Furlong, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Otto Weininger, among others. Third, by omitting the literature on dramatic education, Howard's discussion of "From Image to Action" is inadequate (pp. 47 et seq.). But his sections on useful imaginings (pp. 14-19), expression (pp. 27-37), and heuristic imagination (pp. 43 et seq.) should be recommended to all graduate students of education.

Personally I find part 2, "Ways of Learning," less interesting. This is not to say that other readers will agree with me for it is coherent and linked to the whole. My attitude, I suspect, is due to Howard's separate discussions of learning by instruction, practice, example, and reflection. My own inclinations are specifically holistic and, if I am eating a cake, I like it to be unified and not in lumps.

Finally, the publishers are to be congratulated on the overall presentation of this volume. It is not usual in the economics of the recession to find a significant, softcover, nonfiction book given plenty of "air" around the type and spare pages for reader's notes. These qualities help to make the book "a really good read."

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Pratte, R. (1992). *Philosophy of education: Two traditions*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 326 pp., $58.75 (hardcover).

Professor Pratte has attempted to unite certain features of Ordinary Language Philosophy (one type of analysis) with certain features of Normative Philosophy. The first set of features he calls a "bag of skills"

and the second a "bag of virtues" (p. xxii). He makes it clear that he is not examining the history of the traditions represented by these features but rather he is working within them (p. xii). He does so mainly by using an analytical methodology related to normative aims and purposes of education and first order moral principles. He stresses clarification of concepts and justification of beliefs, with emphasis upon reason or rationality and with respect for persons. He is of the opinion that clarification of fundamental concepts occurs both logically and practically prior to understanding the normative tradition and justifying policies and practices in education. He is aware that some may object to his strong emphasis upon reason, but he insists that teachers, to be effective, must become skilled in the uses of reasoning techniques (pp. xx-xxii).

The book is divided into four parts. The first is termed "Philosophy," the second "Virtues," the third "Education," and the fourth "Issues." Philosophers of education and practical educators will find much that will be both interesting and challenging in all four parts. For those who are not well acquainted with Ordinary Language Analysis, part 1 will need to be carefully studied. The same can be said for part 2 for those who may not be acquainted with certain normative matters. Part 3 deals with education, schooling, and indoctrination, needs, interests, and discipline. Part 4 is devoted to such issues in education as authority, power, freedom, paternalism, privacy, and rights. These issues are clarified and placed in social and educational contexts.

The first part is divided into chapters on "Clarification Procedures of Clear Thinking," "Statements: Claims and Disputes," and "Justificatory Strategies for Clear Thinking." Pratte may bore some readers with excessive attention to numerous and often minute linguistic and/or logical distinctions. The distinctions are not those invented or even explicated by the author. They are rather standard ones in Ordinary Language Analysis. One technique that is often employed for testing logical (necessary) relations of concepts is termed "A with or without B" (pp. 16-18). For example, if A is used for teaching and B for learning, can there be teaching without learning? Conversely, can there be learning without teaching?

One can find numerous cases where the two are not necessarily related and some where a nonnecessary or contingent relation can be found.

Most readers will not find much to object to in what is said about language uses and concept analysis. The author does, however, follow an older work by Israel Scheffler too closely in what he says about definitions (pp. 22-27). He discusses descriptive definitions without first discussing ways in which things can be described. He does not show how to analyze and test such definitions. He discusses stipulative definitions rather well, but he fails to show adequately that programmatic definitions can be prescriptive, emotive, and propagandistic. In a controversial field such as education it pays to examine definitions to find if they are partisan or propagandistic and to reveal what is implicit in them. Other forms of definitions, especially contextual ones, could have been shown.

The second chapter is devoted to "Statements: Claims and Disputes." A statement is what is asserted by a sentence (p. 35). Statements asserted for general acceptance stake claims (p. 36). Pratte identifies six types of statements which he calls imperatives, preferences, value judgments, empirical statements, analytical ones, and metaphysical ones. Some philosophers, however, may only consider truth functional propositions to be genuine. Sentences, as opposed to statements, serve other purposes in language. Imperatives, value judgements, and some metaphysical remarks may not be true or false in the usual sense. Pratte believes that metaphysical sentences are about a supernatural realm of existence, have no agreed-upon meaning, and cannot be verified (pp. 55-58). He does not consider the possibility that some metaphysical sentences could be about conceptual frames of reference rather than about supernatural existence. Finally, the distinction between real and verbal disputes is explored and the role of statements in teaching is discussed.

In chapter 3, "Justification Strategies of Clear Thinking," Pratte finds justification to be "one of the most daunting and vexing of any [problems] facing someone writing a philosophy of education book" (p. 63). He easily distinguishes justification as giving good reasons for acts as opposed to offering excuses (p. 66). He finds reason giving to be within a social

context (p. 67). Some reasons may be empirically true or false and some may be value judgments but reasons cannot be mere rationalizations (p. 66). He sees school rules as cases where justifications may often be required. The typical form of justification is that of argument in which reasons are offered to support conclusions. Although he exhibits a deductive argument form (pp. 72-74), he favors practical arguments as described by Stephen Taulmin and others in terms of grounds, backing, and warrants for conclusions (pp. 76-77). Normative arguments of this kind are not valid or invalid, but rather are more or less convincing depending upon the strengths of the grounds, backings, and warrants.

In chapter 4 Pratte turns his attention to human dignity, personhood, and respect for persons which he allies with tolerance to provide an "ethical ideal" (p. 89). He admits to a kind of Kantian normative position (p. 89). Unlike Kant's categorical imperative, Pratte holds that there are no universally valid moral principles (p. 90). Yet he speaks of moral duties to help victims of society at home and abroad (p. 90). Pratte admits that what he advocates may not be the dominant normative view (p. 90). He attempts to justify his view and speaks of a major aim of education as enhancement of the moral life of society (p. 91).

Human dignity is justified, he believes, by documents such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Rights. He falls back, however, on Kant's imperative to treat persons as "ends in themselves" (p. 93). This seems odd, if one rejects universally valid moral principles while claiming that an effective and viable moral code will have universalizable requirements or principles which apply irrespective of persons (p. 94). Perhaps a simple example can be used to clarify the oddity. If stealing is wrong, then it is wrong no matter who does it or how much is stolen. In this case, application of a principle to all is universal. On the other hand, Pratte advocates care, concern, and tolerance (p. 90). How much care, concern, or tolerance can be justified? Do we become tolerant of thieves? How about scoundrels and tyrants? Can we honestly respect mass murderers? The answer is that we respect them as persons while deploring their immoral acts. We punish thieves and murderers but we do so with concern and benevolence (pp. 107-109).

Although Pratte goes to some length to explicate such concepts as "person" and "respect" (p. 101) he seems to agree with W.B. Gallie that some concepts, especially normative ones, are essentially contested (p. 101). Applying moral principles with concern and tolerance and striving to make punishment fit the circumstance of the offense raises questions of fairness. Can unequal treatments of whatever kind be rationally justified? Pratte cites the U.S. Public Law 94-142 called Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 as a case of unequal treatment. He does not consider the educational benefits or educational faults of the act but only justification for it in terms of least restricted environment (p. 111). Finally, he uses the distinction between respect and esteem to show that educators should respect all persons but bestow esteem only where it is due (pp. 118-122).

The mediating factors in moral life for Pratte seem to be concern, caring, and toleration. These are the topics, along with self-development, that comprise chapter 5. The theme is that teachers need to be reasonable, concerned, caring, and tolerant people if they are to cultivate these same dispositions in their students (p. 123). It seems that "modelling," as Pratte calls it, is fundamental to teaching moral dispositions. In short, as long believed, morals are best taught by example and by doing rather than by formal instruction or moral preachment. Nevertheless, Pratte strongly advocates an ethical ideal, not merely for personal life but for social life as well. This ideal, he believes, is best illustrated in prosocial behavior and community service (pp. 147-155). In this regard, he attempts to unify what he believes are disparate normative traditions, individual morality, and social justice (p. 155).

In the third part Pratte attempts to use analytic methodology and values in dealing with education. He explicates the meanings of "education," "schooling," and "indoctrination." There are, of course, different meanings in different contexts of use. There are also a number of justifications for each context. Pratte does not critically examine definitions of concepts to show partisan uses or meanings but he goes to some length to justify education. He analyzes the concept of "schooling" and notes that the actual conduct of schooling was compulsory, sequential, and selective

(p. 174). He could have noted bureaucratic management and political control of public schooling. He does speak of a public school monopoly (p. 175). He does notice some of the failures of recent school reform efforts (p. 177).

Whatever schools may be or do, their central features are teachers, students, and a curriculum. Using A with or without B, Pratte shows that there can be education without schooling and schooling without education (pp. 180-189). He also points out that schooling often includes indoctrination. Pratte, like many philosophers of education, expresses his dislike for implanting religious or political views in students (p. 183). He does admit, however, that indoctrination is a form of teaching that is not always a bad thing, however indefensible indoctrination would be (p. 184). Pratte does not make clear when indoctrination is defensible or just how and when it should be avoided. His further analysis of the concept centers upon beliefs, especially disputatious ones (p. 186). Finally, he seems to think that students are not indoctrinated if they remain open-minded about issues, no matter what the teacher intended (pp. 188-189). On the other hand, he clearly believes that indoctrinators are "betrayers of the young" (p. 190).

From indoctrination the author leads his readers into old questions about meeting student needs, utilizing interest, and maintaining discipline. By analysis he distinguishes "needs" from "wants" (pp. 197-204) and identifies a normative and a psychological meaning for the concept of "interest" (pp. 206-208). Using A with or without B, he shows where "interest" and "attention" are and are not logically related in each of the two senses of "interest" (pp. 208-212). The concept "discipline" is analyzed to show its different meanings such as good order, punishment, and control as well as "discipline" as subject matter and as self-imposed regulation (pp. 217-227).

From discipline the author moves into chapter 8 entitled "Authority, Power, and Freedom." Again analysis of concepts precedes discussion of their uses in education. How authority, power, and freedom are used in schools has moral or normative consequences. This leads to further

consideration of human dignity, respect for persons, concern, caring, and tolerance. Authority, power, and freedom bring to mind questions of authoritarianism and indoctrination. Pratte uses distinctions between being *an* authority and being *in* authority and between expert authority and authoritarianism in discussing the role of teachers and school personnel (pp. 239-240). The role of teachers in relation to students and to administrators is examined.

Authority in paternalistic institutions such as schools follows from the functions of authority and power with regard to child care and schooling of the young. Pratte analyzes concepts such as "paternalism," "privacy," and "rights." The problem of justifying paternalism with attending restrictions of freedom and curtailing rights turns about the immaturity of school children and the inherent imposition of schooling by uses of authority and power of school personnel. Privacy is called an important aspect of personhood and self-development (pp. 283-286); however, schools as custodial institutions do not often respect privacy of individuals. Pratte explores both the moral and legal right to privacy which leads to analysis of other rights and to the role of teachers in respecting rights of students.

Viewing the book as a whole, it is a large and detailed work in philosophy of education, even a textbook on one kind of philosophy of education. It is, however, a book that teachers, school administrators, and school board members should study. Pratte has brought many years of experience and a thorough knowledge of philosophy of education to bear upon schooling.

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