

In Search of a Usable Philosophy of Education: The Vision of J. Glenn Gray

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This essay explores J. Glenn Gray's neglected philosophy of education as an active search after a meaningful framework for grounding the practices of teachers. Influenced by Hegel, Heidegger, and Arendt, Gray's philosophy addresses the tensions between individuality and community, argues for a vision that honors wholeness and synthesis and embraces plurality and public action as one of the bases for a truly generous education. Gray contends that the love of beauty must also be an integral part of education that matters. The concluding part of this essay considers some of the implications of Gray's vision for practitioners.

Cet essai explore la philosophie de l'éducation par trop négligée de J. Glenn Gray en tant que recherche active d'un cadre signifiant sur lequel enraciner les pratiques des enseignants. Influencée par Hegel, Heidegger, et Arendt, la philosophie de Gray aborde les tensions entre l'individualité et la communauté, défend une vision qui honore la globalité et la synthèse et promeut la pluralité et l'action publique comme bases pour une éducation véritablement généreuse. Gray soutient également que l'amour de la beauté doit être une partie intégrale d'une éducation qui compte. Le développement conclusif de cet essai considère quelques implications de la vision de Gray pour les praticiens.

Teachers receive too few opportunities to study texts that situate their teaching practices within some sort of useful philosophical framework. More often than not, preservice teachers are encouraged to develop a "personal philosophy of education," but are given little or no background from which to build such a philosophy. In other situations, in which the approach is only slightly more enlightened, prospective teachers are exposed to second-hand treatments of the philosophy of education canon – from Plato to Dewey – and are then expected, largely on their own, to fashion a meaningful philosophy of teaching from an undifferentiated mass of classic thinkers.

Yet teachers who spend a substantial amount of time studying and discussing philosophically-oriented educational texts frequently report

that the experience has an enduring impact on how they think about and practice their teaching. This is especially true when the texts honor the complexity of the educational enterprise but remain accessible to those with little or no training in philosophy. At their best these texts help teachers to develop a philosophy that gives their work as educators a renewed sense of direction and purpose. Philosophies of education that emerge from this kind of study can provide a crucial reference point for the ongoing professional development of teachers.

Although there are many philosophers of education worth studying, J. Glenn Gray remains one of the most satisfying and, sadly, one of the most neglected. A philosopher at Colorado College for many years with the responsibility for teaching a course in philosophy of education, Gray spent his professional life searching after a useful philosophy of education for teachers. In 1968, at the age of 55, Gray published *The Promise of Wisdom*, which distilled his many years of philosophizing and educating into an eloquent and moving philosophy of teaching and learning. All of his works, however, including three other books and over 50 articles, have a bearing on educational thought and practice, and reflect his lifelong struggle to articulate a meaningful and holistic philosophy of life.

Gray took seriously the idea that philosophy should strive in Dewey's words "to attain as unified, consistent, and complete an outlook upon experience as possible" (1916, p. 324). A lifelong Hegelian, Gray was attracted to philosophy as a way of gaining a perspective on the whole of life and the individual's place within it. He was also committed to developing a theory of education that avoids the artificial and makes a difference for educational practice (Dewey, 1916, p. 328). In endeavoring to build a meaningful philosophy of education, Gray stressed experiences that grant us a helpful and satisfying vision of how education can enrich the larger community and how teachers and students can follow their passions, yet see themselves reflected in the greater whole as well.

Although this essay will focus on the powerful influence that Hegel, Heidegger, and Arendt exerted on J. Glenn Gray's views, there is another thinker whose own experience paralleled Gray's and whose wisdom transformed Gray's entire approach to philosophy and life. This is John Stuart Mill. In his *Autobiography* (1964), Mill attributes his mental breakdown at the age of 20 to three interrelated factors: a) overemphasizing the development of the intellect and the practice of logical analysis, b) attending too closely to the pursuit of his own personal happiness, and c) neglecting the cultivation of his feelings and the

emotional side of his personality. Mill realized that his almost obsessive focus on criticism, analysis, and cognition drew him away from the contemplation of meaning and the connections between things. He learned, too, that a renewed appreciation for music and poetry, to the pursuit of beauty for its own sake, helped him to develop a more balanced outlook on his place in the world. Indeed, he affirmed that "the cultivation of feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed" (1964, p. 113). He would also conclude that devoting his life to helping others or, in general, to a goal that took him outside of himself was the surest path to personal happiness. All of these experiences and insights were to be of paramount importance in J. Glenn Gray's own evolving educational philosophy (Gray, 1968, pp. 82-83).

Gray's writings offer a new angle on old questions and are put forward in a lucid and humane prose that deepens the impact of his arguments. Underlying all of his philosophical and educational thinking is the theme of "being at home in the world." Understanding what Gray means by this theme constitutes an integral part of his philosophy of education, for it is inextricably connected to his view of teaching and learning and to the larger goals of living fully and well.

Gray views philosophy of education as an ongoing search after a serviceable framework for addressing and resolving a number of key questions. For Gray the most important of these focus on the purposes of education, the balance between individual and group goals, the role of education in achieving happiness, and the rationale advanced for curricular choices. As a professor of philosophy, Gray was also called on to build a theory of education that remained sophisticated and rigorous enough to enlighten scholars and yet accessible and relevant enough to inspire and animate prospective teachers with no philosophical training. The bulk of this essay examines Gray's search for a meaningful philosophy of education and how thinkers like Hegel, Heidegger, and Arendt shaped his perspective. It concludes with an exploration of the implications of this philosophy for educational practitioners generally.

Individuality, Community, and the Moral Artist

One of the first great influences on Gray's thinking was the German idealist G.W.F. Hegel. Taking from Hegel the whole notion of finding a home in the world, Gray emphasizes processes, experiences, and purposes that combat alienation and defy estrangement. One of education's first

goals, following the Hegelian scheme, is to develop passions in individuals that allow them to exercise their full powers, to put their flourishing as human beings at the center of the educational enterprise (Gray, 1968; Hegel, cited in Gray, 1970). When people discover those activities and interests that activate and motivate them, the need for extrinsic reward is greatly reduced. The tendency, however, for passions to make the individual too self-interested must be counteracted by the imperative to connect one's thoughts and actions to some larger whole. When the person enters into a kind of "web of relationships" (Arendt, 1958, p. 183) in which individuality and community are in conflict, what emerges from these warring entities are even stronger and still more greatly enriched notions of individuality and community. The person, in this Hegelian dialectic, changes and grows through his or her participation in the group, but similarly the group also experiences growth as a result of each person's distinctive contribution. An enhanced sense of oneself and one's place in the world is thus gained from participation in a variety of human communities, both small and large. Building on the Hegelian triad of reason, passion, and freedom, Gray maintains that true freedom is achieved when the dualistic relationship between self and society is overcome and a kind of kinship between the ego and the objective world is achieved (Gray, 1968, p. 6). Education heightens the individual's awareness of ties between self and social institutions, which culminates in a concrete understanding of how our own being is defined by relations to the beings around us.

In his book about education, *The Promise of Wisdom* (1968), Gray shows how much these Hegelian conceptions influence his thinking about the purpose of education and his view of what it means to be an educated person. The educated person, Gray writes, has "fully grasped the simple fact that his self is fully implicated in those beings around him, human and non-human, and has learned to care deeply about them" (p. 34). It is impossible, though, in this conception to refer to a final state of being educated, for "education is an endless search and a process" (p. 35).

Gray goes on to explain that our individuality cannot be understood without reference to community, and communities cannot be understood without reference to the distinctive individuals who constitute them. He reminds the reader that what we call our own being is contained not only within our skins but also in our surroundings, other beings, and the various social groups of which we are a part. Understanding this simple fact can be a liberating experience, legitimating our sharing in some of the

strength, power, and confidence that may be derived from groups, communities, and cooperatives. Gray is quick to concede that groups have the potential to tyrannize individuals as well as empower them. But what Gray seeks is a community that provides a forum for sharing, for transcending our previous condition, for explaining who we are and where we think we are going. When communities provide these opportunities, self-knowledge and self-worth are enhanced, and the ties of community are further strengthened (1968, pp. 41-53).

Following Dewey, Gray regards communication as the greatest benefit of community. Like Dewey, Gray acknowledges and acclaims the fact that each person is part of many different communities, large and small, face-to-face and distant. Rather than seeking to simplify or limit these communal memberships, Gray considers them, in all their diversity and variety, to be one of the most important vehicles for imparting breadth of experience, and for developing that elusive quality known as character. As Dewey is quick to point out, individual character is not static and unchanging but constantly evolving as a result of the many associational ties we establish with others. These associational ties provide an important face-to-face forum for dialogue which allows us to express our most dearly held convictions, and to put our notions of the good person and the good society to a public test (Dewey, 1930, pp. 81-82; Dewey, 1927, p. 218).

For Gray a significant developer of human character is the habit of self-reflection that develops as a result of our experience in groups. Ironically, this same habit of self-reflection also hastens the feeling of dissatisfaction with group processes and outcomes. Self-reflection affords the group member the ability to imagine a social condition that goes beyond the here and now and provides him or her with the tools to assess and critique his or her own community. Gray states approvingly that "though community is a prior condition of individuality, once produced an individual is always straining at the bonds of every group, tending to break them asunder in order to search for more satisfying associations" (Gray, 1968, p. 59). The quest and search for knowledge, understanding, and wisdom that characterize the educated person also makes that person a destabilizer of community for his or her "rest in existing communities is forever temporary" (p. 59).

Gray goes on to say that critics of a community are among its most valuable members, for through criticism they can help to make the group better and elevate all of the members to greater understanding and a higher standard of behavior. Individuals are helpless without

communities, but communities "cannot become what they ought to be without (the critic's) examination and attempted reconstruction of the bases on which they operate" (1968, p. 61).

As we learn to appreciate that our identities are inseparable from our participation in community and as we learn to become constructive critics of the very communities that shape us, education also helps us to uncover our individual uniqueness, our own one-of-a-kindness. This is not simply a rhetorical point for Gray and German idealists like Hegel; it has an impact on how we should live our lives. As Charles Taylor has suggested in his book *Sources of the Self* (1989), this insight calls on us to strike out in a new direction, to forge a new path that is original and distinctively our own. Closely related to this notion of human originality is a conception of art that gained currency for the first time in the 18th century. Instead of art focusing on the reproductive or mimetic, in which the artist duplicates reality, art is the product of a creative imagination in which something entirely new is produced. As Taylor says, art in this view is an expression which "involves the creation of new forms which give articulation to an inchoate vision, not simply the reproduction of forms already there" (1989, p. 379).

Gray adapts Romantic expressionism and the idea of the distinctive self to explore his notion of the "moral artist." For Gray the moral artist is a person whose love of beauty is practiced not through poetry, music, or dance, but by enacting the beautiful in her actions and character. Associated with such a person is a lightheartedness, a grace, and an open-mindedness that does not in any way detract from the earnestness of her or his pursuit of knowledge and understanding. Absence of rigidity and active searching for wider horizons is one side of her or his personality, as is stubborn commitment to a set of moral principles that may be dislodged only after a rich exchange of ideas and careful study of alternatives have occurred. The moral artist is furthermore like the expressivist work of art in that she or he is inexhaustible; new facets are discovered with each successive encounter. "Such a person is never completely known or knowable for the simple reason that she [sic] is in process of becoming, under way, not at the end of development" (Gray, 1968, p. 111). Gray goes on to argue that the moral artist encourages a kind of "demoralizing of the moral." Without ostentation, without a set of outwardly derived moral principles, the moral artist conducts her or his life in the face of much objection from others. Her or his imaginative individuality almost necessarily engenders hostility in others toward her

or him. But they may also secretly admire her or his independence, especially if they recognize that her or his moral style is not a product of mere willfulness but "the expression of a freely chosen and entire structure of experience" (p. 112).

The Quest for Wholeness and Being

Another great influence on Gray's educational and moral philosophy was Martin Heidegger. For decades Gray immersed himself in studying and translating Heidegger's essays. These investigations and translations consumed a great deal of Gray's energy and time, because of the difficulty and unconventionality of Heidegger's thought. Heidegger himself warned that the thinker must be prepared "to suffer constant misunderstanding and contradiction" (Steiner, 1978, p. 129). Deeply sensitive to the truth of this charge, Gray weighed the arguments of Heidegger with great care and wrote only sparingly about the conclusions that he thought could be legitimately drawn. Slowly, deliberately, Gray derived from the German's emphasis on *Being* some lessons for conducting our lives. Once again the theme of being at home in the world figures prominently.

With Heidegger, Gray laments the deep sense of homelessness and absence of purpose so characteristic of modern society. Stressing Heidegger's notion of dwelling poetically on earth, Gray urges others to "find in the simple and homely things of everyday experience the divine and the holy" (Gray, 1952). To dwell in this sense is to find a home by protecting and caring for the earth, to appreciate, respect, and "let-be" each part of the larger whole. It follows from this that our modern tendency to employ technology to exploit and appropriate nature for our own uses, must be questioned if we hope to find a home and to dwell in "proper relation to the other beings in the world" (Gray, 1957; Heidegger, cited in Krell, 1977).

Heidegger's thought also informs Gray's reflections on college curricula. Fearing the overspecialization that he views as a byproduct of an increasingly complex and technologized society, Gray yearns for opportunities to engage in thoughtful, wide-ranging discussion that is free of disciplinary barriers. He seeks spaces in which all discussants, regardless of their specialties, are on an equal footing and in collective pursuit of general understanding. Gray scorns the stultifying effects of courses that elevate analysis at the expense of spontaneity and imaginative thinking. Following Heidegger, who looked at the nonspecialized pre-

Socratic period as a golden age of creative thought, Gray views general, interdisciplinary education as a wonderful way for students and teachers to "retrieve" unknown parts of themselves and to experience the elation that accompanies the search for wholeness (Bernstein, 1986; Gray, 1959b).

Again influenced by Heidegger, Gray claims that general education and the search after wholeness not only have the special capacity to awaken and rejuvenate bored and rootless students, they can also engender a new regard for nature and increase respect for and understanding of the "dignity and independent existence of non-human things" (Gray, 1959b, p. 138). It would be going to an absurd extreme to advocate the relinquishing of all uses of nature, but a place must be found, Gray argues, for simply extolling the things of nature as well.

Developing an appreciation for Being in itself can be frightening, for it initially makes us feel isolated, exposed, and naked to the world. To get close to things, attending to their Being or essence, without thoughts of their usefulness for humans is difficult; we are so unaccustomed to it. But again adapting Heidegger to make his point, Gray warns that our preoccupation with power and control, of viewing the things around us in strictly instrumental terms, prevents us from enjoying our surroundings for their own sake. This includes not only the things of nature, but also our judgments about the value of education and the worth of other human beings. To treat others as ends in themselves, to view education as an end in itself, may not be the only appropriate perspectives, but they are perspectives that shed new light on our experience and on the purposes we advance for living and educating.

For Gray this appreciation for Being has a bearing on our participation in communities, even our capacity for forming friendships. Gray claims that without an interest "in what a thing is in itself and for itself, no intimate relations are possible" (1959a, p. 236). Attentiveness to Being in and of itself, despite its potential for isolating us, makes possible in Gray's view our ability to forge ties with others.

For Gray, friendship and community are similarly important but distinct experiences. Both increase our self-knowledge and self-possession, giving us a feeling that we belong to something larger than ourselves, but also a something that would be radically different without our participation. On the other hand, while community participation initially requires us to give up something of ourselves, to compromise and negotiate our way toward consensus, friendship is a relationship that

arises out of an emotional and intellectual affinity for another, a kind of extension of ourselves. Furthermore, friendship, unlike our experiences in community, entails an endless exploring and searching out of the other "in the attempt to make each complete through drawing out the secrets of another's being" (1959a, pp. 90-91).

While in Gray's view forming relationships and contributing to the larger community are necessary components for a happy life, he goes further, taking the radical view that the imparting of these capacities is also one of the surest safeguards against future war. In his great book called *The Warriors* in which Gray combines autobiographical experiences from World War II with philosophical reflections on war in general, he writes:

When a person finds a friend to whom he can open his heart, when a woman finds a man she can love and to whom she can bear children, when any of us find a community we can love and serve, our little lives take on an importance we had not dreamed of. Far from being the restless ones who welcome war as a possible path to forbidden experience, we experience the threat of war as completely intolerable. (1959, p. 239)

Put another way, when people find their home in the world, they are more likely to care for and sustain those around them.

The Web of Relationships and Generous Education

The greatest influence on J. Glenn Gray's later professional life was the political philosopher Hannah Arendt (Young-Bruehl, 1982, pp. 441-443). Her ideas about human action and about human judging are important contributions to political thought, but they also figure prominently in Gray's reflections on education and the pursuit of happiness.

In a number of her works, but most systematically in *The Human Condition* (1958), Arendt draws clear distinctions between labor, work, and action, which together comprise what she calls the *vita activa* as opposed to the *vita contemplativa* (later explored in her *Life of the Mind* series). She regards labor, work, and action as necessary for sustaining human life, but each has a specific place in the human hierarchy and must not be confused with the others. Labor is the lowest on this scale, as it produces the goods that are consumed to meet our most basic biological necessities. Unlike work and action, labor is not an activity that separates humans from animals. Work, on the other hand, significantly higher on

Arendt's scale, is the activity that produces all goods that are permanent and that are to be used, as opposed to consumed, by humans. These goods include everything from simple tools to great works of art. The third and highest activity of human beings is action. It is Arendt's theory of action that is most relevant for our discussion of J. Glenn Gray's philosophy of education (Parekh, 1979).

For Arendt it is in the realm of action – described as the public space where people in all their plurality come together to talk, deliberate, and make decisions about their collective world – in which people achieve their full humanity. To drive home this point she explores the etymology of the word privacy. She shows that it originally meant privation, or to be deprived of the opportunity to enter the public realm and to participate in that activity which exercises “the highest and most human of man's capacities” (1958, p. 38). Even more strongly she later states that life without action and speech in the public setting is “literally dead to the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men” (p. 176).

Hannah Arendt revealingly talks about action as the realm where people come together and share the “in-between,” a set of words and ideas that “lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together.” She also speaks of the “web of relationships” that emerge in political gatherings in which people “disclose themselves as subjects, as distinct and unique persons” (1958, p. 183) and in which they are in subtle ways transformed by this encounter with so many distinct “others” (p. 182). In this political realm people achieve a degree of freedom and power that they experience nowhere else. They simultaneously revel in the richness of the human plurality with which they are confronted, even as they assert their own individual identities. To be effective, they must also be generous, empathetic participants, who strain to comprehend the perspectives of others. As Arendt says in *Between Past and Future*:

The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. (1968, p. 241)

Finally, like Heidegger's notion of Being, there is an important sense in which the freedom that is experienced in this public space is an intrinsic good, whether or not it achieves any political end. It is a deeply satisfying experience for its own sake, a realizing of something fundamentally

human that is an integral part of the quest for happiness (Hill, 1979; Bernstein, 1986).

Gray's discussion of happiness and education follows closely the example set by Arendt, and, of course, Aristotle before her. Happiness has meaning only as a lifetime achievement in which our whole being is actively engaged in a variety of communities associated with family, work, politics, and culture, and in which our potentialities as rational, deliberative, and emotionally sensitive creatures are given ample opportunity to flower. The achievement of happiness is furthermore dependent upon the harmonious development of hand and head, body and mind, and on an appreciation for the creative tension that exists between the human and natural environment (Gray, 1968, pp. 67-69).

But the threats to the realization of happiness in this philosophical sense are numerous. Thirty years ago when Gray was writing about these issues, existentialist philosophy prevailed and books like Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* and Kenneth Keniston's *The Uncommitted* were being widely read. This atmosphere spurred Gray to write that the specter of meaninglessness is the greatest threat to happiness, and that "education understood in the full philosophic sense is a search for the meaning and purpose of individual and collective experience" (1968, p. 74). Meaninglessness, Gray warns, is not consciously felt by most students, but it is that vague sensation of unease and rudderlessness that arises from a society lacking a social or moral authority beyond one's peer group. Gray believes that this feeling of homelessness, of alienation from anything permanent or enduring, can in part be remedied by a conception of education that is far more generous than in the past.

By generous Gray means an education that increases our "capacity to participate imaginatively in others' experiences, to explore freely many worlds, and to give ourselves to them for their own sake without calculation of return. Generosity implies that disposition of mind which generates intimate attachments" (Gray, 1968, p. 80; 1973) to other people, aesthetic objects, and the products of nature. A healthy and vital public space depends on participants who have been generously educated, who eagerly look to others for wisdom and guidance and who stand ready to contribute their own words and judgment. Although Arendt does not say so, she almost certainly would have agreed with Gray that the education best suited for acting effectively in this public sphere is a liberal and generous one that does not unduly stress specialization and that helps us to gain a clear view of the whole.

For Gray, as for John Stuart Mill, the enemies of generous education are abstraction and specialization taken to an extreme. They have a place in education of course, but when no attempt is made to move from analysis to synthesis, to bridge the chasm between the part and the whole, then liberal education stalls, allowing the forces of uniformity, constraint, and meaninglessness to advance. Liberal education, generous education, meaningful education are all about developing the many facets of human persons, of liberating their capacities to do many things well and to develop rich appreciation for such well-roundedness. The avocational, amateur spirit is the hallmark of generous education in this sense, and is one of the underpinnings of our willingness to celebrate human diversity. As Gray suggests, this spirit assumes that "the more activities we can practice (and savor) for their own sake, the happier we are likely to be" (Gray, 1968, p. 88). Our happiness and hope of finding a home in the world, then, is inextricably connected to an education which teaches us to relate "the head to the hand, theory to practice, feelings to reason, and the individual to community" (p. 90).

Hannah Arendt's distinction between knowing and thinking developed in her last work, *The Life of the Mind: Thinking* (1971) also influenced Gray's understanding of the purposes of education. Following Kant's division of the cognitive processes into intellect and reason, Arendt argues that knowing is the vehicle employed in the search for truth; whereas thinking provides the impetus for the quest for meaning. The pursuit of truth is an enterprise in which we attempt to discover "the way things are in the world." But the search for meaning, Arendt asserts, takes these things for granted, and inquires instead what it *means* for them *to be* (1971, p. 57). What Gray found most penetrating about Arendt's philosophy was that the very process of thinking is carried out to make sense of the experience of being and of belonging to the world (Gray, 1977b).

Near the end of his life, Gray employed Arendt's distinction between truth and meaning to reaffirm his belief that philosophy should be focused on the search for meaning, for making sense out of human experience. He concludes that the quest for meaning calls on us to love the beautiful.

Learning to love visible and invisible beauty in all its myriad manifestations in the events of history and the spectacle of nature is to make sense of our lives. The more we learn to love the beautiful, a difficult learning indeed, the more sense our lives will make to us and others. (Gray, 1977a, p. 15)

In struggling to define the beautiful, he writes that it has at least two equally important dimensions. On the one hand, it can involve a disclosure of the terrible, similar to what we experience when we witness great artistry of tragic proportions. As a lifelong lover of Shakespeare, Gray thought King Lear was a wonderful example of this sort of sublime beauty (Krell, 1981). But just as important, Gray finds beauty in avoiding the snare of everydayness by realizing the extraordinary dimensions of the ordinary, by discerning the beautiful in the familiar and the commonplace (Gray, 1977a).

Trying to make sense of it all does not permit us to ignore the senseless or fail to acknowledge the presence of radical evil in the world. As Gray says, "If the world were only beautiful and our hearts and minds solely directed by love, we would not require the discipline of long education and experience to make progress in the difficult work of belonging" (p. 16). When we learn that the love of beauty is not just an aspect of life but a power that pervades all thought and action, then we can also begin to see that belonging is never an absolute that reaches some final culmination. Rather, "the love of beauty must be won anew during every stage of life and belonging is at most a partial attainment, varying for each of us in the enduring struggle with estrangement or alienation" (Gray, 1977a, p. 16).

Belonging or being at home in the world encompasses Gray's most cherished notions of freedom, critical reflection, passion, and beauty. In his philosophy and his life, Gray attended almost incessantly to maintaining the creative tension between individuality and community, between self-fulfillment and responsibility to the wider world. Timothy Fuller stated in a posthumous tribute to Professor Gray, "J Glenn Gray's consistent theme is the enhancement of the capacity of each human being to harmonize the world's claims on us with our various claims on the world" (1978, p. 5). Challenging though this process of harmonizing may be, it is a challenge brought within our reach of attainment only through education in the sense so profoundly articulated by J. Glenn Gray.

Some Implications for Educational Practice

J. Glenn Gray was the kind of thinker who philosophized and wrote to maximize the connections between theory and practice, between thought and implementation. Still it is useful to show explicitly how his vision of

education would look in concrete form, both to assist practitioners and to summarize key points.

One of the lessons that Gray imparts to educators is to take time and devote effort to constructing formal and informal communities in schools. The personality development of children depends upon their belonging to a variety of groups and associations, some of which will be entirely run by peers, others closely supervised and directed by adults. Through these groups children should have the opportunity to lead and to follow and to shape how they will be educated, but they must also have teachers who will take time to guide and direct their learning.

Groups need to be created that encourage frank and open discussion of issues that range from those affecting the whole world to those confined to a single classroom. Teachers and students alike must learn to exchange ideas in a respectful manner and to pursue new understandings with vigor and enthusiasm. Children should be held accountable in these groups for discussing and deliberating in careful and exacting ways, following the example set by schools like Central Park East, for example, where teachers and students employ "habits of mind" – such as "what's the evidence?" – in virtually every activity (Meier, 1995). Gray would even want to find a way for children to become critics of their own communities, exhorting these groups to higher standards and more progressive practices, or pushing them to examine evidence and pursue the truth with increased rigor. Some groups respond to this kind of criticism, continuing to grow; others will disappear because they inhibit communication or fall prey to "group think," hampering the development of individuality.

Most likely Gray would have approved of the trend among practitioners toward cooperative grouping. But he also would have opposed grouping arrangements that do not give children a place to assert their individuality and to begin to develop their own personal styles. There must be a place for individuals to critique the work of their groups, he would have said, and there must be a way, as well, for children to grow as "moral artists."

The moral artists, those who have generosity of spirit and independence of mind, those who can contribute to community goals and yet are always straining at the bonds that communities impose, have much to offer as students, and perhaps even more importantly as teachers. Teachers who are moral artists know their subject matter well and enjoy being with children, but they also have a stature or force of character that helps them to establish their authority. These teachers may be difficult to

work with at times, exhibiting an intensity that makes them occasionally appear arrogant or aloof, but they also have a personal integrity that is part of their very being, that makes them "incapable of playing roles, of being different human beings in the manifold relationships of life" (Gray, 1968, p. 167). Ironically, this very side of their personality helps them to appreciate and reach out to others who appear different and who do things in unconventional ways. These teachers value plurality in its many different forms; they go out of their way to cultivate it and learn from it.

These teachers – these moral artists – are also passionate about the subjects they teach and eager to share what they know with others. Surely, Gray would have agreed with Herbert Kohl when he refers to his own passion for teaching in the following way:

And I love teaching. For me, writing on a chalkboard and going on about something I am dying to share with my students is one of the greatest pleasures of teaching. I don't feel a need to force them to love what I love or learn what I have learned. I just want to have an occasion to inspire them Taking the initiative to teach well and with love has always been as important to me as providing my students with an opportunity to learn on their own. (Kohl, 1994, p. 63)

Teachers like these also know that collaborating with others is an important way to foster mutual understanding and impart new knowledge. They value the skills that are learned in getting along with others in groups, though they may occasionally challenge the groups they are in to reach higher or work harder. They have a strong sense of themselves that also helps them to be effective group members. They use their knowledge of their strengths to assert their authority and individuality, while also readily admitting the gaps in their knowledge and how much they stand to benefit from what others have to share. These teachers model the kind of humility that many fine teachers exhibit. They have acquired the confidence and the experience to appreciate their own ignorance and to do what is necessary to overcome it (Meier, 1995). As Gray suggests, the moral artist as teacher can never be encompassed, his or her depths are never fully plumbed because he or she never stands still, never stops learning. Like the students who have learned his or her lessons well, he or she is forever becoming.

Generous education is another theme that Gray explores which can be translated into a variety of pedagogical practices. It implies a love of learning for its own sake, a desire to form attachments with other people, as well as objects of art and of nature, from which we expect no gain other

than inner satisfaction. Teachers can provide opportunities for this kind of generous education by taking time just to marvel at the colors of nature, or by expressing awe for a beautiful story or a striking work of art. Teachers can instill this sense of wonder by modeling it themselves, thereby perhaps giving children a renewed appreciation for their own surroundings. As important as it is to teach children to be analytical and critical, there is value as well in teaching them to experience and express delight (Keizer, 1988, p. 80). We teach mathematics, in part, to learn certain habits of mind, but we could also teach it as a marvelous creation of the human mind. We require physical education to promote fitness, but we *could* also focus on the amazing human capacity to meet the most daunting physical challenges. It is even arguable that our inclination to separate criticism from wonder has limited our effectiveness as teachers in general, diminishing our students' desire to pursue learning for its own sake.

Generous education furthermore calls on educators to find time and space to study the natural environment and the arts, to revive the sense of wonder, awe, and humility that accompanies contemplation of the truly beautiful (Gray, 1968, pp. 80-82). Beauty of this kind deepens our appreciation for mystery, for the "illimitable character of everything we think we possess" (Gray, 1973, p. 365). It helps us to gain a perspective on what is important and protects us from overreacting to the ups and downs of everyday life. It grants to our lives a sense of balance and harmony and encourages us, once again, to find a way to educate for cultivating emotions, as much as we do for developing the intellect.

Finally, as important as contemplation of the beautiful is, nonartists, including most educators, should "strive to *enact* the beautiful in deeds and characters" (Gray, 1977a, p. 16). As Gray says, this will most likely occur only in privileged, inspired moments: "there are only momentary triumphs" (p. 17). But like our efforts to find a home in the world, like our endeavors to belong, like our ambitions to become educated, our struggle to live the beautiful in some concrete form is never fully won; it is a lifelong quest. Those who can count themselves truly happy view it as a quest that is inseparable from education in its richest sense. It is J. Glenn Gray's great gift that he was able to articulate in clear and eloquent terms a philosophy powerful enough to allow us to re-envision, in this way, the possibilities for a truly meaningful and even beautiful education.

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