

Barry I. Chazan and Jonas F. Soltis (eds.), *Moral Education*. Problems in Education Series, New York: Teachers College Press, 1973. Pp. X, 192.

Very recently the biographical sketch of one nominee for executive position in the A.E.S.A. included the apparently positive announcement that he was not responsible for the publication of any book of readings. One infers the supposition that books of readings are never worth the academic's while and the presumption that many academics suppose this. Well, surely the assumption is wrong. Many books of readings are probably not worth the energy expended in acquiring the book and reading it. However, it seems that some are. Books of readings fulfill different purposes not all of which are unacceptable to the scholar. Readings compiled by an instructor to make available to his students the particular set of arguments and positions *he prefers to use* in his instruction in, say, an introductory philosophy of education class and which a publisher hopes will be attractive to others are generally a distraction to the scholar's consideration of useful compilations. Readings compiled for use in a highly specialized course offering and published under a generic title are also likely to disappoint scholars other than those who instruct in the same limited specialization. Further, the compilation of readings with the primary intention of providing the editor with either, merely another publication, or a vehicle for the publication of one or two of his own papers undoubtedly helps to explain the voter-appeal of a disclaimer regarding books of readings.

However, some books of readings do serve the scholar well: those comprised of generally acclaimed papers and arguments addressed to a specific topic, clearly marked as such by the title of the book, and regarding which the organization of papers and accompanying commentary are significantly informative; those which are the compilation of symposia contributions and which are clearly marked as such by the title of the book; and those which bring together the papers of an acclaimed scholar. Books of readings which fall into the latter three categories are of obvious value to the scholar. They are readily identifiable in, say, publishers' brochures and can be ordered with the confidence that one knows the value of what he is buying. Books of readings in the first three categories are not adequately susceptible to an evaluation of their worth on the basis of publishers' descriptions and too often serve only to clutter shelves and drain library budgets.

Initial consideration of *Moral Education* reveals those features of a book of readings that mark it an unsatisfactory publication. First, though the title is generic the content is specific. By their own account of three different types of literature on moral education originating from within the educational sphere alone (p. 186 f.) it seems obvious that the title of this book is incomplete — at the very least it should indicate the focus of the book as that of moral philosophy. And although some of the papers attempt to show how moral decisions should be justified, most of the papers, as well as the editorial introduction and commentary, represent the analytical mode of moral philosophy. Unless one knows at least one of the editors by his other works then one is put at a disadvantage in determining from the title just what

kind of literature it contains. Secondly, all but two of the papers are likely to be readily available in any established university library. The first exception is a paper published previously in the proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, 1966, which is probably the primary publication source least familiar to library shelves of all those represented in the book. That paper is by one of the co-editors of this book. The other exception is a previously unpublished paper by the other co-editor. These facts indicate that the point of publication of this book is as much exposure of the editors' own work as it is introduction to the analytical mode of inquiry into moral education. These facts in conjunction with two others indicate that the compilation of papers here is not a gathering together of widely acclaimed works in moral philosophy on moral education but, rather, the general publication of the particular set of arguments and positions one (or both) of the editors prefer to use in his classes in moral philosophy. There are included in this volume of 192 pages total, no less than fifteen papers with forty-two pages of editorial comment and bibliography. In addition, although most of these writings are well known in the area of philosophy of education, many of them are editorial selections from the original papers and books of the authors. All of these facts taken together suggest the content of a course selection, e.g. ("Introduction to Philosophical Study of Moral Education") and not the selection of established or acclaimed positions on the central philosophical issues in moral education. *Moral Education* is likely to be of little value to the scholar in his philosophical research and analysis of moral education. He will be familiar with most of the contributions compiled here; these are now readily available to him; and in the only form he can properly work with, i.e., complete.

In "A Final Word" (p. 183 f.) the editors identify three challenges to be faced by those concerned with contemporary moral education. Philosophical elucidation of the nature and complexity of the moral sphere and of moral education, the accumulation of empirical knowledge of moral development, and the preparation of sophisticated curricula and teaching materials are marked as the frontiers of moral education — those areas needing immediate and intense study and research. This book is intended to help meet the first challenge; and I have argued that so far as scholarly research and analysis is concerned its contribution is quite unremarkable. However, there is a fourth challenge to those concerned with contemporary moral education that is unstated by the editors of this book, but which is directly concerned with "the paucity of effort in moral education . . . reflective of the most distressing of all educational inadequacies" — lack of will and ignorance. The uninformed and uninspired attitude of school teachers is surely a crucial inadequacy facing those scholars concerned with moral education. And it is this challenge that *Moral Education* may help to meet. It is in regard to the inadequacy of concern classroom teachers appear to suffer that we may find *Moral Education* a useful publication. Instructors of introductory courses in moral philosophy and moral education may find that this compilation of arguments and positions is suitable to the achievement on the part of teachers of an awareness and understanding of the basic philosophical issues involved in moral education. The provision of clear and brief analy-

ses of the nature of the moral concern, of the form of moral argument, of the meaning of basic concepts, and of the logical restrictions of teaching another to be moral, may be readily received by teachers and by student-teachers as both informative and directive of their presently ill-defined responsibility as moral educators. Although the editors have not engaged in the extended critical commentary on the papers which might more fully challenge the student to provide perspective and justification for his activities as moral educator, at least the editors have avoided the instructional tendency to tell their students what that perspective and justification ought to be. The sectional introductions are restricted to brief descriptions of the relevant educational issues, the related philosophical problems, with equally brief explanations of the main arguments of each paper addressed to these issues and problems. The instructor is thus unencumbered by the author's "authoritative" viewpoint in using the book of readings to inform and to motivate the student in his quest for clarity and warrant in moral education.

The following account of the content and organization is intended to aid those who do instruct teachers in moral philosophy in making an initial evaluation of *Moral Education* as an undergraduate-level text. By what follows one may at least determine whether or not the arguments and positions which Soltis and/or Chazan seem to prefer to use in the appropriate courses fit closely enough with one's own preferences for instruction material.

The "General Introduction" is a short account of the nature and scope of the inquiry engaged in by moral philosophers, distinguishing it clearly from moralizing, indicating the kind of contribution it may make to moral education and warning the student of the limits of expectation he may properly make of moral philosophy. The nature and function of moral philosophy is the subject of the papers in Part One of this book. The significant paper here is Frankena's definitive analysis of moral philosophy in his *Ethics*. The other two papers in this section are by each of the editors. Soltis seeks to provide a more precise statement of what constitutes a rule or value as a moral rule or value, and concludes that any such statement assumes some particular ethic. Chazan seeks to elucidate the elements of "the moral situation" which distinguish it from non-moral situations; he argues on the basis of this analysis that moral education may properly require that the student be a moral philosopher. Part Two of the book introduces the issue of moral justification and in particular the paradox of objective moral claims not amenable to scientific validation. The four papers presented are addressed to this issue: Phenix's argument that moral objectivity rests on the reality of a divine will (from his *Education and the Worship of God*); Moore's remarkable analysis of ethical judgements from the first chapter of *Principia Ethica*; Sartre's defence of the atheistic existentialists' claim that the justification of a moral claim is its being freely chosen and its being a choice for all men; and Sydney Morgenbesser's argument that the objectivity of moral claims derives from the consensus of agreement we achieve regarding them (*Educational Theory*, July, 1957).

The nature and function of moral principles in determining what ought to be done is the subject of Part Three. Hare's analysis of moral principles and his conclusion that the moral life centers on decisions of principle is followed by Marcus Singer's distinction between moral rules and moral principles as specific guides to action and as guides to judgements regarding what kind of actions are generally right or wrong (*Essays in Moral Philosophy*, edited by A.I. Meldon). Hare's claim of the universalizability of moral judgements, requiring that one choose to do that which he would have others do, leads him to conclude that moral education is the development of an attitude and ability commensurate with making such judgements. That is, moral education is necessarily directed and governed by the aim of autonomous moral thinking ("Adolescents Into Adults"). The development of moral persons, so understood, and the restriction this development places on the educative process is the subject of Part Four. Hare's paper is followed by John Wilson's summative list of the components of a moral character (*Introduction to Moral Education*), and Lawrence Kohlberg's typology of moral thinking ("The Child as a Moral Philosopher," *Psychology Today*, Sept., 1968).

The final section of the book specifically deals with the central problem of moral instruction — closing the gap between moral thinking and moral conduct. Frankena argues, in "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education" (*Harvard Educational Review*, Fall, 1958), that concurrent instruction in both thinking and conduct is necessary to achieve moral education. Reginald Archambault argues that because the function of schooling is intellectual instruction and not directly the attainment of moral conduct, schooling properly restricts itself to that moral instruction which is involved in intellectual instruction — the development of intellectual habits, skills, and sensitivities which are necessary to the achievement of moral conduct. ("Criteria for Success in Moral Instruction," *Harvard Educational Review*, Fall, 1963). The final selection by Raths, Harmin, and Simon (from *Values and Teaching*) represents an attempt to show the conditions of schooling children in value clarification. Soltis and Chazan complete this introduction to the philosophical concerns of moral education by providing the student with a selected bibliography organized according to the subject divisions of their book, and with an explanatory note on other types of literature available in the general area of moral education.

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