

ARTICLES

Abstract

Undertaking responsibility is a difficult process. Undertaking educational responsibility is a major challenge. The basic characteristics of education impose boundaries on educational responsibility. In this article an attempt is made to consider the problem of educational responsibility through a systematic analysis of seven characteristics. In order to confront the challenge a new outlook on the educational system is required. Some basic alternatives, although preliminary in nature, are suggested.

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Must Educational Responsibility be an Illusion?

Royal Commission on Educational Responsibility Transcript:

Chairman:

Let me express appreciation to the committee for the presentation. Now, after two days of hearings, let's recapitulate our main points before we meet again next week. I'll ask each representative to summarize his arguments in one sentence.

(Assistant Deputy Minister, Treasury Board):

Even with our scarce resources, we have exceeded expectations in supporting our schools: however, responsibility for outcome is in the hands of those who are authorized to spend the money.

(Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State):

It's a hell of a task to achieve Cabinet Agreement to the various educational Acts. Once the policy is set, though, responsibility for output is firmly in the hands of the administrative system which is in charge of implementation.

(Superior Council of Education):

We waste too much time and energy in talking about the needed resources, when we all know that we can't get the expected results with the insufficient resources we have. In any event, people in the schools could show more responsibility for results.

(Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction):

Much of our authority is a fiction! Our problems are far beyond our resources. We waste too much time in committees, thus leaving insufficient time to work in schools and with teachers. If you ask me, I think that principals and teachers should feel more responsible for education—even without our close supervision.

(OSSHC representative):**

We stand on the firing line. We're pressured by teachers' demands, but we lack real authority to negotiate with them. Our schools are efficiently run and our educational facilities in top condition. Thus, behind the classroom door, it is the teacher who is responsible for the outcome.

(Canadian School Trustees Assoc.):

Never before has there been such a wide gap between the public demands on education and what the public is ready to invest in it. However, it's up to parents, principals and teachers to share together the responsibilities of our children's future.

(Canadian Home and School and Parent Teacher Federation):

If we, the parents, have almost no influence and can't decide *where* our children will learn, *who* will teach them *what* they will learn and *how*, don't look to us—our responsibilities are minimized.

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**School principals.

(CTF representative):†

We have too many imperative curriculum guidelines. Talk about Federal guidelines is offensive. We have to have much more autonomy in deciding what and how to teach. Anyway we always have to bear in mind that studies show that students' social-economic status accounts for more than 85% of the variation in student achievement. Don't forget, as a last word, that those who write the educational guidelines haven't been in a class for at least ten years.

Although each of the distinguished representatives expresses common and mostly agreed-upon views, the above transcript isn't real. It is an intellectual fiction.¹ However, we might expect a similar one to show up somewhere, sometime, in the future.

To what degree is the question of responsibility, as reflected in the above transcript, a function from the unique characteristics of education? What are the educational aspects which make responsibility illusive? Are there boundaries to responsibility inherent in the way education is organized? And if, indeed, as it is assumed here, educational responsibility is conceived as highly bounded by the very characteristics of the educational system, a major challenge is imposed on society as a whole and on the educational organization, educational leadership, and educators in particular.

Although the next conventional step is to define the concept of responsibility, we will proceed without it. This is for two reasons. First of all, it has been done extensively elsewhere.² Secondly, any definition of the concept which steps beyond a dictionary definition is always associated with moral analysis and philosophies of ethics, which is beyond the scope of this article. Hence, we do not intend to discuss the ethics of responsibility in education as a philosophical issue, which was done extensively by Bantock, Peters and Nash.³ Nor do we intend to discuss here the moral questions of applying authority in education, as Bereiter, for example, does in his provocative book, "Must we educate?"⁴ In this analysis, we mean to undertake a new angle by treating responsibility as a function of the characteristics of the educational system. Consequently, our main focus will be the interrelationships between the characteristics of the educational system and the characteristics of responsibility in general, and their implications for educators' actions and educational administrators' performance in particular.

The analysis will be pursued according to the following steps: First, because of the close interrelationships between responsibility and authority, their multiple meaning will be clarified and revealed; second, after identifying seven basic characteristics of the educational system - authority, interdependence, the unified whole, goals, evaluation, correction, and knowledge - they will be analyzed according to the degree to which they impose boundaries on the application of educational responsibility; and third, suggesting some basic outlines for a different outlook in organizing educational systems which might bring back to reality the illusive aspects of educational responsibility.

The Multiple Meanings of Responsibility and Authority

Too often authority and responsibility are used synonymously, as exchangeable concepts, during which the meaning of responsibility gets lost. This shouldn't be too surprising. Since most of our theoretical and empirical analysis, in following Webber's bureaucracy conceptualizations and Parsons' functional-structural approach, concentrates on the interrelationships between structures and functions, their main products are authority and control systems. In this light, it seems that the main weakness of Webber's model of bureaucracy is that it is conceptualized around an authority-hierarchy system which is oriented towards organizational maintenance, continuity, and efficiency, and takes for granted that responsibility will inevitably follow authority. This leaves acquisition of responsibility to the culture and value system rather than considering it as an indispensable organizational ingredient.

To be sure, authority and responsibility do not appear in pure form and are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, that is all the more reason for an analytic distinction between authority and responsibility. Let us clearly distinguish one thing: Authority is the linkage between structure, role

†School teachers.

and the functions that have to be performed; when responsibility is the linkage between performance and results.⁵ Authority is a manipulative commodity. It is a power resource which can be given and taken.⁶ Not so responsibility. One can't delegate responsibility, and in the last analysis, one can't even take it away. Either one has it or not. The following table summarizes the multiple meanings of responsibility and authority:

Table 1.
The Multiple Meanings of Authority and Responsibility

THE IMPLICATIONS	THE CONCEPT	
	Authority	Responsibility
behavioral	To be authoritative, to behave authoritatively: "Why are you behaving like that? They are not your subordinates."	Responsible behavior which expresses loyalty, devotion, and diligence. "Is this a responsible behavior?"
functional (role)	To be in authority, to receive authority: "Do you have authority to do it?"	To be responsible for, to receive performance responsibility: "I am responsible for accomplishing the mission."
expertness	To be an authority: "I rely on him completely; he is an authority in the field."	
personality description	Characteristic, an authoritarian character: "It is hard to believe that he might change, he has such an authoritarian character."	Characteristic, a responsible character: "I warmly recommend him. He is a very responsible person."
action description	A decisive action which expresses authority: "The action should be decisive, so authority will be clear."	A responsible action which expresses completeness: "These are responsible decisions; everything was taken into account."
consequence related		To bear responsibility for what was done. To be responsible for consequences.
a) as a situational analysis		"Everyone is responsible for his actions."
b) as an accusation, as a research for those to be blamed		"Who is responsible for this performance?"
c) as punishment		"The one who did it will bear the full responsibility."

Educational Characteristics and Responsibility

The choice of the following seven characteristics was based on two criteria. First, being central to education: *authority* as a basic component of organizations and of teaching-learning relationships; *interdependence*, *unified whole* and *correction* as the inherent characteristics of the complex, educational process, a process in which the subject is changing or developing even without, or in spite of, the educational organization; *knowledge* and *evaluation* as the basis for any cause-effect analysis, for any assessment of consequences; and *goals*, which serve as the directive, on the one hand, and as the frame of reference for evaluating, on the other.

The second criterion for selection of these characteristics is their centrality in the analysis of educational responsibility: *authority* which is a correlary of responsibility in the sense that it precedes the ability to act; *interdependence* and *unified whole* which deal with identifying the impact of one's actions and their consequences; *knowledge*, *evaluation* and *goal concepts* which represent the ability to relate performance to results, to measure and evaluate them according to a value system; and *correction* which considers the psychological aspects of responsibility.

Since these characteristics are not based on an unidimensional classification, they are not mutually exclusive and overlapping is assumed. They reflect different angles of analysis, although often of similar phenomena.

a. *Authority*. One of the principles of administration states that functions, responsibility and authority should be inseparable. Thus, "one should have just as much, no more and no less authority as goes with one's responsibility".⁷ Today we can regard this principle as one of those shown by Simon to be proverbial.⁸

In the educational domain, one can observe three basic characteristics which impose perceived boundaries on the relationships between authority and responsibility. Firstly, administrators and teachers perceive that they possess far less authority than they should in order to be able to accomplish their tasks successfully.⁹ Secondly, a full materialization of organizational authority is impeded by the "classroom door". Thirdly, and more important, authority, itself, as a dualistic phenomenon, contains a component of responsibility restriction. Authority is the legitimized use of power which enables the exercise of choice and the determination of actions, and, at the same time, authority is the definition of bounded power.¹⁰ While legitimizing the use of power, it implies restrictions of it. Authority is always restricted to determined content, time, location, population and means. Teachers' authority, for instance, is located almost entirely in school. But the development of mathematical thinking is far from being limited to school math classes for which the teacher has authority. Similarly, the development of teaching capabilities as well as learning motivations are, at most, only partially related to the school system. Thus, it is possible to argue that when authority is defined, it in turn imposes perceived boundaries on responsibility. Furthermore, in education, and this will be clarified further in the following characteristics, authority is inherently bounded. Consequently, as long as responsibility is only a derivation of authority it will be bounded. To clarify this point, let us look at some examples. Teachers possess, formally, behind their classroom doors, the full authority to educate and teach, although they are restricted to certain content. A teacher may force a child to study but cannot force him toward meaningful understanding. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for a teacher to employ authority to alter or influence future modes of thinking, systems of beliefs or behavior.

From the parents' viewpoint, the authority of the educational system (as loose or restricted as it is) is often conceived as relieving parents of many of their educational roles. Unfortunately, parents' sloughing off of responsibility for educational consequences onto teachers and schools is common. Indeed, one of the major dysfunctions of the establishment of nationwide compulsory educational systems is that many parents feel themselves released from responsibility for their children's educational achievements.

From a philosophical viewpoint, authority establishes one's behavioral degrees of freedom, and at the same time limits his freedom of choice. Freedom of choice has, since Aristotle, been regarded in all philosophical schools as the indispensable pre-supposition of ethical responsibility.¹¹ Accordingly, voluntary actions are the only ones for which a person can be praised or blamed. If awareness of freedom means that it could be otherwise as opposed to it had to be this way, and one could have done otherwise if one had chosen to, responsibility is related to one's exercise of choice.¹² Pursuing this line of analysis further would inevitably lead us to the classic philosophical discussions of determinism vs. free choice.¹³ But if we assume that educators, in practice, do not perceive responsibility as an either/or situation, but rather as a continuum, having various degrees of responsibility, it is necessary to study those characteristics of the system which are conceived as restricting free will, thus reducing the level of responsibility.¹⁴ Our argument is two-fold. First, education itself restricts the ability to employ authority and, second, some of the basic modes on which the educational system is organized, limits the freedom of choice. To sum up, in education, it is quite questionable to fully apply the conventional view of relating responsibility to authority.

b. *Interdependence*: Interdependence is part of the educational process. We can monitor the interdependence of educators at any time, and especially during the whole schooling period, inter-

dependence of the various educational agencies, of educators and the children themselves, and of the various processes and subject matters as they are reflected in the child's education. From the participant's viewpoint, interdependence imposes constraints which reduces his degree of freedom. Hence, as it increases, his conceived ability of free choice decreases. 'I couldn't do it, since I had to consider what X was/is doing or will/might do' is unfortunately a common argument among educators. More dangerous is the argument for avoiding decisions since one is dependent on someone else's actions which one can't control. However, since education is a continuous process it works even without the conscious process of decision-making. Not deciding means deciding to do without deciding. The absence of a formal decision enables one to escape responsibility. 'No decision' is the rationalization of nonresponsibility. This situation is exactly what Howard, Matheson and North term the *responsibility cost*.¹⁵ There is an asymmetrical relation between the high responsibility cost for the decision-maker and the conceived low responsibility cost for the others who do not decide and allow things to take their own course. It transpires that this kind of asymmetry influences decision-makers to avoid decisions.

Furthermore, in an hierarchical system, interdependence means the conceived dependence of the managerial level on teachers' performances, on the way they actually accomplish the system's goals and objectives on the one hand, and the conceived dependence of teachers on the decisions made on the managerial level, and the logistics provided by them on the other hand. Hence, responsibility flows in two directions, and, unfortunately, might flow in a vicious circle, downwards to those who act, and upwards to those who decide, without being undertaken by any one of them. For example, the administrator makes the decision but might not accept the responsibility for how the teacher applies it since he cannot control him, and the teacher applies it but might not take responsibility for consequences since he didn't have any influence on the decision-making process.

c. *Unified Whole*. If interdependence characterizes the state of the participants, the unified whole characterizes the relationship between multiple processes and outcomes. The inherent interaction of the various educational agencies makes it impossible to establish a direct distinction between a process or action of one agency and its ultimate impact on a child's education. Hence, in the view, that one cannot justly be held responsible for someone else's action makes it questionable whether any educator or educational agency can be held for full responsibility for educational outcomes.¹⁶ One's personal responsibility can be identified only if there is a clear and unequivocal relation between one's acts and results. Since in education all acts interact, an escape from sole responsibility is provided.

This combination of interdependence and unified whole is often conceived of as imposing severe limitations on one's influence on educational results. To take an extreme example, many teachers, after considering the research findings which reveal that most of the variations in children's achievements can be explained through their social economic status (SES), accept only limited responsibility for results. One of the major outcomes of the interdependence and unified whole characteristics is the development of the notion of 'collective responsibility'¹⁷ or worse, of the system's responsibility. Collective responsibility minimizes the individual aspect of responsibility, when the ethical meaning of responsibility is first of all on the individual level. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that a 'system' as such never does anything; things are always done by people. And since 'system' is a conceptual abstraction, the system's responsibility is a dehumanized concept.

d. *Goals*. One of the main characteristics of educational goals is their vagueness and their bounded ability to serve as a basis for a clear view of operative educational objectives.¹⁸ Consequently, there are many educational outcomes for which unequivocal evaluation cannot be reached, since it would have to be based on a comparative approach, which in the last analysis has to rely on an agreed value system. The worth of educational outcomes is, of course, relative to the obtaining value system, and to the educational goals which represent those values.¹⁹ However, in a pluralistic society educational goals often conflict with each other. The same educational outcomes can be evaluated simultaneously through opposing views, each one of them legitimate. For example, two major goals underlined the Israeli Educational Reform - social integration and improvement of scholastic achievements - for

which increasing evidence shows that they might be essentially conflicting. Most schools emphasize either one or the other.²⁰ The answer to the question of which school achieved most is, of course, related to the set of values judgment is based on. Similarly, equity vs. efficiency, socialization vs. individualization, creativity vs. disciplined teaching, all represent conflicting educational goals. The important point is that all of these goals are legitimate and serve simultaneously as frames of reference for evaluation. Since conceived responsibility is directly related to outcomes, and their evaluation can be derived from different goals' frame of references, it is practically meaningless to conceive responsibility for outcomes which can be evaluated by different, and legitimate frame of references. Consequently, educational responsibility as an ethical entity cannot rely only on external value systems, but has to be based in the individual.

e. *Evaluation.* Qualitative analysis is the essence of any evaluation of educational outcomes. However, in education we measure too often what can be measured instead of what should be measured. At best, quantification is a qualitative approximation which serves as the numerical basis for qualitative interpretations. Beyond the common questions of any evaluation process, such as what and how to measure, which are of crucial importance in education, evaluation is impeded by the problem of when. We have no cut-off point which can determine the when. The time boundaries used in evaluational projects and educational research are mostly arbitrary. They are mainly a function of resources, administrative premises, convenience, and other reasons external to the educational process.²¹ Let us consider for instance the evaluation problems of a new televised mathematical instructional program for the 10th grade. Do we measure mathematical knowledge at the end of the program or at the end of the year? Do we evaluate mathematical comprehension and thinking at the end of twelve years of schooling, or even some time in the future? Or maybe one has to analyze some time in the far future the degree of one's dependence on televised information resulting from the program. Hence, the conventional approach of basing responsibility on evaluated outcomes is in many ways questionable.

Can the movement of educational accountability, which developed in a very quick pace in the early Seventies, be seen as the sought-after answer to the weakness of the evaluational process?²² Accountability, based on the idea of being 'accountable for' which is taken as synonymous with being 'responsible for', tries to establish responsibility by measuring outcomes. However, accountability limits responsibility to specific, expected, and determined outcomes, as framed by role definitions. From the organizational viewpoint, accountability is a means for reallocating resources according to measurable outcomes and contracting of educators according to performance. This, from the educators' angle, is a controlling process which is, in the long run, dysfunctional to the development of a genuine sense of responsibility.²³ Historically, accountability can be seen as an administrative response to bureaucracy's failure to handle the question of responsibility. Administratively, it can be seen as a renewed expression of the classical organizational theory, which, again, in the last analysis, reduces the real meaning of responsibility.²⁴

f. *Correction.* To correct or to re-educate is often more difficult than to educate in the first place. All the difficulties and problems of educational responsibility already discussed above apply to processes of correction, and re-education. It is psychologically easier and more practical to undertake responsibility in cases where the possibilities for correction are not in question. Hence, one of the main socio-psychological reasons of escaping from responsibility is the feeling that educational outcomes are irreversible. To be sure, the educational system learns from past shortcomings and failures, in order to undertake corrections for the future. For the individual educator who feels himself in a fixed position in a student-flow system, correction has long-range educational implications mainly for the next class of students. But for the present individual student, failures are often conceived as irreversible.

Much of the discussion on responsibility from the organizational viewpoint tends towards questions of guilt, where the dispute is mainly about who and when to blame or to punish. In many cases of educational shortcomings and failures, the question of responsibility is administratively resolved and finalized through the process of accusation and punishment. However, punishment itself is more of a

legal matter than a moral instrument.²⁵ Blaming and punishing is a behavioral control device which have very little to do with responsibility.

Many theories of responsibility went wrong by basing responsibility mainly upon what could have been done in the past rather than upon what should be done in the future.²⁶ From this viewpoint, the undertaking of responsibility is by itself a process of becoming responsible.

g. *Knowledge*. Knowledge of possible consequences, of cause-effect relationships, has long been considered one of the major features or conditions of responsibility.²⁷ Existing knowledge of cause-effect relationships in education is at best fragmented and vague. This is a clear derivation from the characteristics of interdependence, unified whole, and evaluation. The more a process is dependent on several actors, the more outcomes are a function of an interactive process; and the greater the measurement problems the harder it becomes to establish cause-effect relationships.

Knowledge is not a static essence; the important thing about knowledge is not its actual extent but the will to know, the active desire to generate new knowledge.²⁸ However, the pace of knowledge development in education is asymmetrical. The complexity of the educational process, the increasing number of variables in it, the increasing range of the implications of contemporary decisions, and knowledge about the various uncertainties inherent in education increases *exponentially*. But our knowledge of cause-effect relationships in education and our ability to control such relations increases only *arithmetically*. Consequently, the discrepancy between our knowledge of the desired, the possible and the expected is constantly growing. Conventional considerations of cause-effect knowledge as a basis for educational responsibility is quite shaky.

A word has to be said about the application of the system approach as a cause-effect model to educational responsibility. When the generalized concept of *input-process-output* is applied to organizational behavior, it tends to de-emphasize conscious human actions, on the one hand, and to overemphasize the concept of an inevitable chain reaction from input to output, on the other hand. Instead, in order to place conscious human action in the middle of organizational processes, a different conceptualization is suggested here: *decision-performance-consequences*. Here, one's actions are the result of one's previous decisions and will always lead to certain educational consequences.

Although the emphasis of the above analysis was on the dysfunctional aspects of the educational characteristics for undertaking responsibility the picture must be completed by also looking at the functional aspects of these characteristics from the viewpoint of the whole educational system. This will be done in the following summarizing table.

Table 2.
Responsibility: Dysfunction and Function

CHARACTER- ISTICS	CRITERIA			
	<i>Responsibility's Dysfunctional Aspects</i>			<i>System's Functional Aspects</i>
	Conceptual Image	Perceived Constraints	Implications for Educational Responsibility	
Authority	hard to actualize	organizational dependence	limits the ability to choose, and bounds the space of choice	bounds arbitrariness, and limits total personal control
Interdependence	without directive control	reduces degrees of freedom of individual performance	impedes individually oriented decision-making	maintains system equilibrium
Unified Whole	interaction	reduces influence on outcomes	disconnect direct and perceived relations between performance and consequences	balances extremes
Goals	vague	limited basis to operative educational objectives	doesn't serve as an unequivocal frame of reference for evaluation of outcomes	enables the setting up of a schooling system in a pluralistic society
Correction	hard for individual accomplishment	minimizes the range of educational experimentations	psychological hindrances	ensures organizational stability, and the individualized unexpected
Knowledge	discrepancies between the desire, the possible, and the expected	restricts the establishment of educational professionalization	fragmentation of cause-effect relationships	enables methodological flexibility and change

Weaving Responsibility to the Educational System

In the contemporary structure of the educational system, conceiving full and meaningful responsibility for outcomes is doomed to fail. The educational system is a structure with alienating orientations.²⁹ For many reasons, most of the non-educational ones, such as efficiency of resource allocation, nation-wide institutionalized "babysitting", etc., since the school as the basic organizational component of the educational structure will remain for the foreseeable future, the school, with its relationship to the educational system as whole, has to be restructured in order to enable the development of undertaking educational responsibility.

Meeting the challenge of responsibility cannot be based on discrete methods and incremental changes. A total restructuring of the educational system is required. Although the following does not presume to identify all the needed changes, still, it provides some motive force and a framework for further analysis and operational developments: *The educational system has to be restructured on a bi-dimensional basis of responsibility and authority.*

We are looking for a multilevel reticular structure, rather than a hierarchical triangle one.³⁰ Authority and responsibility have to be welded together, where authority will constitute the horizontal dimension and responsibility the vertical one. Furthermore, the approach to hierarchy must change. If

hierarchy is generally approached as a process by which each hierarchical level establishes the premises on which the next *lower* level is to base its decisions,³¹ in our case emphasis has to be given to an opposing, though complementary approach. Hierarchy will rather be defined, thus, as a process by which each hierarchical level determines the decision premises and roles of the next *higher* level. Consequently, hierarchy will not only be the distribution of *authority*, but first of all the distribution of responsibility. From this viewpoint, centralized educational systems are in conflict and dysfunctional to the inherent characteristics of responsibility.³²

Education attempts to configure societal and individual needs and demands, and the higher the level in the hierarchy, the more it represents the societal dimension, and vice versa. This is, indeed, one of the main underlying assumptions in advocating a change to a dualistic character in the educational hierarchy. Hence, society-oriented decisions will be bounded by the personal dimension in the educational process. Restructuring the system, must be seen only as a necessary condition, but not as a sufficient one. Processes have to change as well. To exemplify a central one: the process of decision-making, as one of the main reflections of operative authority, which to a large degree determines the processes of communication, coordination, etc., has to be changed. *Participatory decision-making* will be the dynamic aspect of this proposed educational system. To be sure, one cannot be too cautious in applying the concept of participation. The central place of participation in social analysis has produced an overwhelming body of literature. Nevertheless, or maybe because of, few concepts are more perplexing.³³

As a starting point in the analysis of this proposal, participation is defined as a *process by which individuals and groups, with equal power, influence each other during the decision-making process, which in turn implicates future actions*. Consequently, one of the major implications of participatory decision-making in a newly-structured hierarchy will be that decision-making, instead of being conceived mainly as an individual process, will be a shared one, and undertaking responsibility, instead of being conceived mainly as a shared process, will be a personal one.

The structural and procedural change advocated here, might lead only to superficial behavioral changes. Ritualistic behavioral patterns, when new behavior is adopted but still controlled by old attitudes and goals, might lead to a dangerous situation. There is nothing more dangerous to an educational system than developing an individualized system of responsibility without personal commitment. Educational leaders are challenged here. People have to be educated towards a *personal commitment to responsibility*. This has to be a goal in itself.

In the era of discontinuity and temporariness, an era where we don't have one a solid value system, an era of a pluralistic society, when the results we expected yesterday turn out to be the failures of tomorrow, and the distinction between right and wrong are elusive, *personal responsibility* might be the only solid base in education. One wonders if, indeed, at the moment we don't have too many educational authorities around with no educational responsibility.

A final word by way of summary. An attempt is made here to consider the problem of educational responsibility through an analysis of the educational system's major characteristics. The analysis calls attention to a number of questions and problems which are reflected in the basic question of responsibility in education and to some alternative possibilities in the educational structure. It is necessary to reiterate that these alternatives are highly tentative and should be considered as a starting point, intended to raise issues rather than to solve them.

Notes

¹ The 'transcript' was prepared for a lecture presented to an Educational-Administration graduate seminar during my sabbatical visit at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. Interestingly, the 'transcript' was taken as real by the students, teachers, principals, board members and other educational administrators. I am thankful to Prof. J. Holland and Prof. R. Townsend and the seminar students for their helpful remarks.

² Responsibility is one of the key concepts to any ethical philosophy. For three comprehensive analyses, see Windelband, Wilhelm, *A History of Philosophy*, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1958, especially Vol. I, Sec. 16, and

Ginsberg, Morris, *On Justice in Society*, Penguin Books, 1965, and Frankena, W.K., *Ethics*, Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963, especially Chap. 4, "Moral Value and Responsibility".

Thus the following list will concentrate mainly on summarizing analyses, cross analyses and discussion of this concept. Bradley examined 'the vulgar notion of responsibility in connection with the theories of free will and necessity' and developed the conditions of being justly held responsible for an action (F.H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, Oxford University Press, 1962. First published 1876.)

Hart, H.L.A. in "The Ascriptions of Responsibility and Rights", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 49 (1948-49), pp. 171-94, reopened the discussion on the relationships between action and responsibility. For some reactions, see G. Pitcher, "Hart on Action and Responsibility", *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 69 (1960), pp. 226-35 and J. Feinberg, "Action and Responsibility" in M. Black (ed.), *Philosophy in America*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1964, pp. 134-60. For two thorough summarizing discussions on responsibility, see Glover's comparative analysis of various theories of responsibility in Glover, J., *Responsibility*, Humanities Press, New York, 1970, especially Chap. 1, and Baier's conceptual analysis in which he reveals the multi-meaning of responsibility as accountability, obligation, answerability, culpability and liability. (K. Baier, "Responsibility and Action" in M. Brand (ed.), *The Nature of Human Action*, Scott, Foreman and Co., 1970, pp. 100-116.)

On responsibility and education, see W. Hare, "A Sense of Responsibility" in *Teacher Education*, University of Toronto, Spring 1970, pp. 52-59, and W. Hare, "Responsibility and Rights in Contemporary Education" in *Educational Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 1972, pp. 303-308. For more reading on this subject see, for instance, H.L.A. Hart, *Punishment and Responsibility*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960. W.K. Frankena, "Freedom, Responsibility and Decision", *Proceedings of the International Congress*, Vienna, 1968, pp. 143-54. J.R. Pennock, "The Problem of Responsibility", in C.J. Friedrich (ed.), *Responsibility*, Nomos III, New York, 1960, pp. 3-27, who clarifies the distinction between having a responsibility and have responsibility.

³ See some of the basic books on these issues: G.H. Bantock, *Freedom and Authority in Education*, London, Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1952, R.S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility and Education*, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., Paul Nash, *Authority and Freedom in Education*, an Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, New York, John Wiley, 1966, R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966.

⁴ Carl Bereiter, "Must We Educate?", Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973.

⁵ Thus, continuing Parson's conceptualization, it is possible to relate role-authority-functions to universalism and individual-performance-responsibility-results to particularism. This can be complemented by Getzels' analysis that authority is inherent in the nomothetic structure and responsibility in the idiographic structure, and that authority will be related to an individualistic-competitive cultural frame of reference, and responsibility rather to a personal authenticity value system. See J.W. Getzels and E.G. Guba, "Social Behaviour and the Administrative Process", *School Review* 65 (1957), pp. 423-91, and J.W. Getzels, "Creative Administration and Organizational Change: An Essay in Theory" in L.L. Rubin (ed.), *Frontiers in School Leadership*, Rand McNally Co., Chicago, 1970, pp. 69-86.

⁶ Such treatment of authority can be found, for instance, in W.F. Ilchman and N.T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969.

⁷ Follet, Mary P. in Metcalf, Henry C. and Urwick, L. (eds.), *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Work of Mary Parker Follet*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1970, p. 147.

⁸ Simon, Herbert, "The Proverbs of Administration", *Public Administrative Review* VI, Winter 1946, pp. 53-61 and also *Administrative Behavior*, New York, The Free Press, 1957, pp. 20-36.

⁹ See some research findings which support this statement in Dan E. Inbar, "Perceived Authority and Responsibility of Elementary School Principals in Israel", *The Journal of Educational Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 1, May 1977, pp. 80-91.

¹⁰ Except for those extreme situations of absolute, totalitarian authority which is not the case in question.

¹¹ See, for instance, Wilhelm Windelband, *op. cit.*

¹² Undoubtedly, this brings us directly to Sartre's school of thought. See on this subject, H. Broudy, "Sartre's Existentialism and Education", *Educational Theory*, 1971, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 155-77.

¹³ On determinism as related to responsibility, see Ree, Paul, "Determinism and the Illusions of Moral Responsibility", Ch. 1, Part 1, "Determinism and Moral Responsibility" in P. Edwards and K. Pap (eds.), *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, The Free Press, New York, 1973 (3rd Ed.), and W.T. Blackston (ed.), *Meaning and Existence*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1971, Part 5, "The Problem of Free Will, Determinism and Responsibility", which includes seven articles on the subject. Glover, Ch. 2, "Determinism", *op. cit.* Ginsberg clearly emphasized that the distinction between free will and determinism "is not of decisive importance from the point of view of the regulation of conduct, except perhaps for those who accept a retributive theory of punishment," *op. cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁴ An interesting study was done by Jacques Elliot who measured responsibility levels as a reward determinant. *Measurement of Responsibility*, Tavistock Publication Ltd., London, 1956 and *Work, Creativity and Social Justice*, Heinemann, London, 1970.

- ¹⁵ Howard, R.A., Matheson, J.E. and North D.W., "The Decision to Seed Hurricanes", *Science* 16, June 1972, Vol. 176, pp. 1191-1202.
- ¹⁶ This view can be derived from Glover's straightforward interpretation of Bradley's first conditions of responsibility of self-sameness, i.e., "I must be throughout one identical person." See Glover, *op. cit.*, p. 14, Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- ¹⁷ To be sure, "collective responsibility" is often exploited as a control mean through group pressure, since "collective punishment" follows in this case "collective responsibility".
- ¹⁸ For a thorough summary of this issue, see Elboim-Dror, R., "Organizational Characteristics of the Educational System". *The Journal of Educational Administration*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1973.
- ¹⁹ Compare it to Rittel and Webber's distinction between "tame" and "wicked" problems. Rittel, Horst and Webber, Melvin W., "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning", *Policy Science* 4 (1972), pp. 155-69.
- ²⁰ For some empirical findings on this issue, see Dan E. Inbar, H. Adler and N. Rash, "Ethnic Composition, Integration, Achievement, School Climate", *Megamot Behavioural Sciences Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3-4, 1977, p. 230-37.
- ²¹ Pedersen, E., Faucher, T.A. and Eaton, W.W. presented an unconventional study which is almost a unique exception. They studied first grade teacher effects on adult status. See "A New Perspective on the Effects of First Grade Teachers on Children's Subsequent Adult Status", *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1, Feb. 1978, pp. 1-31.
- ²² It will be fruitless to list all the publications on accountability. However, some summary of publications is worthwhile. Lessinger, L.M., in *Every Kid a Winner*, opened essentially the "accountability" revolution (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1970). For some analytical critiques, see Browder, L.H. (ed.), *Emerging Patterns of Administrative Accountability*, McCutcheon Publishing Corp., Berkeley, 1971; Gephart, W.J., *Accountability - A State, A Process or A Product?* Thirteenth Phi Delta Kappa Symposium on Educational Research, Bloomington, 1975, which is essentially a "State of the Art" summary, generally extremely critical.
- ²³ See on this issue, Spencer, L.R., "Accountability as Classical Organizational Theory", in Browder, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-94.
- ²⁴ On performance contracting, see Lessinger, *op. cit.*, Ch. 4.
- ²⁵ See on this issue, Frankena, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-57 and Hart, 1968, *op. cit.*, especially Ch. VII, "Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility.
- ²⁶ Dewey in analyzing the relationships between responsibility and education emphasizes this point: "It is argued that there is no justice in holding a person liable for his act unless he might equally have done otherwise - completely overlooking the function of being held to account in improving his future actions", Dewey, John, *Theory of the Moral Life*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1960 (first published 1908), p. 177.
- ²⁷ See, for instance, Ginsberg's analysis in which responsibility has three features: freedom, knowledge of consequences and knowledge of relevant obligations. Because of the difficulty of defining these different features, he developed different measures of responsibility - full, diminished, and lack of. *op. cit.*, p. 162. On this issue Brand clarifies: "Hart and others who hold the ascriptivistic thesis are claiming that the concept of human action is essentially a moral and social concept ... to reduce responsibility to causation by the agent is, at best, to assert a volitional-type analysis". See Brand's "Introduction to Action and Behaviour" in *The Nature of Human Action*, M. Brand (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 18.
- ²⁸ This is a point Dewey emphasizes in his analysis of moral judgment and knowledge. *op. cit.*, p. 143.
- ²⁹ On this issue see Z. Lamm, "Teaching and Alienation," *Megamot*, Vol. 14, No. 1-3 (1966), pp. 163-171.
- ³⁰ On such structural developments, see Smith, R.W., "A Theoretical Basis for Participatory Planning", *Policy Science* 4 (1973), pp. 275-95.
- ³¹ See Thompson, J.D., *Organization in Action*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, p. 149.
- ³² It has to be emphasized that centralization as such might often lead to unexpected results. An over-centralized system might lose its control on the local units and decentralization might in this case be just the means to gain back control.
- ³³ For an analysis revealing twenty-one different meanings and uses of participations, see Dan E. Inbar, "Social Planning: The Challenge of Adult Education for Social Participation", in a special issue of "Adult Education and Development Policy", *Vierteil Jahres Berichte* No. 72, June 1978, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn.