

ARTICLES

Abstract

This paper re-examines the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill, with special emphasis on his views regarding freedom, education, and social reform. It is concluded that Mill's individualism is less unbending than it is often described, that a definite conflict between freedom and control is one of the more salient characteristics of his work, and that the complexity of his social thought is such that we need to proceed cautiously in drawing educational inferences from his writing.

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John Stuart Mill on Freedom, Education, and Social Reform

The problem of how to influence people (especially little people of school age) to make "right" choices, when faced with alternatives, without impeding their development as autonomous moral agents is one that tests the ingenuity of each new generation of educators. It is part of the perennial problem of balancing freedom and control, a fundamental issue in any social and educational philosophy and one that is encountered frequently in the work of John Stuart Mill.

Mill is perhaps best known for his efforts in *On Liberty* to demonstrate the validity of the proposition that governmental interference in the lives of individuals ought to be kept to a minimum. Indeed, he presents the case for individualism so persuasively in that book that his arguments often seem as attractive to Reagan-style conservatives as they do to liberals such as the late Justice Douglas, who cited Mill frequently. In this paper I shall attempt to show that Mill's individualism is less doctrinaire than it is often depicted; that, in fact, a deep-rooted tension between the concepts of "freedom" and "control" is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Mill's thought, and that this tension is the source between the concepts of "freedom" and "control" is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Mill's thought, and that this tension is the source of certain theoretical ambiguities in both his philosophy of education and his social thought. The paper should not, however, be construed as an attempt to "debunk" Mill. Rather, its purpose is simply to point out some of the conflicts in his thought and to address the problem of drawing educational implications from his work in light of those conflicts.

The paper will be divided into two sections. In Section One, which will be expository for the most part, I will provide an overview of Mill's social philosophy in order to place his reformism in proper perspective. In Section Two the exposition will be expanded to include some of Mill's educational prescriptions, but my main concern in that part of the paper will be to furnish an analysis and critique of selected aspects of his work. The emphasis there will be on the significance that Mill attaches to freedom and education as means to social betterment.

I

The unifying element in Mill's social and educational thought is his reformism. Indeed, he tells us that in his youth his main objective in life was to be a reformer of the world, no less.¹ Mill undoubtedly lowered his sights with the passage of time, but he continued to believe in the feasibility

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of sweeping social reform. One of his strongest statements to that effect appears, as a matter of fact, late in his career with the publication of his chief work on ethics:

No one whose opinion deserves a moment's consideration can doubt that most of the great positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and will, if human affairs continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits . . . All the grand sources, in short, of human suffering are in a great degree, many of them almost entirely, conquerable by human care and effort.²

Mill's reformist convictions are influenced, of course, by his utilitarianism, which he defines as follows:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to produce happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain and the privation of pleasure.³

Mill's concern here is not simply with individual happiness, we should note, but rather with the happiness of all.⁴

In his discussion of utility's sanctions, Mill refers to altruistic feelings of duty and obligation toward others. Although such feelings are acquired rather than innate, they are based on natural social sentiments and are therefore rooted in human nature. These social inclinations, Mill argues, may be reinforced through proper societal arrangements and educational processes to the point where an individual may actually experience feelings of intense pain as a result of his failure to discharge his duty to others.⁵ The ultimate sanction of utility, then, is the subjective conscience. No other moral theory, according to Mill, can claim more.

Mill thus supplements his version of utilitarianism with the concepts of altruism and duty, and suggests that an individual should be taught to associate his own interest with the general welfare. For Mill this association does not, however, imply a repudiation of individualism. On the contrary, he holds that social reform depends heavily on the development of good character in the individuals who make up the social whole, and everyone's character is unique. As each person develops his own individuality, he becomes more valuable both to himself and to others; hence as individual value is enhanced, there is a concomitant increase in the value of society at large.⁶

Differences in personality, Mill claims, lead people to seek self-realization and happiness in various ways, and government must respect this diversity of taste.⁷ In the long run society gains more by permitting people to assert their individuality than by forcing them into similar patterns of behavior.

Now the right to pursue our own good as we see fit implies a broad commitment to the principle of liberty, and Mill provides an eloquent statement of the principle in this celebrated passage:

That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.⁸

Here Mill seems almost prepared to ascribe intrinsic value to individuality. Although he continues to accord fundamental importance to the principle of utility in his ethical system, Mill appears at the very least to regard freedom and individuality as vital components of happiness. Moreover, he clearly views self-realization, personality development and the like as having social, as well as individual value.

From Mill's point of view, the chief threat to the growth of these qualities is, of course, the "tyranny" of majority opinion. He detects a strong tendency in modern society to impose majority views on the individual in an attempt to regulate conduct. This tendency, he insists, must be met with

an equally strong commitment to individual rights if we are to take seriously the advancement of civil liberty.

Mill selects popular government as the political arrangement best suited to preserve individual freedom and at the same time to insure social progress. Autocratic rule may be more efficient, he notes, but it contributes little to the character and intelligence of the governed. Popular government, on the other hand, by encouraging citizens to take an actual part in the discharge of some public function, does stimulate intelligence and is conducive to character development.⁹ In addition, participation in the governmental process helps people to develop a perspective wider than their immediate self-interest. In short, popular government has educational value for the citizen in addition to its inherent political merits. Mill recognizes that full-scale "participatory democracy" (to borrow a contemporary term) is impractical, however, so he looks to representative government as the nearest practical approximation to the ideal.¹⁰

Mill qualifies his endorsement of representative democracy, however, by noting two of its flaws (which, actually, he views as characteristic of government in general): an uninformed and intellectually inadequate populace, and disregard of minority views and interests by the majority.¹¹ To deal with the problem of majority domination, Mill recommends adoption of the Hare plan of proportional representation, wherein minorities are assured of representation proportional to their voting strength. This plan, according to Mill, would furnish a political voice to the well informed individuals who often speak for minority interests.¹²

The other threat to the well-being of a representative government — the effects of general ignorance — could be met by restricting the franchise, but Mill rejects this solution on the grounds that (as noted above) participation in the political process contributes to the education of the citizenry. His solution is to give people of superior intellect two or more votes. Though every qualified citizen should have a part in the selection of political leaders, in Mill's view, the parts need not be identical. He suggests occupation and educational level as possible criteria for identifying voters of superior intelligence.¹³

Proportional representation and plural voting, Mill claims, would overcome the inherent defects of representative government and insure the election of competent leaders. Once these well informed, intellectually able legislators take office, they should be free to exercise their own political judgment, and not be bound by the sentiments of their constituents.¹⁴

Thus Mill finally subscribes to a moderate form of elitism. He is genuinely in favor of a widely distributed suffrage, but not at the cost of neutralizing the better informed members of the electorate. His aim, in short, is to foster an aristocracy of talent within a democratic framework.

Although Mill's elitist inclinations are clearly tempered by his democratic leanings, the former nevertheless place some strain on the internal consistency of his views on liberty. We shall return to this point later, but first we should touch briefly on the connection between Mill's social thought and what we might refer to as his philosophical psychology.

As we noted earlier, Mill is optimistic regarding the prospects for social betterment, and education is the key to the process. Social institutions can be improved if enough individuals with the necessary character and intelligence are on hand to accomplish the task, and it falls to education (not only formal, but also in the broadest sense) to produce such individuals.

Mill wants to effect social change along utilitarian lines. That is to say, he is interested in change that will result in the greatest good for the greatest number. He suggests, as one means to this end the possibility of producing an association of ideas in people's minds such that they will come to equate their own happiness or good with the good of all.¹⁵ The strategy is based on the notion that we are

pretty much what we learn, and what we learn is contingent upon the various combinations of ideas we have formed as the result of experience. This being the case, we ought to be able, given certain psychological laws of association, to construct a science of character formation (Mill calls it "ethology") that would account for the ways in which nature and culture combine to form various kinds of people.¹⁶ This new science would enable us to predict, even to shape, human behavior. For Mill, ethology would also serve as the basis for a science of education, which would eventually yield precepts that could be transformed into practical principles of instruction.¹⁷

Mill's optimism concerning the level of understanding attainable in a science of character formation stems in large part from his assumption that causal connections are as applicable to human behavior as they are to other natural events. Accordingly, if we had enough information about an individual's motives, character, and disposition, we could predict his behavior with as much certainty as we could predict any physical event.¹⁸ Since character is developed by virtue of the association of ideas, moreover, the possibilities for improving the species are virtually unlimited. Mill goes so far as to claim that even instincts may be susceptible to modification as the result of education.¹⁹

II

Mill's determinism serves well his attempt to establish a science of human nature (ethology), but for his ethics it poses the familiar problem of reconciling freedom and responsibility with necessity. Mill's solution is to point out that although character is molded by circumstances, the desire to shape it in a particular way is among the most significant of those circumstances. This perception, together with the notion that appropriate action in accordance with the desire is possible, gives rise, according to Mill, to a sense of moral freedom and indicates that necessity is not at all equivalent to fatalism.²⁰ This contention hardly seems adequate, however, to meet the obvious counterargument that the very desire to alter character is itself determined by external circumstances.

Mill's determinism also seems to undercut to some extent his stand on liberty. His articulate and effective warnings concerning the possibility of individual freedom being crushed under the weight of majority control are perhaps his most widely recognized contributions to political theory, and they seem to confirm beyond question his credentials as a "humanistic" social philosopher. A rather different side of Mill emerges, however, from a consideration of his remarks concerning the possible development of a science of character formation (ethology). Here he is concerned with utilizing psychological "laws" (of association) to foster altruistic dispositions conducive to social harmony, and all of this seems to anticipate the kind of behavior modification through psychological manipulation that is anathema to many contemporary humanists.

On the other hand, it could be argued that since Mill does begin his essay *On Liberty* by pointing out that he is concerned with civil liberty as distinct from freedom of the will, the case he makes for liberty is unaffected by his efforts to utilize the "laws of association" to influence human behavior. That contention raises questions, however, concerning the extent to which civil liberties can be sustained independently of widespread freedom of thought. It might well be argued, in this connection, that civil liberties could easily be divested of substance through the kind of thought control suggested by Mill's proposed science of ethology. Mill himself seems to sense the apparent inconsistency when he argues that "all restraint, *qua* restraint, is an evil . . . leaving people to themselves is always better, *caeteris paribus* than controlling them."²¹ But surely control over people is exactly what we would expect to follow as a consequence of the development of Mill's proposed science of ethology.

The tension between freedom and control in Mill's thought is also noticeable at the boundary between his social, and his educational philosophy, where his initial confidence in the capacity of

popular education to induce people to live according to the dictates of knowledge and reason soon yields to the view that it is best for the masses to look to the class of intellectuals for moral and intellectual guidance. His early faith in education as a means to social melioration is readily apparent in two speeches delivered near the beginning of his career. In an 1823 address on "The Utility of Knowledge," for example, he saw a wider distribution of knowledge contributing to the advancement of morality, and an "aristocracy of wealth and rank" gradually giving way to a "democracy of intellect."²² Then in 1828 he gave a speech on "Perfectability," in which he argued that education could be expected to foster widespread "moral and intellectual excellence."²³

With regard to a general plan of instruction appropriate to these aims (to digress for a moment) Mill suggested, four years later, that all learning must come from within. The teacher can only suggest appropriate questions for the student's consideration. The student's intellect must then grapple with the material and seek the answers for itself through observation, imagination, and reason. This is original thinking, Mill contends, and original thinking is the mark of genius. But this is precisely what is lacking in the schools. Modern education, as Mill sees it, is all "cram" as though everything worth knowing has already been learned. His remedy is to discard cram and train the mind to learn by the actual use of its own consciousness.²⁴ "As the memory is trained by remembering, so is the reasoning power by reasoning; the imaginative by imagining, the analytic by analysing; the inventive by finding out."²⁵

On this occasion Mill did not indicate how one might translate these ideas into curricular recommendations, but several years later (1867) he prescribed a curriculum with an emphasis on science, mathematics, Latin and Greek at the elementary and secondary-school levels, and a university curriculum rich in the sciences, classics, philosophy, and the arts. Mill thought these subjects would discipline the intellect, stimulate interest, and lead to "precision of thought."²⁶

Elsewhere, he implied that the teacher ought to present all possible views on controversial issues. Until one has reflected on all sides of an issue, the only reasonable position to take is one of suspended judgment.²⁷

All of this seemed consistent with his earlier comments on education and the characteristics of genius, which in turn were related to his notion of a "democracy of intellect." Yet (returning now to the main point) even before his reflections on the relationship between education and the nature of genius were published in 1832, Mill evidently was having second thoughts regarding the extent to which popular education could become a liberating social force. In *The Spirit of the Age* (1831), for instance, we find him doubting that many people possess the skills, information, or time needed to uncover the truths that would enable them to regulate their lives according to knowledge and reason. A more realistic approach to social betterment, Mill suggests, is to rely on the "cultivated minds" of intellectuals to carry out the necessary inquiries.²⁸

This view seems consistent with the somewhat elitist political views later advanced by Mill in *Representative Government*, but it is rather far removed from his notion of social melioration emerging from a "democracy of intellect." It is also difficult to reconcile the intellectual paternalism apparent in Mill's advocacy of a clerisy to shape popular opinion with one of the arguments that he later used frequently in the essay *On Liberty*, namely that each person is the best arbiter of what is in his own best interests.²⁹

As E.G. West has pointed out, moreover, Mill also displays paternalistic leanings in his recommendations for compulsory education.³⁰ *On Liberty* presents, as noted previously, an articulate and eloquent case for the non-interference of government in the lives of individuals, except "to prevent harm to others." Mill's individualism assumes that people can generally be relied upon to make wise decisions. When it comes to education, however, Mill's confidence in the general public

is clearly not unlimited, for he is unwilling to trust them to decide that the proper education of their children is in their own best interest. "The uncultivated," he says,

cannot be competent judges of cultivation. Those who most need to be made wiser and better, usually desire it least, and, if they desired it, would be incapable of finding the way to it by their own lights. It will continually happen, on the voluntary system, that, the ends not being desired, the means will not be provided at all, . . .³¹

Thus it is all but self-evident, Mill claims in another context, that the state should make education compulsory.³²

In this context, then, Mill places significant limitations on the degree to which the individual is entitled to lay claim to total freedom from interference by the state. With regard to compulsory education, at least, he is prepared to endorse the use of political authority by the talented minority to encroach on the individual freedom of the "uncultivated" to continue on their unenlightened way.

To summarize, these conflicts between freedom and control in Mill's writings are conspicuous at three levels of his thought: (1) at the practical level where he tempers his democratic convictions with a touch of political elitism, and where his claim that adults should judge for themselves what is in their best interest is to some degree at variance with his recommendations for compulsory education; (2) at a somewhat more theoretical level when he first sees the development of "a democracy of the intellect" as the means to social improvement and later claims that the masses, lacking sufficient opportunity for study and inquiry, must defer to the authority of an intellectual elite in matters of morality and social philosophy; (3) at a still more theoretical, that is, basic philosophical level where the concern for freedom and human dignity so central to Mill's social thought clashes with the deterministic tendencies evident in his philosophical psychology.

To students of contemporary social thought, such inconsistencies are not at all unfamiliar. Indeed they are echoed in much of the social and political debate of our own day. As Gertrude Himmelfarb has noted with regard to Mill, "The ambiguities and ambivalences that are to be found in him are those that beset much of modern political thought and that continue to plague us today. In this sense we are all interested parties in the case of John Stuart Mill."³³

Himmelfarb's reference to "ambiguities and ambivalences" pertains in large part to the manner in which Mill deals with the notion of "liberty" or "freedom," which, by all accounts, is a pivotal idea in his social philosophy. If his deliberations on "freedom" are ambiguous or ambivalent, then obviously great care should be taken in drawing educational implications from his work.

West has observed, in relation to this issue, that Mill's treatment of "liberty" might be interpreted as an attempt to reconcile the "negative" and "positive" interpretations of the concept, with the former viewed as the absence or removal of external restraints that prevent people from acting as they see fit, provided they respect the rights of others, and the latter associated with self-fulfillment or self-realization in terms of the release of personal capacities of various kinds.³⁴ "Positive" freedom is often equated with increased capacity for understanding and appreciation, as well as with the intellectual ability to set realistic goals and carry them to fruition. This conception of freedom is often said to be contingent on knowledge and reason; it entails the "liberation" of the mind from the bonds of error, impulse, prejudice, "blind" passion, "unbridled" emotion and the like. Since increased knowledge is accompanied by enlarged opportunities and expanded options, the more one knows the freer one becomes. Thus ignorance and freedom are held to be incompatible.

It comes as no surprise, then, that philosophers and educational theorists have generally held "positive" freedom in higher regard than "negative" freedom. John Dewey, for instance, held that "freedom from restriction," i.e., negative freedom, was of quite limited value other than as a means to positive freedom, which he viewed as the "power" to formulate and achieve desirable ends.³⁵ And

as Paul Hirst has observed, the [positive] notion of freedom as a kind of intellectual and moral liberation based on knowledge and rationality has served as a cornerstone of Western liberal education since ancient times.³⁶

Now the Mill of *On Liberty*, as the book is commonly understood in its entirety, is generally associated with the negative view of freedom and thus appeals to those who maintain that schools are generally repressive institutions, which tend to inhibit the spontaneity and creative impulses of their students. According to those who subscribe to this view, the first, and perhaps most important, step toward improving the schools is to remove the constraints that prevent children from expressing their personal desires and interests.

The Mill of the *Political Economy* and the early essays on "The Utility of Knowledge" and "Perfectibility," however, as well as the Mill of the section in *On Liberty* (chapter five) that endorses compulsory education, comes through as a spokesman for the positive view of freedom. This Mill appeals to educators who see learning and rationality as the chief instruments of liberation and are prepared to choose positive, over negative freedom in cases of conflict. Should a child balk at learning to read, for example, the teacher who subscribes to the positive view of freedom might well decide to overrule that decision, or at least to exert some gentle pressure on the child to reconsider, on the grounds that the long-range increase in positive freedom (more options, better opportunities, etc.) derivable from literacy outweighs the short-term satisfaction the child would experience if his or her decision were allowed to stand.

To further complicate matters, the Mill of *The Spirit of the Age* and *Representative Government*, with his reservations concerning the intellectual capacity of the general populace, lends support to the elitist conviction that critical thinking on a mass scale is probably a visionary ideal. Finally, the Mill who strives to foster enlightened self-interest and to establish a science of education built on the principles of associationism might well appeal to those who subscribe to the Skinnerian view that "freedom" is an anachronistic, "prescientific" concept and one that sophisticated psychologists should have abandoned a long time ago.³⁷

What, then, in view of Mill's appeal to opposing schools of thought, can we safely conclude with respect to his position on the interrelationship among education, freedom, and society? First of all, the idea that education widely dispersed is a requisite condition for social betterment is sustained with some qualifications. Though Mill's early optimism concerning the extent to which enlightenment can be diffused is clearly tempered by experience, he does retain the belief that the many can be rendered knowledgeable enough to qualify at least as intelligent followers of the superior few.³⁸ On this point, Roellinger concludes — accurately, it seems to me — that "the position he [Mill] finally takes on the question of whether the grand aim of education is to bring about a 'democracy of intellect' or an intellectual clerisy is somewhere between these extremes."³⁹

Regarding his stance on freedom, Mill is commonly remembered, as we have seen, for his defense of individualism and hence of freedom in the negative sense. It is probably fair to conclude, nonetheless, that he comes down more often than not on the side of those who view learning and rationality as the chief instruments of liberation, on the side, that is, of positive freedom. Mill's genuine interest in protecting the individual from nonessential interference on the part of the state comes through clearly in *On Liberty*, to be sure, but his overall rationalism inclines him to the view that reason and understanding are the essential ingredients of "freedom" in the fullest sense of the term. As West concludes,

In the end, the negative liberty which Mill strived to establish becomes difficult to distinguish from an intellectual's special brand of positive liberty, i.e. the idea that what truly liberates is knowledge, rationality or culture.⁴⁰

Interpreting Mill's work as an attempt to reconcile the positive and negative senses of freedom and placing him closer to the camp of the former than to the latter, does not, of course, remove the tension between freedom and determinism in his work. That problem remains an unresolved issue and still another reminder that the complexity of his thought is such that its appeal is not necessarily limited to social and educational theorists of a liberal and/or humanistic bent. Yet, his image does seem to endure, inconsistencies notwithstanding, as something of a beacon to many who view the steady growth of centralized authority in an increasingly corporate civilization as a very serious threat to individuality. His insistence on the need to safeguard the freedom of minorities against possible majority repression and the case he makes against the suppression of opinion and discussion in *On Liberty* are significant contributions to political theory. With the qualifications implicit in the preceding analysis duly recorded, then, we may nevertheless regard Henry Aiken's appraisal as a fitting epitaph for Mill, one that captures the essence of both his individualism and his intellectualism

He has been called the "saint of rationalism," but his rationalism, if such it be, is a far cry indeed from that of his seventeenth and eighteenth-century predecessors. I prefer to think of him as "the saint of liberalism," who kept alive in the Age of Ideology the ideal of reasonableness with a small "r." It is not an ideal which is easily dramatized or which appeals to most questers after certainty. But it is the mark of a civilized mind, and general acceptance of it is the mark of a civilized society.⁴¹

Notes

¹ John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography*, with an Appendix of hitherto unpublished speeches and a Preface by Harold Laski (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 112.

² John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1906), pp. 21-22.

³ P. 9.

⁴ P. 16 and pp. 24-25.

⁵ Pp. 39-42.

⁶ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company; Gateway Edition, 1955), p. 91.

⁷ Pp. 98-99.

⁸ P. 13.

⁹ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, ed. C.V. Shields (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 16-25.

¹⁰ P. 55.

¹¹ P. 86.

¹² Pp., 102-113.

¹³ Pp., 131-138.

¹⁴ P. 177.

¹⁵ Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 25.

¹⁶ John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic*, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898), pp. 569-570.

¹⁷ P. 570.

¹⁸ P. 547.

¹⁹ P. 561.

²⁰ P. 550.

²¹ Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 140-141.

- ²² Mill, *Autobiography* with an Appendix of speeches, pp. 270, 274.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293. For a related discussion of Mill's social and educational views, to which I am indebted, see Francis X. Roellinger, Jr., "Mill on Education," *Journal of General Education* 6 (July 1952): 246-259.
- ²⁴ John Stuart Mill, "On Genius," in Kingsley Price, *Education and Philosophical Thought*, 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 540-547. Originally published under the pseudonym (Antiquus) in the *Monthly Repository* 6 (October 1832): 649-659.
- ²⁵ P. 546. Here Mill seems to be endorsing the doctrine of formal discipline, a view that has been discarded by most contemporary educational psychologists.
- ²⁶ John Stuart Mill, *Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews*, 2d ed. (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867), pp. 20-79 passim. It is not made clear, however, how these recommendations would lead individuals to associate their own happiness with the general good, which is one of Mill's primary educational goals.
- ²⁷ Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 52-53.
- ²⁸ John Stuart Mill, *The Spirit of the Age*, ed. Frederick A. von Hayek (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 17-31. *The Spirit of the Age* was originally a series of essays (signed "A.B.") written for the *Examiner* in 1831.
- ²⁹ Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 98, 100, 111-112, 122-123.
- ³⁰ E.G. West, "Liberty and Education: John Stuart Mill's Dilemma," *Philosophy* 40 (April 1965): 138-142. I am indebted here to West for his analysis of the tension between Mill's views on liberty and his commitment to compulsory education.
- ³¹ John Stuart Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, ed. W.J. Ashley (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915), p. 953.
- ³² Mill, *On Liberty*, p. 155.
- ³³ Gertrude Himmelfarb, *On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. xi.
- ³⁴ West, "Liberty and Education," pp. 129-135.
- ³⁵ John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1938), pp. 63-64.
- ³⁶ Paul H. Hirst, "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in *Philosophical Analysis and Education*, ed. Reginald D. Archambault (New York: The Humanities Press, 1965), p. 115.
- ³⁷ B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp. 9, 19-25, chap. 2 passim.
- ³⁸ Mill, *Inaugural Address*, pp. 18-19.
- ³⁹ Roellinger, "Mill on Education," p. 254.
- ⁴⁰ West, "Liberty and Education," p. 142.
- ⁴¹ Henry D. Aiken, ed., *The Age of Ideology: The 19th Century Philosophers* (New York: The New American Library, Mentor Books, 1956), p. 148.