

The Quest for Understanding in Educational Administration: A Habermasian Perspective on the "Griffiths-Greenfield Debate"

W. Rod Dolmage
University of Western Ontario

In this discussion I consider the current confusion in the theory and research tradition in educational administration, specifically by addressing the Griffiths-Greenfield debate from the perspective of Habermasian communications theory. I argue that the field's inability to reach a new understanding can be partially attributed to inappropriate communications structures and strategies and that new approaches are required.

Dans cette discussion, nous nous arrêtons à la confusion qui existe dans la théorie et la recherche en administration éducationnelle. Pour ce faire, nous nous adressons au débat Griffiths-Greenfield à la lumière de la théorie des communications de Habermas. Nous voulons montrer que l'incapacité de ce domaine à produire une nouvelle compréhension est partiellement attribuable aux structures et aux stratégies communicatives inappropriées. C'est alors que de nouvelles approches s'avèrent nécessaires.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

— T. S. Elliot, *Four Quartets*

Optimism concerning the fate of educational administration as a field of study appears to be on the wane (McCarthy, 1987; UCEA, 1987). The validity of existing theory, and the quality and usefulness of research in the field, have come under fire both from within the academic establishment and from critics of the dominant educational administration paradigm. The fact that even founding fathers and leading contributors to the field continue to express doubts about its past, current, and future theoretical and practical value should be cause for concern for both academics and practicing administrators. What is potentially even more disturbing is that awareness of the problems being experienced in the field is no longer confined to the initiated. Indeed, senior administration at two

Canadian universities housing large Educational Administration Departments are toying with the idea of folding educational administration into omnibus management programs encompassing business and public administration. Their argument is simple; educational administration has been unable to define itself as a unique discipline and has not demonstrated an ability to improve the practice of administration in Canadian school districts.

Theory in educational administration has been founded upon the belief that generic organizational theory would provide the necessary foundation for the study of educational administration and that social science would provide the concepts and research tools needed to solve the problems which exist in educational organizations. Griffiths summarized this perspective in 1957.

A theory of administrative behavior will make it possible to relate what now appear to be discrete acts to one another so as to make a unified concept. The great task of science has been to impose an order upon the universe. . . . This is the great task of theory in the field of educational administration. Within a set of principles, yet to be formulated, it will be possible to recognize interrelationships among apparently discrete acts, it will be possible to predict the behavior of individuals within the organizational framework, and it will be possible to make decisions that will be directed toward the solution of problems, have clear definitions, and will contribute to the whole concept of administration. (p. 388)

This body of theory still dominates the study of organizations in general and educational administration in particular (Smith & Blase, 1989, p. 1; Greenfield, 1988, p.131; Willower, 1988, p. 730; Burrell & Morgan, 1985, p. 25; Culbertson, 1981, p. 28; Kendell & Byrne, 1977, p. 9). However, as Kendell & Byrne (1977) have pointed out, the positive outcomes that Griffiths predicted would result from the development of a scientific theory of educational organizations have not materialized.

The theory based movement has dominated the field of educational administration and has imposed a view of theory and research that not only has not been highly productive in terms of interpreting and explaining the phenomena of administration but also may well have ill served the field by insisting on a theoretical and research mode without a sound basis for training administrators or for dealing with practical educational questions. (p. 10)

Research in educational administration does not appear to have fared much better. In 1973 Iannaccone pointed out that there appeared to be no pattern or consistency to the direction of research in the field (p. 58). In 1982 Hoy (see also Hoy, 1978, p. 5) reported, "Fifteen years of work and still the research on school administrators is generally disjointed, atheoretical, non-cumulative, simplistic, and often trivial. Not only is most research theoretically barren, but it also has little or no practical utility" (p. 5).

Perhaps some of the lack of optimism concerning the future of educational administration can be summarized in the following interrelated criticisms: (a)

existing theory had a sharply defined mission and an exclusionary stance; (b) the theory advocated, but did not use, standardized scientific approaches to research; (c) these approaches did not produce significant or useful results; (d) no one appeared to know how to fine-tune the theory or methodology in order to make either work; and (e) there appeared to be no *acceptable* alternative theories or methodologies.

As is evident from the criticisms outlined above, the lack of significant change was not the result of the existing establishment simply ignoring its failures. Neither was it the result of the establishment failing to even question its paradigm. Griffiths attempted to do so in 1979: "I approach this task with a certain sadness, because it is not possible to do the job without challenging virtually all of the premises that I have accepted during my career" (p. 44). Unfortunately, the early result of Griffiths's "sad task" was a reaffirmation of the basic tenets of the existing theory, coupled with a call for further fine-tuning: "Some way must be found to rationalize or otherwise dispose of the criticisms of traditional theories" (p. 61).

Finally, and more germane to this discussion, the lack of significant change cannot be said to have resulted from a lack of criticism from outside of the existing establishment. The criticisms leveled from such perspectives as hermeneutics, critical theory, ethnography, and phenomenology are too numerous to catalog. These critics argued that the basic assumption of the dominant paradigm (i.e., that theory and methodology derived from the physical sciences could be used in the study of educational organizations) was erroneous, primarily because the objectivity claimed (but never achieved) by the natural scientist could not even be claimed by human researchers studying human organizations and because the supposedly "value-free" perspective of the physical scientist was both erroneous and inappropriate. These scholars argued that, in fact, organizations could best be understood through the subjective, interpretive study of the human beings who create, control, and populate them and that values, far from being irrelevant, were the most significant element of decision-making in organizations. For years, these criticisms from the more interpretive paradigm also failed to have a dramatic impact.

Inevitably, one is led to question why, with all the evidence of the limited success of theory and research and the criticism from inside and outside the existing establishment, there was, for such a long period, no dramatic change in the dominant paradigm of educational administration. There was, after all, a continuing, widely published, widely read, and widely discussed debate concerning theory and research in the field. This exchange of opposing views, which became known as the "Griffiths/Greenfield Debate," occurred between Thomas Greenfield and Daniel Griffiths and their respective supporters, beginning with Greenfield's address to the International Intervisitation Programme in 1974.

The Griffiths - Greenfield Debate: A Search for Understanding?

While the critique leveled by Greenfield and others and the responses of Griffiths and other supporters of the status quo are extremely important to the evolution of theory and research methodology in educational administration, they are not the principal subjects of the discussion to follow. Rather than analyzing the substantive arguments, I seek to examine critically the structure of the debate itself. The perspective to be used relies heavily on communications concepts developed by Habermas (1984). Initially, the major points of distinction, as described by Greenfield, are outlined. This brief description is followed by an examination of the paradigmatic nature of the debate, the North American forum in which the debate took place, the approach to communication of the major protagonists, and the validity claims of the debaters. It is argued that these elements of the exchange provide insight into why this attempt to find a consensus concerning the meaning of theory and research in educational administration resulted in nearly two decades of "intellectual turmoil" (Griffiths, 1979) and little progress in developing a new understanding.

While phenomenology was hardly a new concept in the social sciences (Greenfield, 1973), supporters of the established paradigm in educational administration appeared to recognize Greenfield's 1974 presentation to the International Intervisitation Programme as the first cogent challenge to the use of the tenets of natural science in this field (Culbertson, 1988, p. 20; Griffiths, 1988a, p. 30). Greenfield (1974) pointed out that for two decades the field had tried to supplant the practical knowledge of the administrator with the supposedly value-free, abstract, theoretical knowledge of the academic. The fact that training programs based upon theory borrowed from the natural sciences appeared to have little effect on either organizations or administrative practices did not appear to dampen anyone's enthusiasm (p. 1; see also Fullan, 1972, p. 1; Willower, 1980, p. 2).

Greenfield (1974) explained this paradox by describing two competing "ideologies" which he chose to call the *phenomenological* view and the *naturalistic*, or *systems*, view. The latter described the status quo; the former described the interpretive approach he would advocate (Kendell & Byrne, 1977, p. 6).

Greenfield concluded that the systems view has distorted the reality of organizations — that it has become a justification for the way social reality is organized rather than an explanation for it (p. 6). In actuality, he argued, organizations are social constructs created to transform people's desires into social reality. These constructs are defined by the values of those who have access to the power necessary to see that their desires are met by the organization. Others, who do not hold the power, must accept, or attempt to oppose, the limitations imposed upon their actions by those who do. Implicit in this model are the assumptions that individuals do not share the same values and goals and that conflict is inevitable.

Greenfield (1974) maintained that educational administration, as "an academic industry which trains administrators by disclosing to them the social-scientific secrets of how organizations work or how policy should be made indulges at best in premature hope and at worst in a delusion" (p. 12). He suggested the following as directions for future study in the field: (a) "healthy skepticism for the claim that a general science of organization and administration is at hand" (p. 12), (b) testing of the assumptions underlying contemporary organizational models in the hope that this may begin to identify the sources of problems rather than their symptoms, (c) training programs involving a more critical and reflective perspective as well as a stronger clinical component which includes both theoreticians and practitioners, and (d) research that "should turn to those methods which attempt to represent perceived reality more faithfully and fully than do the present highly quantified and abstruse techniques" (p. 13).

It is important to note that Greenfield was not arguing against the use of quantitative methods per se, although it is frequently assumed that this formed the basis of his thesis; indeed, he stated that "qualitative and quantitative analyses may be found in any of the paradigms of inquiry" (1991a, p. 10; see also MacKinnon, Young & Hansen, 1990, p. 47). What Greenfield does not accept is the theory movement's assumption that quantitative data is "scientific" and therefore intrinsically more "truthful" and/or useful than qualitative data, or that the theory developed from such "hard" data somehow constitutes value-free "fact." This is of paramount importance in understanding his critique, because he argues that it is the values that are of fundamental importance in educational decision-making (1991a, p. 23) and points to Hodgkinson's extensive work on the value basis of educational leadership and, in particular, Hodgkinson's description of administration as a "moral art" (Hodgkinson, 1991). Greenfield has not deviated substantially from these views throughout the debate (Greenfield, 1974; 1975; 1978; 1980; 1988; 1991a; 1991b).

The fact that Greenfield's arguments provoked a protracted and emotional exchange reflects the impact not only of what was said, but also of where and how it was said. On one hand, the reaction of the academic sector of the educational administration community may be explained by the fact that Greenfield's arguments advocated a shift in theory and research emphasis in which the fundamental assumptions of the status quo were questioned. On the other hand, the structure of the debate and the approaches to communication used by both protagonists must also be credited with some of the responsibility for the lack of mutual understanding which characterized the exchange of views.

The Paradigmatic Nature of the Debate

Greenfield (1974) described the differences between the naturalistic and phenomenological perspectives as ideological in nature (p. 2). If indeed the

debate were ideological, there existed a substantial possibility that it might have led to a new shared understanding of organizations. In describing the "idealism" of ideology, Gouldner (1976) stated that all ideologies are predicated upon the idea that people

are open to persuasion by an appeal to their reason and to their ideals. Ideology claims, tacitly or overtly, that the public project for which it calls is a deserving cause, and that its call will be heeded in part for that reason. (p. 85)

Ideological differences are subject to reconciliation through rational dialogue. If the debate in question had been ideological it should have been resolvable. Others, such as Kuhn (1970) and Burrell and Morgan (1985) have described debates of this nature as paradigmatic. If these scholars are correct, it may be that no amount of discussion of the kind that we have witnessed would have been adequate to produce a compromise or a new understanding.

From a Habermasian perspective, each person is seen as possessing (or being possessed by) a paradigm or paradigms, a number of worldviews or conceptual frameworks which Habermas (1984) described as the person's *Lebenswelt* or lifeworld. The lifeworld is "formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background convictions. This lifeworld background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic" (p. 70).

The lifeworld convictions are deeply ingrained in the personalities of the individuals and are reflected in their beliefs concerning the way the world works and in the very language they use, such that they "cannot be seen as an interpretive system open to criticism" (p. 71). The lifeworld paradigms are acquired through the individual's socialization in the family and in the community prior to any rational consideration of the issues concerning which beliefs are held. Indeed, lifeworld paradigms are so deeply ingrained that "beliefs which do not fit such convictions — convictions that are as beyond question as they are fundamental — appear to be absurd" (p. 336).

The prejudgmental structure of understanding not only forbids putting this consensus — which has become customary and at all times is the foundation of our misunderstanding and unintelligibility — into question; indeed, the prejudgmental understanding makes such questioning appear meaningless. (Habermas, 1970, p. 124)

Individuals interpret the world through the veil of their paradigm(s), about which they "normally know nothing, because it is simply unproblematic and does not pass the threshold of communicative utterances that can be valid or invalid" (Habermas, 1984, p. 337). If the naturalistic-phenomenological debate were paradigmatic, in this sense, in nature, each side would have viewed the other as dogmatic adherents to ultimately irrational beliefs; therefore, it would seem unlikely that either side would be able to see the validity of the arguments offered by the other.

Griffiths himself (1977; 1979) described the naturalistic perspective as a paradigm. He stated, "It is time for a new paradigm in educational administration" (1977, p. 7). Greenfield (1980), in rebuttal to arguments mounted by Hills (1980) and Willower (1979; 1980), also admitted that he and his critics view and interpret reality from fundamentally different perspectives.

Both Hills and Willower live in a world where facts stand separate and independent from theories about the facts. In their world it is possible to explain facts by theories and thereby gain control over them . . . In my world, the line between fact and value is at best blurred and what we see as facts is in large measure determined by ideas in our heads. (p. 29)

Disciples of these two paradigms can find little upon which to agree; each presents an epistemological argument (each rational from its particular perspective) concerning what constitutes valid knowledge in educational administration.

The very fact that the protagonists chose to debate the issues publicly indicates that they were attempting to communicate, each believing that rational argument would convince his opponents of the validity of his claims; the paradigmatic nature of the debate, on the other hand, would appear to negate the possibility of either side yielding to the other. It must be remembered, however, that these debaters performed not only for each other but also for their readers, many of whom were less committed to one view or the other. The paradox inherent in a debate of incommensurable (Kuhn, 1970) beliefs may, to a significant degree, explain why change in the field evolved so slowly. The existence of an interested and less committed external audience may explain how change was able to occur at all.

The Ideal Speech Situation, the Public Sphere, and the Forum of the Debate

The North American forum in which the Griffiths-Greenfield debate was held may have also contributed to its failure to reach understanding. Habermas (1970) stated that, to be truly effective, communication should adhere as closely as possible to an *ideal speech situation* (p. 132). While Habermas admitted that the ideal speech situation is, indeed, an ideal, he stated that it is of paramount importance that all speech situations be treated as if they were ideal. "It belongs to the structure of possible conversation that we contra-factually operate as if the imputation of an ideal speaking-situation were not fictitious, but real" (p. 132). Frankel (1979) argued that effective communication is predicated upon such an assumption.

We could not begin to communicate with one another if we did not implicitly believe that we could reach mutual understanding. Every time two or more speaking subjects enter into communication there is the a priori goal of realizing an ideal speech situation. (p. 210)

Gouldner (1976) described four elements crucial to such an ideal communication: (a) no violence (this would include such symbolic violence as

coercion or sanction); (b) permeable boundaries between public and private speech (no compulsive, rigid, and unexaminable barriers); (c) allowance of traditional symbols and rules of discourse to be made problematic (i.e., no undiscussible sacred cows); and (d) insistence on equal opportunities to speak (implying a nonpartisan forum for discussion) (pp. 142-143).

An ideal speech situation is predicated upon the assumption that all individuals are guaranteed the freedom to express their opinions without prejudice. As Frankel (1979) stated, "Those societies, institutions, or interpersonal relations which prevent open discourse by hiding behind, or enforcing . . . technocratic 'professionalism' and other discriminatory constraints are the enemies of open, rational discourse" (p. 211).

While the question of sanctions is theoretically not an issue in academic discussion, it is a reality which should not go unconsidered. Though critics of an existing paradigm are no longer required to recant or face execution, there are still significant sanctions, forms of symbolic violence (Gouldner, 1976, p. 143), which could be applied by those who maintain the status quo. As Byrne pointed out, "control of publication and publishing opportunities, leadership in the policy making bodies and associations, access to the resources necessary for scholarly work, and the status incumbent to acknowledged leadership in a professional field" are all rewards which can be granted to, or withheld from, those who choose to question conventional knowledge (Kendell & Byrne, 1977, p. 7). Therefore the question of sanctions cannot be ignored, unless the debate took place in a truly nonpartisan and public forum. Habermas (1974) has described this type of external structure as the "public sphere."

The traditional idea of the public sphere involved the common political activity of all citizens in the city state (Hohendahl, 1974, p. 46). Habermas (1974) stated that, while contemporary western societies maintain a belief in the existence of this sphere, it really no longer exists in this form and that "today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere" (p. 49; see also Gouldner, 1976, p. 140). In areas of academic concern, the media which constitute the public sphere are the learned journals associated with individual disciplines because it is within these periodicals that the issues of the discipline are debated. While the two perspectives in question here have been presented in a number of scholarly journals, including *Educational Administration* (British) and *The Journal of Educational Administration* (Australian), in North America the debate took place in the *UCEA Review* and the *Educational Administration Quarterly*. This latter journal constituted the primary public sphere for this debate on this continent; as such, it is an important part of the external structure of the discussion. Habermas (1970) has pointed out that a truly public sphere must exist such that

the communication is not only not hindered by external contingent influences, but also not hindered by forces which result from the structure of the

communication itself. Only then does the peculiarly unforced compulsion of a better argument dominate

The condition that the structure of the communication itself does not produce any forces is fulfilled when completely symmetrical relations exist between the participants in the discussion, i.e., when none of the participants is favoured. (p. 131)

Whether the learned journal in question truly provided this symmetry is subject to question.

From as early as the 1950s the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) was instrumental in the development of the naturalistic paradigm in educational administration (Hoy, 1978, p. 9). That the UCEA has continued to support this paradigm is evidenced by Hoy's appeal that it "continue to be a convincing advocate of scientific research in educational administration" and avoid "becoming seduced by the sirens of practice" (p. 10). A further indication of this philosophical stance can be gleaned from Culbertson, then Executive Director of the UCEA, who, in 1981, suggested that what was needed in educational administration was a further fine-tuning of naturalistic theory (p. 42; see also Willower, 1988).

The *Educational Administration Quarterly* was established by the UCEA in 1965 to provide, "research-oriented professors with a forum to present, discuss, and critique theory and research" (Hoy, 1978, p. 6). Interestingly, Hoy's 1982 *EAQ* review of developments in theory and research in educational administration, while it did discuss the ongoing debate, did not refer to any phenomenological research among the recent studies considered "important" in the field (p. 1). Griffiths (1983) pointed out that "the *Educational Administration Quarterly* apparently has yet to carry an ethnomethodological study" (p. 211). One is left to conclude that, previous to 1983, either no ethnomethodological studies had been submitted to the *EAQ* or that none had met its publication standards. In her 1986 *EAQ* review of research, McCarthy maintained that "the legitimacy of qualitative approaches in conducting research has now been established" (p. 9); however, she referenced only one review of research critical of logical positivist studies (p. 13). For his part, Greenfield (1991a) pointed out that "one of the most effective ways of defending orthodox opinion as incontestable truth is to see that heterodox opinion is not published, or that the rare heterodox opinion that does get published is well countered with extended bulls of orthodox refutation" (p. 16).

It was certainly Greenfield's (1978) contention that the debate as carried in British journals was qualitatively different from the debate as represented in the *EAQ*. Indeed, he recommended that readers should look to the British journals if they wished to read "dialogue [which] ultimately focuses on the issues . . . not the protagonists" (p. 4; see also 1988, p. 136). In 1991 he wrote, "Having seen 'the traditional academic review and editorial process' from the inside, I know

what illusions of subjectivity and bias the facade of objectivity and impartiality can hide" (1991a, p. 17). He pointed out that one of his papers was rejected by *EAQ* on the basis that "deans, academics, and practitioners were 'tired' of reading such critiques from me" (p. 17). No independent "blind" reviews were included with this rejection. At the same time, he maintained that "voices of the orthodox mainstream of the field seem to have unlimited access and in most cases the last word on any critical writing that does appear in the journal" (pp. 17-18; see also Smith & Blase, 1989). Greenfield concludes:

Can the main journals of the field do better in the future? Can they allow honest and full examination of the issues to take place? Can they expand the range of issues explored, the methods used to explore them? Can they allow more "turmoil" in the belief that it is a necessary precursor to the ashes that might see the better and stronger shaping of the field? Can they permit trial of truth by what is contrary? I am hopeful, but not optimistic. (p. 17)

Idealism notwithstanding, it may be unrealistic to expect the journal in question not to represent a particular conceptual framework; it is, after all, no more than the product of its editors. Indeed, it must be granted at least some degree of credit for providing the vehicle for a discussion which brought into view the assumptions of the paradigm it supported; however, it must be accepted, without prejudice, that *EAQ* did not represent a nonpartisan forum for the debate. While it would be inappropriate to argue that the editors of *EAQ* exhibited intentional bias in their handling of the debate, it is clear that the journal had traditionally been the voice of the status quo; therefore, the assumptions of the ideal speech situation and the public sphere were violated. If Habermas is correct, this would seriously reduce the possibility of an understanding being reached and thus assist in explaining why the debate remained unresolved.

Strategic Speech Actions

The communications strategies used by the protagonists in this debate also may have contributed to its failure to reach understanding. Gouldner (1976) pointed out that, whenever individuals assume that words can be used as tools to convince others of the validity of opposing views, rhetoric itself becomes an element of the debate (p. 85). Habermas (1984) stated that a high degree of intellectual candor is required if communications pathologies are to be avoided. Participants must attempt to reach understanding, without regard to winning the argument.

Communication pathologies can be conceived of as a result of a confusion between actions oriented to reaching understanding and actions oriented to success. In situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the parties behaves with an orientation to success, but leaves others to believe that all the presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied. (p. 332)

If one or both parties to a discussion attempts to manipulate (implying a

concealed, conscious intent) their opposite number, the action is strategic rather than communicative and is unlikely to produce understanding. If Griffiths and Greenfield confused strategic with communicative speech acts, it would follow that understanding would be unlikely to result from their debate.

Greenfield in particular, through introductory epigrams, analogies, provocative choices of wording, and impractical recommendations, clearly pursued goals apart from simply achieving understanding. Perhaps Greenfield (1978) best summarized and exemplified this aspect of the debate in stating, "The medium is the message, the massage, the machete. Choose your words; choose your weapons" (p. 1).

Because this was a public debate, of necessity it took on the characteristics of a dramaturgical action. Habermas (1984) describes such an action as

an encounter in which participants form a visible public for each other and perform for one another "Encounter" and "performance" are the key concepts. A performance enables an actor to present himself to his audience in a particular way. (p. 90)

If actors intend to communicate, to reach an understanding, their speech will be aimed at creating a receptive psychological set in the minds of their audiences; they will attempt to avoid creating defensive reactions in the hearers precisely because they know that, if they wish to convince them of the correctness of their point of view, they must ensure that their audiences are listening to what is being said. On the other hand, if their intention is to win the debate,

dramaturgical action can take on latently strategic qualities to the degree that the actor treats his audience as opponents rather than as a public. The scale of self-presentations ranges from sincere communications of one's own intentions, desires, moods, etc., to cynical management of the impressions the actor arouses in others. (Habermas, 1984, p. 93)

Greenfield's style often fits the latter mode. He has, for example, a penchant for prefacing his articles with quotations intended to convey something of the flavor of what is to follow; for example:

Very old are we men;
Our dreams are tales
Told in dim Eden
By Eve's nightingales,
We wake and whisper a while,
But, the day gone by,
Silence and sleep like fields
Of amaranth lie.

— W. de la Mare
(quoted by Greenfield, 1978)

Thus, Greenfield uses de la Mare to argue that knowledge of the world is subjective and transient. Those who would claim knowledge of universal truth would seem to be attempting to deny the subjectivity and transience of their experience and perhaps even their own mortality.

He prefaces another article with the following quotation: "We are much beholden to Machiavel [*sic*] and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do" (Francis Bacon, quoted by Greenfield, 1980). Here, Greenfield references individuals who waste their time prescribing what leaders ought to do instead of describing actual behavior. Though not clearly directed at his critics, these references leave readers to draw the inevitable conclusions. Empiricist readers may find themselves squirming in their seats without knowing exactly why they are uncomfortable.

In addition, while Greenfield might have chosen any number of methods of developing arguments to support his perspective he chose, not infrequently, to use analogies that referenced specific periods in the history of science during which dogmatic adherence to traditional theory had created intervals of intellectual stagnation. In his initial presentation, for example, he developed a Darwinian analogy for organizational evolution.

Systems theorists see small, quick-witted, democratic organizations replacing the ponderous, bureaucratic forms now expiring around us. The fact that bureaucratic organizations appear as large, robust, and formidable as ever does not appear to shake belief in organizations as living entities. (Greenfield, 1974, p. 4)

In addition to this reminder that dominant paradigms have traditionally impeded the progress of knowledge, there is a sense that Greenfield may have been hinting at a contemporary form of dinosaur, a large, robust, and formidable dinosaur of theory, who is reluctant to give up its reign even though its time has come. Similarly, in a later article (1978, p. 18), reference is made to Galileo and the development of the telescope, again reminding the reader that significant, indeed revolutionary, developments are usually suppressed by the establishment. Implicit is the question, "If there is nothing to my argument, why are they making such a fuss about it?"

In another analogy, he states that "even God reserves his judgement on day-to-day affairs in the world; only Science [*sic*] presumes to tell us the ultimate reality of things short of the day of the final judgment" (1980, p. 31). By implication, naturalistic researchers, at best, are playing God. In the same article he quotes Huxley's reference to Blake as follows: "I have always found that angels have the vanity to speak of themselves as the only wise. This they do with a confident insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning" (Greenfield, p. 37; see also 1988, p. 146). In another reference to scientific rationality, Greenfield (1980) points out that scientific thinking would not have precluded a belief in witches. Perhaps, he hints, witch-hunts are not entirely a thing of the past — attacks on the critics of the status quo being a case in point.

Finally, in his 1991 AERA article, Greenfield referred to the supporters of the status quo as the "'Mother Church' of educational administration" (1991a, p. 3), subtly implying, at the least, that the truths claimed by these individuals were based not on objective "facts" but rather on faith, and that one could well expect these defenders of the faith to retaliate with religious zeal. Greenfield carried the analogy into his address to the Thirty-fifth Anniversary Conference of the Department of Educational Administration, University of Alberta, when he referred to Campbell and Gregg's (1957) *Administrative Behavior in Education*, which includes a chapter by Griffiths, as "that fecund catalogue of new thinking for educational administration, the book which in many ways constitutes the Holy Writ" (1991b, p. 1).

Griffiths and his supporters, in keeping with their adherence to a more concrete conceptual framework, did not use analogy in this way. However, both protagonists and their supporters were guilty of using terminology which can only be interpreted as dramaturgical and provocative. Griffiths, for example, claimed that Greenfield's views were "obvious and innocent" (1975, p. 12), immature and unsophisticated (1977, p. 5); that he had no theory base (p. 10); that his conception of organizations was a straw man (p. 10); that his criticisms were "petty" (1979, p. 44); that phenomenologists' methodology produced results which were of "little value" (p. 56); and that their arguments were "often sadly lacking in evidence" (p. 59). Hills (n.d.) claimed that Greenfield's theses "rest on serious deficiencies of understanding and interpretation" (p. 1) and that some of his "utterances" could not be decoded (p. 2). Willower (1980) stated that phenomenologists preach "with the dedication of the convert" (p. 7); that they were "intellectually irresponsible" (p. 8); and that Greenfield, in particular, simply "dislikes organizations because he thinks they are oppressive and he identifies with the oppressed. Hence, he shuns theories that deal with organizations" (p. 14).

For his part, Greenfield (1978) claimed that Griffiths "largely ignored the implications" of his arguments (p. 5); that naturalistic researchers' "efforts to establish social truths will be a self-contained, and ultimately self-deluding pastime" (p. 13); that they "have not been paying attention" (1980, p. 34); that they were simply blinded by theory (1975, p. 3); that they appeared to be saying "that error is attributable to the world, not to the researchers' assumptions about it" (1978, p. 14); that "normal science does nothing to increase our understanding; it only moves in circles to re-discover what it already knows to be true and calls the result objective knowledge" (1980, p. 52); and that phenomenology "constitutes green, growing roots under the massive and largely useless weight of systems theory" (1975, p. 2). Willower, says Greenfield (1978), "misses the point" (p. 5). Greenfield concludes: "Does anyone engaged in academic studies in educational administration hear these questions? I am beginning to despair that they do not" (p. 7).

All of this inflammatory language was not lost on the protagonists; Griffiths (1983) commented, "As one reads and listens to Bates (1980) and Greenfield, one gains the impression that they consider advocates of traditional theory to be idiots at best and pathological at worst. These expressions are often reciprocated" (p. 108). Greenfield (1978) commented that

my concerns about the systems theorist and the phenomenologist at different ends of the telescope arise from doubt that they will be able to reason with each other and from fear that they may ultimately use the telescope to batter each other on the head. (p. 18)

Finally, in clearly dramaturgical acts, Greenfield provoked his critics by recommending ideas which he must have known they would not, perhaps could not, accept. For example, Greenfield (1980) suggested that his colleagues should read Isherwood's (1963) tract on Yoga.

I recommend it, not as an answer to substantive questions in the study of organizations — though it may provide such insight as well — but, rather, it should be read to appreciate an attitude which may ease our acceptance of non-objective knowledge and help to break the lock that a tradition of Western, technical, means-oriented thought has used to bind our perception of the world. (p. 38)

In the same article Greenfield recommended that the field might adopt the following rather nontraditional training program for educational administrators.

We might begin the training process by placing the novice in an actual monastery, preferably one carved into the cliffs of a Greek mountain where the monks are sworn to vows of total silence. Then they might spend time as bartender, bouncer, or manager of a disco, followed by service as an orderly in a mental institution, or indeed as a patient in such an institution. (p. 48)

What is of interest here is not the practicality, utility, or the sincerity of Greenfield's recommendations; rather, it is the appropriateness of such suggestions, given his audience. Greenfield's critics saw themselves as scientists, individuals who were proud of both their scientific objectivity (which hardly prepared them for transcendental experience) and their detachment from the practical application of their theories and research (Hoy, 1978, p. 2). These individuals would find Greenfield's suggestions at best whimsical, and at worst ludicrous. Why, we may legitimately ask, would Greenfield make these recommendations? It would appear that either Greenfield was so naive that he did not realize how his critics would react or that he had some other motive for offering suggestions which he knew would be rejected outright. Ockham's razor would suggest that he was being blatantly dramaturgical and provocative, precisely because he knew that his critics would feel obliged to respond. For his part Greenfield (1991a) defends the use of this sort of language, arguing that if we rule out strong ideas, "we will make the field, as has been observed, 'unnecessarily boring'" (p. 18).

Again, the question of audience is of paramount importance here. Obviously, Griffiths and Greenfield performed not only for each other but also within a limited type of public sphere, one made up of fellow academics and of students of the field. To some degree each may have felt it necessary to dramatize his arguments in order to maintain the audience each hoped to influence. Some third party comments on the dramaturgical aspect of the debate appear to recognize its strategic nature; Kendell & Byrne (1977) stated that "the continuing disagreement of T. Barr Greenfield, Daniel Griffiths, and others . . . is beginning to resemble an extended political campaign" (p. 6). Kelsey and Long (1983) also recognized the rhetoric; however, they warned that this strategy "can all too easily lead to a polarization of ideas which are not fully enough explored to justify that polarization" (pp. 429-430). Others appeared to miss the strategic nature of the language completely; Miskel (1984) dismissed the debate as a "nonproductive climate of carping about 'the correct paradigm and method'" (p. 113).

Again, if Habermas is correct, and communicative rather than strategic speech acts are required if understanding is to be achieved, these violations of the principles of effective communication may also assist in explaining why the debate continued and why change in the field evolved so slowly. Again, the existence of an interested and less committed external audience may explain how change was able to occur at all.

Validity Claims

Failure to achieve understanding in this debate may also be partially explained by the fact that each protagonist presented claims to validity which each believed were not criticizable. If this were the case, they attempted to debate paradigmatic validity claims which, by definition, are undebatable. As Habermas (1984) stated, an individual's lifeworld convictions, or paradigms, "are as beyond question as they are fundamental" (p. 336).

Each speech act states, or implies, at least one form of "validity claim." Habermas (1984) describes this concept as follows:

A validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of an utterance are fulfilled. Whether the speaker raises a validity claim implicitly or explicitly, the hearer has only the choice of accepting or rejecting the validity claim or leaving it undecided for the time being. (p. 38).

Debate, or argument intended to develop understanding, is the process of sharing and critiquing opposing validity claims (p. 18).

Validity claims can be rejected on the basis of one or more of the following: (a) the rightness that the speaker claims for the action in relation to a normative context, the rightness or wrongness of an act given societal norms; (b) the truthfulness that the speaker claims for the expression of subjective experiences

to which he has privileged access, the subjective truth or untruth of a statement; and (c) the objective truth of a statement per se, or the propositions the speaker has to presuppose in the given circumstances (Habermas, 1984, p. 307). The listener may reject the validity claim on the basis of disagreement with normative value, subjective truth, or objective truth. The second and third bases for rejection, subjective and objective truth, may relate to the listener's belief in the truth of the statement or its presuppositions, or to the sincerity or insincerity of the speaker. The speaker may believe the statement is true when in fact it is not or may know his statement is untrue, but he or she may state it as true in order to achieve some purpose. The statement may be rejected if it is perceived to be untrue or untruthful (Habermas, 1984, p. 312).

With respect to the normative context, Greenfield (1974) pointed to a fundamental difference in the validity claims of the two sides: "choice among theories and among approaches to theory building involves normative and — especially in the social sciences — moral questions" (p. 7). Phenomenological research, he argued, must concern itself with issues of morality and ethics; naturalistic research does not (Greenfield, 1978, p. 9). In a later article (1980), he stated that "the problematics in the study of organizations lie not in the realm of fact in any case, but in that of values. And it is in the face of values that science is silent" (p. 44). Culbertson (1981) corroborated Greenfield's claim; he stated that logical positivists believe "that meaningful generalizations cannot be developed about ethical matters" (p. 31). Greenfield rejected the validity claims of the naturalistic paradigm because he believed that these claims ignored the moral and ethical issues of enlightenment and liberation, the achievement of which he believed to be the fundamental purpose of social science. Supporters of the naturalistic paradigm, on the other hand, argued that, while morality and ethics may be significant concepts, they cannot be measured; thus, they cannot be quantified and are nonscientific. From a phenomenological perspective the choices among theories are moral and ethical choices; from a naturalistic perspective choices are not based upon what is moral and ethical but upon what can be known.

With respect to subjective truth, neither Griffiths nor Greenfield questioned the sincerity of the other's beliefs, nor did they question the sincerity of each other's statements of subjective truth. Why this should be so when both, and particularly Greenfield, employed openly dramaturgical, strategic, and provocative speech acts is uncertain. Since Griffiths said nothing to indicate that he was aware that even the most blatant of Greenfield's speech acts were dramaturgical, the reader is left to wonder whether he believed that Greenfield sincerely proposed sending prospective administrators to a monastery on a Greek mountain.

Each protagonist believed the other was confusing description with prescription. Greenfield (1974) stated that "we forget the role of theory is to tell

us the way things are rather [than] to point the way they ought to be or how we would like them to be" (p.4). For his part, Griffiths (1977) claimed that what the phenomenologists describe is "a prescription for what phenomenologists believe an organization should be" (p. 6). The naturalists claimed that validity is established by the scientific method; Greenfield (1978) rejected this claim absolutely: "Theory is never disconfirmed by empirical research The researchers' theories and methodology themselves ensure that the data will be consistent with the researchers' initial assumptions" (p. 14). The phenomenologists maintained that reality exists in the interpretation of the individual; the naturalists viewed this as dangerously close to solipsism. "What is learned in these ways is not scientific knowledge, it is not generalizable, and often is of little use" (Griffiths, 1979, p. 56).

Neither side in this debate appeared to accept the limitations of its own rationality nor the objective validity claims of the other, because these claims were not simply ideological in nature; they were rooted in different perceptions of the world. As such, these beliefs are not easily influenced. The paradigmatic nature of the validity claims of both sides provides a further explanation for the continuation of the debate.

Summary and Discussion

Habermas (1984) and Gouldner (1976) point out that argumentation requires debatable (even if ideological) validity claims; but both protagonists in this debate argued from paradigmatic rather than ideological beliefs. Each side appeared to view its own lifeworld beliefs as ultimate and not open to further criticism and each others' lifeworld beliefs to be unsupportable. Smith and Heshusius (1986) summarize the likelihood of such a discussion reaching consensus in the following way.

Given the fundamental difference in the approach to disagreement, if a quantitative enquirer disagrees with a qualitative inquirer, is it even possible for them to talk to each other? The answer, for the present, is a qualified no. An appeal that one must accept a particular result because it is based on the facts will have little impact on one who believes there can be no uninterpreted facts of the case. On the other hand, the idea that facts are value laden and that there is no court of appeal beyond dialogue and persuasion will at the very least seem unscientific and insufficient to a quantitative inquirer. (p. 11)

This interpretation suggests that the two sides in this debate argued across what some readers of the early work of Kuhn (1962) described as a "Kuhnian Gulf," a difference in perspective so profound that no amount of persuasion would result in the development of a new understanding. Even if this were true (and the evidence does not support such a conclusion), this does not argue that the debate did nothing more than create a "nonproductive climate of carping" (Miskel, 1984, p. 113).

First, it must be pointed out that Griffiths, in recent years, has become an advocate of a more open approach to theory and research methodology in educational administration.

Equal attention should be given to the new theories and approaches to understanding organizations. These include ethnography, phenomenology, naturalistic inquiry, as well as neo-Marxist theories. . . . In order to understand organizations, both views are necessary. (Griffiths, Stout, & Forsyth, 1988, p. 294)

While the current scene in educational administration is chaotic, there does seem to be a way of rendering it more orderly. We should welcome the era of multiple paradigms. (Griffiths, 1988b, p. 283)

However, while Griffiths evidenced a partial change of heart (he didn't abandon the traditional approach altogether) and phenomenological theory and methodology are now, at least, given "lip-service" (McCarthy, 1986), their status has yet to be broadly established in educational administration. McCarthy speculated that this may simply result from the fact that "knowledge production typically lags behind theoretical advances, and the application of research to improve practice lags behind the state of the art in knowledge production" (p. 6). Greenfield (1980), however, maintained that naturalists still view "qualitative analysis as essentially a lower order of knowledge that must be validated through later quantitatively oriented theory and inquiry" (p. 53). In 1988, he maintained that

while a weakening of this remarkable uniformity is now apparent in all branches of the field, orthodoxy still struggles tenaciously to maintain its grip. In educational administration, defenders such as Willower (1985) meet the challenge by repeating positions only slightly modified from Simon's philosophical assumptions about the nature of administration and the proper means for inquiry into it. (p. 153)

Nevertheless, Griffiths's move to a more flexible position must be recognized. That it does not appear to represent a "conversion" should not surprise us; Kuhn (1970) points out that an individual who has devoted a lifetime to a specific paradigm may find himself

persuaded of the new view but nevertheless unable to internalize it and be at home in the world it helps to shape. Intellectually, such a man has made his choice, but the conversion required if it is to be effective eludes him. He may use the new theory nonetheless, but he will do so as a foreigner in a foreign environment, an alternative available to him only because the natives are already there. (p. 204)

Second, it must be recognized that the audience for the debate included many readers who were not committed to either paradigmatic perspective. Even if the protagonists in the debate had remained unmoved, the next generation of scholars in the field of educational administration, relatively unfettered by the

burden of an a priori agenda, were free to observe the ebb and flow of the rhetoric and draw their own conclusions.

Finally, Kuhn (1970) argues that the concept of the "Kuhnian Gulf" is erroneous. Indeed, he argues that the crux of the problem in debates involving paradigmatic beliefs lies in language. He points out that two individuals may view the same situation and perceive it differently. If these individuals share a common vocabulary, as those within a particular field of study generally do, they will each describe the situation using the same vocabulary but will be using the same words differently. Kuhn suggests that a possible solution lies in each participant recognizing that the other is a member of a different "language community." He further suggests that each must attempt to act as a "translator"; that is, to

try to discover what the other would see and say when presented with a stimulus to which his own verbal response would be different. If they can sufficiently refrain from explaining anomalous behavior as the consequence of mere error or madness, they may in time become good predictors of each others behavior. (p. 202)

Critical consideration of the Griffiths-Greenfield debate would suggest that Habermasian communications theory might provide a useful starting point for operationalizing Kuhn's concept of translation. The Habermasian perspective is helpful in developing an understanding of the debate as it evolved in the past and also suggests techniques which recognize and attempt to overcome the problems inherent in the limited rationalities of paradigmatic perspectives; these may prove instructive in future debate.

Habermas described the circumstances required if truly communicative actions are to be achieved. These included a nonpartisan forum. The American journal in which this debate took place had long represented the naturalistic perspective in educational administration; it could not, therefore, represent a nonpartisan forum for the debate. It is something of a moot point to argue that the provision of a nonpartisan forum would have increased the likelihood of a more productive outcome in this debate; no such forum with stature equal to *EAQ* existed in North America. Arguing what should have existed is pointless. However, this is an opportune time for the field, and its leading forum, to adopt a less defensive posture and to encourage and nurture the translation required if proponents of the two perspectives are to begin to understand each other. Surely, such an approach would encourage constructive participation in the debate and provide an invaluable service to the field.

The ideal speech situation described by Habermas requires that the individuals involved in a debate attempt to reach understanding rather than attempt to pursue success in the sense of winning. The strategic nature of the arguments presented by both sides of this debate indicate that both pursued the latter. In addition, both, and particularly Greenfield, baited their critics,

promoting the strategic nature of the debate. This type of rhetoric was clearly not in keeping with an attempt to "translate" in the Kuhnian sense.

It is not clear, or even likely, that the protagonists in this debate would have reached a consensus if they had chosen to be less dramaturgical and provocative; each was already committed to a particular perspective. It is also possible that had the participants been more dispassionate, their arguments may not have generated sufficient interest to maintain the argument. This point is particularly important given that a consensual perspective would be far more likely to evolve in the less committed members of their audience, many of whom may well become the next generation of scholars in the field. However, while it may be that the provocations employed were vital to maintaining the discussion in the past, it is clear that they also served to retard progress toward reaching understanding. Kuhn and Habermas suggest that this can be avoided.

It has been argued that the Griffiths-Greenfield debate has not been a useful exercise and that the issues which sparked the exchange need be pursued no further (Miskel, 1984). Such an argument would appear to assume that some form of resolution has been reached — that one side or the other has "won," or that a consensus has been achieved. None of these outcomes would appear to be accurate.

Many still assert that the naturalistic paradigm has produced very little of value in theory development (Griffiths, 1977; Kendell & Byrne, 1977; Willower, 1980; Hoy, 1982; Smith & Blase, 1989). Research based on the tenets of the naturalistic paradigm has been described as directionless (Iannaccone 1973), disjointed, noncumulative, simplistic, often trivial, theoretically barren, poorly done, of little or no practical utility (Hoy, 1978; 1982), and not consistent with the principles of its own paradigm (Griffiths, 1983). Supporters of the naturalistic view must admit the failure of the search for law-like generalizations which can be applied to educational organizations; the limitations of the theory and methods of the natural sciences; and the need for practical, usable knowledge. Clearly, the theory movement has not won the debate.

On the other hand, supporters of the pure phenomenological view must accept that while it is true that orthodox theory and methods have produced little of value, much of this failure can be attributed to the fact that these have generally been misused. (Some would argue that they have yet to be used at all.) Misuse and/or nonuse do not make these theories and methods useless or wrong, "nor yet does it mean that previously neglected or newly discovered paths to knowledge are necessarily 'better'" (Allison, 1990, p. 5). Subjective, individual, interpretive perspectives are equally open to misuse. Furthermore, if the field of study encompassing educational administration is to develop into a discipline, the search for understanding in the form of useful, albeit nonuniversal, theory has validity.

To this point in time, as Greenfield points out, theory and methodology from the interpretive paradigm are still, in the main, being viewed as "a lower order of knowledge" (1980, p. 53). It is equally clear that the interpretive paradigm has not been able to rise, as the Phoenix (Greenfield, 1991a), from the ashes of its predecessor. This debate has had no winner.

Some (McCarthy, 1986) argue that qualitative analysis has become an accepted part of the academic study of educational administration. Others maintain that this acceptance amounts to little more than lip-service (Smith & Blase, 1989; Greenfield, 1991a; 1991b). Still others (Smith & Heshusius, 1986) argue that the phenomenological perspective has been co-opted rather than accepted.

During the past few years the quantitative-qualitative issue has gone from a situation of conflict to one of compatibility and cooperation This transformation is not based on the development of a legitimate *via media* between the two perspectives, but is actually a matter of the "capture" of qualitative inquiry by the quantitative approach. Both perspectives are now thought of — even if only implicitly — as sharing the same realist-oriented assumptions. (p. 10)

These authors and others (MacKinnon, Young, & Hansen, 1990, p. 46) argue that the inclusion of the phenomenological perspective within the naturalistic paradigm is an unfortunate error, not only because such inclusion requires an assumption of compatibility which has yet to be established but also because it has the effect of bringing closure to a discussion of overriding philosophical importance.

The point is not that anyone knows exactly what will result from the conversation or what inquiry will look like in the future, but rather that to avoid the conversation is to avoid issues at the core of the research enterprise and, for that matter, at the core of our contemporary intellectual, practical, and moral lives. (Smith & Heshusius, 1986, p. 11)

In a more pragmatic context, continuation of this discussion may be fundamental to the development of educational administration as a unique discipline. Given the failings of the theory movement, there is clearly no refuge in incorporating the phenomenological perspective within the existing naturalistic paradigm.

What we are left with is what Greenfield originally pointed out in 1974: at least two quite different and apparently incompatible ontological and epistemological paradigms. This is not as threatening as it might first appear. Physics has, after all, managed to survive quite successfully and without undue self-consciousness using theory derived from quantum mechanics and from general relativity, two theories which are not compatible. Indeed the ultimate goal of modern physics is to discover a unified field theory which could incorporate both. In the meantime, physicists have gone on with their work

simply by using each theory when it is appropriate — quantum mechanics when dealing with the very small and relativity when dealing with the very large (Hawking, 1988, p. 61). Why social scientists feel they must declare a winner and a loser, or declare that a unified theory has been found when there is no evidence to support this, is unclear. Here, perhaps, is one case where we would do well to learn from the example of the physical sciences. As Allison (1990) argues:

Academic study properly flows from the informed statement of questions derived from interpretation of the literature and mediated by experience; the nature of those guiding questions governs the kind of "data" that must be considered, which in turn determines the selection of appropriate methods, with this sequence being re-iterative and recursive. (p. 6)

The correct theory and method for study of educational administration, then, is dependent upon the nature of the questions being asked. If one wishes to know, for example, how pay scales are related to teacher retention, one may well select a quantitative methodology. If, however, one wishes to investigate the retention of teacher/victims of student violence, one might do well to choose a qualitative approach. What is important is that the question being asked is not twisted so that it will "fit" a particular research methodology and that the methodology selected is used properly. As Allison puts it:

If the process is reversed, if "method" or "data" are allowed to determine the questions to be studied, then freedom of inquiry is curtailed and scholarship held hostage by ideology. This is what happened when the theory movement ruled academic work in educational administration, with much of the research time being guided by the construct or paradigm in use rather than a spirit of informed inquiry. (p. 6)

If the integrity of educational administration is to survive the next decade, it will have to accept new directions in theory development and accept and utilize research methodologies which produce theoretically significant and practically useful results. This simply will not happen if the stimulus of critical discussion is allowed to quietly slip away; the discussion must continue. However, while Griffiths and Greenfield are both to be credited for bringing the issues to the fore and for keeping them there, it is hoped that the debate will not continue in its present form. As Smith and Blase (1989) argue:

The Greenfield-Griffiths debate was an early hope for the development of a critical perspective in educational administration. Such a hope cannot be advanced without additional opportunities for rigorous debate of the basic theoretical issues underlying research and practice. How long will researchers in the field of educational administration run and hide from such debate? (p. 5)

The search for understanding in educational administration would benefit from an approach in which the perspective of Habermas's ideal speech situation is utilized. Forums of academic discussion which cannot shed their traditional biases will seal their own fate as new generations recognize that such journals

operate in fundamental opposition to the very principles they claim to represent; those who are committed to an open-minded search for truth will find new forums. Participants in the debate must feel free to propose new and sometimes unpopular ideas, confident that arguments rather than contributors will be critically examined. There must be no more "sacred cows." Both sides must accept, not only intellectually but also at a deeper level of understanding, that paradigmatic beliefs do not, even temporarily, equal truth and that claims to "scientific truth" or "private truth" are equally ineffectual. Validity claims must be open to dispute. "Reason in the sense of the principle of rational discourse is the rock on which hitherto factual authorities are smashed rather than the rock on which they are founded" (Habermas, 1970, p. 127).

I have argued that the Griffiths-Greenfield debate was not a futile exercise because it has not reached a resolution in a new understanding of the meaning of theory and research in educational administration. Rather I have argued that an examination of the structure of the debate, using a particular theory of communication, furnishes some insight into why a new understanding has not been achieved.

If the field can accept the fact that it is suffering from a serious lack of credibility and direction, this knowledge should provide the motivation necessary to carry on the search for understanding and reduce the need for dramaturgical, strategic, and provocative speech acts. If the field cannot accept that it is facing a crisis, it may find itself standing in embarrassed silence as its publics' perception becomes, to borrow a final analogy from Greenfield, that it has been arguing over the cut and color of the emperor's new clothes. If senior administrators at our universities reach this conclusion, those of us who remain employed may well find ourselves teaching the "Education" elective in the M.B.A. program.

References

- Allison, D. J. (April, 1990). Empiricist science under the new regime: A reply to Smith and Blase. *Organizational Theory Dialogue*, 1-9.
- Bates, R. J. (1980). Perspective: Educational administration, the sociology of science, and the management of knowledge. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 16(2), 1-20.
- Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1985). *Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis*. Aldershot, Hants, England: Gower.
- Culbertson, J. A. (1981). Perspective: Antecedents of the theory movement. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 17(1), 25-47.
- Culbertson, J. A. (1988). A century's quest for a knowledge base. In N. J. Boyan (Ed.), *Handbook of research on educational administration* (pp. 3-26). New York: Longman.
- Frankel, B. (1979). Jürgen Habermas: The relationship of communication to learning. In J.V. D'Cruz & W. Hannah (Eds.), *Perceptions of excellence* (pp. 195-221). Melbourne: Polding Press.
- Fullan, M. (1972). Overview of the innovative process and the user. *Interchange*, 3(2-3), 37-44.

- Gouldner, W. A. (1976). *The dialectic of ideology and technology: The origins, grammar, and future of ideology*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1973). Organizations as social inventions: Rethinking assumptions about change. *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, 9(5), 551-574.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1974). *Theory in the study of organizations and administrative structures: A new perspective*. Paper presented at the International Intervisitation Programme, Bristol, July, 1974.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1975). *A response to Jean Hills*. Unpublished manuscript, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1978). Reflections on organizational theory and the truths of irreconcilable realities. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 14(2), 1-23.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1980). Response: The man who comes back through the door in the wall: Discovering truth, discovering self, discovering organizations. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 16(3), 26-59.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1988). The decline and fall of science in educational administration. In D. E. Griffiths, R.T Stout, & P. B. Forsyth (Eds.), *Leaders for America's schools; The report and papers of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration* (pp. 131-159). Berkeley: McCutchan.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1991a, April). *Re-forming and re-valuing educational administration: Whence and when cometh the phoenix?* Paper presented to the Organizational Theory Special Interest Group of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago.
- Greenfield, T. B. (1991b). *Science and service: The making of the profession of Educational Administration*. Paper presented to the Thirty-fifth Anniversary Conference of the Department of Educational Administration, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1957). Toward a theory of administrative behavior. In R. F. Campbell & R. T. Gregg (Eds.), *Administrative behavior in education* (pp. 354-390). New York: Harper.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1975). Some thoughts about theory in educational administration - 1975. *UCEA Review*, 17(1), 12-18.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1977). The individual in organization: A theoretical perspective. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 13(2), 1-18.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1979). Intellectual turmoil in educational administration. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 15(3), 43-65.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1983). Evolution in research and theory: A study of prominent researchers. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 19(3), 201-221.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1988a). Administrative theory. In N. J. Boyan (Ed.), *Handbook of research on educational administration* (pp. 27-51). New York: Longman.
- Griffiths, D. E. (1988b). The professorship revisited. In D. E. Griffiths, R.T Stout, & P. B. Forsyth (Eds.), *Leaders for America's schools; The report and papers of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration* (pp. 273-283). Berkeley: McCutchan.
- Griffiths, D. E., Stout, R.T., & Forsyth, P. B. (1988). The preparation of educational administrators. In D. E. Griffiths, R.T Stout, & P. B. Forsyth (Eds.), *Leaders for America's schools; The report and papers of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration* (pp. 284-304). Berkeley: McCutchan.
- Habermas, J. (1970). Summation and response (M. Matesich, Trans.). *Continuum*, 8(1,2), 123-133.
- Habermas, J. (1974). The public sphere: An encyclopedia article (1964). (S. Lennox & F. Lennox, Trans.). *New German Critique*, 1(3), 49-55.
- Habermas, J. (1984). *The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization of society* (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

- Hawking, S. W. (1988). *A brief history of time: From the big bang to black holes*. Toronto: Bantam.
- Hills, J. (n.d). *Some comments on T. B. Greenfield's theory in the study of organizations and administration structures*. Unpublished manuscript, University of British Columbia, Centre for the Study of Administration in Education, Vancouver, B.C.
- Hills, J. (1980). A critique of Greenfield's "new perspective." *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 16(1), 20-44.
- Hodgkinson, C. (1991). *Educational leadership: The moral art*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Hohendahl, P. (1974). Jürgen Habermas: "The Public Sphere" (1964). (P. Russian, Trans.). *New German Critique*, 1(3), 45-48.
- Hoy, W. K. (1978). Perspective: Scientific research in educational administration. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 14(3), 1-12.
- Hoy, W. K. (1982). Introduction: Recent developments in theory and research in educational administration. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 18(3), 1-11.
- Iannaccone, L. (1973). Interdisciplinary theory guided research in educational administration: A smoggy view from the valley. *Teachers College Record*, 75(1), 55-66.
- Isherwood, C. (1963). *An approach to Vedanta*. Hollywood: Vedanta Press.
- Kelsey, J. G. T. & Long, J. C. (1983). Educational administration: Orthodoxy (and heterodoxy). In R. F. Lawson & R. L. Schnell (Eds.), *Education studies: Foundations of policy* (pp. 407-447). Washington: University Press of America.
- Kendell, R. R. & Byrne, D. R. (1977). Thinking about the Greenfield-Griffiths debate. *UCEA Review*, 19(1), 6-16.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions* (2nd. ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- MacKinnon, D., Young, B., & Hansen, B. (1990). On valid knowledge. *Journal of Educational Administration and Foundations*, 5 (2), 39-51.
- McCarthy, M. M. (1986). Introduction: Research in educational administration: Promising signs for the future. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 22(3), 3-20.
- McCarthy, M. M. (1987). The professoriate in educational administration: Current status and challenges ahead. *UCEA Review*, 28(2), 2-6.
- Miskel, C. (1984). Communications: Hypotheses and assumptions guiding research: A rejoinder to Daniel Griffiths. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 20(1), 111-113.
- Smith, J. & Blase, J. (January, 1989). You can run but you cannot hide: Hermeneutics and its challenge to the field of educational leadership. *Organizational Theory Dialogue*, 1-7.
- Smith, J. K. & Heshusius, L. (1986). Closing down the conversation: The end of the quantitative-qualitative debate among educational inquirers. *Educational Researcher*, 15(1), 4-12.
- UCEA. (1987). *Leaders for America's schools: Report of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration*. Tempe, AZ: University Council for Educational Administration.
- Willower, D. J. (1979). Ideology and science in organizational theory. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 15(3), 20-42.
- Willower, D. J. (1980). Perspective: Contemporary issues in theory in educational administration. *Educational Administration Quarterly*, 16(3), 1-25.
- Willower, D. J. (1988). Synthesis and projection. In N. J. Boyan (Ed.), *Handbook of research on educational administration* (pp. 729-745). New York: Longman.