

Abstract

Curricular planning for sociocultural development rests upon dubious ethnocentric assumptions respecting the superiority of the modern. Analysis shows that a society's capacity for controlling and directing its own inherent propensity for change and/or stability is profoundly conditioned by the phenomenological form experientially assumed by the basic epistemological categories of time, space, causation, number, ethics, and aesthetics. For a variety of logical and functional reasons, therefore, continuing validity must everywhere be accorded to many traditional practices.

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Curricular Planning for Sociocultural Change and Development: A Critique

The focus of the present paper is upon a critical evaluation of those recent intellectual and/or ideological trends in the field of curricular construction which have become manifest, say, in recent decades, albeit variably and sometimes belatedly, in differing countries which face developmental educational problems, including our own. These trends are evident at times in the forms of curricular planning theories, at other times and places in the forms of methodological emphases, and, of course, sometimes as both. And while the prospective critique is intended to apply, implicitly and more or less uniformly, to all societies indiscriminately, the strictures to be introduced would seem to bear most heavily and urgently upon the so-called developing countries of the Third World.

Third World countries are variably situated respecting the continued borrowing of Western ideas and technologies. And, seemingly, in their haste to achieve higher material standards of welfare, they have seldom hesitated to continue accepting essentially Western notions, whether these arrive in the guise of Historical Materialism, old-fashioned Christianity, modernized Capitalism, or whatever.

But regardless of the particular ideological "packaging" or "labelling" which characterizes such now alien cultural borrowing, it is apparent that what is occurring is the rise of a new form of colonialism. This more modern colonialism is a *technological colonialism*, a self-imposed and self-deluding colonialism, which an indigenous Western-educated middle-class leadership is thrusting, often uncritically and coercively, upon many unsuspecting Third-World peoples.

From the argument to be elaborated below, it appears to follow that for many such peoples this new technological colonialism is, in a cultural and political sense, a Trojan horse. In its inner recesses there lurk a Pandora's Box full of (for them)

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hypothetically apocalyptic Western, i.e., Christian, philosophical, conceptions: linear time, discontinuous and hierarchical social space, an impersonal, open-universe notion of causation, ethical and moral universalism, and much, much more.

The phenomena indexed by these and related philosophical-behavioral categories, their derivative combinations and permutations, are hypothetically at the very center, at the core, of every culture. And this poses the problem of whether any one such conception taken singly (or even several of them taken in combination) can be introduced and successfully infused into a non-Western culture, even with the aid of substantial coercion, without simultaneously incurring grave risk of subsequent cultural disintegration and collapse, whether in the short-run or the long.

There are thus two issues of overriding importance which will command our attention in this context.

The first of these is the question: can developing countries everywhere feasibly adopt Western conceptions of the fundamental sociocultural categories of time, space, etc., as the bases of their curricula without incurring *less* sociocultural change of a consciously planned and desired kind than they want, and *more* change of a kind that they may *not* have either planned, or intended or foreseen, or would have desired, had they had a free and informed option of choosing?

The second issue proceeds from the consideration that the problem of change is not fully exhausted by an assessment of purely qualitative changes. Toynbee has convincingly argued that in historical perspective, civilizations exhibit a growth pattern which is characterized by emergence, growth or development, decay, and decline.¹ Presumably, judging by its historic rarity, civilizational emergence does not take place until some critical "take-off" point of change and development has been achieved by the society in purview. Presumably also, judging by the apparent historic inevitability of civilizational decline, decay does not begin to set in until some critical "saturation" point of change and development has been exceeded by the society in question. And this poses the issue: Is there some optimum *amount* of change beyond which it is fatal for civilization to go? To date there is no evidence to suggest that curricular planners in any World have given more than passing attention to this question. Yet as an issue, it would appear to be of fundamental importance in both the short-run and the long, inasmuch as Toynbee held out the positive hope that mankind, by taking thought and action, could and would break the historic inevitability of civilizational decline.

The strategy to be employed in constructing a relevant critique rests upon a number of interrelated assumptions. First, in keeping with Piaget's conception of psychological structure and development, it is assumed that time, space, causation, number, ethics and aesthetics must be counted as both logically and analytically pre-eminent among the fundamental philosophical categories.² Second, that these same categories must be viewed, phenomenologically, as being culturally relative, as subjectively meaningful, and as analytically interdependent, rather than dependent, variables which exhibit both sacred-secular and physical social dimensions. Third, that only by so construing these concepts does it become analytically feasible to view each of them separately, and all of them interdependently, as instances of *social* belief, *social* value, *social* motivation, *social* action, and, hence, *social* causation.

In order to explore more fully these philosophical-behavioral categories, it will be expedient to undertake a systematic comparative analysis of our own

mythological traditions and historic behavior, on the one hand, and the mythology and behavior patterns of the native peoples of English-speaking North America, on the other. Such a comparison will be illuminating, inasmuch as these people's, by Toynbee's criterion and classification of civilizations, are seemingly only now recovering from the shock of cultural contact and assimilation and are making rapid strides upon the road to development and civilization.³

The implications for sociocultural change are cited in passing throughout. The curricular planning implications, however, are reserved for detailed discussion at the close of the present essay.

Time

Clearly, in this, the native world view, the well-springs of life, the origins of time, and the form and constitution of space, and the principal of causation are not, as they are with Christians, somewhere up in the sky, over and above man and nature. On the contrary, they are seen instead, as welling up from below. Nature, hence, is herself regarded as the great creative force, the great transcendent causal principal, the inexhaustible source of order and genesis in both life and society. In here are constituted the rhythms which signal and recount the passage of time; on her broad breast, the earth, she provides to all living forms a place of succourance and support; and it is in her and through her and by her that her children find a cause, a reason to be born, a reason to live, and a reason to die. Life forms of every kind, therefore, symbolize nature's transcendence, her eternal recurrence, her encompassing wholeness, her inexhaustible power and mystery, and man's total and ultimate dependence upon her.

With the possible exception of the mythologically given acts of creation itself, there has been for native peoples no fall from a state of grace and, hence, no single historic act undertaken by any single human embodiment of the supernatural through which a collective spiritual redemption was achieved, as is the case with Christians. On the contrary, the act of achieving personal salvation, of acquiring supernatural powers with which to manipulate nature, typically occurs in a uniquely personal way at the outset of adult life. Moreover, the substantive content of this experience serves only to reinforce the individual's identification of himself as part and parcel of nature. His names, his songs, his dances, his medicines, and indeed the image of his tutelary guardian spirit reflect this unity with nature. Accordingly, in both his highly individuated spiritual life, as well as in his individuated economic life, the native person remains obsessed by the rhythms of nature. And these are endlessly cyclical and circular.

Unlike his Christian counterpart, he does not see life extending forward in a linear fashion to some anticipated ultimate climax in which he will achieve salvation through union with the supernatural. He has no need to do so. For him this climactic event has already taken place in the past, and its meaning and significance, its periodic renewal, is immediately and intimately linked with the cyclical rhythms and recurrences of nature. Lacking as he does, then, both a written record of a shameful past as well as an idealized image of a temporal future, i.e., a heaven to which he will go in the after life, his perceptual orientation remains linked to the present. And this present has its genesis in a vague and ill-defined past and, projectively, links forward to an equally vague and ill-defined future. His preoccupation is with *Being*, rather than *Becoming*, as is the case with us. Time, therefore, is not something to be treasured and conserved. Rather, it is something to be consumed

in the here and now. Its value can be realized only in terms of the opportunity which it presents at any given moment for the satisfaction of minimal physical needs essential to survival. Apart from momentary and fleeting recreational activities, there simply are no other important alternative uses to which time, as such, can be devoted. Native time redounds on nature's rhythms themselves. The appropriate symbol for native time, therefore, is the circle. Time for us is linear, sequential, and non-recurring; for natives, it is cyclical, integral, and ever-recurring.

If we were to try to draw a contrast between this conception of time and that of the Judeo-Christian tradition, one would be justified in suggesting that we who have the linear time concept know, or at any rate think we know, where we came from, where we are at present, and where we are ultimately going. Native people, by contrast, being without a linear time concept, and having instead a cyclical, which is to say circular, concept of time, also know where they have come from as well as where they now are. But, they are far less clear on where they are ultimately going.⁴

Cyclical time is associated with a positive evaluation of the past and of the present. Of the future, however, it is ignorant. Hence it can neither disdain nor positively value what, in functional terms, does not exist. The future, therefore, cannot have value, whether negative or positive. And without such a concept, the notion of growth, development and progress is also necessarily culturally unreal and without meaning.⁵ In consequence, each generation tends to remain a mirror image of its predecessor.

The full significance of this cannot, of course, be fully explored here. To do so would involve a formal and systematic exposition of a theory of socio-cultural change which is more or less implicit in this as well as the discussion which follows. But among the more important considerations which warrant some passing comment, it would appear, is the notion that for societies which have the linear time concept, as contrasted with others who do not, there are present differential opportunities for change as well as differential limitations.

The opportunities for change and innovation are tremendous in scope and volume. If, as is the case among ourselves, we disdain and deny the past, and value most highly the future, it is because the future is associated in our minds with progress. Our confidence and optimism is practically unbounded. Under such circumstances we are open to change on an unlimited scale and at an increasingly exponential rate.

The limitations associated with a linear time concept, on the other hand, seem to be that the contemplated future, the idealized future, the tolerable future, must logically and functionally be continuous and consistent with the whole of our historic past. Our unshakeable conviction of order and controllability in nature as well as our complex economic, fiscal, and organizational interdependence, seemingly allows us no other option. This means that there is and can be no voluntary retreat, no deliberately chosen return to the past; there is and can be only movement forward on the road to a future that leads onward and upward to some hypothetically desirable condition we know not which, precisely, or where. With us, therefore, change is highly valued, expected and encouraged. Moreover, its occurrence, if not yet its forms, is increasingly programmed, progressive and cumulative, despite, indeed, because of, its centrifugal effect upon traditional norms, values, and modes of cultural integration.

Alternatively for societies, like those of our own native peoples, which have a cyclical time concept, and which are without an ontologically pre-figured future, tomorrow seemingly can be different from today, in degree or even in kind, without necessarily violating any fundamental structural or logical or historical rule, such as would be the case among ourselves. Where we are bounded and hemmed in by our canons of logical consistency, they are free to behave erratically, discontinuously, and situationally. Provided only that change is episodic and random, rather than programmed and continuous, such societies hypothetically can more easily resist change. Moreover, they can assimilate, hypothetically, sporadic changes which do occur in a much more flexible, manageable way, it would appear, than is possible for us. And this, presumably, has much to do with their propensity to assume that nature is arbitrary, capricious, and essentially non-controllable as well as with their far less complex mode of socio-cultural interdependence and integration.

Space

In native eyes *physical space* and all objects in it are, like they themselves, a part of the larger, undifferentiated unity in nature from which none can be separated.⁶ The area occupied by the society simply *exists*, rather than being "owned". This collectively held area is one which all are free to use according to their needs, and for such periods of time as might be required. Given these property concepts, the issue of physical space being appropriated for private uses and alternative economic functions, as is so fundamentally the case among ourselves, logically does not arise.

Respecting *social space* native cultures emphasized and the economy functionally compelled grouping into nuclear family units, where close affective ties existed only between the members of this constricted social entity. Political organization was, with few exceptions, non-existent. Outside the bounds of the nuclear family, leadership and authority were almost totally lacking. Each nuclear family unit remained a law unto itself, as it were. The head of such a unit was compelled to rely upon his own resources, and to provide for and protect its members as best he could, and to seek directly from nature the supernatural power, authority, and sanctions for his behaviour.

If this suggested absence of a common and collective source of supernatural power hypothetically militates against the legitimization of authority and hierarchy in the abstract, and hence, against large-scale organizational structures and collective actions, it is also apparent that it tends to militate against any *major* social action, novelty, change, or innovation being undertaken on a unilateral basis. Instead, it insures, indeed, guarantees, a consensually based *inaction*, one which endures until and unless all reservations and potential resistances have been allayed and set aside. This "democracy-of-the-whole," then, serves to control the form, the rate, and direction of any and all major sociocultural change. At the same time it ensures the continuation of an integrated, organically united and consensual society. It also insures the assimilation of all persons to the "highest common multiple" of public interest and welfare rather than the "lowest common denominator," as is so often the case with ourselves. Here, then, is a socio-spatial concept in which the direction of change is hypothetically always regulated and directed in such a manner as to insure that it constitutes a "regression on the mean;" that it becomes assimilated to centripetal, rather than centrifugal forces, as viewed from the standpoint of sociocultural integration.

Among ourselves, both vertical and lateral differentiation are possible. And since our spatial concept is functionally joined with our linear time concept, it is possible, indeed, most probable, that the vertically differentiated and segmented parts of society will structurally draw apart, every further. In native thought and in native behaviour, by contrast, vertical differentiation in terms of power is precluded, indeed, prohibited, although a measure of lateral differentiation may and does occur. The functional linkage between their concept of social space and their cyclical concept of time implies, however, that the differentiated and segmented parts remain an integral part of the whole and redound back upon the culture-as-a-whole, inasmuch as no differentiation of power, no structural hiatus, in the vertical plane can and does occur. The appropriate symbol for our own conception of space is a three dimensional pyramid. For the native peoples, the appropriate symbol seems more nearly that of a flat, two dimensional plane.

Given a flat, two dimensional plane conception of native space, it would appear to follow that what in general is culturally conceived as possible and probable is limited to that which any one individual in his own lifetime and with his own limited strength and resources might achieve. And since, occupationally speaking, everyone is a generalist rather than a specialist, social ambition and aspiration to progress must necessarily remain highly limited. There may, consequently, be little or no conscious planning, no programmed increment, and no "risk capital" put to work. But every individual, as individual, lives a full and balanced life. And this we may well envy.

For us the present state of the world appears as a lineal descendant of the historic past. Our myths of origin postulate an initial hierarchical structure of power that is total, a power which is absolute, a power which is universal. This has descended in some sort of graduated form from the supernatural *above through* man to nature *below*. These strata, then, are deeply fissured and discontinuous. We alone have had kings who ruled by divine right; we are the ones who have historically entertained a pluralistic system of jurisprudence in which there was one law for the clergy, another for the unsanctified layman, yet another for the rich, and a final one for the poor and the unwashed; we are the ones who have had segmented social strata that are grounded in differentiated economic and political power. And as a society or civilization we alone have been given a mandate by the supernatural to achieve dominion over nature.

All this in marked contrast to the situation in native societies in which power, as we have seen, resides in nature. This power, moreover, is only partially manifest in man himself and in human society. Hence, it is characterized by a local, conditional, and highly particularistic form of organization. It comes to men from strange, unseen, mysterious depths in nature herself; and it is to these same regions that it cyclically returns. Neither has there been a pluralistic system of native jurisprudence and/or segmented social strata. Chiefs have achieved preeminence of a limited, partial, segmented sort only by virtue of having demonstrated a superior measure of supernatural power which was derived from a guardian spirit who bestows such gifts from and on behalf of a capricious nature. But this implies no authority to command and no obligation to obey, as is the case with us. The community, hence, is not fragmented into discontinuous power factions. Our own current tendencies toward permissiveness in social relations generally notwithstanding, it is only in the immediate nuclear family group that we seem to have retained something of this same complex blend of equality-within-hierarchy which appears to have characterized native thought and practice throughout.

Causation

Among native persons causation is construed in terms of a personalized, closed-universe model. It is seen generically as immanent in nature and as suffused throughout the whole of her parts. Moreover it is seen as being harmoniously in balance with her and part of her, rather than as emanating from *above*, or *apart* from her, or being dominant *over* her.⁷ It is from this that there springs the comparatively vast scope for intellectual and moral and ethical apprehension and appreciation of nature in all of the multiplicity of her forms, her moods, her powers, and her potentials. All these, including man himself, partake of the sacred and the supernatural quality that pervades nature herself. In consequence all aspects of her warrant universal respect. And all this in turn informs and illuminates the complex integration of causal, temporal, and spatial phenomena in all their manifestations, whether sacred or secular, physical or social.

All of this, of course, also has profound implications for the notion of causal potency or causal limitations which govern man and society, as such. With us, as noted, causation is construed in terms of an open-universe model. This means that it is we as persons or we as members of collectivities of various kinds who, with the doubtful help and guidance of the supernatural, but with the certain and reliable aid of our ever more efficacious science and technology, are the potent and responsible agents and caretakers of the world. With native peoples, by contrast, it logically follows that since it is the supernatural forces inherent in nature who are causally potent and who move in answer to human supplications and manipulations, the residual potency remains with them. For the native, then, causation is viewed as a *personified* manifestation of nature herself. Nature, consequently, remains on object of both love and fear. And this effectively precludes any aggressive and arbitrary attempts to rest transcendent causal power from her, or to impose one's will upon her.

With such a view of causation, it is comparatively easy for native peoples to surrender themselves, their wills, their mentality to transcendent nature. Because for them the transcendence that nature does achieve is complete. For us, by contrast, such a true and complete transcendence is lacking. Our presence on the scene and our accustomed dominance of her precludes an acceptance of such a view of her. We seek to differentiate and segmentate the natural and the supposed supernatural. Every forward step in the advance of science, whether natural or social, seemingly implies a corresponding step down into a positivistic quagmire of wholly impersonal and mechanistic conceptions of causation, even in the social realm. It is seemingly not possible, therefore, for us to yield ourselves and our wills, our hopes, our dreams, our public policies, to nature's inexorable law, to nature's mysterious will. Such an act is no more possible for us than it is for the owner of a slave to surrender his welfare into the hands of his erstwhile subordinate. Like the slave master, we are logically compelled to react in fear and dread, since it follows, intuitively, that we must impute to the slave the selfsame antipathetic motives that have informed our own dominant relationship with him in the historic past. And this, of course, is not a very positive or constructive basis upon which to build a partnership with nature or to maintain a working relationship with her. Only among equals, only among peers, only among those who love and fear and respect one another does the requisite code of honour readily obtain.

Number

In the mythology of the Judeo-Christian world, number, construed as an analytic and philosophical category, is held to have been present even prior to the

beginning of the world. Indeed, like the Creator God Himself, number is held to have been prior to and outside of time and place and cosmos.⁸ From a mythological standpoint, it is further evident in the Judeo-Christian world that the category of number achieves this cosmic transcendence, in part, owing to the fact that the Creator God Himself initially represented *unity*.⁹ As such He is held to have been omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, omnicausal, and omnirelevant. In consequence, the number one stands as a symbol of unity in the Judeo-Christian world.

In the beginning, mythologically speaking, there was no conflict, there was no lack of integration, there was no inconsistency and no incoherence. In the prehistoric and precosmic states, presumably, there was only order and stability and peace and harmony and unity. It is from Him, this unitary divine being, that all other things have subsequently come. All of the differentiated forms and manifestations of life presumably began with Him and were created in Him and through Him. But, with the introduction of history, with the creation of the cosmos, with the arrival on the scene of man, all peace, all order, all harmony, all stability was permanently shattered on the shoals of man-made history, or so it seems.¹⁰

From a comparative perspective, it is seemingly important also to know whether the numerical embodiment of the principle of unity, i.e., God, is conceived in terms which humanize and personify and historicize Him, in one degree or another, or vice versa. And this leads logically to the further question, namely, whether or not the principle of unity is to be monolithically construed. That is to say, is there, mythologically speaking, one, and only one God? Or conversely, is the concept to be construed pluralistically and polytheistically, i.e., that there not only are multiple gods, but in addition to the gods themselves there are other spiritual beings, whether these be called angels, or saints, or guardian Nspirits, or whatever?¹¹ And again, much also depends, seemingly, upon whether these lesser deities and spirits are construed as humanoid and personified and historicized entities, or whether, on the contrary, they are seen as being disembodied, remote and impersonal.¹²

All cultures appear to recognize in some form or other some transcendent principle of order, i.e., God, Nature, or however it be called. The operative question, therefore, is whether the integrating bond between the person and this principle of order is direct and unmediated or whether it is seen as being indirect and mediated. And if it is indirect and mediated, by what and by how many intervening steps or links is the separation constituted? Even in respect of this, there seem to be differences between cultures concerning which and how many of the "objectively intervening" steps or links are in fact culturally, i.e., phenomenologically, *accented*. And even if they are accented, the further question arises of how *heavily accented* they are in a comparative sense.

With Christians, for example, it used to be the case, historically, that the role of the Church (and the mythological reference figures promulgated by it) as an intervening, an intermediating, agency was so great as to constitute a virtual monopoly of importance and power.¹³ And indeed, this notion was not uniformly confined to the sacred realm alone, but was carried over, for a considerable period of time in the high middle ages, into the secular realm.

This historic state of affairs has passed away. Today, on occasion, many of us still go to Church, but Church membership and attendance is no longer culturally accented. But in its place we have witnessed the emergence of the nation-state. It is

this body which now appears to have replaced the Church and which serves as a secularized substitute for the position formerly occupied by it. Yet just as we are not completely monotheistic in the religious realm, so we lack a full and complete monism in the socio-economic-political realm. Where race or ethnicity fails to divide us, social class steps in. Although many of us may resent it, it is indeed now the case that all of us, of necessity, have to belong to some given nation-state, even though this is largely involuntary on the part of given individuals. Nevertheless, without a nation-state with which to identify and without a claim to membership in its corporate body, a person is today a virtual outcast — legally, politically, morally, and culturally.

Other cultures now as well as in other periods of history have seen these things differently from ourselves. In classical China, for example, as well as in the case of our own native peoples here in North America, there have been numerous intervening steps or links which have been given a high degree of cultural accentuation, whether in the secular or the sacred realm. Among those that can be most prominently mentioned, of course, are guardian spirits, blood brotherhoods, medicine societies, various men's clubs and/or fraternities, the clan, the tribe, etc.¹⁴ And it would appear that as the number of these accented intermediating groups and/or categories increases, the cultural emphasis upon the individual *qua* individual recedes to essential insignificance.

The character of the linkage or connection between the individual and any intervening and/or mediating organizational level, up to and including the principle of unity itself, is consequently of great importance. If this is close and marked by superordinate-subordinate relationships then power (and its correlate, social causation) will be distributed in one more or less characteristic way. If, on the other hand, it is loose and the relationship or structure is coordinate rather than superordinate, then power and/or causation will be distributed in quite another distinctive and typical way.¹⁵ In its purely secular reference, therefore, the *social organizational aspects of number* divide, at the ideal-typical polar extremes of a continuum of empirical variation, into two logically opposite principles. The one extreme rests upon the individual person; the other, upon the group or the collectivity. The former is exemplified by our own Western, Judeo-Christian societies; the latter, by societies that traditionally have been collectivistic, such as classical China and, in degree, those of our own native peoples.¹⁶

But all this leaves begging the question concerning what the relationship is between the notions of number and that of the incipient theism manifest among peoples everywhere.

A functional view of theology suggests that the question of a choice between monotheism versus polytheism turns upon a conception of the manner in which the tasks of creating and maintaining the universe (and the causal and governing powers appertaining thereunto) have been divided mythologically among given entities, whether spiritual or mortal and material.

Among traditional Catholics, for example, the notion of dependence upon the supernatural for aid of various kinds seemingly gave rise to a "natural polytheism" which included not only a notion of a triune God, namely, God, the Father; God, the Son; and God, the Holy Spirit.¹⁷ It also formally included numerous angels, saints, and other spiritual entities. And in the face of this pantheon, this plurality of divinities, this polytheistic conception of the supernatural, there was accepted

also a corresponding notion of caprice and potential disorder and disunity among the multiplicity of gods.

In traditional Calvinistic Protestantism, by contrast, the principle of monotheism appears to have fared much better. And this, seemingly, was and is the case because the human person is viewed as being independent of or outside of current and/or future supernatural assistance. In other words, any such assistance as the supernatural is inherently able and/or predisposed to give, has already been given in the past. Hence, the person is currently dependent upon himself and his own initiative and resources. And in consequence, he disdains dependence upon and supplication of the supernatural in favour of self-reliance and of self-determination.

From the perspective of our own generic Christian tradition it would thus appear that where the gods are numerous and personalized, as in traditional Catholicism, they *promote a personalized and humanized and dependent system of ethics*. And this in turn is associated with the notions of pity and of loving permissiveness, which may indeed be extended universally to others in an abstract way. In this view, individuals can be directly morally reconstructed, but not society as such. A New Jerusalem is, from this point of view, strictly speaking, neither necessary nor possible. All this stands in marked contrast to the opposite tendency which was most noted in Calvinistic Protestantism, namely, to look upon God *as unitary and singular, as being remote and impersonal*, and to respond to this condition by the espousal of an ethic of personal asceticism and personal self-reliance. And this seemingly in turn has tended to promote an ethic of dominance over nature and a commitment to worldly success as a substitute form of "salvation." In this view, then, individual moral reconstruction takes place as a consequence of a prior societal reconstruction. From this perspective, not only is a New Jerusalem possible, but its establishment is regarded as a divine mandate.¹⁸

But however this may have been in the Christian community itself, the contrasts are dramatically highlighted when we undertake a comparison between Christianity, inclusively viewed, and our own native peoples whose theology, while fragmentary, is nevertheless available to us in broad outline form.¹⁹

Putting aside for the moment the tendencies toward polytheism that have been manifest in traditional Catholic Christianity, it remains the case that for Christians as a whole God the Father, God the Creator, as such, is seen as a unity, that is to say, in a singular form. He is seen as a powerful "person" who caused (created) an impersonal and subpersonal nature, and who orders and controls her forms and functions through His continuing causal transcendence, His continuing creative and regulative power.

Among natives, by contrast, Nature is seen as the prime causal agent. She appears as a multiple and complex "person", as a personified source of multifarious powers whose manifestation is not controlled *from without*, but which rather is regulated in some mysterious way *from within*. The so-called Great Spirit appears in this perspective more nearly as a semantic device which serves as a complex symbol for Nature in all Her continuing capricious complexity and her multifaceted mystery. Thus, whereas for us, personification of the creating divinity tends to promote the idea of unity and order and stability, for natives the personification process appears to presage the notion of a multiplicity and multiphaseity of Nature which renders Her capricious, chaotic, dangerous, unstable, or spiritual power, namely, to Nature in all Her power and mystery and complexity.

Each of these several considerations enters significantly into fundamentally differing cultural conceptions of the rules of classification which govern the structural forms and functional canons of the resultant systems of logic.

If the cosmos is construed as constituting a single, unitary, monolithic and wholly empirical causal order, as it tends to be in our modern, secular, scientific world, then our logical classes and/or categories must per force be both mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Moreover, the nominal and relational identity of their respective contents must likewise be fixed, determinate and immutable. To wit, the abiding conflict between religion and science.

But where, as with native peoples, matters such as otherwise construed, the canons themselves will likewise differ. Since for them the cosmos is seen as being characterized by a plurality of differing, discontinuous, and potentially conflicting orders, logical classes and/or categories can have no single, fixed and perduring identity, whether in respect of their structure or their functional interrelationships. Neither can their respective contents be governed by the canon of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness. On the contrary, elements of both data and of relations within and between classes can for this reason be more or less freely combined and recombined according to situational shifts in functional purpose and desire.

Since there is no formal distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and equally, since all causation, as we have seen, is construed as "personalized" and immediate rather than impersonal and remote, the elements of 'reality' are seen as capable of entering variably into numerous and diverse class identities and, hence, as being obedient, whether successively or simultaneously, to differing causal nexii, both empirical and non-empirical.

It follows that there are corresponding conceptions of what to us would be construed as the realm of possibilities and probabilities. And these in turn will be profoundly constrained and/or supported by the prevailing conceptions of time and space.

Our own conceptions of linear time, hierarchically structured space, and a unitary causal order in the cosmos compel the acceptance of a single and wholly sequential causal order. Hence our modern, secular tendency to deny a separate realm of the supernatural. Hence, too, our modern disdain and contempt for beliefs in the supernatural, in the efficacy of magic, and the reality of the occult. This, despite the persistence into the present of sizeable segments of the population that continue to adhere to our historic predispositions to believe in a non-empirical God, to credit miracles, and to pray for divine intervention in the purely natural laws held to govern the cosmos.

Admittedly, these traditionalists more closely resemble native peoples in their beliefs and actions than do their modernistic, atheistic counterparts. For like our own traditionalists, native peoples are prone to recognize a limited, conditional, and variable realm of order in the cosmos. They differ from our own traditionalists, however, in that the supernatural forces who hold effective causal power adequate to the alteration and/or destruction of mundane cosmic order are numerous and varied. Moreover, their disposition toward man's hopes and dreams and wishes are not invariably favorable and sympathetic. On the contrary, if prevailed upon by some human enemy or even, betimes, on their own mysterious recognizance and volition, they can and do constitute themselves as powerful malevolent forces who can work great harm or hardship on the person. Indeed, the

paucity of native science and technology, the plurality of causal orders in the universe, and the lack of differentiation between man and nature as well as between the natural and the supernatural, the empirical and the non-empirical, implies that the native powerfully leans to a wholly personal, animistic and 'psychological' conception of causation.

In this conception causal efficacy and effectiveness are accepted as valid on the basis of sheer mental association of some common attributes which link together otherwise logically separate persons, objects, events, etc. Clearly, from such a perspective, a causal process constrained by the exigencies of both time and space must necessarily appear as mere appearance and illusion. For the unseen and mysterious forces which are postulated as standing behind and above the mere empirical manifestations themselves partake of the essence of time and space and hence escape these constraints by virtue of the spiritual qualities. Hence, the native's ready acceptance of a conception of causation which rests upon the principle of simultaneity and in which sequentiality of causal process appears as nothing more than a special, limiting case. Hence, too, the native's predisposition to believe in and take recourse to magic and the occult without pause or contradiction.

For if, as the native believes, persons, things, objects, etc., by virtue of their spiritual qualities, are and/or can be in two or more temporal-spatial-causal conjunctures at one and the same time, then a purely magical conception of causation, as we would say, is entirely logical and corresponds in all essentials with his whole conception of reality. In consequence, as we shall see, if the native's logic is situationally and operationally specific, then it follows that his system of ethics must likewise be situationally structured.

Ethics

True and genuine monotheism apparently tends to go with both systematic rationality and ethical universalism. That is to say, it gives rise to a *logically necessary* universal inclusiveness, a single hierarchical order, a single rational realm, a single intellectual arena, with a single ruler and/or governor in which *principles of logic and principles of ethics interpenetrate and merge*.²⁰ The meaning of each of the separate points of the universe seemingly can be defined and comprehended only in relation to the whole, philosophically speaking. The quest for meaning moreover is, in this instance, very direct. And it is, at the same time, also a quest for order, for unity, for wholeness, for integration. The ultimate and final reference point for meaning and meaningfulness is, from this point of view, always the abstracted and logically detached self, or, more correctly, the qualitative life experience of this self.

By contrast, polytheism tends to be associated with the opposite characteristics. Here we see an absence of logically coherent, hierarchically systematic, and universally inclusive principles and categories, whether of logic or of ethics.²¹ We see, too, that it is associated with a notion of a differentiation which leads to segmentation, to conflict, to competition, to a lack of integration, and to a lack of coherence. *Behavior, both logical and ethical, is, in this instance, situationally variable and flexible*. And it proceeds from the premise of balanced wholeness-in-diversity. Here, the meaning of the separate points of the universe remain more-or-less discrete and they are discretely apprehendable. The quest for meaning, therefore, is *not* a quest for unity, but rather for one of balance. The ultimate reference point

for meaning is not, in this instance, the egocentric self. On the contrary, it is the more inclusive collectivities, such as the family, the kin group, the clan, the tribe, the nation, the race, the species. If the former is a quest for direct, unmediated, and absolutistic meaning; the latter is one in which there is a search for indirect, for structurally mediated, for relativistic meaning.

It is not alone a question of what position God, or Nature, per se, occupy in the inclusive reference-group profile, whether real or mythological, of the actor in purview. Rather, we must also look to ascertain the operational significance of certain specific ethical precepts as these are taught by specific "prophets", whether human and natural or supernatural and divine.

In this perspective, the historic Christian "prophecy" concerning Christ's redeeming love may be seen as a modification of certain moral-ethical imperatives mythologically attributable to the Creator God, Jahweh. To the latter's mandate to dominate and subordinate Nature, we now have the caveat which enjoins us to extend love and pity to all God's creatures. Correspondingly, the native may experience a revelation from his Spirit Guardian which in some particular way alters or modifies the general moral-ethical precepts culturally attributed to the Great Spirit or to Nature. Presumably these and other sources of ethical precept are normatively, though idiosyncratically, incorporated into the reference-group structure of the actor in purview. And it is from thence that their respective influence is manifest upon culturally accentuated doctrines of moral responsibility, whether largely individual, as with us, or largely collective, as with native peoples.

Some evidence in support of these observations inheres in a further comparison of ourselves with our own native peoples. For the native, the acquisition of a source of supernatural power in the form of a spirit guardian does not, logically speaking, result in a final resolution of the problem of his search for meaning, as is, or, at any rate might be, the case with us. Rather it constitutes for him nothing more than the minimum necessary conditions for the effective *continuation of the search for*, or, alternatively, the *continuously emergent discovery of meaningfulness in the universe*. It is, as it were, a necessary, but not sufficient condition. And for the native this takes on a prime significance, because it occurs during one's active earthly lifetime. Indeed, for him it occurs typically at the onset of adult life, rather than, as is the case for us, at the end of our earthly lives when, if indeed union is to take place with the supernatural, it is only then (and not until then) that we are assimilated into unity with it. For us, *a unity of such reference meaning sources*, per se, is the paramount consideration. For the native, by contrast, there seemingly may be a multiplicity of such meaning references outside of and in addition to his own egotistical self.

The irony of a logically irresolvable moral dualism, so characteristic of our own Christian experience, is seemingly relativized and dissipated as soon as there is present a more extended spectrum, a larger plurality, of meaning reference structures, as appears to be the case among the native peoples. This because in the absence of what, for us, must be viewed as a merely legalistic and hence *contingent promise* of salvation, uncertainty is reduced or eliminated. Hence there is no structural foundation present in belief for them on which to rest such an unresolvable psychological tension. In other words, the native can and does view his "salvation", his union with the supernatural, in an *ex post facto* temporal perspective. And from such a perspective it appears that the debilitating uncertainty and mystery associated by us with this as yet contingent event, has been, for him, removed.

That which for us continues to be *the* ontological Omega-point of meaning, is for the native already culturally transmuted into a well accustomed ritual, a familiar and commonplace coping technology. Hence, he can and does assimilate life experience to a plurality of meaning references, not any one of which is definitive of his whole self, his whole person, his whole identity, as tends to be the case with us. Hence, too, the comparative absence of a tight logical integration, of a monistic coherence, of a formal legalism, and of a systematic logical correspondence and hierarchical consistency of form in his thoughts. Life can be taken *as it is*, rather than eternally being squeezed and pummelled and forced into potential conformity with some personalized and idiosyncratic notion of *what or how it ought to be*. Whereas we are inveterate idealists, the native is a pragmatic realist. In Being rather than in Becoming, as is the case with us, the native lives in and through the cyclical rhythms of his own life in his own way in his own time before passing on and having his personal being finally absorbed into the larger containing mystery, that cessation of awareness and sensation which constitutes what we call Death.

In our current extremely individualistic cultural phase, the individual cannot hope to achieve any significant level or degree of moral transcendence in relation to his own personal self-image. The symbolic framework within which meaning in life must be sought is therefore always only partial and incomplete. This gap, this moral vacuum, is consequently pre-empted by death. For death can level, even as it destroys. And hence it becomes a great, albeit negative, transcendent moral force which stands as an object of diffuse anxiety and fear.

Differentiation and specialization produce diversity. And where they are as highly elaborated as they are with us, they destroy our sense of wholeness, of unity, of integration, of coherence and consistency. A great deal of our anxiety, our alienation, arises from the fact that we, all of us, are committed to some limited number of ends or purposes. The unavoidable plurality, partiality, and diversity of our commitments, therefore, constitute a hiatus, a departure from the simple, monistic, integrated totality of life which is the hallmark of our mythology and, hence, of our historical youthfulness and naivete. We may indeed achieve maturity and adulthood eventually, but only at the price of much ambivalence and alienation.

All this naturally is carried over into the culturally prevalent notions of moral and ethical responsibility and the several doctrines that have, in our own case, been elaborated in connection with them.

For us the ultimate moral and ethical responsibility rests ultimately and irrevocably with the individual. It is the individual's duty to believe, to act, to save his own immortal soul. It follows in consequence that human society is properly viewed as a merely nominal entity; as a merely nominal, if somehow organized, collection of individualistic spiritual atoms. The transcendent moral-ethical principle (to the extent that it is at all operative) is to be found in the notion of a belief in and an acceptance of the collective and universal fatherhood, the life-giving divinity, of the Creator God, and of our uniquely personal subordination and dependence upon Him as well as to His redeeming Son, Jesus Christ.

In native society, by contrast, there is present also some limited notion of individual responsibility, but basically the socially and culturally accented notion of moral-ethical responsibility tends to focus on collectivities of various kinds, in particular, the family and the band as a whole. And here, the "cement" of moral-ethical transcendence proceeds from a collective rather than an individualistic pre-

mise. For them it is the species, the band, the collectivity as a whole, which constitutes the unit whose well-being and survival is morally imperative. And this would appear to follow from their close identification with and their recognition of a prior dependence upon Nature. It is Nature Herself that would suffer an imbalance if, say, the species or the band died off. The individual person's survival is, in this view, neither here nor there. If an old and helpless person actively wants to die, he can be given aid and succour in an active way by native peoples. Not so with us, as our legal codes most amply attest.

With us, as has been noted, the ultimate reference category is *the ego-centric, the indestructable, spiritual self*. We see ourselves, each of us, as the object of God's creation, of the Divine Plan, and especially of Christ's Redemption. And it is the loss of this self, the inhibition and restraint of this self, the failure to foster and develop this self, which is threatened with imbalance if Nature and the world, both physical and social, are not brought into some correspondingly appropriate degree and manner of subordination and instrumental functionality to it. In this view, then, it is imperative that society should be viewed instrumentally and made or kept *comparatively* stable, *comparatively* rational, *comparatively* predictable, *comparatively* dependable, in order that we, each of us, can "self-actualize" in the most flexible and changeful manner.

And in consequence of all this emphasis upon unity and community, isolation, whether absolute or relative, is, for us, undesirable. Non-conformity is likewise bad. Deviance and atypicality are to be shunned. Disloyalty and/or states or conditions which render persons "Incommunicado", whether these be drug-induced or otherwise, are likewise to be avoided. These and other "undesirable conditions" are culturally so defined because they threaten order, unity, coherence, consistency, mutuality, and, indeed, whatever else needs to be kept orderly and predictable and controllable. For only in this way, only if societal conditions are favorable can the individual maximize his own value and potential self importance; only in this way can he enhance his own ego; and only in this way can he most easily and most readily save his own soul. Hence, we are eternally caught up in an ethical dualism. We seemingly cannot abandon the moral question of the relationship between self and society; neither can we solve it.

The native view of these things, needless to say, is just the opposite. For them the issue simply does not arise in the same terms. The native consequently sees himself not as *the* object or *the* end of God's creation, but as one of the many means by which the whole of Creation, the whole of Nature, the whole of Life, can be maintained and supported and fulfilled in a balanced manner.

In a general way it seems to be the case that with us all other persons, when viewed in their collective associations and identities, are potential means to the end of self-gratification, self-actualization, self-aggrandizement, etc. That is to say, the organizations in which we participate at school, at work, in the nation, in the political arena, in a church, in a professional association, in a social club, etc., etc., etc., are regarded as means, as instrumentalities, in relation to given ends. And so are the people who constitute their membership. In brief, ours is an ego-centric and hedonistic outlook and orientation. We ourselves are *the* relevant end; *they* are, all of them, *the relevant means*.

By contrast, in native societies, all other persons, when viewed in their collective or individual identities, are dealt with not precisely either as means or as ends, but rather largely as complex co-equals, as so many different, diverse, and indepen-

dent centers of will, power, value, and danger. They become, rather, more nearly so many differing salient and constraining conditions. And, as such they are strictly comparable to other natural "laws", obstacles, barriers, facilitators, etc., i.e., which are culturally given as conditions of action. All this is tantamount to saying that in Native society all others, whether they be viewed individually or collectively, are not, strictly speaking, viewed as means, but only as objects bearing complex and problematic relations to the culturally given, collectivity-linked, and morally transcendent ends, i.e., those ends which serve in maintaining a balance of Nature. In Her and for Her and by Her these means and ends are variably and situationally transmuted, pursuant to the continuity of the species and of the cosmos, rather than to the end of individual gratification and ego-enhancement, as is the case with us.

Where morality is hierarchically organized (as with us), it can be and is pushed into the non-empirical, wholly theological and/or supernatural levels, as is evident in the current debate concerning abortion, suicide, capital punishment, etc. The basic premise of the argument presented is that since *God* is the author, the giver of life, He and He alone has the *right*, the *power*, the *legitimacy*, the mysterious and mystical and evil-transcending *potency*, to take that life away. Here, significantly, God is *personified*, *humanized*, and *socialized*. Here also, significantly, He is seen as being morally transcendent, while Nature is not.

Where things are otherwise, as among our native peoples, where Nature rather than God (or Man) is transcendent, morality respecting these kinds of things (as well as others) is not derived from a "monotheistic", personified, humanized, and personalized (causal) entity. Here polytheism, in fact, reigns. Hence, Nature in this case retains Her *diffuse* power, mystery, potency, etc. It is not to Man to question Her too closely, too profoundly. And if, say, She makes a mistake and grants life to a monster, then it is to Man to restore Nature's balance by killing or destroying it. Man sees himself as Her helpmeet, as Her assistant, as Her corrective agent.

If Nature is transcendent, as with native peoples, then moral deference in the highest degree will go to Her. But where, as with us, Man, the species, (through divine mandate) is transcendent (even though it may be incumbent upon him to keep the cult of the divinity), then Nature assumes a lower-order ranking, a lower status position in the hierarchy, in the scale of moral values and/or moral transcendence. In consequence, She will be "sacrificed", instrumentally, in order to maintain the overriding, morally higher and transcendent ethical "principles."

We assume that Nature is *largely* (if not wholly) orderly. Seemingly only small islands of disorder, of ignorance, of chaos, remain. In consequence, we see Nature as tamed and weak, as benign and wholly tractable. And hence, there is much scope for arrogance and egocentricity and brutal callousness toward Her on our part. Even when we don't feel it necessary to appeal to non-empirical "principles", e.g., "God's Will", "The Divine Plan", etc., we appear to be prone to impute moral teaching, moral principles, moral wisdom to *History* rather than to Nature, per se.²²

Where moral principles (and hence associated rules of logic and syllogistic manipulation) are generically hierarchical, as with us, the "higher" principles are identified by (and achieve their transcendent stature through) being associated with the principle of *Order*. Viewed instrumentally, the concern is with the survival of *the principle of Order*, if only by means of the survival of a few true believers (or, in the negative case, their certain and necessary extinction).²³ Hence, much will

depend in particular instances upon how arrogant, how personally egocentric, the actor(s) in a given cultural or sub-cultural drama happen to be.

Native peoples, by contrast, assume that Nature is powerful, untamed, potentially malevolent, and suffused with mystery. In native eyes She is capricious, arbitrary, and largely chaotic. Only small and wholly ephemeral degrees of control over Her are seemingly possible. Hence, She is held in awe, respect, love and fear.

The native finds no tidy principle of unity, no logically symmetrical model of order. On the contrary, he is presented with a chaos that is manifold, random, and diffuse. The symbolic topography that he surveys discloses only isolated islands of order in an otherwise diffuse and untidy landscape. For him there is, consequently, no compelling assumption of order in Nature. The only tenable hypotheses, on the contrary, is one of power, mystery and caprice. Our unquenchable thirst for unity, for symmetry, for order and consistency has its counterpart in the native's commitment to balance, harmony, flexibility, and continuity. The reason would appear to hinge on the pre-eminent moral transcendence which is accorded by him to a multi-faceted, polymorphous, personified Nature, as opposed to egocentric self, as is the case with us.

Seemingly, we are desperately seeking to reassure ourselves that behind the manifold diversity that specialization has wrought among us, there is a theoretical *unity* which can and must be kept in an orderly condition. Native peoples, by contrast, seemingly seek, perhaps with equal determination, to reassure themselves that behind the *apparent harmony* of their comparatively undifferentiated culture, there really lurks a *potential diversity* which must at all costs be somehow kept in *balance*.

Balance, harmony, and stability are sought by them in areas where we seek change, growth, discontinuity, and progress. Where we are constrained, prospectively, to extend and consolidate *order*, they are constrained, retrospectively, to establish and maintain *balance*. Where we intend to take captive and domesticate that which is wholly unknown and unfamiliar, they intend to extend and enlarge the known and the familiar in such a manner as will integrate and accommodate the unfamiliar. Hence, it is through order-in-unity that we find moral transcendence and ethical fulfillment. Native societies, by contrast, find it through a focus upon balance-in-diverse-multiplicity.

Aesthetics

The essentially hierarchical form of our ethical system has historically had an exact counterpart in the form which governed the manifestation of our Judeo-Christian aesthetical system. The late medieval European cathedral is perhaps the perfect embodiment of this form, and it remains as a symbol of the distinctively Christian form and system of aesthetics.

In this particular aesthetic form, a myriad of widely differing artistic elements — architectural, sculptural, graphic, plastic, and musical — were characteristically brought together into a single pattern that achieved an hierarchically structured unity of focus. And such unity was constituted through a process of conscious subordination of each of the constituent elements to a single, morally transcendent purpose, namely, the greater honor and glory of God.²⁴

In all of this nature was seldom emulated and superceded. Instead, nature was simply ignored and bypassed in the overweening concern with an artistic portrayal

of the culturally idealized and stylized relationship between Man and the Supernatural, and, by implication, between society and God.

The hierarchical structure of Christian aesthetics faithfully depicts what has been alleged earlier about our cultural conceptions of time as being linear, space as being hierarchical, causation as being impersonal and remote in origin, and number as being unitary. And at the same time, its hierarchical structure serves to underscore the logical (cultural) consistency of the widely prevalent notion of "art for arts' sake" and "change for the sake of change". Throughout, it would appear, aesthetic values, focused as they have been upon Eternal *Becoming*, have functionally reinforced the particular change-producing propensities associated with temporal, spatial, causal, and numerical conceptions and predilections toward centrifugal change in the culture as a whole.

As the rate and direction of change has advanced in the society at large, so the realm of aesthetics as a whole has responded in equal and corresponding measure. The insatiable demand for novelty in all aesthetic fields from architecture through music in our own day, as well as the consequent extremely rapid rate of change in all of the artistic fields, arrives, then, as a secondary result of the culturally sanctioned propensities to abstract and detach individually given elements — whether of line or color or texture or rhythm — from the confining bounds of the historically larger containing pattern of order, hierarchy and unity. Unity there continues to be as well as hierarchy. But today we witness a unity and an hierarchy of at best a few isolated and detached elements, rather than a blending and melding of multiple and diverse artistic elements in a single, overriding, morally transcendent unity of purpose.

The native system of pluralistic aesthetics evinces an essentially parallel correspondence to their equally pluralistic ethical system. The point of contrast with our own preferences for hierarchy, unity, and moral transcendence is to be found in their propensity toward harmony, balance, and naturalistic realism. For with them all *relevant* artistic elements and values are present and blended into one harmonious whole; the several distinctive elements — whether of line, or color, or texture, or rhythm — are presented in a balanced manner. And in all of this, Nature and existential realism are the governing premises of composition and style, as native masks, totem pole carvings, dance and musical styles, among other things, appear to show.

Obviously, this state of affairs clearly reflects the predilection of native cultures, not alone concerning man's idealized relationship to Nature (and the Supernatural), but equally to Native conceptions bearing upon cyclical time, two-dimensional space, personalized causation, and plurality respecting number.

Once again, we can find in all of this no analogue to our notions of "change for change's sake" or even "art for art's sake". On the contrary, the entire realm of the artistic, of the aesthetic, is suffused with atemporal realism and pragmatic functionalism. The aesthetic values of the culture, in this instance focused upon Eternal *Being*, reinforce the general predilection for the intentional maintenance of the status quo and the channeling of such change as does occur into centripetal channels.

This, presumably, is what is really meant when native art and aesthetics are stigmatized by the charge of "primitivism" and a lack of mature perspective. For to us perspective implies a conception of linear time and three-dimensional, hierarchical space as well as the numerous other artistic notions and values assimilated to and

associated therewith. These notions native peoples have been willing to embrace only as they have set their feet on the road to assimilation; only as they have self-consciously begun to experiment with cultural syncretisms of varying kinds.

On overview, therefore, it would appear that a monistic, cosmically-transcendent diety, such as ours is, is not only entirely consistent with, but is, indeed, predictive of, a logically rigid and systematic structure of behavior. In such a system logical and analytical principles show a systematic, one-to-one correspondence with an equally systematic structure of ethical as well as aesthetic principles. All are necessarily hierarchically and deductively integrated.

Such an emphasis on rationality, moreover, invites to universal inclusiveness as befits a monotheistic theory of creation. In respect of a predisposition concerning socio-cultural change, therefore, we are the helpless objects of a compulsion that is not merely logical, but, at the same time, both ethical and aesthetic. We are compelled, seemingly, to change "for the sake of change", to innovate "for the sake of innovation", etc. Hence, the frenetic urge to acquire the new. Hence the propensity to cultural borrowing. And hence too the very substantial investment of social capital in scientific research, whether pure or applied. The quest for *mastery* is only a mask for the quest for order, and the compulsion to order, in the final analysis, is in itself a transfigured dream of a postulated primordial pristine *unity*.

Where ethics and/or aesthetics are elaborated and organized into an hierarchical system, as with us, it is readily feasible to reject and deny principles which stand lower in the scale of valuation in favor of those which rank higher. Thus, insofar as further socio-cultural change or more rapid socio-cultural change can be seen to conduce to a greater degree of order and/or control over Nature and/or society, it will be positively valued. The social costs and the ethical as well as the aesthetic principles thereby necessarily compromised are rationalized out of mind by the promulgation of convenient accounts and excuses of the ways in which the end justifies the means. Hence our ready materialism, our perennial duality, our notorious duplicity, our growing artistic vulgarity, and our increasingly dubious moral and ethical integrity in the eyes of others.

As opposed to all this, the multi-premised logic associated with the native commitment to polytheism is devoid of a corresponding degree of rigid and systematic rationality. The absence of such systematic characteristics, whether in respect of logical or ethical or aesthetic principles, precludes both hierarchical structure and neat syllogistic deduction. Comparatively speaking, therefore, the native is to some significant degree free of "determinism", whether in respect of logic or of ethics or of aesthetics. His behavior, in consequence, is predicated upon a concrete *situational* (as opposed to an abstractly defined) application of not just one, but probably several more-or-less relevant logico-ethical-aesthetic principles *simultaneously*.

His situation is much like that of women in our society whose capacity for logical behavior has also not infrequently been disavowed — a claim that is, on the face of it, correspondingly biased and for the same structural reason. Here, then, there is never any necessary question of change "for the sake of change"; neither is there one of necessary conservatism "for the sake of conservatism". Rather there is pragmatism, situationalism, flexibility, and the search for a balanced wholeness-in-diversity. Hence, instead of a predisposition toward rapacious cultural borrowing and a policy of deliberately planned scientific-technological advance, we witness, rather, a *laissez-faire*, maybe yes, maybe no, attitude which, far from foster-

ing a policy of systematic cumulation of cultural traits, may even permit the outright loss of traits which were present and valued in the culture at some prior point in time.

By elaborating the ethical-aesthetic imperative of helping Nature to stay in balance, the native reaffirms the known and familiar parameters, the culturally defined limits of the eco-system, both natural and social, in which his life is lived. And when elevated to the status of a culturally conditioned predisposition, this has the functional effect of sanctioning behavior which tends to maintain the *status quo* in some sort of balance.

Hypothetically, cultures that are very loosely integrated *ab origine*, such as appears to be the case among our native peoples, will have a structural predisposition to channel change, whether involuntarily imposed or deliberately sought on the part of some person or group of persons, in a *centripetal* direction. Conversely, those, like our own, whose integration has been very tight from the beginning will manifest, perforce, an opposing predisposition to channel the bulk of change-inducing behaviors, whether on the part of individuals or groups, into *centrifugal* channels. In the former instance, change is buffered and absorbed and neutralized: in the latter, it becomes cumulative and predisposing to ever greater and ever faster rates of change.

Native societies, thanks once again to their mythological pre-suppositions, manage to combine a highly individualistic religious practice with a highly collectivistic ethical system. But from what has been alluded to above, this *apparent* logical inconsistency should occasion no surprise.²⁵ Their mythological commitment to a polytheistic supernatural and corresponding multi-premised, polymorphous, and loosely integrated ethical-aesthetic structure easily accommodates such apparent discrepancies. Quite clearly, the logical identity and relational direction of means and ends is radically different in native cultures than it is in our own. And it is the number and variety of just such discontinuities and disparities that eternally frustrate and complicate interactions between representatives of the two types of society in the socio-economic-political realm.

Implications for Planned Change and Development

What implications for planned change and development, whether by curricular design or other means, follow from the foregoing analysis?

From a purely curricular perspective the universal failure of all attempts to introduce a curriculum into a developing society based upon culturally alien concepts and values is amply attested by our own continuing failure here in North America to make "little brown white men" out of our native peoples.²⁶ And in absence of any reported successes in similar endeavours elsewhere, it can reasonably be assumed that our recognized failure will shortly be matched by events transpiring in other countries in which native peoples have set their feet upon the road to "progress" and development under similar circumstances.

The foregoing comparative analysis of the six basic behavioral categories relied upon an ideal-typical form of analyses as well as an historical perspective.

By adopting such an ideal-typical strategy, it was possible to provide a working conception of the two polar extremes of a continuum of variation which presumably exhausts the range of possibilities which cultural history presents to us respecting the behavioral categories under review. And as we shall see presently, this opens

the door to further systematic exploration and analysis of other points on the respective continua which occupy the middle ground between the two extremes. And given that these polar opposites are logically constructed types, it follows that given historical and/or empirical societies will in each instance necessarily present a variable profile or mix, i.e., diverse permutations and combinations, of the characteristics which define the polar extremes.

Thus, with respect to time, the continuum of variation extends from completely cyclical conceptions of time, at the one extreme, to completely linear conceptions of time, at the other. Cast in more operational terms, any particular empirical instance raises the question: Is the experientially cyclical character of culturally defined social time "large enough" to permit it to be viewed by culture bearers "as if" it were linear, or does it continue to be viewed "circularly?"

With respect to social space, the continuum of variation encompasses a distinction between a flat, two-dimensional plane, on the one extreme, to a three-dimensional pyramid, at the other. Again, from an operational perspective, the question here posed with respect to any particular empirical instance is the following: Is the culturally defined "area" of social space sufficiently restricted and devoid of structural differentiation, in terms of either vertical or horizontal differentiation and specialization, to permit it being viewed by cultural bearers "as if" it were a flat, two-dimensional plane, on one hand, or, obversely, it is viewed as a three-dimensional, hierarchical structure?

With respect to causation, the continuum of variation encompasses a concept of causation which is characterized by the idea of being internal, personal, local, and immediate, on the one extreme, and that of being external, impersonal, and remote, on the other. In this instance the operational question posed by any particular empirical instance might be phrased as follows: Is social causation defined in the culture "as if" it were characterized by personification, historical immediacy, and functional simultaneity, or, obversely, "as if" it were characterized by impersonality, structural and historical remoteness, and functional sequentiality?

Concerning number, the continuum of variation ranges from the notion of a pluralistic nature and a polytheistic supernatural, on the one extreme, to a monotheistic supernatural and a unified nature, on the other. The operational question posed by any particular empirical instance in this case can be phrased provisionally in the following manner: Is the phenomenon of number, in its generic form and condition, viewed in the culture "as if" it were a plural, cosmologically immanent, and socially mediated (only indirectly apprehendable and approachable by the individual) source of power and order, or, obversely, "as if" it were a unitary, cosmo-transcending, and socially-unmediated (directly approachable) source of creative and governing power?

Respecting ethics, the continuum of variation ranges from an ethical system which stresses situationality, which is multi-premised and multi-principled, and which emphasizes balance-in-diversity, at the one extreme, to a system which stresses the universalistic, the legalistic, the abstract, and the logically hierarchical structure of ethical principles, on the other. Here the operative question might be phrased: Is the ethical system culturally defined in such a manner as would permit it to be viewed "as if" it were logically polymorphous, multi-premised, loosely integrated, concrete and situationally variable in its application, or, obversely, as logically hierarchical, monistically premised, tightly integrated, and abstractly categorical in its manifestation and application?

Finally, with respect to aesthetics, the continuum of variation encompasses an orientation toward the polymorphous, the pluralistic, the idea of man in harmony with nature, on the one extreme, to the monomorphous, the unitary, the hierarchically monistic, the notion of man over nature, at the other extreme. Here the operational question might be phrased as follows: Is the aesthetic system culturally designed in such a manner as would permit it to be viewed "as if" it were logically polymorphous, prone to stress pluralism and harmony, concerned with the imitations of nature, and the presentation of man as a stoic victim of fate or destiny, on the one hand, as opposed to a system which is prone to stress monomorphism, unity, and hierarchical ordering at the same time that it presents a view of man which places him over nature, one which views his work as an improvement upon nature and sees man as master of his fate and destiny, on the other?

These considerations prompt a return to the issue cited earlier concerning the notion of a critical point of development beyond which, hypothetically, a civilizational "take-off" becomes possible, on the one hand, and that of another critical point of healthy change and development which, if exceeded, leads inevitably to civilizational decay and decline, on the other.

Alternatively phrased, the one issue posed is whether a certain minimal degree of *universalism* in ethics, religion and the state — the defining characteristic of civilization for Toynbee — must somehow be present before civilization, so construed, becomes possible; the other is the issue of the historic inevitability of civilizational decline. In such an historical pattern truly inevitable, or merely historical, as Toynbee himself believed?

Toynbee implicitly recognized that there may be some hypothetical upper limit to healthy change and development beyond which mankind could freely choose not to go. To choose otherwise, he felt, was to incur an inevitable and fatal decline. For presumably, there is a point beyond which the cement of ethical values can no longer serve to hold the ever more tenuously integrated political and social aspects of civilizational structure together.

It seems oddly ironic that just when educational power-holders in Third World countries everywhere are expending much valuable time, money, and effort in a seemingly misguided attempt to emulate and overtake Western peoples in the shortest possible time, we ourselves in the West appear to be in retreat from the extremes to which our historic conceptions of the fundamental cultural categories have impelled us. Not only the new Leisure Ethic, but equally, the new Environment Ethic would seem to attest this. Surely, then, the proper and abiding emphasis, viewed from the perspective of global survival, lies in a return (for us) and/or advance (for Third World peoples) to the middle ground which exists between our own respective historic conceptions of these things and that which historically animated Third World societies. Surely it is this middle ground which begs creative conceptualization and dissemination by all, regardless of the particular "World" in which we happen to find ourselves. For nothing short of this gives any meaningful promise of guaranteeing survival for mankind, whether of the First, Second, Third or other World.

Can such critical points, such a lower and upper limit to healthy change and development, be provisionally indicated? Can we speak of a range or frame of variation within which change and development are healthy and desirable but beyond which change and development become socially undesirable and fatal to the civilization's survival.

Respecting this matter, then, it seems possible to venture the following tentative hypothesis:

All other things being equal:

1. the time frame must be focussed in the future, albeit neither too distantly nor too nearly, lest the society's vision of its becomes either too large and too remote to constitute a meaningful source of motivation for planning, programming and related behavior in the present, or too small and too near to permit a continuing commitment to long-term social planning and programming;

2. the space frame must allow for both horizontal and vertical occupational differentiation, such that the full range of social skills and their attendant motivational commitments are permitted reasonable scope for articulation and realization, but it must not be permitted to exceed the point at which social skills are arbitrarily declared obsolete and/or their associated rewards — rank, wealth, power — are either too sharply inflated or too sharply deflated to ensure continuing motivational commitment;

3. the causation frame must permit a view of causation as being impersonal and ultra-local so far as physical nature is concerned, but must not be permitted to exceed the point at which man and society begin to be seen as passive and helpless objects which are unilaterally subject to the whims of "external" causal forces that are situated outside the realm of history, culture, and society, and biopsychology;

4. the number frame must begin to approach unity with reference to monotheism in the supernatural realm, and with reference to both nature and the State in the natural realm, but it must not be permitted to exceed the point at which theological orthodoxy arbitrarily precludes lesser mythological personalities, and scientific orthodoxy, whether natural or social, precludes eclecticism in the natural scientific realm and philosophical pluralism in the socio-economic-political realm;

5. the ethical frame must approach a conception of a partnership with nature and legalistic abstraction and extra-situational hierarchical ordering of principles with respect to human relations, but it must not exceed the point at which nature begins to be ruthlessly dominated and exploited and beyond which all *particularistic* considerations in the realm of human relations are denied place and made totally subordinate and subservient to abstract, categoric, and legalistic *universalism*.

6. and finally, the aesthetic frame must move toward perspectivism and hierarchism, such that an "improvement upon nature" becomes both possible and feasible, but it must not exceed the point at which the aesthetic realm becomes so highly differentiated and atomized that all sense of unity and parallelism between the various art forms disappears and there are left only isolated and unrelated fragments of artistic form and substance in the several artistic media.

Admittedly, the concrete and operational burden of definition implied by the foregoing formulation is formidable but not, in principle, impossible. but if extant as well as now nascent civilizations are to escape their historic fate of eventual decline and eclipse, there would appear to be no feasible alternative to an immediate and resolute commitment to the accomplishment of this objective.

It seems imperatively indicated, therefore, that serious and sober reflection be given to the continuing validity, in both theory and practice, of non-Western, non-Christian conceptions of the basic philosophic categories of emerging nations everywhere. For it is only as conceptions of such matters which are genuinely their own can continue to be promulgated in their educational and social systems, that

genuine and integral creativity, relative to their different and historically unique circumstances, can realistically be expected to come forth. Only in this manner can their cultures remain integral to themselves and continue to nourish and sustain their peoples in the crisis-laden future which seemingly lies ahead of all of us.

Résumé

La préparation du programme de développement socio-culturel.
Une étude critique

La préparation du programme de développement socio-culturel repose sur l'assertion ethnocentrique douteuse que ce qui est moderne est meilleur. L'analyse montre que la capacité d'une société de contrôler et de diriger ses propres tendances au changement et/ou à la stabilité est profondément conditionnée par la forme phénoménologique expérimentalement assumée par les catégories épistémologiques de temps, d'espace, de cause, de quantité d'éthique et d'esthétique. Ainsi donc, pour de multiples raisons logiques et fonctionnelles, la validité permanente doit toujours être en accord avec de nombreuses pratiques traditionnelles.

References

¹Arnold Toynbee (with Jane Caplan), *A Study of History*, revised and abridged edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

²For a comprehensive overview of Piaget's work, see John H. Flavell, *The Development Psychology of Jean Piaget*, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1963.

³See Henry Zentner, *The Indian Identity Crisis*, Calgary: Strayer Publications, Ltd., 1973.

⁴Obviously, there may be empirical instances of societies which have a linear time concept which is comparatively "short", while others have a cyclical time concept that is "large". The present usage is in essence ideal-typical. In this connection, Simpson alleges that "... the sociologist seeks to arrive at ideal types which establish what the action of individuals or groups would be if it were strictly rational, unaffected by errors or emotional factors, and if, furthermore, it were completely and unequivocally directed to a single end. Actual behavior of individuals or groups is then studied as a deviation from such ideal-typical behavior." See George Simpson, *Man in Society*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954, p. 52.

⁵For a more extended comparative analysis of native and some of the major Christian religions, see Henry Zentner, *Profiles of the Supernatural*, Calgary: Strayer Publications, Ltd., 1972.

⁶For a more detailed extensive review and analysis of time and space as theoretical concepts, see Henry Zentner, *Prelude to Administrative Theory*, Calgary: Strayer Publications, Limited, 1973; see also Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane; The Nature of Religion*. Translated from the French by Willard R. Trask, New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

⁷There are differing spatial metaphors which are represented in differing bodies of myths relating to causation. In the case of native peoples, there is an image of a welling up of causal potency and/or capacity from below, out of the earth, out of the water, etc. In the case of the Judeo-Christian tradition, mythology pictures descent of causal power from on high, from heaven above. It is no doubt this kind of imagery that was inveighed against when Bishop Robinson spoke of the God "up there" or "out there". It is not entirely without significance, therefore, that the return to the principal of a supernatural which is diffuse and universally immanent, as called for by Bishop Robinson, is an idea that is entirely consistent with the character of native thought. See John A.T. Robinson, *Honest to God*, London: SCM Press, 1963. See also in this connection, Bernard J. Cooke, *The God of Space and Time*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969.

⁸The secular concept which conveys this notion is that of infinity, whether of number, or space, or what-not. Quite clearly, if one places God (or the principle of order) outside the cosmos, as our mythology tends to do, then one has a logical as well as an intuitive grounding for the concept, for the notion, of infinity in numbers. Similarly, and correspondingly, one has a logical and an intuitive basis for the concept, for the notion, of an open-system, impersonal, cosmos-transcending hypothesis of causation. And correspondingly, too, we have a basis for the notion of a space-encompassing and/or space transcending system of spatial location for such an impersonal source of causal potency. It is these intuitively apprehended notions of time and space and causation and number that give rise to the basic logical syllogisms that compromise our empirical science, e.g., entropynegentropy, etc. This seemingly proceeds from the historically generic notions of linearity, and at the same time it reinforces and affirms the assumption of a linear time and hierarchical space and (sequential) causal sequence.

Obversely, if the creative force (or principle of order) is conceptually and functionally placed inside the cosmos, as native mythology tends to do, there is precluded not only the notion of infinity, but also that of cosmos-transcending location and causation. The implications of such a logically divergent world-view, whether for causation, narrowly construed, or for time, space, number, and ethics, indeed, for the broad realm of science as we know it, is, to say the least, profound.

⁹As we shall see somewhat later in this essay, it is undoubtedly for this reason that the number one (which is the logical equivalent of unity) tends to have a morally transcendent significance in all manner of contextual circumstances in the Judeo-Christian world. And further, that from a phenomenological standpoint, the mythological foundations of our conceptions of number convey many additional related intuitions of power, of unity, of integration, and, of course, their logical reciprocals.

¹⁰Cf. Thomas J.J. Altizer, *Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963. See also, M. Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, translated by Willard R. Trask, Princeton University Press, 1971.

¹¹Needless to say, we ourselves are quite imperfectly monotheistic, and native peoples are only more or less polytheistic. No doubt, at present we approximate more closely than we did, say, in the High Middle Ages, the one ideal-typical polar extreme. Correspondingly, native mythology may not at present approximate as fully as was the case in pre-contact times the logically opposite type of case, i.e., the Nature-has-always-been-there polarity. Presumably, if we did succeed in achieving a complete monotheism — unitary, abstract, and impersonal — theology could be resolved without residue into philosophy. And philosophy, in turn, might assume the form of a systematic logical positivism in terms of which Man could be reassimilated to Nature and subjected to the same control and manipulation as we now practice on Her.

¹²For an analysis of the manner in which the Christian is variably indicted into an active relationship with given members of a projected mythological reference group, a transfigured "heavenly family," see Henry Zentner, *Profiles of the Supernatural*, Calgary: Strayer Publications, Limited, 1972.

¹³It is not with number in the simple quantitative or numerative sense that we must be concerned in approaching our subject matter from a phenomenological point of view. On the contrary, number must be construed in the organizational-functional and/or existential sense of the term. That is to say, the highest unity from both an organizational-functional and/or existential standpoint, seemingly, is God, or Allah, or the Great Spirit, etc. For it is only with reference to such an ideal-typical unifying principle of order, or unity, or integration, that the reciprocal notions of chaos, of conflict, of randomness, and of non-integration become logically meaningful and possible.

Presumably, in the socio-cultural realm, only two major alternatives are possible. In addressing the overriding principle of social organization, societies can choose to ground it on the individual, on the one hand, or the collectivity, on the other. But having opted for the one or the other, it does not follow in any simplistic sense that the alternative chosen as the idealized end condition precludes making extensive instrumental use of the other one as means.

¹⁴For a more or less detailed comparative analysis of native mythology and reference-group behavior, see Henry Zentner, *The Indian Identity Crisis*, Calgary: Strayer Publications, Limited, 1973. It is not without significance that the very restricted size of native societies readily advances the band or society-as-a-whole to the status of a real-worldly reference group of prime significance and, hence, of substantial moral transcendence.

¹⁵Either of these two ideal-typical patterns of distribution of power and causal potency will of course have their own specific linkage to and propensity for the maintenance of the status quo, on the one hand, or the support for and/or facilitation of social change, on the other.

¹⁶It follows, of course, that in the empirical realm both of these notions can and do exist uneasily side-by-side and in conjunction with one another, but with one of them being dominant. In any given society, too, there will be supporting and corresponding conceptions of time and space and number.

The specific (empirical) "mix", the particular permutations and combinations, however, will be problematic and require specific determination in each and every instance.

¹⁷The precise role and function of the Holy Spirit has never been very clearly defined among Christians. Presumably, the historic work of *physical* creation (as distinct from moral) was done by God, the Father; that of Redemption was done by God, the Son; while that of *emergent moral* creation remains to be done by God, the Holy Spirit. Such an interpretation, at any rate, would suggest that He has much in common with the notion of the Great Spirit current among native peoples. He too is less frequently associated with the historic facts of physical creation — this task having been performed by various cultural heroes — than with *moral* creation which is seen as continuously emergent and extending into the present.

¹⁸We are not here concerned with the question of whether these things occur through the homely arts of peace and industry, or, alternatively, through the martial arts of war. Neither are we seriously concerned with the *physical aspects of number*. These are perhaps of least importance in the present context. Marx and Historical Materialism to the contrary, what is at issue is the question how such mundane things as climate, soil conditions, topography, and natural features of all kinds ramify with the facts of comparative density of settlement, of comparative social and physical isolation, of the comparative availability of modes or models and channels of communication and transportation, of the comparative opportunities (or lack thereof) for trade and the exchange of goods, and services, and ideas, and values, and cultural standards of all kinds. In brief, we are concerned here with the potentialities for personal and/or cultural change and growth, whether through invention or through borrowing and development.

¹⁹The ethnographic literature bearing upon North American Indian mythology is quite equivocal. Certain linguistic analysts, such as Dorothy Lee, report evidence which supports the assumption that native peoples view their world as one in which Nature-has-always-been-here. Others find mythological evidence which supports the assumption that some societies may have been inclined to a monotheistic interpretation of creation. But as Paul Radin in his review of these data has rightly observed, it is a question of where the *cultural focus* is to be found, rather than where some given informant may find and/or place it. (See, for example, Dorothy Lee, "Linguistic Reflection of Wintu Thought," and Paul Radin, "Monotheism Among American Indians," in Dennis Tedlock and Barbara Tedlock (eds.), *Teachings from the American Earth*, New York: Liveright, 1975.

²⁰Needless to say, Christian casuistry has not yet reached its *intended* point of completion. Its structural unity is less than total, its hierarchical form is merely relative, and its putative universalism is compromised by situational considerations. Yet, despite the fact that Supreme Court decisions are seldom unanimous, the principle of equal application and of universal equality before the law does obtain to a remarkable degree. For a review of some of the major besetting problems associated with ethical theory, see Philip H. Phenix, *Realms of Meaning*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

²¹From a developmental standpoint, the relevant question would seem to be: Given the increasingly greater and more complex differentiation of culture through time, which culturally overriding logical premise — religious, political, economic, etc. — serves as the operative and behaviorally self-conscious basis of sociocultural integration at given point in time? At given stages of development? By given power elites? That the religious premise, say, is at some point superseded and displaced by, say, the economic among the ruling classes, does not per se invalidate religious logic as a predictive hypothesis in relation to the behavior of the population as a whole. The widespread resurgence of religious activity in various so-called "iron-curtain" countries of late would seem to bear this out. Clearly, then, as Durkheim (*The Division of Labor*) would no doubt have agreed, the structure and content of later-emerging premises are, in large measure, culturally (i.e., functionally) determined by the earlier-appearing ones. No doubt, a study of, say, Toynbee's *Civilizations* would show that differentiation (and segmental logics associated with it) does not become acute until Nature has been forgotten and a commercial-industrial economy is full-blown. It is seemingly only under these circumstances that a *fully monistic* structuring of both logic and ethics occurs and begins to exercise its influence upon the rate and direction of social change in a truly dramatic way.

²²Viewed from a purely secular perspective, it would appear that not only Historical Materialism but, equally, all manner of other antitheisms are comprehensible as simple logical extrapolations of such a predisposition toward a single, unitary, cosmos-transcending creative power. And so, equally, is political totalitarianism.

²³Such an overweening emphasis upon the logic of order and unity presupposes a number of ancillary commitments. Implied, on the one hand, is a propensity for the *cultural denial* of given aspects of "objective reality", the acceptance of which would prove too radically inconsistent with the established order to accept, e.g., the assumption that women are or can be the equal of men. Alternatively and cor-

respondingly, it is implied also that there will be manifest a propensity for the *cultural affirmation and reification* of certain other purely fictional or mythical "realities", e.g., the assumption that certain sexual, age, ethnic, racial, occupational or other categories *are inherently superior* (or inferior) to all others. Presumably, for cultures committed to balance (rather than unity), logically corresponding behavioral predispositions are manifested which would deny other aspects of "objective" reality and reify differing fictions and/or "non-realities."

²⁴See Katherine E. Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, *A History of Aesthetics*, rev. ed., Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954. In this same connection, see Section Three, "Curriculum Design and Validation in Aesthetic Education," in Ralph A. Smith, *Aesthetics and Problems of Education*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971.

²⁵Levy-Bruhl (*How Natives Think; Primitive Mentalite*) to the contrary, the charge that native peoples, being preliterate, are "pre-logical" is manifestly absurd. It is rather the case that their *system of logic as well as their system of ethics*, being multi-premised and multi-valued, proceeds according to a radically different dialectic.

²⁶In this connection, see Ian R. Brooks, *Native Education in Canada and the United States: A Bibliography*, Calgary: Office of Educational Development, Indian Students University Program Services, The University of Calgary, *passim*.