

On the Grounding of Teacher Education in the Human Condition

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ABSTRACT: Teaching is and should be conceptualized as a moral enterprise. However, in order to derive a view of teaching practice from such conceptualization, our understanding of the moral dimensions of teaching needs to be embedded in the framework of a theory of morality. Hence, teacher education that wants to prepare teacher candidates for such teaching practice needs to be grounded in a theory of morality. Discussing three different approaches to morality, I not only argue that they each have different implications for teaching practice – and, thus, teacher education – but that central to their differences are their different assumptions about “the human condition”. The article concludes with a discussion of what this means for teacher education that strives to prepare teacher candidates for teaching as a moral enterprise.

RESUME: L'enseignement est, et devrait être, conceptualisé comme une initiative morale. Nonobstant et afin d'exprimer une opinion sur la pratique de l'enseignement à partir d'une telle conceptualisation, notre visualisation des dimensions morales de l'enseignement a besoin d'être enchâssée dans le cadre d'une théorie de la moralité. Ainsi, la formation des enseignants qui se veut préparer les candidats à l'enseignement pour un tel apprentissage pédagogique, doit reposer sur une théorie de la moralité. En débattant des trois approches différentes de la moralité, non seulement je soutiens qu'elles détiennent chacune des retombées distinctes dans l'exercice de l'enseignement et donc, par la même, dans la formation des enseignants, mais aussi que l'élément essentiel de leurs différences réside dans la divergence de leurs suppositions en matière de “Condition humaine.” Les conclusions de l'article amènent à une discussion sur ce que cela signifie pour la formation des enseignants qui s'efforce de préparer les candidats enseignants à exercer moyennant l'initiative morale

Introduction

Advising elementary school teacher candidates during their practicum, I find in almost all of the schools I visit some kind of explicit moral education in place, although the school might not call it moral education. The Roots-for-Empathy program (Gordon, 2005) and the Virtue-of-the-Month program are two examples. In the case of the latter, for instance, each month a different virtue, like kindness, respect, caring, or social responsibility, is made a topic of learning in each class and sometimes in school assemblies, and it is almost always supported by print posters in the hallways. However, being involved in teacher education (research), I notice that "the moral life of schools" (Jackson, Boostrom & Hansen, 1993) is given very little attention in the preparation of teachers and, as far as I can tell, almost none in the preparation for subject matter teaching, which will take up the vast majority of teaching time in elementary school and all of the teaching time at the high school level. In this article I argue for addressing this *gap* in teacher education and unpack what I see needs to be considered when addressing this gap.

My line of argumentation is as follows. The purpose of teacher education is to prepare teacher candidates for a particular teaching practice. All teaching practices are deeply moral, and teaching should be conceptualized as centrally a moral enterprise. Any conceptualization of teaching as a moral enterprise needs to be framed within a theory of morality. Any theory of morality makes assumptions about the human condition. In fact, differences in theories of morality are based in different assumptions about the human condition. Hence, teacher education needs to be grounded in a view of the human condition and – expressed in terms of teacher education practice – needs to engage in establishing and uncovering a view of the human condition.¹

Teaching as a Moral Enterprise

There is ample literature which argues for teaching as a moral activity.² I suggest that this literature falls broadly into three categories. The first one suggests that teaching *per se* is moral. Hansen's (2001) notion that teaching is an *inherently* moral activity in the sense that "any specific teaching *act* is able of conveying moral meaning" (p. 827) is an example that falls into this category (cf. Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993). The literature in the second category suggests that teaching has a *moral purpose*. The extensive literature on moral education with a long-standing tradition belongs here (e.g., Molnar, 1997). The third category

emphasizes the moral responsibility that comes with the profession of teaching (professional ethics).³

A professional ethics for teaching provides a socio-cultural, normative framework that articulates minimum expectations that are set *because* teaching is a moral enterprise in the sense conceptualized by the literature in the first two categories. Therefore, contributions to the third category do not really add anything to the idea of teaching as a moral enterprise for the purpose of this article; thus, I concentrate on the first two categories. Although it is somewhat of a simplification, one can think of the first approach to teaching as a moral enterprise as providing the reason because of which teaching *is* a moral enterprise and the second approach as providing the reason because of which teaching *should* be a moral enterprise. I will now discuss in turn reasons for both – that teaching *is* and that teaching *should* be a moral enterprise.

Teaching *is* an inherently moral activity because of the *motivation* out of which teaching is done and because of the (potential) *effect* it has on the morality of students. Gary Fenstermacher (1990) articulates those two reasons as follows:

What makes teaching a moral endeavor is that it is, quite centrally, human action undertaken in regard to other human beings. ... The morality of the teacher may have a considerable impact on the morality of the student. The teacher is a model for the students, such that the particular and concrete meaning of such traits as honesty, fair play, consideration of others, tolerance, and sharing are "picked up," as it were, by observing, imitating, and discussing what teachers do in classrooms. (p. 133)

It is because teaching is undertaken (by the teacher) in regard to other human beings (the students) that teaching is a moral enterprise. Undertaking something for the growth and betterment of others is at the core of moral engagement with the world. Also, because teaching can have a considerable impact on the morality (moral development) of students, teaching is a moral enterprise. The modeling by the teacher, Fenstermacher mentions, should be understood beyond the narrow sense of "demonstrating" (a sense in which "modeling" is used in many virtue-ethical approaches to character education).⁴ Teachers are crucially involved in designing and shaping students' school experience. Because almost half of students' awake-time is spent in school, teachers shape in a central way the world students experience as they grow up. Students' embeddedness in their school's and classroom's culture – importantly shaped by teachers – contributes in an important way to students'

development of moral notions like honesty, fair play, and so on. Of course, such conceptual development can also take place in a culture with modeled dishonesty, unfairness, and so on.

Both reasons given for teaching *being* a moral enterprise do not provide answers to the question what teaching *should* accomplish with respect to students' moral development. In case of the first reason, teaching is considered as being undertaken in regard to other human beings. This is the case regardless whether the teacher considers influencing students' moral development or not. In case of the second reason, the potential impact of teaching on students' moral development is assumed to exist *regardless* whether that is intentional or not. It is, thus, a separate aspect of teaching as a moral enterprise if one asks why teaching *should be* a moral enterprise.

I see three reasons why teaching *should be* a moral enterprise. First, if teaching already *is* a moral enterprise by its very nature, then it also should be one because the explicit intention makes it then critique-able and debatable. Second, there is a convincing argument that "intellectual education" should be understood as moral education. Since almost all educators will agree that fostering intellectual development should be at least one central goal of schooling, the argument makes moral education a central goal as well. The argument is brought forward by John Dewey and is connected to his notion of *moving ideas* as educational goals. Dewey (1909/1975) writes:

The business of the educator – whether parent or teacher – is to see to it that the greatest possible number of ideas acquired by children and youth are acquired in such a vital way that they become *moving* ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct. This demand and this opportunity make the moral purpose universal and dominant in all instruction – whatever the topic. Were it not for this possibility, the familiar statement that the ultimate purpose of all education is character-forming would be hypocritical pretense; for as every one [*sic*] knows, the direct and immediate attention of teachers and pupils must be, for the greater part of the time, upon intellectual matters. (p. 2)

What Dewey is suggesting is that when we teach for intellectual development through the teaching of ideas, we want these ideas to be so "vital" that they contribute to the way we live our life. But if intellectual ideas become such "motive-forces for the guidance of conduct," then the teaching of these ideas is moral education since "the moral" is what guides how we live our life. Thus, if schooling should be centrally about

developing intellectual ideas as "moving ideas," then schooling should be centrally about moral education – which makes the question *what* intellectual ideas schools should teach into a question of the moral purpose of schooling.

The third reason for the view that teaching *should* be a moral enterprise is that if the moral is indeed central to human functioning as suggested previously, then the moral should be central to the purpose of any educational endeavor. What can be more important to education than addressing what is central to human functioning? This third reason is connected with the second reason in the sense that the latter makes the assumption that "motive-forces for the guidance of conduct" are conceptualized as being moral in nature. The third reason is, however, different from the second one, because it is independent of whether intellectual development is a purpose of schooling or not. The third reason is independent of *whatever* the rationale for schooling is. It just makes the assumption that "motive-forces for the guidance of conduct" are directly linked to the moral.

Grounding Teaching in a Theory of Morality

In the previous section I argued that teaching is and should be a moral enterprise. However, if one wants to derive anything from this understanding for teaching practice and then for teacher education, one needs to explicate the notion of moral enterprise further. This, though, can only be done if one embeds the notion of the moral into the framework of a theory of morality, which would be a theory that has the moral aspect of human living as its subject matter. In the following I argue for this requirement by discussing briefly three different theories of morality or approaches to morality and their different implications for teaching practice and, thus, teacher education. That those different theories of morality have such different implications for teaching practice and teacher education, then, is my argument for the necessity of grounding one's understanding of teaching as a moral enterprise in a theory of morality.

The first approach to morality in the context of education that I want to briefly discuss is prototypically represented by Lickona's (1991) and Ryan's (Ryan & Bohlin, 1999) work on what I would call "traditional character education approaches to moral education." These approaches are grounded in a theory of moral virtues (Pence, 1991) which goes back historically and conceptually to Aristotelian virtue theory (Aristotle, 1976; Rorty, 1980). In moral virtue theory living a moral life is not

grounded in following moral rules or principles, but rather in *being* a moral person or, in other words, having a moral *character*: "We progress in our character as a value becomes a virtue, a reliable inner disposition to respond to situations in a morally good way" (Lickona, 1991, p. 51). It is an educational task to help children progress in their character and develop certain values as reliable inner dispositions (virtues).

The teaching practice suggested within this character education approach to help children develop certain reliable inner dispositions is characterized by two core features. First, these virtues should be taught *directly* and *explicitly*.⁵ Second, the environmental context should be such that students are socialized into virtuous living, which involves in particular the modeling (in the sense of demonstrating) by adults of being virtuous (being honest, being just, and so on). In the context of schooling and teaching, the first feature translates into the curricular teaching of and about moral virtues, and the second feature translates into the teachers being role models for the respective virtues (Lickona, 1991; Ryan, 1987).

Concerning both features, Ryan and Bohlin (1999, p. 152) write: "One of the stumbling blocks preventing schools from embracing character education, then, is that few teachers have been prepared for this work." Teacher education that wants to prepare teacher candidates for helping children develop virtuous dispositions needs to help teacher candidates to cultivate virtues themselves, in particular those that are conducive to their work in a character education approach. Ryan and Bohlin identify four virtues (professional responsibility, trust, moral courage and justice) and suggest: "Cultivating these virtues, we believe, can help teachers make the commitment to character education" (p. 156). Beyond the commitment to character education, teacher candidates would also need to develop skills like leading class meetings, using cooperative learning effectively, and conflict resolution skills (Lickona, 1991).

The second theory of morality I want to briefly discuss in the context of schooling and teaching is Kohlberg's developmental approach to moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). In the tradition of Jean Piaget's work on children's stages of intellectual development in general and on children's moral reasoning in particular (Piaget, 1932/1997), Kohlberg has proposed a stage theory of moral development, which distinguishes between six developmental stages. Those stages are "a rational reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning" (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 224). Accordingly, the stages in Kohlberg's theory move from

egocentric and individualistic, through interpersonal, towards principled moral reasoning (e.g., Lapsley, 1996, pp. 70-72). In order to assess a person's developmental stage of moral reasoning, Kohlberg uses their reasoning about moral dilemma situations. Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral (justice) reasoning is *descriptive* in character – within a normative framework of theoretical assumptions. But there has also been evidence that moral dilemma discussion can have a stage-raising effect in students (Turiel, 1966; Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). This led to the idea of using moral dilemma discussions in the classroom as moral education (Galbraith & Jones, 1976; Schuster, 2001).⁶

If Kohlberg's theory of moral (reasoning) development would be at the core of one's conceptualization of teaching as a moral enterprise, the teaching practice suggested by it would focus on the discussion of moral dilemmas. Compared to the traditional character education approach, here the "moral qualities" of the teacher are not central, but rather the teacher's abilities (a) to design meaningful moral dilemma discussions or recognize actual situations as meaningful opportunities for such discussions, and (b) to assess students' developmental level of justice reasoning based on their responses in hypothetical moral dilemma discussions or interviews or in actual "performances" in moral dilemma situations. The teacher functions here more like a facilitator of students' development of moral reasoning. Teacher education that is to prepare teacher candidates for this practice would then need to primarily help them to develop these abilities.

The third approach to morality in the context of education is the ethics of care. The ethics of care is a theory of morality which puts the concern for caring relations at all levels (personal, collegial, societal) into the centre of moral living (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Tronto, 1993). "The central aim of moral life [is] to encounter, attend, and respond to the need to care." (Noddings, 2002, p. 23) Virtue ethics focuses on the qualities of the individual as a moral agent and, as moral education, on the improvement of those qualities, while the ethics of care focuses on human (caring) relations and our responsibility for the betterment of others (p. 14). Furthermore, as a needs and response ethics, the ethics of care is wary of principle-guided conduct as represented by principled justice reasoning in Kohlberg's theory of moral development, because conduct that is guided by (moral) principles is not responsive enough to situational circumstances and needs.⁷

The goal of moral education within a care-ethical framework is to help students become intentional and competent carers and help them

to develop the skills and attitudes necessary to build, sustain and improve caring relations.⁸ Noddings (1992, pp. 22-26; 1996, pp. 239-241; 2002, pp. 16-21) proposes four aspects of care-ethical moral education which directly impact on teaching practice: modeling, practice, confirmation, and dialogue. Enacted practice of care-ethical teaching would have students experience being cared for (modeling), having opportunities to care for others (practice), being confirmed and practicing confirmation (seeing the best in others), and they would experience true dialogue and engage in true dialogue (conversations, where the outcome is not set right from the outset), in particular about their and others' needs. The same ideas of care-ethical moral education would apply to teacher education: having teacher candidates experience being cared for and helping them develop the attitude and skills that will support them in building, sustaining, and improving caring relations in their school and their lives in general. Here, the focus of teacher education would move from learning-to-teach to becoming a caring person. Learning-to-teach would be a means to help meet students' needs.

The three different approaches to the notion of the moral and to moral education just discussed frame three *different* ways in which teaching as a moral enterprise can be understood. Thus, if one wants to derive any meaningful action from the recognition of the importance of the moral dimensions of teaching for teaching practice and, then, teacher education, one needs to frame those moral dimensions within a specific theory of morality. In the next section I argue that theories of morality make assumptions about what I call "the human condition." These assumptions are at the very core of what makes up the difference between different approaches to morality and moral education.

Grounding Theories of Morality in the Human Condition

Assumptions about the human condition permeate educational practice. When a teacher uses competitive games to engage students in skill practice, she or he makes the assumption (not necessarily consciously) that competitiveness is a driving force in human engagement and motivation. When a teacher decides on punishing consequences for undesired behaviour, she or he makes (not necessarily consciously) the assumption that humans learn social skills or develop social understanding through (at least partially) harm avoidance. Some might describe these assumptions as assumptions about "human nature." Although referring in many situations to the same phenomenon, I prefer

the term "human *condition*," which better expresses my view that the possibilities and limitations for living our life are constrained rather than determined, as the former term seems to suggest.

One central type of conditions under which we live as humans are those *general* conditions that apply to all humans *qua being human*. For instance, the fact that we live our lives under particular socio-cultural conditions is part of the human condition, while the particular socio-cultural conditions we live in are not. The human condition is not "absolute," neither in an epistemological nor in an ontological sense. We can get a *sense* of the human condition only *within* our socio-cultural embeddedness as socio-cultural beings.⁹ With the change of a particular socio-cultural environment, the sense we have of our human condition changes. The following brief discussion of the assumptions made about the human condition by the three approaches to morality and moral education introduced above serves as an illustration for that very claim of the socio-cultural embeddedness of our conceptualization of what the human condition is characterized by. At the level of theorizing, such socio-cultural embeddedness particularly includes an embeddedness in a particular tradition of social theorizing.¹⁰

What view of the human condition underlies the traditional character approach to morality and moral education?¹¹ The conditions under which humans live a *good*, and that means in Ancient Greek tradition *moral*, life revolve around *being* rather than *doing*. Being moral means to *be virtuous* rather than to *do right*. Aristotle – exemplifying this point with the virtue of justice – writes:

A difficulty, however, may be raised as to how we can say that people must perform just actions if they are to become just ... because if they do what is just ... they are just. ... But virtuous acts are not done in a just ... way merely because *they* have a certain quality, but only if the agent also acts in a certain state, viz. (1) if he knows what he is doing, (2) if he chooses it, and chooses it for its own sake, and (3) if he does it from a fixed and permanent disposition. ... Acts, to be sure, are called just ... when they are such as a just ... man would do; but what makes the agent just ... is not merely the fact that he does such things, but the fact that he does them in the way that just ... men do. (Aristotle, 1976 [trans.], 1105 a17-b8)

Acting justly, then, depends on *being* a just person. That assumes about the human condition that there is such a thing as a character that establishes our being (dispositions) and guides our conduct (acting).¹² Furthermore, when Aristotle writes that just people act in a way that

"just ... men [and women] do," he assumes that there is a socially established sense of what it means to be a just person. Thus, our being virtuous is conditioned by our embeddedness in a social context through which we understand what it means to be virtuous. Socially established character traits (virtues) and models of virtuous being set the conditions for living a virtuous life. Important from an educational perspective, this approach also assumes about the human condition that our character is in need of being formed – guided by a socially established view of being a virtuous person.

Kohlberg's view of the moral, and being moral, on the other hand, has its origin in Kant's (1785/1988, 1797/1996) writings on morality. This affinity to Kant's view becomes obvious when considering Kohlberg's highest stage in his developmental approach to moral reasoning – the highest level of a morally mature person.¹³ At the highest stage, a person would "[follow] self-chosen ethical principles" and those "principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons;" her or his "perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such;" and she or he has "the belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them" (Kohlberg, 1987, p. 286). According to Kohlberg, the morally mature person is individually responsible for her or his moral decisions, sees a human being as an end in itself rather than a means to other ends, and follows universal moral principles, which she or he can access through reasoning. These are the core elements of the Kantian theory of morality (O'Neill, 1991). The assumptions about the human condition made here are that we are autonomous moral agents (at least at the morally most mature level), who are guided by abstract moral principles to which we have access through reasoning. With the assumption that these principles are universal, it is not society that establishes what is right to do, as it is seen in the traditional character approach to morality. Furthermore, the focus is on our acting in accordance with these universal moral principles rather than on our being (character).

Quite different assumptions about the human condition are made in the ethics of care. The aim of moral life, namely "to encounter, attend, and respond to the need to care" (Noddings, 2002, p. 23), is grounded in the assumptions of a *relational ontology* (Diller, 1991; Noddings, 1984, p. 3), according to which humans are relational beings for whom the

well-being depends on the quality of their relationships to others. As a *relational ethics* (Noddings, 1988/1996, p. 236), the ethics of care assumes our interdependence with other people as the fundamental condition for living our life (well). Humans are not seen as autonomous moral agents in the Kantian sense, but rather as relational, interdependent beings. The ontological principle of relational interdependence is the foundation for the ethical principle of relational responsibility in the ethics of care:

Contrary to Kant, who insisted that each person's moral perfection is her or his own project, we remain at least partly responsible for the moral development of each person we encounter. How I treat you may bring out the best or worst in you. How you behave may provide a model for me to grow and become better than I am. Whether I can become and remain a caring person – one who enters regularly into caring relations – depends in large part on how you respond to me. (Noddings, 2002, p. 15)

The wariness of principle-based responding in the ethics of care is grounded in the relational ontology, because if we are guided in our (moral) living by an abstract and – by necessity – generalized moral principle, we are generally not able to respond adequately to the particular needs of the particular person in a given particular situation. It is the assumption of humans as relational beings that also distinguishes the ethics of care from virtue ethics, as Noddings (2002, p. 14) points out: virtue ethics focuses on the qualities of the individual and, as moral education, on the improvement of the qualities as an individual agent; the ethics of care, on the other hand, focuses on the quality of our (caring) relationships to others and our responsibility for the betterment of those others and, as moral education, on the improvement of those relationships and the development of that responsibility.

What I have argued for in this section is that theories of morality are *grounded in* different assumptions about the human condition. In the conclusion I will draw on this and previously made arguments in order to make the point that teacher education should be grounded in an understanding of the human condition.

Conclusion:

Grounding Teacher Education in the Human Condition

My line of argumentation has been so far as follows. I argued that teaching is a moral enterprise regardless of whether this is recognized or intentionally addressed by teachers or not. I argued that teaching *should be* recognized and intentionally addressed as a moral enterprise by teachers and that teacher education programs need to prepare teacher candidates for teaching as a moral enterprise. Any curricular engagement, teaching practice or policy framed within this view of teaching as a moral enterprise, however, can only be justified relative to a conceptualization of notions of morality, the moral, and so on, and it is a theory of morality within which such conceptualization has to happen. In other words, in order to frame teaching practice within any intentional and purposeful addressing of the moral purpose of schooling, one needs to commit to some kind of theory of morality. Using three different theories of morality, I illustrated that such commitment indeed makes a difference for the teaching practice which are to address the moral purpose of schooling and, thus, for teacher education programs that want to prepare for such practice. Expanding on the three approaches, I then argued that the central differences in different theories of morality lie – at least partially – in their different assumptions about the human condition. If the assumptions about the human condition make a central difference in the conceptualization of the moral and, thus, the way in which the moral purpose of schooling is understood and addressed in teaching and teacher education, then teacher education has to be concerned about the human condition, because – in Dewey's terms – what we consider as worthwhile moving ideas or as moving ideas at all is guided by our view of the human condition. Teacher education that wants to prepare teacher candidates for a teaching practice that intentionally and purposefully addresses the moral dimensions of teaching needs to be grounded in assumptions about the human condition.

For any practical purpose, this relationship between the conceptualization of the moral, a theory of morality and assumptions about the human condition is not linear in the sense that a commitment to a perspective of the human condition comes first, then comes a commitment to a theory of morality that is consistent with that perspective, then comes a perspective on the moral purpose of schooling that is grounded in that theory of morality, and then, finally, comes a view of a teaching practice that is consistent with that moral purpose of

schooling and of a teacher education program that prepares teacher candidates for that teaching practice. Our embeddedness in a socio-cultural context with particular moral traditions that are grounded in particular perspectives on the human condition have already created prejudices (in a hermeneutical sense; Gadamer, 1989) for us, which shape our perspectives and fundamental assumptions. We cannot take a neutral stand from which we start off with a clean slate and make decisions about the positions on such fundamental perspectives as those about the human condition and about the moral, or even to what degree we see teaching as a moral enterprise. On the other hand, however, we are not predetermined by and limited through our upbringing and embeddedness in a socio-cultural context. Our human capacities of memory and imagination allow us to enter into a (hermeneutical) *dynamic interaction* with that very socio-cultural context, and thus our perspectives are not just being shaped by it but are also taking part in shaping that very context.¹⁴

When we engage in an exploration of what it means for the conceptualization of teacher education to respond to the understanding of teaching as a moral enterprise, we engage in a dynamic interaction with our prejudices and biases about the human condition, the moral, and teaching practice, and other perspectives on those matters, for instance in the form of (moral) theories. We develop *and* uncover a net of assumptions we make and convictions we hold into which we then embed a suitable conceptualization of teacher education. What I have argued for in this article is that when we undertake such an exploration, our discussion about teacher education needs to give central consideration to (our) assumptions about the human condition.

This line of argumentation has some important implications to an answer to the conference theme question "How might teacher education live well in a changing world?"¹⁵ I would suggest that addressing teaching as a moral enterprise as well as exploring our assumptions about the human condition can greatly contribute to a well-being of teacher education discourse – and thus teacher education practice – because the former engages with the fundamental purpose question of teaching and, hence, teacher education, and the latter engages with underlying assumptions central to the former as argued in this article. Revisiting both the purpose question and fundamental assumptions in teacher education should be particularly important when socio-cultural contexts change as rapidly as they have been in Canada and elsewhere.

It is often in times of contextual change when a case for looking at purpose and fundamental assumptions can be made the strongest.

NOTES

1. At the end of this article it will become clear what I mean by "establishing and uncovering."
2. See, for instance, Buzzelli & Johnston (2002), Campbell (2003), Dewey (1909/1975), Hansen (2001), Noddings (1992), and the articles in Goodlad, Soder, and Sirotnik (1990).
3. See, for instance, Strike & Soltis, 2004.
4. For a critical discussion of the use of modeling in the sense of demonstrating in moral education see Fenstermacher, 2001, pp. 649-650.
5. See Borba (2001) for concrete suggestions on how to do so, and see Falkenberg (2006b) for a review of an alternative view of how to develop moral dispositions.
6. In British-Columbia the Performance Standards for Social Responsibility (Ministry of Education, 2001) are used to assess students' "level of social responsibility." At the core of the Social Responsibility Standards are features of Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral reasoning.
7. See, for instance, Katz, Noddings, and Strike (1999) for a discussion of the relationship and tension between justice and care.
8. See, for instance, Noddings (1992, pp. 21-22). Within the context of education, it is Nel Noddings's work that not just introduced care-ethical thinking to education, but that is the reference point for all other care-ethical work done in school education and teacher education so far (see Falkenberg, 2006a, for a critical discussion of Noddings's approach to the ethic of care and a framework for care-ethical education and teacher education).
9. Charles Taylor (1991) has made the same point for people's striving for authenticity in, particularly, Western societies: the moral ideal of authentic self-fulfilment focuses the concern for things of importance to one's individual self, *however*, what is of importance to one's self can only be judged against a background of a socio-cultural horizon.
10. For an illustration of this view see the discussion of the socio-cultural embeddedness of the conceptualizations of the notions of "caring" and "human needs" in Falkenberg (2006a).
11. Here as well as in the case of the other two approaches each approach has to be understood as a *cluster* of theories that have greater similarities to each other in terms of their assumptions about and perspective on morality and moral education than to those in the other clusters.
12. A comprehensive and influential study by Hartshorne and May (1928, 1929) has challenged at least the extreme form of this assumption on empirical grounds.

13. Although, Kohlberg disagrees with Kant's rejection of the necessity of experience for the development of what Kant considers the inborn moral consciousness (see Kohlberg, 1987, p. 261).
14. For an explication of this perspective see Martin, Sugarman, and Thompson, 2003; also Falkenberg, 2006a.
15. This article is an expanded version of a paper presented at the *International Conference on Teacher Education*, University of Calgary, Nov. 2-4, 2006.

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