

The final chapter surveys contemporary issues in Australia as its organising focus. A claim counter claim format is used as the issues are discussed. This is followed by a critical appraisal of alternative curriculum designs. The issues in themselves are interesting and highlight the diversity of areas that are of concern to curriculum workers in Australia. These issues are: multicultural/aboriginal education, transition from school to work, moral education, non-sexist education, computer education, gifted and talented children, and leisure education. This last chapter is sketchy. Although it offers a mixture of facts and assertions regarding Australian contemporary issues, it could just as easily have been omitted without doing any damage to the rest of the book.

In general terms there has been maintained throughout the book a creditable mix between academic fringe dwellers and hard core discipline centred ideals, assertion and hard evidence, conjecture and fact. The case studies draw the themes together. The notorious time dimension of the task of teaching that restricts teacher development on the job (and as a consequence curriculum planning and thinking) is well-documented as a source inhibiting teacher involvement in experimentation and innovation. Thus the brief thumbnail sketches, tables, graphs, timelines and summaries allow professionals in the field to quickly read the salient points prior to serious study of a practical guide to curriculum development.

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Dunlop, Francis, *The Education of Feeling and Emotion*. London: Allen and Unwin Inc., 1984, 129 pp., \$7.50 (paper).

This book is very interesting and very good.

It begins with a discussion of two contrasting philosophers, R. S. Peters and John MacMurray, on the nature of emotion and its place in human existence. For Peters, emotion is closely connected with beliefs, and the educational task is the development of appropriate appraisals (a moral matter) and the control and canalisation of passivity, achievements the validity of which lies in their conformity to rationality and social norms. This view the author regards as too intellectual, and the contrasting position of MacMurray is elaborated, according to which the world can be encountered and felt without any intervening scheme of publicly testable concepts or language; the ideal action is spontaneous expression, keeping us in touch with the heart and maintaining personal wholeness. This point of view is regarded as not intellectual enough, and Dunlop's skillful treatment of the two philosophers leaves one ready to believe that the truth will probably incorporate elements from each.

There then follows a general survey of the affective sphere. This is as good and as comprehensive a review of the literature on emotion as exists anywhere. Here are found Langer, Reid, Bantock, Findlay, Brentano, Osborne, Whitehead, Kenny, Midgley and Tanner; also Hillman, Claparede, Duffy, James, Arnold, Leeper, Pradines, Marshall, Dumas, Polanyi, Bridges and Gasson; further Lersch, Strasser, Scheler, Sartre, Maslow, Bollnow and Ingarden. Emotion is analysed in relation to psychic disturbance, conation, perception, cognition, upheaval, sentiment, attitude, mood, depersonalization, excitement, appraisal, impulse and feeling. Thus the difficulty and complexity of the subject are well exhibited; yet the author still succeeds in deriving some specific results from the survey.

One of the results is the claim that it is necessary to think of the human mind in terms of stratification. The affective occupies one layer, thinking and willing another. Integration and balance are the outcome of self-discovery and self-realization. Also, feeling is indispensable for value, since value requires experience of the world directly whereas thought apprehends not the world but a matrix of principles and criteria. The largest enemy of feeling, and of life, is the increasing technicizing of existence through technology.

Suggestions with regard to the education of feeling and emotion are given. Dunlop's view is that the matter is not inescapably moral, but involves development. His remarks, however, are by no means limited to what follows from the discussion so far. Predictably, literature and other arts are seen as important, since they are expressive, and literature is reckoned most important because it is in language that the subtleties of feeling are

given expression. Reading aloud is of especial value here. As for the encouragement of the higher emotions, this is seen in terms of the transforming of concern for self into concern for transcendent objects progressively more removed from the self. (The moralist's position is in agreement here.) This is particularly difficult for adolescents because self-centredness is ascendent in their peer group and encouraged by commercial pressures. A sense of community must also be developed, and this, for Dunlop, cannot be in the purely impersonal terms of contractual obligation but must include common feelings. The culmination of the education of emotion is emotional autonomy. This requires teaching the young that their worth is simply in what they are, not in their achievements; also they have a nature and an obligation to develop it. The temptation to deny feelings is to be resisted; ultimately, what is within is what counts.

Factors promoting such enlightenment include the presence of teachers who are themselves emotionally autonomous and not prone to inhibition. The succumbing of the school to management methods is a factor working against this enlightenment. Rituals and ceremonies lacking an instrumental purpose are sadly no longer understood or respected. On the matter of curriculum subjects, a disparaging word is offered on the social sciences for purporting to provide a scientific treatment of human affairs. Democratisation is also criticised for pandering to drives for power and social recognition.

As is usual for writers on the topic of emotion, Dunlop does not in his arguments address a strong position for reason against emotion, despite the fact that his position in favour of emotion is one he sees as in need of the substantial support he gives it. Apparently he thinks that it is among the general public that emotion is disparaged and suppression of feelings enjoined. To me it seems the opposite; all manner of fatuous, mewling nonsense is excused and even praised for being the expression of how someone feels. A reader informed of any hard rationalist position in the literature will find some of Dunlop's arguments question-begging: the fact that denial of one's feelings is denial of one's self (if, indeed, fact is what this is) is no commendation of emotion unless it is already agreed that all parts of the self, including feelings, are important. And if it were true that we do not reach the world in perception but only in feeling (a highly dubious proposition) then the thinker might choose to ignore the world. The claim that without feeling we are prisoners of a conceptual scheme and unable to see anything in a fresh light is not convincing and can be countered by arguments from Kant and Sartre. Lastly, the idea that what matters is what people are, not what they achieve, is at variance with the project to educate. People matter, not because of what they are inside, but because they can engage in impersonal activities, such as solving equations, and because their thoughts, words and deeds can be rational, as contrasted with understandable.

The writing is, from start to finish, of high quality. The chapter on the education of the emotions would be of particular value in the teaching of a course in the philosophy of education. It contains a clear statement of a point of view on a variety of curricular and institutional issues in schooling, and could be used to initiate a number of class discussions. The earlier parts of the book are philosophically competent and a pleasure to read, but sometimes difficult. This is perhaps a drawback, since the aim of books in this series is to provide competent philosophical treatment of topics relevant to students of education and accessible without prior philosophy. For a beginner, the book would be tough, and the earlier chapters are more involved than is needed for what follows. The relevance of the topic is first said to be that it connects with educational literature on the affective domain. This literature is barely spoken of. This is no error, since the bulk of it is, in any case, best left aside; and there is plenty else of relevance to teachers in the book. Finally, a most welcome feature of works in this series is a classified bibliography as guide to further study, and Dunlop's list is excellent.

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Bowers, C.A., *The Promise of Theory: Education and the Politics of Cultural Change*. New York: Longmans Inc., 1984, 116 pp., \$11.95 (U.S.).

Perhaps the most apt characterization of this book comes from the author himself — 'thinking against the grain.' Although this phrase is used for different purposes in a article published prior to the present work, it is suggestive of both the thrust of *The Promise of Theory* and some of the contradictions that surface from within it. 'Thinking against the grain' calls for a methodological commitment and a thorough search for substantive