

*The academic labor market in general and for political science in particular can only be characterized as irrational. Career expectations originate in an academic socialization process which imparts to graduate students the belief that the only responsible vocation is university teaching and research. This has led to oversupply of political scientists on the academic labor market and created a reserve army of frustrated academics, with potentially serious consequences for the polity and the academics themselves.*

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## The Academic Labor Market: With Special Reference to Political Science\*

The academic labor market is a fact of life for all present and prospective academicians. Like some other important facts of academic life, it has remained largely unexamined. This article is an analysis of the academic labor market. While there are specific references to political science, they serve to illustrate the operations of the market in general.

A reliable sociology of knowledge is still in an embryonic stage of development. Even a sociology of the knowledgeable remains to be realized.<sup>1</sup> American political scientists, many of whom are ahistorical, have devoted little attention to the history and sociology of political science as an academic discipline. As the authors of a pioneering work on the discipline noted, "most American political scientists are largely unfamiliar with the origins and early evolution of their discipline."<sup>2</sup> To the extent that political scientists lack disciplinary self-consciousness, political science as an academic discipline remains underdeveloped.

One important lacuna in the knowledge about the discipline's structures and practices concerns recruitment for academic positions. The aca-

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\*This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

<sup>1</sup>David Riesman, *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958), pp. 23-24.

<sup>2</sup>Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *The Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1967), p. 2.

democratic labor market for political scientists has been virtually untouched by scholarly inquiry. How potential employees meet potential employers has not yet been adequately determined. Available evidence indicates, however, that the structure and practices of the academic labor market in political science today are essentially the same as those which emerged almost a century ago, when political science as a vocation was born in the United States. Whether that structure and those practices are still effective, if they ever were, is highly questionable. With so much secrecy and inefficiency in personnel allocation, the academic labor market for political scientists can only be characterized as irrational. Nowhere has the accuracy of Max Weber's observation that in university careers chance "rules to an unusually high degree"<sup>3</sup> been better demonstrated. While recruitment practices in political science may be irrational, they reflect the existing academic prestige system, which may itself be archaic.

## I

Academic labor markets are in many ways similar to black markets, markets in which personal friendships, special contacts, and connections play a vital role.

—David G. Brown

The American academic labor market, more precisely the market for university and college teachers, is relatively closed and decentralized. The present situation contrasts with an open market in which information about vacancies and candidates would be widely publicized and candidates selected strictly on the basis of their professional qualifications.<sup>4</sup> In much of the rest of the world, including both developed and developing areas, full publicity for academic vacancies is the norm. This is, for instance, the case in Northern Europe, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.<sup>5</sup> In the United States, however, it is often considered contrary to academic ethics to employ formal methods in the search for a position:

Professional ethic condemns active job seeking, ridicules the use of formal employment liaisons, and accepts only the most diplomatic approaches to the market. Hints in convention conversation, postscripts added to letters following naturally among professional colleagues are the channels of communication, at least for the better schools within academia. Availability is carried circuitously and precariously along partially formalized grapevines.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 132.

<sup>4</sup>Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee, *The Academic Marketplace* (New York: Science Editions, Inc., 1961), p. 131.

<sup>5</sup>*The Recruitment and Training of University Teachers* (Ghent: International Association of University Professors and Lecturers, 1967), p. 104; Caplow and McGee, *op cit.*, p. 248; Ernst Ekman, "Selecting a Professor in Sweden," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn, 1955), pp. 547-551; Howard D. Marshall, *The Mobility of College Faculties* (New York: Pageant Press, 1964), p. 132; William Anderson, "The Teaching Personnel in American Political Science Departments: A Report of the Sub-Committee on Personnel of the Committee on Policy to the American Political Science Association, 1934," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4 (August, 1934), p. 762.

The existing American academic labor market resembles the Federal civil service as it existed prior to the introduction of a merit system by the Pendleton Act (1883). Despite the great increase in the number of academic institutions, applicants, and the increasing specialization, which make it impossible to know of many of the positions for which one is qualified and potentially interested, recruitment is still on a highly personal basis, with faculty members recommending their friends for positions. Many potential applicants, especially younger ones, unaware of what is available, are denied equality of opportunity in being considered for many of the existing positions.

The results of this chaotic situation include poor allocation of personnel, spending of too much time in recruitment, paucity of written rules, and nepotism. Since both candidates and departments are frequently ignorant of what is available, often the second or third best candidate is hired.<sup>7</sup> Departments spend far too much time in recruiting individual faculty members. This extravagance is especially excessive in the search for junior faculty.<sup>8</sup> In most institutions there are no written or unwritten rules governing recruitment practices.<sup>9</sup> Nepotism of one variety or another is widespread. A 1957 study found that 40% of instructors and assistant professors and 61% of associate and full professors had some contact with the department prior to their candidacy.<sup>10</sup> A 1963 survey of political scientists revealed that "having the right connections" was ranked third in contributing to career success, above both quality of publications and teaching ability.<sup>11</sup>

There is considerable and increasing discontent with current recruitment practices. Women are especially dissatisfied. Their dissatisfaction has more deep seated roots, for they are not regarded seriously in the academic world.<sup>12</sup> It is widely believed that motherhood aborts scholarship. Among academicians of different disciplines, political scientists are among the least satisfied with existing recruitment practices.

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<sup>6</sup>David G. Brown, *The Mobile Professors* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1967), p. 113.

<sup>7</sup>Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>8</sup>Caplow and McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 207.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 132. The differences in the percentages are significant by a chi square test at the .05 level of significance. This study was based upon vacancies in nine universities during the 1954-1956 academic years. See also Reece McGee, *Academic Janus* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1971), pp. 110-117, 199.

<sup>11</sup>Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 79.

<sup>12</sup>Caplow and McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 226; *The Recruitment and Training of University Teachers*, pp. 37, 218. Many of the tables in a recent scholarly study deal only with "males". See Richard B. Freeman, *The Market for College-Trained Manpower: A Study in the Economics of Career Choice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

In a 1965 survey of academicians who found positions for the 1964-1965 academic year, 54% in political science, 45% in history, 43% in sociology, 39% in economics, 21% in French, and 20% in mathematics rated the existing channels in the academic labor market mechanism as very poor or poor. On the whole individuals in disciplines where professional associations have taken a larger role in recruitment are more satisfied.<sup>13</sup>

In view of the highly imperfect market mechanisms, those who seek academic positions employ a variety of informal and formal methods, ranging from contracting graduate professors to associating with a commercial teacher's agency.<sup>14</sup> A 1965 survey revealed that 80% of the good positions and 56% of the poor ones were found by informal methods.<sup>15</sup> Nearly two-thirds of all positions were secured by informal means.<sup>16</sup>

The methods used by employing departments vary with the size, location, prestige, and financial status of the institutions they represent, as well as with the vacancies they wish to fill. The prestigious institutions usually do not openly publicize their vacancies. In political science only a small percentage of all the vacancies are listed in the American Political Science Association Personnel Service's *Newsletter*.<sup>17</sup>

While current academic recruitment practices may be characterized as irrational, they reflect the prevalent academic prestige system. It has its basis in the traditional master-apprentice relationship, which still endures, especially at the prestigious institutions. This relationship is essentially that described by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers:

The person of the master exerts an authority with a marvellous power. A wide variety of motives comes into play here. There is the need to subordinate oneself, the desire to avoid responsibility, the relief experienced through association with greatness, coupled with the enhancement of one's sense of self-importance and the need for a discipline sterner than any we can impose on ourselves.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>13</sup>Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>14</sup>Based upon a survey of academicians who found positions for the 1964-1965 academic year. For the table, see *ibid.*, p. 119. Other studies of the academic labor market in the period from the late 1920's to the mid-1960's confirm Brown's findings. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 118. The differences in the percentages are significant by a chi square test at the .05 level of significance.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>17</sup>For the 1964-1965 academic year 26.2% of the positions were listed, but for the 1969-1970 academic year only 19.5% were listed. Since these percentages were calculated on the assumption that all have completed their doctoral dissertations prior to the beginning of their full-time teaching, these percentages are, if anything, liberal estimates.

In 1970 the Council of the American Political Science Association adopted a policy of open listing of vacancies. It remains to be seen whether or not the open listing policy will secure the desired results.

<sup>18</sup>Karl Jaspers, *The Idea of the University* (London: Peter Owen, Ltd., 1960), p. 63.

It is thus not surprising that professors favor their own disciples for appointment:

Professors are inclined to prefer their own disciples in matters of appointment, if they do not indeed limit access to them entirely. On the strength of the sheer duration of their study under a given professor these students feel that they earned the right to academic appointment — a right which they claim unjustly but which the professor recognizes for reasons of personal sympathy. Professors are sought after who have the reputation of finding academic jobs for their students.<sup>19</sup>

Weber, who tried to follow the principle that his students must find employment at a university other than his own, sadly concluded: "But the result has been that one of my best disciples has been turned down at another university because nobody there believed this to be the reason".<sup>20</sup>

An individual is hired on the basis of how good he will appear to others: "What is important is what others in the discipline think of him, since that is, in large part, how good he is".<sup>21</sup> There is considerable anxiety and uncertainty with the result that departments prefer a candidate who is even slightly familiar to one who is totally unknown.<sup>22</sup>

## II

So long as intellectual life brings no tangible rewards, social or economic, only those fired by an uncompromising determination will turn to it. To the extent, however, that education and scholarship carry privilege, they become popular with the mass of people. Since most people seek whatever promises privilege and prestige in excess of their actual capacities, social and economic premiums do not actually favour intellectual achievement, but only its external trappings.

—Karl Jaspers

There has been a considerable increase in the proportion of the American university and college age population (18-21 years of age) attending institutions of higher learning. In 1900 4% of this age group attended institutions of higher learning, but in 1960 the percentage had risen to 40.<sup>23</sup> By contrast, in Canada in 1960 only 13% of this same age group attended such institutions;<sup>24</sup> it is expected that even with substantial increases, by 1980 only 17% of this age group in Britain will receive full-time higher education.<sup>25</sup> The great increase in enrollments is not due to a sudden eagerness for education, but is rather due, as Weber already noted,

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>20</sup>Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

<sup>21</sup>Caplow and McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>23</sup>*The Recruitment and Training of University Teachers*, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup>Z. E. Zsigmond and C. J. Wenaas, *Enrolment in Educational Institutions by Province, 1951-52 to 1980-81*, Economic Council of Canada, Staff Study No. 25 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 38.

<sup>25</sup>*The Recruitment and Training of University Teachers*, p. 12.

to a desire to secure the social prestige and economic benefits that degrees bestow.<sup>26</sup> The intellectual cost of degrees is low, "and with the increasing volume of such certificates, their intellectual costs do not increase but rather decrease".<sup>27</sup>

There has also occurred a great increase in academic teaching personnel. In 1900 there were 41 university and college professors per 100,000 employed population, but in 1960 there were 571.<sup>28</sup> The material conditions for the support of so many academicians have been, until recently, good. Far more important than the socio-economic benefits that professors derive from their vocation, is possession of what Weber referred to as the "inward calling".<sup>29</sup> This calling includes patience, enthusiasm, objectivity, dedication to work, and the search for the truth, not as means to something else, but for their own sake. All persons may have the potential for meditation and reflection, but "only a very few have the calling for intellectual work in all its complexity".<sup>30</sup>

The considerable increase in the number of university and college teaching personnel has resulted in the influx of persons lacking the "inward calling", with the expected consequences:

The influx *en masse* of mediocrity into the learned professions has given rise everywhere to a hothouse culture where either of two things is the rule. Either an external, mechanical method seems easily learned and applied to the point where everyone can 'participate', or else a purely formal method of thought together with a limited number of simple axioms can serve as a universal container.<sup>31</sup>

In the United States more of the former than of the latter has occurred. As Hacker has demonstrated, the "quantitative growth in academic employment has had the inevitable effect of diluting the quality of the scholarly calling".<sup>32</sup> In view of the greatly enlarged academic population, "much of contemporary scholarship may usefully be seen as environmental adaptations devised to provide honorable occupations for Americans of middling intelligence".<sup>33</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Weber, "Bureaucracy", in Gerth and Mills, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 242. One of the first American graduate students in political science wrote: "But I must put myself up to the highest bidder at the end of this collegiate year: and it is probable that I would fetch a bigger price with a Ph.D. label on me than I can fetch without. It's a choice, apparently, between pecuniary profit and mental advantage — with the metal sacrifice perhaps small enough to allow one to *think* of risking it." Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Volume 3: 1884-1885* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 415.

<sup>28</sup>Andrew Hacker, "Democracy, Mediocracy, and the Scholarly Calling", paper prepared for delivery at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 3-7, 1968, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup>Weber, "Science as a Vocation", p. 134.

<sup>30</sup>Jaspers, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>32</sup>Hacker, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

Careers as university and college staff members are eagerly sought. Of all the doctoral recipients for the 1954-1956 academic years, 45.2% entered university or college teaching. Of the doctoral recipients for the 1970-1971 academic year, 54% entered teaching. For political scientists, the percentages are 73.4% and 76.9%, respectively.<sup>34</sup> The socialization process of graduate students, especially in social science and the humanities, is such as to inculcate in them the idea that the only honorable vocation is teaching and research, preferably more of the latter than of the former. Those few who venture outside the academic world are considered as lost and dead.

This large body of academicians has become heavily dependent upon governmental and foundation support for salaries, research, and equipment. As a consequence, it has lost much of its desire to examine critically the existing order. What Jaspers says of professors in general is even more applicable to the American variety:

Inevitably, professors tend to support the social conditions which favour them and give them status; to recognize the existing state of affairs and to serve the current government with their spoken and written word.<sup>35</sup>

A well-known political scientist has aptly expressed the need for American political scientists to pursue the truth:

American political science is in urgent need of ceasing to be identified with the status quo and the powers-to-be. It must assume the mission, which is the true mission of any science worthy of the name, to speak truth to power rather than justify and rationalize power in pseudo-scientific terms.<sup>36</sup>

### III

“‘It looks like snow’, said the Laplanders, who had skis to sell.”

—Snorre Sturlason

Except for the years 1953-1955, the seller's market for American academic positions has prevailed since the end of World War II. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's there were many predictions of desperate shortages of university and college faculty. The President of the American Political Science Association in 1966 commented upon the bright future of young doctoral recipients:

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<sup>34</sup>National Education Association, *Teacher Supply and Demand in Colleges and Universities, 1955-56 and 1956-57* (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 75; National Academy of Sciences, *Summary Report 1971 Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities* (Washington, D.C., 1972), pp. 8-9.

In 1967 89% of political scientists with doctorates and 72% with master's degrees were employed by academic institutions. See Heinz Eulau and James G. March, eds., *Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 77.

<sup>35</sup>Jaspers, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>36</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, “Statement of Views”, *Biographies and Statements of Views of Nominees*, 1970 Election of the officers of the American Political Science Association, p. 4.

. . . the growth of departments of political science at a rate exceeding the capacity of our graduate schools to produce Ph.D.'s means that these young men are scarce, are in a seller's market, and are being promoted rapidly, and becoming department chairmen and otherwise influential in the affairs of the profession.<sup>37</sup>

As late as 1969, the authors of a handbook for political science students painted a bright picture for those thinking of academic employment: "The demand for teachers of political science exceeds the supply, and this picture is not likely to change in the foreseeable future".<sup>38</sup> It is difficult to dispute the Cartter and Farrell observation about those who still refuse to believe that there is a surplus on the academic labor market:

One can only surmise that old dogmas are difficult to dispel, and that no amount of evidence other than men with Ph.D.'s selling apples on street corners is going to convince some people that market situations are dramatically changing around them.<sup>39</sup>

Since 1954 Cartter has predicted a surplus on the academic labor market from about 1976 onward.<sup>40</sup> In a later survey of Cartter and Farrell a surplus on the academic labor market was predicted from about 1970 onward.<sup>41</sup>

The situation today resembles that existing in 1942, when mere possession of the doctorate no longer provided the bargaining power that it once did.<sup>42</sup> Since the 1968-1969 academic year, if not earlier, there has been a buyer's market. In a masterpiece of understatement, one of the resolutions adopted by the 1970 annual meeting of the American Association of University Professors referred to the "currently tightening academic market".<sup>43</sup> Over-production has occurred not only on the farms of the United States, but also in its graduate schools. That such a phenomenon could occur is a sad reflection upon the rationality of academic planning. Universities, it appears, are not the most rational social institutions.

Precise data on the imbalance between supply and demand are not available, but it is increasingly evident that the imbalance is considerable and is increasing in many disciplines. The greatest imbalances appear to be in physics, English, and political science.<sup>44</sup> The number of appi-

<sup>37</sup>Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 4 (December, 1966), p. 870.

<sup>38</sup>Richard L. Merritt and Gloria J. Pyszka, *The Student Political Scientist's Handbook* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), p. 169.

<sup>39</sup>Allan M. Cartter and Robert L. Farrell, "Academic Labor Market Projections and the Draft", in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 91st Congress, 1st Session, *The Economics and Financing of Higher Education in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 372.

<sup>40</sup>Cartter, "Future Faculty: Needs and Resources", in Calvin B. T. Lee, ed., *Improving College Teaching* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1967), p. 122.

<sup>41</sup>Cartter and Farrell, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

<sup>42</sup>Logan Wilson, *The Academic Man: A Study in the Sociology of a Profession* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 8.

<sup>43</sup>*American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, Vol. 56, No. 2 (June, 1970), pp. 142-143.

cants for a single position varies in some cases from 200 to 500; for two political science positions in a California state college, 400 applications were received.<sup>45</sup> On the basis of information gathered by the present authors, there were proportionally fewer vacancies in political science for 1970-1971 academic year at United States than at Canadian institutions. In Canada (Ontario and the provinces east of it) of the 29 four-year institutions and graduate schools that are predominantly English-speaking, which includes nearly all such institutions, 17 (58.6%) had 31 vacancies. Of the 345 United States institutions from Maine to Maryland in the same category and which also includes practically all, only 85 (24.6%) had 110 vacancies. Although the Canadian institutions constitute only 7.8% of all institutions, they had 22% of all the vacancies. A 1970 survey by the American Political Science Association of political science departments which award the doctorate revealed that the ratio of applicants to teaching positions in these departments was at least 5:1.<sup>46</sup> Another survey, of non-doctoral political science departments, concluded that faculty growth in them in the 1970's will be below that of the 1960's and far below the projected doctorate production.<sup>47</sup>

The causes of this surplus on the academic labor market are numerous, but the major factors are the inability of the academic world and the economy, as now existing, to absorb so many highly educated persons. There is also an underlying demographic dimension. Very few social scientists, especially political scientists, enter non-academic employment.<sup>48</sup> Even if substantially more political scientists desired to enter business and industry, it is doubtful whether they could be absorbed at a rank commensurate with their expectations and/or ability. As one perceptive analyst has observed, in most developed states the number of professionally-trained people is increasing faster than their economies can absorb them.<sup>49</sup> The so-called brain drain from the less developed states to the

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<sup>44</sup>Larry Eichel, "Market Value of Ph.D. Plummetts", *The Harvard Independent*, Vol. 1, No. 18 (March 19-25, 1970), p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>Clifford E. Landers and James S. Cicarelli, "Academic Recession", *The New Republic*, Vol. 162, No. 19 (May 9, 1970), p. 14.

<sup>46</sup>Earl M. Baker, "A Survey of the Graduate Academic Marketplace in Political Science", *P.S.*, Vol. III, No. 3, (Summer, 1970), p. 368.

<sup>47</sup>Martin O. Heisler, "The Academic Marketplace in Political Science for the Next Decade: A Preliminary Report on a Survey", *P.S.*, Vol. III, No. 3 (Summer, 1970), p. 375.

<sup>48</sup>National Academy of Sciences, *The Behavioral and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 214, 218; for the percentages, see National Academy of Sciences, *Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities 1958-1966* (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 83; *Summary Report 1967 Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities*, 1968, p. 7; *Summary Report 1968*, p. 7; *Summary Report 1969*, p. 7; *Summary Report 1970*, p. 7. See also Carroll McKibbin, "Career Patterns Among Political Scientists", paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7-11, 1971, p. 6.

<sup>49</sup>George B. Baldwin, "Brain Drain or Overflow?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January, 1970), p. 358.

more developed ones is more often than not an overflow: "The less developed countries are not being stripped of manpower they badly need; more often than not they are being relieved of manpower they cannot use".<sup>50</sup> It can be said that the population of the United States is now above the economic optimum. With an ever-increasing population, vast resources are invested for consumer support, not capital formation. There are two large and increasing dependent populations — the young, among whom the proportion receiving higher education is increasing, and the old. Perhaps one of the most deplorable consequences of a mass society is that individuals are increasingly regarded as easily expendable. This is very noticeable in the academic labor market, ranging from the frequent refusal of institutions even to respond to position inquiries to the belief that since there is an academic reserve army individual candidates are cheap and easily obtainable.

The consequences of this imbalance between supply and demand may become serious for the individual academician, for research, for teaching, and for the polity. Those who have what Weber called the "inward calling" for academic employment but are unable to secure positions, or secure positions below their capabilities, will undoubtedly experience substantial personal anguish. Some worthy individuals will be unable for lack of funds to engage in needed research. Students will be taught by fewer teachers, with the result that there will be even larger classes and fewer meaningful contacts between students and teachers. Unemployed or underemployed academicians might well contribute to excessive instability in the American polity. Politics in the United States might come to resemble German and Austrian politics of the 1920's and early 1930's, where the thousands of underemployed holders of doctorates were in the vanguard of social revolt.<sup>51</sup>

Not all of the consequences of this imbalance need be negative. There is a recent commendable trend in many of the prestigious institutions to reduce graduate school enrollments. Curricular changes may be in the direction of offering courses in public policy formation with the view to inducing more political and other social scientists to enter government service.<sup>52</sup> There may also be a reduction in the number of published research findings, which would enable many to better cope with the published works.

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<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 359.

<sup>51</sup>Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 31. An even earlier instance was perhaps more dramatic: "The failure of the established order to put Doctor of Philosophy Marx in a Prussian university post was of no small consequence in launching him on his career". Harold Dwight Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), pp. 50-51.

<sup>52</sup>John Dreijmanis, "Occupational Alternatives for Political Scientists", paper prepared for delivery at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association, Kingston, Rhode Island, April 21-22, 1972, p. 9.