

This article is the last of a series dealing with questions of moral education (see Giroux, 1988, 1989, 1990a). Parts of this article were published in French in the April, 1990 issue of the *Journal of Educational Thought* (Giroux, 1990a).

Teaching Moral Thinking: A Reconceptualization

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During this last decade, research in teaching moral thinking shows that certain fundamental questions need to be addressed. In this article, I examine three of these questions: 1) If moral deliberation is practical thinking, what kind of rationality does it call for? 2) If this rationality is progressively acquired, what transformations does moral thinking undergo? and 3) If these transformations are favored or hampered by education, what kind of teaching would best foster the advent of mature moral thinking?*

La recherche de la dernière décennie en éducation morale montre que certaines questions s'imposent dans ce domaine. L'objet de cet article est de repenser l'enseignement de la réflexion morale à partir de trois de ces questions, soit: 1) La délibération morale étant une pensée pratique, quelle sorte de rationalité exige-t-elle? 2) Cette rationalité étant progressivement acquise, quelles sont les transformations successives de la pensée? 3) Ces transformations étant favorisées par l'éducation, quelle sorte d'intervention pédagogique serait la plus apte à les promouvoir?

No one would question the importance of sound, ordered thinking in moral living. Indeed, critical reasoning has been the only way out of the imperialism of revealed truths and imposed behaviors. Today, however, one has to wonder whether dogmatism has not just traded the garb of church cassocks for the guise of lab smocks. It has been said that the wisest thing about ideologies is that, like the devil, they fool people into believing that they no longer exist.

One of today's leading ideologies is analytical positivism. Its basic assumption is that a statement has no epistemological value unless it starts with "hard facts"

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and proceeds according to the logic of induction; any other mental activity is deemed nonrational (Ayer, 1952). Such other ideologies as functionalism and the cognitive sciences describe thinking in terms of calculations aimed at finding the most effective and efficient means of realizing one's objectives. Here, reflection boils down to data-processing and problem-solving operations. It is my contention that, inasmuch as they borrow from the scientific or problem-solving paradigms, methods of moral education overlook the primary law of epistemology: The methodology must fit with the object of inquiry.

This is the error that Guindon (1978) detects. After a year spent with Kohlberg and the Harvard team, he questions the epistemological and educational value of a cognitive developmental approach in which the concepts of knowledge and development are "so representative of (the) extant scientific paradigm of knowledge" (p. 232). I propose to take up that question in order to clarify its meaning and to show its breadth, cogency, and even urgency.

In the first part of this article I illustrate various models of rationality. There is the logic that weighs the relative effectiveness of means and which, in science, presides over deductive thinking. While this logic may enter into moral thinking, it does not constitute it. Today, teachers must consider what model of rationality is epistemologically sound in moral thinking. The very nature of their work causes teachers to be keenly aware that thinking is a progressively acquired capability. This is why, in response to the developmental question in the second part of this article, I propose that mature moral thinking is a progressive integration of logical thinking, dialectical thinking, and a sense of paradox. Finally, considering both the nature of mature moral thinking and the sequence of transformations that lead to it, teachers must also consider the kind of teaching that is best suited to fostering progress in moral thinking. In the last part of this article I describe the best teacher as one who integrates both the knowledge and skills of the master and the sensitivity of the facilitator. That teacher is the mentor.

Models of Rationality

Techno-logic and logic. At the time when he was regarded as a guru in many educational circles in the United States, Central Canada, and France, Rogers (Rogers & Kinget, 1976) compared the evaluation process to the functioning of a gigantic computer — one capable of rapidly processing a multitude of data from experience and of producing, quite instantaneously, the behavior formula representing the most economic vector for the satisfaction of individual needs. Value choices and decisions would result from complex computations of facts; errors in judgment would be no more than miscalculations (1976, p. 301-302).

Rogers acknowledges the fact that his computer analogy and the depiction of values problem solving in terms of electronic input and output could prove displeasing. He offers what he considers a translation in more human terms, but

has nothing to say about the issue of choices of means and ends, the heart of the matter. In effect, techno-logic is unable to conceive the vital distinction between making, efficient means, and effective behavior or performance on the one hand, and doing, proportionate means, reflective conduct, and personal competence on the other. Because making seeks the production of useful or beautiful objects, the means disappear in the end-product. On the other hand, since doing is a quest for some form of perfection, the means-in-use must be that very type of perfection-in-progress. Thus, for Aristotle, the knowledge displayed and the means chosen by the flute-maker are far from the knowledge displayed and the means chosen by the flute-master. Since moral life is a doing, the only means of teaching and learning how to live well is to live as best as one can.

If the notions of techno-logic are inappropriate for moral thinking, the concept of reasoning as an exercise in formal logic is equally inadequate. Logical reasoning achieves precision, organization, structure, and definition. It interlocks the links in a chain of reasons; thus, it solves scientific problems. Reducing moral thinking to an exercise in logic creates what Guindon (1981) calls "Post-conventional Yogis"; judgment is passed on what other hypothetical people should logically do. Those abstract verdicts have the objectivity, clarity, detachment, and impartiality that are possible only to those who keep their eyes steadily fixed on one absolute principle. Post-conventional Yogis still believe that if all men only agreed on very few (preferably one) absolute principles and reasoned correctly, they would all come to the same self-evident conclusion. Mature thinkers, however, have discovered that the most decisive questions of human living are not scientific problems and that moral answers are not logically-deduced solutions. Moral reflection consists, rather, in casting life's questions in alternative ways and in finding meaningful responsible ways of living with them. Moral reasoning is about what happens in the sinuous transition from abstract to concrete, from the vision of theories to the guidance of principles, and down to the constraints of responsible conduct. Practical conclusions are not logical inferences.

Axio-logic. In axiology, *logos* is meshed with *axios*, producing another kind of rational discourse known as practical thinking. On the first level of mental operations, that of conception, practical thinking is not, like technical thinking, interested in finding various interchangeable means. It seeks to find and to understand the desirable, that which is worthy of being chosen as an end. Moral reflection is concerned with weighing the relative worthiness or suitability (*axioma*) of aims themselves. The question facing the moral agent is not whether this can be done and how but rather whether it is worth doing. In other words, is this means consonant with or worthy of the end being sought? Since professional conscience is an expression of moral conscience, the teacher is faced with such questions as: Is this means educational? Does it, in and of itself, inspire and nurture the desire to learn, the habits and attitudes that allow a person to learn?

In moral thinking, the second level of rational discourse is known as deliberation — not inference. Deliberation moves on three quite distinct and interdependent levels of prescriptive judgments: (a) self-evident and universal laws, directing actions from afar — for example, the laws of nonmaleficence and of beneficence; (b) general rules governing actions in various circumstances, such as civil law or professional ethics; and (c) a combination of universal law, general rules, and adequate description of matters of fact, those of the particular case, with a view toward finding the most proportionate means to achieve the right end. The logic of evaluation is further complicated by the fact that the prescriptions of practical intelligence must be executed. Right thinking must secure the cooperation of sound willing. But the will, although it is preceded by prescriptive judgments, is not compelled by them, at least not in the same way that, in logical reasoning, the premises impose the conclusion.

For Aquinas, human (i.e., free or moral) acts are the end-result of a sequence of 12 enmeshed partial acts, six of practical reason and six of the will. (D'Aquin, 1984, *Summa*, Ia - 2ae, Questions 6-17, pp. 65-129). One could say that first practical reason conceives a good, thus eliciting only a vague desire (*velleitas*) of the will. That vague desire will only become an intention (*intentio*) of the will when the intellect can produce a satisfactory examination of the possibility of obtaining the good. In the same way, consent (*consensus*) will only follow when practical reason has found adequate means of obtaining the good. The will then proceeds to the choice of means (*electio*), but only after adequate deliberation (*consilium*) of the intellect on diverse means. Similarly, the will acts only when the practical reason has satisfactorily ordered the operations to be carried out (*imperium*). Lastly, the will enjoys the act (*fruitio*) only when it has been adequately executed. At any moment of the process the will can, so to speak, declare that the presentations of practical reason are not satisfactory. The human will is desire ordered by practical reason. Aquinas quotes Aristotle who describes reason as governing passions not in a despotic fashion, as a master commanding a slave, but in a royal and political fashion, as free men who, although ruled by those who govern them, still retain the capacity of acting contrarily to what they are ordered. (D'Aquin, 1984, *Summa*, Ia - 2ae, Question 9, Article 2, no. 3, p. 85). Only the perfect good can necessarily determine the human will. As long as a good lacks perfection in any way, the will can always claim that it is not satisfied, thus retaining its consent.

The language of the *Summa* might carry a ring of foreignness, but it remains an important reminder that moral thinking and choosing are the product of a harmonious collaboration between practical reason and will. Nominalism has separated will and reason, thus erecting, on the one hand, voluntarism or existentialism, and on the other, idealism or intellectualism. It is this brand of rationalism that causes modern thought to wish that ethical judgments be wrapped in the scientific tidiness of "precise" science. The drama and dignity of human beings consist not only in the fact that they belong to the world of

empirical reality but also in the fact that they weigh this reality against transcendental inclinations. The human subject's aspirations always outweigh the powers of reflective reasoning.

Because it includes action to be taken by the moral agent, axio-logic cannot be speculation rendered by an external observer on someone else's dilemma. Yogis (Guindon, 1981) and impartial judges (Martin, 1987) both lack the crucial element of moral judgment — that of being the very person about whom a decision must be taken. Axio-logic is rumination born from personal preoccupation, the mental gropings of an agent already engaged in that inescapable course of action called daily living. In the final analysis, moral questions are about the kind of person one is making of oneself through everyday choices and private as well as public actions.

Moral choice is about personal identity. The ponderings of moral reflection would entail much less trepidation if grappling with issues of right ends and proportionate means did not lead to the realization that moral questions are not just about to do or not to do; they are about to be or not to be. Most anyone has an adequate if not infallible sense of the difference between a do-gooder and, for example, an Albert Schweitzer as well as between the efficient worker and the upright teacher, doctor, or mechanic. We all know that manner matters and that human quality is achieved in the style and beauty of human conduct. In other words, just as a work of art not only reveals but realizes the artist, so daily choices of ends and means do more than manifest person quality; they define it. The ultimate (and therefore first) question of moral thinking is: Why be moral?. The answer lies in the concepts of personhood and of human conduct as the expression of person quality.

But personhood and human quality in conduct are not birthrights. The nature of humanity is such that it does not just happen; it is achieved. Moral thinking, because it draws from both the cognitive and the affective capacities of the person, follows the broad lines of psychosocial and intellectual development. Thus, having reconceptualized the nature of moral thinking, teachers must ask: What sequence of transformations is moral thinking likely to undergo?

Transformations of Moral Thinking

Since Riegel (1973, 1979), dialectical psychology has retained the attention of Arlin (1975), Gilligan and Murphy (1979), Murphy and Gilligan (1980) and Basseches (1984). For her part, Labouvie-Vief (1980) has arrived at the conclusion that theorists of development have been mistaken in focusing on the question: What is the development of logic? "Instead," she writes, "they need to return to the contrapuntal question . . . What is the logic of development?" (p. 158).

Researchers from Piaget (1932) to Kohlberg (1981, 1984) — including Egan, (1979); Erikson, (1968); Fowler, (1981); Kegan, (1982); Loevinger, (1982); and

Perry, (1970) — depict the development of moral thinking as a gradual integration of three major forms of reasoning. The first is logic. In both its concrete and abstract stages, logical thinking is centered on clear answers containing definite meanings; moral thinking consists of discovering those answers and meanings.

The second form of moral thinking I will call “dia-logical.” It consists in the capacity to understand and take into account a diversity of *logoi*. Here, meanings are no longer given in answers; they are contained in the very questions. The ultimate form of moral thinking I would name “para-doxical,” an outlook that leads outside the boundaries of shared *doxa* — whether those of clear answers or those of insightful questions — and on to the journey of personal response through commitment in the midst of ambiguity. Logic and its answers nurture a sense of security. With dia-logical thinking comes a sense of irony, insight daring to question life. Para-doxical thinking gives a sense of serenity, a graceful assurance in the face of questions that life imposes.

Logical Thinking: Security and Meaning in Answers. Developmental psychology has very aptly shown the magnitude of the transition from mythical and magical to logical thinking. The same research confirms experience by showing that young children are not the only ones for whom the advent of logical thinking marks the point when they acquire a sense of agency over their actions and themselves. The new sense of authorship (author-ity) gives security, both cognitive (Piaget, 1932; Perry, 1970; Egan, 1979) and psycho-social (Erikson, 1968, and Kegan, 1982). The person now sees his or her destiny not so much in the hands of benevolent — or not so benevolent — others but in his or her own. Erikson (1968) describes the perception of the new self in terms of “I am what I can make work” (p. 27). Logical thinking marks the entry into a world of established rules and roles. It is empowering. Instead of having things happen to oneself, the person can make things happen his or her own way. What Erikson sees as taking place on the level of the school-age child, Kegan (1982) observes at the level of the young adult entering the work world: a sense of control, agency, and performance, as well as the aplomb, ambition, competence, independence, and resistance to stress epitomized in the Self-Made Man. For logical thinking, moral life is a matter of playing by the rules (more often than not “close to the chest”), paying one’s dues for membership, and earning respect from members. The rules, dues, and conditions of acceptance and respect are quite clear. They give the child or young adult the sense of security and direction needed to embark on that journey which most likely will bring him or her to yet unsuspected crossroads.

The advent of abstract logic only gives more self-assurance. Formal logic rises above mundane *emperia* to the panoramic vision of *théôria*; from this higher viewpoint, it captures not only discrete realities but the universal order of things. Particular phenomena take on new significance once they find a place in

a vast system. From this vantage point things are not only observed and understood; they are judged as to their realness and worth. In effect, the person now holds the very Principles, Ideas, Method, or Ideology that unlocks all answers to all of life's riddles.

So it is that utopias (*eutopia*: happy, attractive, fortunate places) were born. The *Republic* (c. 390 B.C.), the *De Civitate Dei* (413-426), *Utopia* (1516), *Walden Two* (1948) and the *Humanist Manifestos* (Kurtz, 1982) are illustrations of metaphysical ideas translated into moral ideals. In this perspective, moral reasoning becomes a quest for the absolute in the shape of Justice, Christendom, Best Commonwealth, Operant Conditioning, or Self-Sufficiency of Reason. A world organized and ruled by the philosopher king, revelation, the social engineer, or the secular humanist would make possible its *epiphaneia*. But utopias are also Noplaces (*ou*, not; *topos*, place). Remote islands, secluded communes, sterilized labs, and all brave new worlds have proven to be no-man's lands, places unfit for human living.

Dia-logical Thinking: Irony and Meaning in Questions. Dia-logical thinking is provoked by the encounter of another logic: that which brings forth the fact that not all judgments are conclusions of deductive reasoning. On the contrary, where the most decisive questions of human living are concerned, reasoning starts with intuitions or generalizations from experience. No inference, data computation, or scientific prediction ever yielded guiding principles or premises such as "The soul is immortal," "God is dead," or "All men are created equal." As Aristotle (1941) points out, practical thinking (in art, ethics, and politics) is dialectical reasoning. Practical premises are *opinions believed* on the basis of common experience or acknowledged competence and credibility (p. 188, 190; my emphasis). Since moral issues are dialectical problems, questions and reasonings are bound to enter into conflict (p. 196-197). Therefore, in practical reasoning, the cogency of rules and the propriety of particular decisions fall under the realm not of certainty but of doubt.

This is precisely what a maturing person discovers. When faced with "the dilemmas of facts" (Gilligan and Murphy, 1979), one finds that logic is not as reliable when thinking, having become dia-logue, gives voice to the *logos* of a person who is at once radically different and more and more part of the self. In daily living and in interpersonal relationships the method devised for finding answers is of little help, since the challenge of thinking has become that of finding which, in a cluster of issues, is the central question and what is the meaning of that pivotal question. Faced with dilemmas that bring to light the limitations of concrete or abstract logic, many tend to adopt, at least for some time, one of two epistemological positions. The first, relativism, is at best moral stalemate and, at worst, moral suicide.

Perry (1970) gives an account of various degrees of relativism (Position 5, p. 109-133). The essence of this perspective is not so much the explicit declaration:

"Everyone has the right to his own opinion," but rather its underlying assumption, namely: "All opinions are of the same value." For Kierkegaard (1975) relativism is the esthetic stage of life. It consists in a certain donjuanism of thinking and valuing. Here, everything and anything is equally worthy of being thought and lived (p. xxi). But the rigidity of the old logic and the free flow and fluctuations of the new irrationalism carry the same epistemological message that moral meaning either exists as a given or it does not; in any case, it is useless to search for it. Thus, when it becomes the new dogmatic position, relativism sounds the end of the reign of the reason and the beginning of the era of the absurd. Absolute relativism is nihilism. When nothing is true, nothing is certain and nothing can be known; thus, nothing can be thought or done. This is the end of mental and moral life.

Confrontation with "the dilemma of facts" can mark the beginning of moral progress when it awakens the sense of irony or insight into the meaning of questions. *Eironia*, interrogation, as a personal disposition, is openness to the abnormal, the atypical, the unexpected, the incongruous. The sense of irony is a *logos* that takes over when one dares to doubt one's own logic, or when logic gives up dictating its own order to reality and to other persons in order to listen and enter into dialogue with them. In Riegel's terms, thinking becomes entering into a discussion (1979, p. 5).

For Kierkegaard, intellectual life starts with *thomasein*, the initial shock that sets the thinker out of his cave. Moral life or life worthy of being called human starts with a sense of irony (1975, pp. 4, 294). Dia-logical thinking, a sense of irony or what Kierkegaard considers as the ethical stage of life, is the Socratic perspective.

Socrates is an incarnation of *eironia*; he is a living and unrelenting question put to the whole of Athenian assumptions. On the very level of personal appearance, he contradicts the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. On the level of knowledge, he questions the existent notions of philosophy; he abandons the Ionians' cosmological speculations, shuns the Sophists' polytechnical skills, and stays away from an Academy whose declared intent is to prepare an epistemocracy. For him, the object of philosophy is neither the workings of the world above, nor the functioning of day-to-day survival, nor the organization of social reform. Socrates questions the visions of the elite as much as he does the blindness of the mob; he shows no ambition for advising rulers and no meekness in the face of rules. For him, the object of philosophy is the ineffability (*efferari*, to say; to tell) of the human soul. Philosophy is a quest for wisdom: that is, love and pursuit of authentic nescience. Socrates prides himself in having no disciples, in teaching nothing, and in not being a master.

Rather than seeking a position of power, he chooses to be the gadfly of the *agora*. Instead of challenging the secrets of abstract knowledge, he addresses matters of personal philosophical conversion. Socrates does not see his teaching

as consisting in finding solutions to problems and demonstrating them to others; instead, he sets out to check with anyone in the market place whether his perplexities are shared by them. They usually are, and the problems, far from being settled, are set in motion. The tone of the discussions is not that of self-affirmation but of self-doubt. The *logos* is circular; it seems to be leading nowhere but it goes straight to the heart of the matter: An unexamined life is not worth living and, for human beings, thinking needs no justification of worth outside its own self. Just as children are the only ones in the crowd who dare to say exactly what they see — namely, that the emperor is naked — so Socrates denounces ignorance dressed up as knowledge. In the same fashion a sense of irony discovers instances where there is less reality, knowledge, justice, or logic than appearances would suggest or personal wishes would want.

If dia-logical thinking renounces finding immediate, efficient, and overriding answers, it does not give up the quest for meaning. Its very aim is to generate, conceptualize, and ask seminal questions. In moral thinking, real questions are about the self in the world with others. Here, thinking becomes reflection — recoiling on oneself — in the very heart of realities that are more often than not inconsistent, subjective, and dramatic. Such questions escape the conclusions or solutions of *l'esprit de géométrie*. For Egan (1979), the ironic stage is that in which personal dilemmas arise from the confrontation between, on the one hand, general schemes without which reality would appear as nothing but chaos and, on the other hand, particular realities that resist being fitted into general schemes (p. 85). Dia-logical thinking finds meaning at the intersection of organized visions and inconsistent situations. At this stage of development, theories do not render judgment on the legitimacy of facts; rather, it is their legitimacy that is weighed in the light of facts.

In moral development, the awakening of a sense of irony is a step forward, in the sense that important elements of moral thinking are learned. The very first of these elements is the fecundity of doubt or question. Critical thinking starts interrogating unexamined assumptions, dogmas, and conventional certainties. It undermines naive confidence in common sense; thus, it renders impossible the explaining away of the incongruities of living. A sense of irony reveals the radical contradictions of personal life experiences and thereby shakes blind faith in the infallibility of human reason. In the language of Socratic *maieutikè*, this painful experience of being in contradiction with oneself is the very first step of philosophical conversion. To realize how the logical consequences of personally held positions become unacceptable is to be faced with no other alternative but to reject the very premises of one's judgments. Only then can the process of building personal thinking really start. This time, thinking is concerned with right questions to be found and promising directions to be sought.

Although much is learned in the ironic stage of moral thinking, much is also left to be discovered. In and of itself, critical thinking can give birth just as well

to moral impotence, be it in the form of paralyzing perfectionism, cynical withdrawal, or nihilism. Tearing down the idols of presuppositions and identifying the dead-ends of thinking amount to discovering what is not and what must be left behind; critical thinking does not say what is, what could be, and what one should decide to pursue. Turning away from shadows and ghosts is not yet finding vision, purpose, and meaning. When philosophical self-consciousness asks such questions as What is it that I do not know? and What am I not? it is with the aim of initiating a quest, of becoming the best of what one is.

Para-doxical Thinking: Serenity and Meaning in Commitment. Para-doxical thinking has been referred to in terms of Ricoeur's *seconde naïveté* (1960, p. 326-327). The naïveté of the seasoned thinker could also be described as graceful serenity: the state of mind of a person who has made peace with life's contradictions and learned how to stand under the questions that life imposes. While security inspires resistance, serenity results from resilience. Security believes in the goodness of the world; serenity has good reasons to think that evil is not the last word of this world. Serenity is post-critical knowledge, the knowledge of wisdom. On his death bed, Socrates knows that the time for dialectics is over; he has decided on faith. Thus, he comes full circle to the starting point of his philosophical conversion: the certitude about the immortality of the soul. This is the undemonstrable premise: The body (*soma*) is, in fact, *sema*, a grave. Life in the body is the propaedeutic to the full life of the mind; the act of philosophizing is therefore a preparation to die. Socrates's and every person's resolute choice in favor of his or her highest possibilities and best self illustrates para-doxical thinking in that this most decisive choice rests not on objective certainty but on moral certitude. The premises of this and similar moral choices are undemonstrable; this, not in spite of but because of the very fact that they are first principles.

Practical or moral thinking is often para-doxical; that is, it adopts a perspective outside the *doxa* or dogma of the times. Today, one of the dominant *doxa* is logical positivism. The main tenet of this philosophical position is that all intellectual activity and knowledge is the science of observable facts and logical analysis of concepts. According to this assumption, moral argument is nothing but the expression of emotions, passions, and prejudices. The world of human experience, however, is not neatly divided into bare facts and pure values; in healthy persons, desires are permeated by reason and more often than not are related to facts. Science and analysis neither fulfill nor replace the human need for the kind of reason that will not demonstrate the logic but will show the appropriateness of one's choices. Human beings need reasons for living, the very ones which, for Socrates and countless others, also make it meaningful to die.

Those reasons are what Pascal (1904) calls *les raisons du coeur*. For him, the

heart is the innermost center of personhood, the locus of human understanding and judgment in all of its fullness. Para-doxical thinking generates that kind of reason, because it integrates both the light, insight, and comprehension of the intellect and the power or passion of affect. It reconciles respect for the object or acknowledgment of the universal with concern for the subject or caring for the particular. Para-doxical thinking reveals how the universal contains the particular without dissolving it. In moral thinking, a sense of paradox neither assumes that meaning is clearly given nor that it is simply absent; it bids the moral agent to make meaning through life commitments in the very midst of incongruities.

Faced with a question of reasons to live, Rieux chooses to remain in Oran to care for the living dead. In the same manner, when German guards show up at his orphanage with orders to deport "non-productive elements" to Treblinka, Janus Korczak accompanies "his" children to death (Kohlberg, 1982, p. 401-408). Likewise, in Auschwitz, Maximilien Kolbe offers his life in replacement of that of a fellow prisoner. Rieux, Korczak, and Kolbe could be seen as martyrs; they could be considered as cases of altruistic suicide. My contention is that they are examples of moral life based on an undemonstrable premise (i.e., the integrity of personal life is more important than living itself). Beliefs and convictions such as these allow mature moral thinkers to adopt neither the thesis of Universal Order and clear answers nor the anti-thesis of Universal Chaos and nonexistent answers. In mature moral thinking, deliberation is based on a personally arrived at hypothesis; a tentative, acceptable, likely answer; or an act of intelligent believing. This belief is translated into a foundational commitment, one that becomes the bedrock of what a person is and what the person stands for. As Perry's (1970) subjects finally realize, the qualitative leap of personal hypothesis is what gives moral identity.

With para-doxical thinking, action in the world is transformed. Moral agents are acutely conscious of the fact that the best informed and most lucid judgment is that which is wariest of its blind spots. They are also aware of the fact that, as far as moral living is concerned, the by-product of thinking (judgment) is more crucial than its product (knowledge or authentic nescience) (Arendt, 1978, p. 193). Thus, commitment to a transforming vision does not hinder the capacity to enjoy and work in an untransformed world. A sense of paradox avoids the pitfalls of abstract utopias by reconciling a vision of the highest possibilities with respect and care for incidental realities; it reveals the decisive importance of "insignificant" particulars. Where the ironic stance discloses ignorance draped in the cloak of knowledge, the sense of paradox now brings forth the lucidity and courage of authentic nescience, the evidence of some undemonstrable premises, the breadth and depth of some unmeasurable realities.

If moral living is, in the final analysis, a question of artistry in conduct, and if this artistry consists in an orchestration of progressively finer insights and

deeper sentiments, then Socrates's question is inevitable: Is virtue, that quality that makes the very fabric of personhood, a teachable thing? Along with this age-old question, one must ask today: Is virtue teachable in school? How?

Models of Moral Teaching

The essence of virtue (i.e., person quality) cannot be taught; it is inevitably learned. It is learned in school as much as in the family or through the media. In effect, moral insight and living are the result of a specific kind of knowing, that which comes from experience and love. The Ancients called it knowledge of connaturality; Marcel (1935) called it intersubjective knowing. Virtue is the kind of knowing that is, one might say, caught through interpersonal relationships. In school, one of the most decisive relationships is that which develops between the teacher and the student.

Various theories of moral learning require different dispositions and assign different roles to teachers. Teachers may be seen as masters who use their knowledge and skills to train behaviors and minds. They may also be cast in the role of facilitator: Their intervention is that of sensitive listeners. My hypothesis here is that at various stages of the development of moral thinking, a learner needs both these types of teaching. But in order to attain mature moral thinking, one needs to find a teacher who has discovered how to integrate both the knowledge and skills of the master and the sensitivity of the facilitator. That teacher is a mentor (Giroux, 1990b).

The Teacher as Master. Some theories of moral education assign to the teacher the role of master. For Durkheim (1974) indoctrination is not a necessary evil; it is an indispensable first step in moral education, since it helps to acquire precise ideas and good intellectual habits. Those are the very preconditions of moral autonomy — reflection accepting and consenting to necessity. Durkheim's teacher is a trainer; that is, the teacher is an authoritative and benevolent figure, one who exercises a great deal of power without abusing it, one who is both a fervent believer and a serious thinker.

Other theories of moral teaching also see the teacher as trainer. For Skinner (1948) and radical positivism, teaching is a matter of inculcating socially accepted behavior by means of the technology devised for behavior modification through social controls. Here, the teacher is a technician receiving his or her orders from the master-trainer, the social engineer. For Dewey (1944) the school is at the same time a miniature society, a place where children are socialized as well as the agency of social progress and reform. The teacher is a member of the larger community. He or she is vested with a social responsibility, that of being an example and advocate of social values. For Kohlberg also, when the teacher becomes part of the Just Community, he or she is a socializer (Mosher, 1980).

Besides shaping behavior, the teacher trainer also shapes minds. For Dewey

moral education is done by practicing the scientific method of inquiry. The scientific method will ensure objectivity in moral judgment and provide the necessary public justification of behavior. The teacher trains minds to first isolate and clarify problems, then to methodically develop hypotheses, project and rehearse solutions, visualize consequences, and consider ideas and situations in various configurations. Here, moral conduct is intelligent solving of personal and social problems. The Wilsonian (1961) moral teacher is also a trainer of minds. Most of all, this person has a disciplined mind. In this rational utilitarian model, the teacher is a thoughtful philosopher and proficient pedagogue who is not only a Socratic facilitator of thinking but who also takes a personal stand; not with the intention of imposing his or her views but to show students that the process of moral deliberation is complete only when it comes to moral resolution. Kohlberg's teacher resembles Dewey's and Wilson's. This person's role is also to stimulate cognitive growth by relentless and critical questioning. His or her aim is to shape the mind in such a way that it will carry out the process of moral judgment. Kohlberg's teacher probes students into refining questions, clarifying terms, specifying issues, relating problems, resolving conflicts. In this theory the decisive component of moral development is the shape or the formal aspect of thinking.

Socially acceptable behavior and sound thinking are indispensable components of moral living, at any time in a person's life. As far as moral development is concerned, training in proper behavior and good thinking becomes a crucial element of education especially at the time when the young person arrives at logical thinking in its concrete and abstract forms. Today more and more questions are being asked about ideologies that define progress in terms of overthrowing traditions and proclaiming the autonomy of the world of childhood (Arendt, 1987, p. 173-196), thereby causing childhood to disappear (Postman, 1982). The teacher as benevolent trainer is a reminder of the fact that moral socialization is indispensable, since it helps a person to find a place in a reasonable and stable social order.

But moral training is not sufficient for moral living. Durkheim's morality of discipline, attachment to the group, and consent to law easily obliterates personal conscience in favor of collective thinking and valuing. Dewey's, Wilson's, and Kohlberg's models of rationality neglect very important elements of human moral living: irrationality, tragedy, lack of freedom, sinfulness, and passion. The knowledge, authority, and skills of the teacher-trainer must be balanced with the sensitivity of the facilitator.

The Teacher as Facilitator. In the 1970s, under the influence of client-centered therapy, education became child- or student-centered. According to this model, learning starts and ends with the learner's daily experience and teachers must learn how not to teach (Kozol, 1985, p. 208). They divest themselves of all authority, becoming one of a group of autonomous learners.

In moral education, the Values Clarification method (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966) shows teachers as facilitators; their role is a transfer of the client-centered therapist's role (Lockwood, 1976, p. 156-164). By active listening and skillful questioning, they help students relate personally and emotionally to value situations. They are accepting, prizing, trusting persons who set a climate of unconditional regard and let students arrive at their own values. Facilitators refrain from teaching substantive values: They are not role models of desired behavior. In fact, their own values, behavior, and personal lives are not directly relevant to their facilitating activities. Values clarification argues for the neutrality of teachers and refuses reference to an external, normative body of values.

Surely, the Values Clarification movement was, in its heyday, a refreshing move away from prescribed absolute values and authoritarian education. Teachers as facilitators stress that values can only be values for someone, that is, for a free agent who sees them as such. Moral facilitating opens to various ways of feeling and valuing. It underlines the relativity of moral choices; by stressing cultural and individual diversity, it calls for respecting differences and legitimizing divergences. Teachers as facilitators are open to dialogical thinking.

But research and experience have demonstrated that as far as moral living is concerned, clarification is far from being enough, and unconditional openness to whatever an individual may choose to value is far too much. Facilitating teachers might gain an important insight by remembering that, in Socrates's mind, "know thyself" is a prescription for moral conversion, not an invitation to spontaneous self-expression.

The Teacher as Mentor. Moral maturity is best favored by a mentor, that is, "a wise and faithful teacher, guide and friend" (Funk and Wagnalls, 1963). The educational secret of mentors lies in the fact that they have somehow found a way of integrating the probings of the trainer and the mediations of the facilitator. In that lies their wisdom. Mentors realize the paradoxical nature of education. As Maritain writes, the main paradox of education is that those things which are the most important to learn do not lie in the domain of teaching. As far as actual human living is concerned, nothing is more important than love and intuition, but intuition is a gift and love is a matter of freedom (1969, p. 37). Because they understand the paradoxes of education, mentors know that when it comes to the very essence of human living, they can do much less than training and much more than facilitating.

This might be the reason why, when faced with the question of the teachability of virtue, Socrates elects to become not a professor but a gadfly. He knows that real thinking starts with the sting of an infectious teacher. It could be said that Virgil's answer to the question of the teachability of poetry is of the same nature. His first "pedagogical intervention" is to arrange for the aspiring

poet to meet History's greatest and most infectious poets (Dante, 1866). Socrates and Virgil show that mentors or great teachers neither hypnotize their students nor disappear before them; rather, they are persons who embody value, rendering it meaningful and attractive. For young Dante, Virgil, Homer, Horace, Ovid and Lucan (Canto IV) do not derive their greatness from the beautiful things they do but from what beauty has made of them. In the same fashion, a mentor's teachings are neither teacher-centered, nor discipline-centered, nor student-centered; they are value-centered.

Mentors are guides in the quest for value. To their protégés, they become what Kegan (1982) calls a holding environment. Just as Virgil with young Dante, mentors know how and, most importantly when, to hold — support, sustain — and even carry learners close to their hearts, more as children than companions (Dante, 1866, Canto XXIII). In those moments, learners realize that they are kept and that they belong. Mentors also know when to hold back — to restrain and contain — to impose limitations upon learners. Each mentor is an authority, a locus of reference and a living reminder of the necessity of control. Finally, mentors know when and how to hold on to the vision of what the learner is becoming. Holding, here, becomes persevering, enduring, not letting go. Mentors know how to hold forth to their protégés the promise they have made to themselves.

At the end of his exposé on the paradoxes of education, Maritain writes that the most important factor in a person's development is what Bergson calls *l'appel du héros*. Those heroes, the real educators of humanity, writes Maritain, are the saints and the martyrs (1969, p. 39). In the mind of such a believer, this is a very fitting "last word" on the subject. But a conclusion is more than a little intriguing in one of Kohlberg's last works (1981). Kohlberg's models of the moral educator are Socrates, Jesus, Martin Luther King, and Janus Korczak. Not surprisingly, Kohlberg's "Stage 7" was questioned (Kurtines and Grief, 1974; Gibbs, 1977); he does, in fact, transgress the canons of his discipline. But provided methodological questions can be set aside, there remains, here, an important intuition, one that caused Kohlberg to declare that "Korczak helps to exemplify the ideal of moral development that this volume has struggled to clarify" (1981, p. 408). But moral educators need not be martyrs. In fact, mere-mortal mentors are more and more recognized, if not canonized. They are persons who are held — sustained, contained, and maintained — by a vision. That is how they have learned to hold others in their odyssey towards their own.

Conclusion

The issue of teaching moral thinking raises three questions. First, does the dominant paradigm of thinking as deductive logic do justice to mature moral reasoning? I have argued that the dialectical paradigm of reasoning is better suited to moral thinking than that of deductive logic, since it makes room for

both logic and what I have called axio-logic. Second, given the fact that maturity marks the end of a process, what sequence of transformations does moral thinking undergo? I have described the development of moral thinking as a progressive integration of security and meaning in answers, a sense of irony and meaning in questions, and serenity and meaning in commitment. The last and inevitable question involves the teaching of moral thinking. I have argued that the best moral educator is the mentor — a person who is held by a vision and, from that experience, has learned to hold others in their own quest for value.

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