least empirically plausible that a high degree of open-mindedness might often induce one to vacillate in situations where irrevocable decisions have to be made promptly and with scant knowledge of likely consequences. To be sure, Hare gives us good reason to want administrators who do not have thoroughly closed minds, but the *extent* to which practicing open-mindedness is compatible with an adequate degree of decisiveness in administrative roles is an interesting and open empirical question. Hare could doubtless maintain that his focus on conceptual matters is dictated by the limits of philosophy. But whatever can be said about the limits of philosophy, the fact that tricky empirical questions lurk so frequently in the background of this book makes Hare's defence of open-mindedness far less than decisive.

Furthermore, I do not believe that we yet have a sufficiently detailed analysis of what open-mindedness actually is, and in the absence of sufficient detail the strength of any defense of the ideal will be unclear. Hare has noted on several occasions that the degree to which open-mindedness requires one to examine relevant evidence and argument varies from one context to another. If I automatically accept my wife's word that she went shopping this afternoon I merely show that I am a trusting husband; I do not betray a closed mind, at least

if there is no evidence to suspect my wife's veracity. If I automatically accept my pastor's word that homosexuals will roast in hell, the accusation of close-mindedness would surely be apt. In order to explain this variation in the requirements of open-mindedness, we need an account of criteria which distinguish contexts where the requirements are stringent from those where they are not. Hare has touched on this matter in passing but an extensive treatment is vital to his research project.

It would be unfair, however, to end a review of this book by emphasizing the importance of questions which the author does not ask. Hare has dispelled some fairly serious confusions in contemporary educational discourse, and for that alone we should be very grateful.

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Hare, William. *Controversies in Teaching*. London, Ontario: Althouse Press, 1985, 139 pp.,$8.95.

Controversies in Teaching, by William Hare, is a book that consists of twelve papers presented by him at seminars and conferences at universities in Canada and England between the years 1972 and 1976. The book, with an introduction, is divided into four parts: Part One — Slogans in Education; Part Two — Aims; Part Three — Teacher Education; and Part Four — The Role of the Teacher. In each chapter, the author uses conceptual analysis — the dominant form of philosophy of education in Canada. In the introduction, he gives ten reasons for using conceptual analysis and presents ten replies to ten possible objections from would-be detractors of analytic philosophy. As one would expect from a well trained analytic philosopher, Dr. Hare's arguments are clear and concise.

In the first chapter, "Learning: Experience and Enjoyment," Dr. Hare distinguishes between valuable and trivial learning experiences, and argues that it is an enjoyable experience to become educated even when aspects of educational effort are exhausting, tedious and dull. In "The Criterion of Relevance," he considers a number of cases in which educational relevance has been called into question; in defense of teaching classic studies, he says that it is irrelevant to question the relevancy of the classics because they have intrinsic value in themselves. In "The Concept of Innovation in Education," he criticizes educational theorists who blur the distinction between change based on empirical or analytical reasoning. He also urges educational leaders to resist worthless changes by preserving "what is valuable when it is in danger of being abandoned." In "Calling a Halt: Comments on John Holt's *Escape from Childhood*," he does not label Holt as a Progressivist, but accuses him of vague writing, unsupported claims, a lack of rigor, and a failure to distinguish similar-sounding terms and phrases in his book on the rights of children. In "Appreciation as a Goal of Aesthetic Education," Dr. Hare argues that rational appreciation, requiring argument and discussion, is an objective of aesthetic education; that appreciation, as aesthetic judgment, is the evaluation of the intrinsic worth of an art object; and that appreciation requires not only intellectual comprehension but affective sentiments as well. In "Education and Cultural Diversity," he discusses some of the implications of educating in a culturally diverse nation. He emphasizes the importance of teachers encouraging students to examine issues in cultural diversity critically and rationally; and, in developing open-mindedness and critical ability, he says that teachers need to consider objections to some of their own traditional beliefs and customs. In "Education and Cultural Disadvantage," he analyses the concept of what it means to have an advantage, and, using insights from the writings of Jencks and Rawls, argues for the importance of creating a just educational system to overcome cultural disadvantages. In "Teaching: Preparation and Certification," he argues for the view that teachers should be formally prepared and certificated for teaching. He extends the argument to the level of post-secondary education, saying that there is a need to improve university teaching and a need for public scrutiny to prevent some professors from indoctrinating. In "Models of Field Experience," he considers the apprenticeship, anthropological, and intern models of student teaching. After considering advantages and limitations of each, he concludes that no one model should be followed to the exclusion of the others. In "Philosophy as a Vocational Handicap," he presents a case for the need for philosophical training in teacher preparation, and he argues against particular government regulations which impede such training. In "Controversial Issues and the Teacher," he analyses criteria required for describing an issue as controversial, and argues that it is educationally valid to teach such issues because they are, in fact, found in every academic discipline. In "The Roles of the Teacher and the Critic," he states that the aim of the teacher is to get someone to learn, while the aim of the critic is to