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Latin American Security: Canadian and International Perspectives

*edited by Monique Greenwood Santos
and Stephen J. Randall*



CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary promotes excellence in military and strategic studies. Its members work in areas including military history, Canadian defence policy, and international strategic and security issues. *Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies* presents their research to the public.

ABSTRACT: The papers and presentations in this volume were part of an international conference on Latin American and Caribbean basin security issues hosted by the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary in May, 2013. Focusing on Canadian security policies in the region, the conference went beyond traditional notions of security and focused on a range of human security issues: the impact of insecurity on violence against women, the role of illegal armed groups, organized crime, guerrilla insurgencies, youth gangs, and the impact which armed conflict has on the physical environment. The findings of this conference suggest that, with increased private sector investment in the region combined, growing trade ties have implications for the image of Canada in the region and necessitate a close and effective working relationship between government and the private sector to ensure that international standards pertaining to the environment and human rights are observed.

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University of Calgary
2500 University Drive NW
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Tel: 403.220.4030 / Fax: 403.282.0594
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*Latin American Research Centre and
the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies*

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and Stephen J. Randall*

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Preface

This publication includes a selection of presentations from the May 2013 Latin American Security Conference hosted by the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary, jointly with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, the School of Public Policy and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. We are very grateful for their collaboration and support, as we are for the very generous support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Defence Engagement Program of the Department of National Defence. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada very kindly arranged for Canadian Ambassador to Colombia Tim Martin to deliver the opening keynote address. Several corporations provided critical financial support for the conference, including Agrium, Enbridge International, UBS Bank Canada, and Rainmaker. Enbridge International, Petrominerales, Nexen, CKR Global, Goldcorp, Grantierra, NortonRose, and Yamana Gold also facilitated the participation of panelists from their firms.

We were fortunate to have had the participation of several doctoral student rapporteurs who prepared executive summaries of each of the presentations and discussions which followed the presentations. They included: Adam Cahill (History), Clayton Dennison (CMSS), Mariana Hipolito A. Ramos (Political Science), Elizabeth Pando (Political Science), and Brenan Smith (History).

Overall conference coordination was handled with patience and skill by Monique Greenwood Santos, Program Coordinator in the Centre. She is also the co-editor of this volume. The Latin American Research Centre would also like to thank the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies for its collaboration in the publication of the conference proceedings.

Stephen J. Randall
Director, Latin American Research Centre
University of Calgary

Introduction

Dr. Stephen J. Randall, FRSC,
Director, Latin American Research Centre

The papers and presentations in this volume were part of an international conference on Latin American and Caribbean basin security issues hosted by the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary May 2 & 3, 2013. The conference was co-hosted with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary, and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, also based in Calgary. The conference received very generous support from the Defence Engagement Program of the Department of National Defence, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, as well as private sector sponsorship from UBS Bank Canada, Agrium, and Rainmaker. The Centre is grateful to its co-hosts and its sponsors for making it possible to draw together a range of academics and practitioners from Canada, the United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

The objectives of the conference were several. The first was to adopt a very broad approach to what was meant by “security.” We wanted to include but go beyond traditional notions of security which focus on the military and thus give attention to a range of human security issues, whether it be the impact of insecurity on violence against women, the role of illegal armed groups, organized crime, guerrilla insurgencies, youth gangs, or the impact which armed conflict has on the physical environment. A second goal was to include and learn from academic specialists, government officials, international agencies, NGOs and members of the business community with operations in the region. Perhaps inevitably there were gaps. Although issues relevant to Latin American indigenous groups were identified, there was no spokesperson from an indigenous community in the region. Nor was there a representative of organized labour from Latin America, both sectors which have been impacted by armed conflict in the region. The focus of the conference was on Hispanic and Portuguese Latin America. Of the English, French, and Dutch Caribbean only Trinidad and Tobago received appropriate attention, although that country’s security agenda was set in the larger framework of CARICOM (Caribbean Community). Since this was a Canadian-based conference, a third goal was to learn more about the evolution of Canadian

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security policies in Latin America, what the policy objectives have been, where Canada has focused its attention and resources and in what ways Canada has made an impact.

Conference sessions thus dealt with: the evolving role of the military in the region; tensions between the ideal and the reality of the military's function; the relationship between police forces and military; and the role of non-state armed groups, whether guerrilla insurgents such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), paramilitary groups or narcotics cartels such as the Zetas in Mexico and Central America, or the youth gangs that have increased levels of violence from California to Panama. In all presentations there was an underlying or explicit recognition of the context in which security must be understood: pervasive poverty and inequality, race and class conflict, sexism, and for several countries in the region, most significantly in Central America, among the highest rates of homicide in the world.

To set the stage for one dimension of the discussions, Hal Klepak traced the evolution of the inter-American security system from its roots in the early nineteenth century to the present. He stressed that hemispheric cooperation has been strongest in periods when the region faced a common external threat, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and World War II period, or Communism during the Cold War, although for many Latin American countries the United States itself has been seen historically as a threat. In the absence of an external threat since the end of the Cold War and with waning U.S. interest and influence in the region, the inter-American security system has reached its weakest point since prior to World War II. Hector Luis Saint-Pierre turned our attention to the Latin American military, outlining the traditional and evolving mission of the armed forces, with a focus on Brazil. He stressed the philosophical distinction between security and defence. As with other participants, Saint-Pierre noted the fact that threats are not solely state to state but rather derive from social, economic, and political challenges. Saint-Pierre viewed as unfortunate the blurring of lines between areas in which military forces appropriately belong, which is defence of the state, and areas in which police are the appropriate institution. Lucía Dammert concentrated her analysis on the evolution of military-police relations in the region. She outlined the factors which have led governments and civil society to turn to the military rather than the police to deal with criminal activity, in particular the general corruption and inefficiency often associated with police forces and the high degree of personal insecurity felt by many Latin American citizens in their daily lives. Dammert argued that police reform has been largely ineffective, and Saint-Pierre cited instances in Brazil where

the police had undermined the efforts of the military to deal with criminal activity. Commentator Hendrik Kraay suggested that since the military was already very actively engaged well beyond its traditional role of defence of the state, the need was to find ways to minimize their impact.

Canadian Ambassador to Colombia Tim Martin in his opening keynote address echoed Dammert's stress on the sense of citizen insecurity in the region. Martin noted that among the factors accounting for Colombia's recent success in meeting its security challenges were: a strong and professional military and police; a coherent and progressive package of social and economic policies including a victims-based restitution policy; and international and regional support. Ambassador Adam Blackwell, Secretary of Multidimensional Security at the Organization of American States (OAS), reinforced Dammert's data on violent crime, noting the impact that the illicit economy has had on financing criminal enterprise, with homicide rates and rates of gun violence increasing. He indicated that some estimates identify some 900 gangs in Central America alone. Like Dammert he noted the extent to which citizens feel insecure as the result of the high crime rates. In a paper prepared subsequent to the conference, Colombian scholar Bernardo Pérez Salazar identified organized crime as one of the critical areas in which multidimensional security in the Americas has not been successful since the adoption in 2003 of the Mexico City Declaration by the Organization of American States. Pérez suggested that the ineffectiveness in dealing with organized crime has been particularly problematic in areas that he identified as "undergoverned," in other words those areas in which weak states have failed to establish a credible and effective political and military/police presence. Pérez referred to all non-state actors criminalized by the state-centric multidimensional security doctrine. In his paper, he criticized the view that the state is necessarily the best actor capable of providing governance goods and services. His paper also dealt critically with "development agendas" focused on strengthening state military and policing capacity as the main cornerstone of state-building. His specific focus was the case of Colombia, where counterinsurgent, antinarcotic and stabilization doctrine and operations have been applied for decades with increasing troop density, to no avail. Thomas C. Bruneau provided an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the challenges that threaten civilian control of military forces in the "new democracies" of Latin America. He outlined a number of the preconditions that must be established to ensure an effective civil-military relationship, the most important of which he suggested is that power must reside with elected civilian decision-makers with military subservient to the civilian power. In

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his estimation only Chile and Colombia at present have achieved an effective institutional structure. Presentations provided analyses of the impact on society of the militarization of the war on drugs in Mexico during the Calderón government. Zulma Y. Méndez demonstrated the correlation between the intensified military operations in the Ciudad Juárez area and the dramatic increase in the killing of women. María-Cristina Rosas observed the lack of continuity in the development of a national security strategy in Mexico during the last several administrations. She noted that President Vicente Fox's national security strategy made no reference to narcotics trafficking and the cartels, whereas the national security strategy of the Calderón government identified narcotics and organized criminal activity as a national security threat and "federalized" as well as militarized the war on drugs, paying little attention to state and municipal authorities. With Calderón's successor, President Enrique Peña Nieto, the strategy shifted to a policy of "Mexico in Peace" with a greater emphasis on protecting human rights and reducing the high levels of violence.

Several papers and presentations dealt with the challenges posed by organized crime, paramilitary groups, youth gangs, and the few remaining insurgent groups in the region, the most significant of which is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the longest standing major insurgency in Latin America. The Colombian government and FARC have for some time been engaged in negotiations with a view to a peace accord. Former Colombian ambassador to Canada and former Colombian peace commissioner in earlier negotiations with FARC, Alfonso López Caballero, expressed some degree of optimism about the current negotiations, noting that, in contrast to previous peace negotiations, FARC faces too many pressures internally and internationally not to negotiate in good faith. At the same time, he noted the divisiveness in Colombian society and political circles over the ultimate treatment of FARC in a final settlement, with some factions perceiving FARC as simply a brutal terrorist organization, opposed even to negotiations let alone a smooth and liberal transition into civil society for FARC insurgents. Ambassador Martin echoed López Caballero's optimism about the peace negotiations.¹ Greg Purdy and José Miguel Cruz offered sobering reflections on organized crime and violence. Purdy stressed the transnational nature of organized crime and its destabilizing impact. Like Cruz, Purdy underlined the extent to which pervasive corruption, whether among military, police, intelligence or civilian officials, has contributed to the ineffectiveness of government policies. Purdy noted, for instance, the failure of Colombia's intelligence agency DAS as the result of corruption.

Given the massive levels of wealth generated by organized crime and the comparatively poorly compensated civilian and military personnel, it was not surprising that corruption should be so pervasive. As well, as Purdy pointed out, organized criminal organizations in countries with high rates of unemployment and inequality can be both sources of employment and socio-economic levelers. Cruz was pointedly critical of *mano dura* policies that have been pursued by most Central American governments in dealing with organized crime. He cited the increased levels of violence in Central America when *mano dura* policies have been pursued. Military and police aggression were matched by aggression from target groups, resulting in a general escalation of violence. Cruz distinguished between insurgent groups, which need to maintain some degree of support from civilian populations, and organized criminal groups which have little need to do so. He noted, as well, the effectiveness of state institutions in some countries and their failure in others, such as the contrast between the situation in and policies pursued by Nicaragua versus Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In the case of Nicaragua the Sandinista governments in the 1980s worked to dismantle illegal armed groups and to establish a reasonably credible, independent, and non-corrupt police force which enjoys the confidence of Nicaraguan civilians. Ambassador Adam Blackwell concurred with Cruz's assessment, stressing that the problem of insecurity is not necessarily more security. *Mano dura*, he noted, has been tried and found wanting; heavy-handed military and police tactics and tough crime legislation have not resulted in lower levels of violence and lower serious crime rates. Rather, he advocated a humanistic approach, with a focus on crime prevention, alleviating the conditions which give rise to crime, deterring youth from joining gangs in the first place, and providing more support for the victims of crime. Like other panelists, Blackwell also stressed the importance of reducing impunity for those who commit crimes, including crimes of corruption by officials and crimes of violence perpetrated by police and military. Without addressing impunity it is not possible to create a context in which citizens have confidence in the state, its agencies, and officials.

Pablo Policzer and Elizabeth Pando-Burciaga noted the extent to which youth gangs, especially in Central America, constitute a threat to security, the rule of law, and the capacity of states to maintain effective governance. He identified the important difference between the *pandillas* and the *maras*, the former of which were formed by youth returning to their countries after the end of the Central American civil wars in the 1980s. The latter were largely the product of the more than forty-thousand youth gang members

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deported to their countries of origin from the United States after 1996. The estimated numbers of members of such gangs in Central American countries range from 70,000 to 200,000. Policzer and Pando-Burciaga noted that Central American countries have responded to youth gangs with three not necessarily mutually exclusive policy options: *mano dura*, delivery of public goods (*mano extendida*), and dialogue. He noted the challenges associated with direct dialogue: the legitimization of illegal actions and violent offenders; and the difficulty of dialoguing with often non-hierarchical, decentralized groups and multiple parties.

Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Trinidad and Tobago, drew the attention of participants to the parallel challenges in the Caribbean basin. He emphasized that many of the small Caribbean island nations suffered not only from the legacy of colonialism and dependence but also from the lack of resources to deal with high crime rates and corruption associated with trafficking in narcotics and arms as well as money laundering and cyber-crime. He added that those problems are compounded by the fact that institutions are weak and leadership in the region tends to pursue policies and strategies which are not adequate to attain their goals. He expressed some degree of pessimism about the capacity of the region to surmount these obstacles without major institutional reforms and significant external assistance from Canada, the United States, and other nations along with the private sector and civil society.

Several presenters addressed the issue of multinational cooperation, and their assessments were not uniformly positive. Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Frank O. Mora, noted that the last time a large number of countries in the hemisphere reached a major regional agreement was a decade ago with the 2003 Mexico City Declaration on security. Mora noted the resistance to U.S. initiatives in the region, for instance in response to proposals for the way in which militaries respond to natural disasters. Mora had little positive to say about the effectiveness of either the OAS or CARICOM, both of which he identified as “chattering organizations” which promote idealistic agreements but leave them largely unfunded and ineffective. Part of the problem, he noted, is the weakness of state institutions and of many of the states themselves, lacking the strength and authority to make effective multilateral commitments and leaving multilateral challenges to the small number of stronger states to address. Another part of the problem, in his view, is the continuing resilience of narrow conceptions of sovereignty which make it difficult to reach meaningful multilateral agreements and commitments at a time when the challenges that confront the region are challenges

without borders. For Mora there is a need to develop a new framework or set of institutions capable of addressing these complex problems, but he did not express optimism that such a framework would emerge in the near future. Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue expressed equally pessimistic sentiments about the value and performance of multinational institutions and the quality of multilateral delegations. Hakim echoed Mora's analysis that such collective commitments as the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter have not been effective in defending democracy, citing the recent examples of Venezuela and Paraguay. He suggested that there is not even a clear consensus about what constitutes democratic norms, making it virtually impossible for the OAS to do more than engage in endless debates and send fact-finding missions when disputes arise.² Hakim also noted the fragmented nature of economic relations in the hemisphere, with the region divided into camps. He noted that eleven countries have free trade agreements with Canada, the United States, and the European Union. Brazil has resisted overtures from North America and instead leads the seven-country Mercosur.

The concluding session at the conference was a roundtable with senior security officials and representatives of Canadian companies active in Latin America. The session was intended to explore the concrete and practical security challenges companies operating in the region face, how they respond to those challenges, and how they interact with their host communities. The conference was fortunate to have on the panel a number of individuals with Canadian police and intelligence operations experience as well as company officials responsible for corporate security, corporate social responsibility, and international business development.

As noted earlier, one objective of the conference was to explore aspects of Canadian security policies and engagement in Latin America. Having for most of the Cold War years distanced itself from the region as a U.S. sphere of influence, Canada and its governments have been far more active in security, political and socio-economic development since joining the Organization of American States. Elections Canada has played an important role in helping to draft electoral laws and monitoring elections along with other regional and international agencies. Canadian military forces participated in ONUCA (UN Observation Group in Central America, 1989-92) and ONUSAL (UN Observation Group in El Salvador, 1991-92). The former operation was primarily a verification and peace observation mission, in particular focused on the demobilization of the U.S.-backed Contras. The latter began primarily as a human rights monitoring mission but expanded into involvement with the

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demobilization of certain military and police units which had been identified with severe human rights violations. In 2006 the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade established a Secretariat for the Americas Strategy announced by the Conservative government. In 2007 during a Latin American tour Prime Minister Stephen Harper identified the Americas as a policy priority and called for a re-engagement with the Americas. In Santiago, Chile, the Prime Minister identified three broad areas of policy focus: strengthening and promoting freedom, democracy and human rights, and the rule of law; building strong, sustainable economies; and meeting security challenges, including environmental and health risks. In the 2007 Speech from the Throne the Harper government made a clear commitment to strengthening the Canadian security capacity.³ Canadian military, policy, and intelligence agencies have been increasingly active in the Caribbean and Latin America in the past decade. Canadian forces were from the outset part of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Canadian police forces, especially the RCMP, have worked closely with their counterparts in the Caribbean and Latin America. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service has officers placed in several key Latin American capitals.⁴ Canada has been an active participant in the Defense Ministerials of the Americas, hosting the 2008 meetings in Banff, Alberta. Canada also sent a strong delegation to the Central American Security Conference in Guatemala in 2011, including a small civil society delegation. Canadian naval forces have also participated in the U.S.-led multinational Joint Interagency Task Force operating out of Key West engaged in narcotics interdiction in the Caribbean. In 2011, for instance, HMCS *St. John's* participated in the recovery from a semi-submersible of a cargo of cocaine with a street value of US\$180 million. The task force involves eight Latin American countries, plus the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Canada. Canadian Major-General D. Michael Day outlined for the conference participants some of the significant and basic issues relevant to the Canadian strategy for engagement in the Americas. He identified the current Canadian defence practices and the role of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces in the region. He contended that Canada's approach needed to be hemispheric and global in scope since the challenges are global, not just regional in nature, and he noted that some of the lessons learned about combating narco-terrorism in Afghanistan could be applied in dealing with comparable issues in the Western Hemisphere. He stressed that Canadian security policy in the Caribbean and Latin America had to be developed within a climate of budgetary restraint. He noted the broad definition of what is considered a security challenge, including nat-

ural disasters, illegal migration flows, border security, transnational crime and organizations, violence, drug trafficking, and the security of Canadians abroad. Major-General Day noted the value of Canadian contributions to peacekeeping and monitoring, education, training, exchange programs, and partnerships with other agencies and governments in the hemisphere.

Ambassador Martin focused less on Canada's military engagement and more on its contributions to peace and security programming in Colombia, where Canada has contributed some \$32 million toward improving long term security by working with institutions that seek to safeguard human rights, citizen's freedoms, and the rule of law. Canada has contributed to the important Colombian government's land restitution program, to the Organization of American States' support for the demobilization of illegal armed combatants, to the OAS peace mission (OAS-MAPP), and the project seeking to assist the victims of violence. Canada has played a particularly important role in supporting the identification and removal of anti-personnel mines in Colombia and Central America as well as encouraging and supporting the Colombian government's advisory role in Central American conflict resolution.

The implications for Canadian policy of these security challenges in Latin America are numerous. It was evident from all presentations, even those which did not explicitly address Canadian policy, that high levels of violence in Latin America, organized crime, the lingering guerrilla insurgencies and the various factors which give rise to those phenomena, and challenges associated with the quality of governance necessitate a higher level of commitment to the region than has traditionally been the case. Analysts note that the Americas Strategy has not resulted in any significant increase in foreign aid to the region, although there has been more focus on the security agenda by the Canadian government working bilaterally and multilaterally through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It was also observed that the increased private sector investment in the region combined with growing trade ties have implications for the image of Canada in the region and necessitate a close and effective working relationship between government and the private sector to ensure that international standards pertaining to the environment and human rights are observed.

University of Calgary
July 2013

INTRODUCTION

Notes

- 1 Ed. Note. In late May 2013 FARC and the Colombian government reached agreement on a number of agrarian issues.
- 2 Ed. Note. In June 2012 the Paraguay legislature removed leftist President Fernando Lugo from power. The United States and OAS Secretary General Insulza opposed the suspension of Paraguay from the OAS. Venezuela, then still under President Hugo Chávez, and the other Bolivarian republics sought suspension as did eighteen other hemispheric countries. Canada, the United States, and Mexico
- 3 among others opposed. In contrast, in 2009 the OAS suspended Honduras for what it argued was the unconstitutional removal of President José Manuel Zelaya.
- 3 Stephen J. Randall, "Canada's National Security Challenges in the Caribbean and Latin America," *Foreign Policy for Canada's Tomorrow* 7 (Toronto: Canadian International Council, June 2010).
- 4 Ed. Note. The conference did not address the security issues of Haiti which remain serious challenges.

**I:
CANADIAN POLICY
PERSPECTIVES**

**A:
Diplomatic and
Military Engagement**

Building Security, Peace, and Prosperity in Colombia: The Role of Canada

Ambassador Tim Martin, Canadian Ambassador to Colombia

Introduction

It is always a great time to be the Ambassador of Canada in Colombia, but now more than ever as our Colombian friends are in the process of moving from a dark past into a bright future. But it is a complex moment, extremely demanding for the Colombian leadership, and it is a moment with implications for their Canadian friends in the public and private sectors. It requires putting the victims of Colombia's armed conflict at the centre of public policy. It involves Canadian investments to grow the economy responsibly and rapidly. It means doing all this in areas where there is still armed conflict and the presence of the state is inadequate. With the multi-faceted challenges it faces, one could say Colombia contains many of the security issues confronting the region as a whole. What makes Colombia so instructive is that it is facing these challenges with three great assets:

- a strong and professional military and police;
- a coherent and progressive package of social and economic policies including a victims-based peace policy; and
- international and regional support, not least in the fight against transnational organized crime.

Our relationship with Colombia is vital and dynamic because Canada and Colombia share many interests. We have a solid and growing relationship that spans all three goals of Canada's engagement in the Americas, which are:

- to increase mutual economic opportunity;
- to strengthen security and institutions that safeguard freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; and
- to foster lasting relationships.

These goals are at the core of our ongoing partnerships with friendly countries like Colombia as we work together towards a more prosperous, secure and democratic hemisphere. Our relationship with Colombia is one that we value greatly and that has been important in deepening our engagement in the Americas.

There are two themes I would like to focus on in particular. Firstly, the Colombian progress we observe in achieving security, human rights, and economic opportunity for its citizens; and secondly, the role and contribution of Canada as part of our engagement in the Americas. However, let me note that insecurity has been very costly for Colombia, and implementing solutions is an urgent matter.

The human rights of Colombians have been badly violated by the armed conflict which is arguably the biggest challenge for contemporary Colombian governments. The military confrontation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and with the National Liberation Army (ELN) are the primary and best known drivers of the armed conflict, though greatly diminished in strategic terms over the last decade. At the same time, success in the form of dismantling the country's paramilitary groups has brought new challenges with it and the actions of criminal bands, known as BACRIM, are responsible for many abuses.

The proliferation of an array of emerging BACRIM groups following the end of the demobilization of the paramilitaries in 2006 remains a major challenge for President Santos' security efforts and the implementation of some of his flagship policies. Following the demobilization process, these groups have consolidated their presence in between 10 percent and 20 percent of the country's municipalities and have managed to maintain between 2,000 and 3,500 members for the last four years. Their pragmatic nature has also led them to reach temporary local cooperation pacts with the FARC and the ELN. Although drug trafficking remains their main source of income, some of these groups are heavily linked to local delinquent gangs involved in small scale extortion, retail drug dealing, illegal mining, and contraband. In some cases, their resilience has become an obstacle for the implementation of assistance to victims of the armed conflict.

In fact, it is often observed that that there are three dimensions to the Colombian security challenge: the guerilla, the BACRIM, and common criminality. As a result of its armed conflict, Colombia has among the highest number of displaced people in the world, at some four million.

Among the most vulnerable groups have been human rights defenders, those in the vanguard of land restitution for the displaced, and children.

Also, Colombia has the highest number of landmine victims in the Americas and the second highest in the world after Afghanistan. In 2012 the country reported 479 victims, of which fifty-two children were injured and twelve were killed by landmines.

With respect to labour rights, there have been great advances. As a matter of fact, our Free Trade Treaty has a side agreement on labour. But there is much more work to do because Colombia has been qualified as one of the most dangerous countries in the world for union leaders.

Poverty is also an issue and its reduction is a major concern of Colombian policy makers. In 2012, 34.1 percent of Colombians were living in poverty and 10.6 percent in extreme poverty. While remarkable progress has been made, the presence of the Colombian government remains uneven and limited in certain rural areas, especially those areas affected by armed conflict. As a result, the Colombian state has not yet fully completed its task to protect and provide basic services to all Colombians.

It is a work in progress and Canada continues to promote and support efforts to address the situation. For example, Canada is among the top donors to the programs of the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Colombia and we pay particular attention to Colombia's progress in meeting its human rights commitments such as UNSC resolution 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict.

Why It Matters to Canada

The kind of insecurity we see in Colombia and its consequences also matter because of Canada's interest in and commitment to working with partners towards regional and international security. The fact is, Canada is a country of the Americas, and this is our home. Insecurity anywhere in the Americas poses threats to our friends and neighbours across the hemisphere, but also to Canada and Canadian interests; including tourists, businesses, diaspora communities, and investors. What happens in the neighbourhood has an impact on everyone in the neighbourhood.

We have found that working with Colombia, and with our other neighbours in the Americas, to prevent and address crime inside their borders is beneficial to us all. It enriches their security and also prevents crime from flowing into other countries. We do this because we recognize the importance of supporting a country's own efforts and in recognition of the interconnectedness of our hemisphere.

It is a truism that durable solutions to security problems cannot be achieved in the absence of good governance and the rule of law. And here

it is very important to recognize progress and momentum, as well as the potential for Colombian leadership through demonstration in the region. For example, President Santos has made Colombian accession to the OECD the first priority in his international agenda. This is not because he wants Colombia to be on the list of rich countries. He calls it “the club of best practices.” This commitment to good governance, at the very top is a key enabler for all the rest that has to happen.

Colombia is walking the talk and examples abound. Colombia has an open and liberalized economy. Tax reforms are being implemented to increase formalized employment and competitiveness without changing the government take. Specialized agencies have been created to reduce poverty and eliminate extreme poverty, and Colombia has successfully encouraged responsible foreign investment and improvement in the distribution of royalties for the benefit of all Colombians. Colombia is also contributing to international good governance efforts already. It is active in the anti-money laundering work of the OECD and has, with Canadian support, established a contact point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

What Colombians and Canadians are discovering is that we have shared values that cement our relationship and our ability to work together. We agree that any vision for economic and social development needs practical expression in sensible public policies, both domestically and internationally. Moreover, this focus on good public policy is a healthy contrast to other governments in the region who prefer ideological and populist approaches.

For this reason, the continued success of Colombia is in our interest, as is its growing capacity for regional and international leadership. The Ministerial and Summit of the New Pacific Alliance in Cali, Colombia in May 2013 (of which Canada was an observer) is another good example of this positive Colombian leadership in our hemisphere. In other words, the success of Colombia matters, not just to Colombia, not just to Canada, but also to the region as a whole.

Canada's Contributions to Peace and Security in Colombia

Over the last six years, Canada has contributed some \$32 million in specific peace and security programming in Colombia. And these projects have generated very important results. Here are some of the areas where we have been investing in peace and security.

Since its initiation in 2005, Canada has supported the transitional justice process initiated by the Government of Colombia with the Peace and Justice Law. This law gave rise to the demobilization of ex-combatants and the estab-

lishment of institutions for assistance and reparation of victims of the armed conflict. Restitution mechanisms have been created including a Center for Historical Memory, fast-track methods for investigation of conflict-related crimes and institutions to assist victims.

While only fourteen sentences have been rendered against former combatants, on the subject of truth, much has been accomplished. Over 77,000 victims have participated in criminal proceedings against former combatants. For example, demobilized paramilitaries have confessed to a total of 25,757 homicides and 1046 massacres. These are chilling numbers, but establishing the facts of these cases is critical for Colombia to move on, and for families to know for certain the fate of missing loved ones.

In June 2011 the Victims and Land Restitution law was approved, thanks to which 157,800 victims have received reparations. This is a shining example of the State of Colombia taking responsibility to address the problems of the armed conflict as it affects the citizens of Colombia.

Many observers of the armed conflict in Colombia say that the issue of land contains the roots of the conflict and the seeds of peace. Canada was among the first supporters of Colombia's effort to redress massive issues of dispossession with policies and programs to return land to their rightful owners. Like so much of Colombia's efforts, the high level of policy ambition corresponds to the great depth of problems the state needs to address. Our role has been to help the Government of Colombia bring its policies closer to the client. This has involved the opening of "store-front offices" around the country for victims of dispossession to open their files, complete their cases, and have them forwarded to specialized judges for decision. The first judicial decision was handed out in October 2012 restituting sixty-five hectares to fourteen families. The process is accelerating, and there are currently some 34,000 claims registered for 2.2 million hectares of land. The task is daunting, but it is also inspirational to see Colombian officials rolling up their sleeves to find ways to make this work and to see Colombian farmers who were displaced stepping up to claim their rights and re-establish their roots in their land.

Canada was among the first in supporting international verification of demobilization processes, and our support continues to this day. Here the unsung hero is the Organization of American States (OAS) Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP), which has been on the ground and doing a low profile, field-based effort that has been critical to the success of demobilization so far. More than 51,000 combatants have been demobilized. Much more has to be done and the processes for addressing the challenges of eventual demobilization of FARC and ELN fighters are yet to be defined.

BUILDING SECURITY, PEACE, AND PROSPERITY IN COLOMBIA

The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process has not only played an oversight role, but has also strengthened institutions along the way that will help sustain the effort in the long run. Our contributions to the OAS MAPP and to the government entities charged with addressing the needs of victims of the conflict have been important expressions of Canadian efforts to improve security and to do so for the long-term by working with institutions that will protect and safeguard citizens' freedom, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

A very good news story from 2012 involves work of the OAS and the Colombian humanitarian de-mining battalion of which Canada is a major supporter. It is a remarkable example of cooperation in which OAS civilians work with communities to identify mined areas for clearance by the Colombian military. In this case it is an unarmed and specially uniformed humanitarian de-mining battalion. The headline of this good news story was certification of the Municipality of San Carlos as the first mine-free municipality in Colombia. The best news is what demining enabled in terms of the return of 286 families to their homes, land, and schools.

Of course, the top of mind peace and security issue today is the negotiations to end the armed conflict between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, the major insurgent group in the country. These are taking place according to a carefully designed and agreed agenda witnessed by Norway, Cuba, Chile, and Venezuela. The five issues under discussion are very specific. They are:

1. Rural development and agrarian reform;
2. Citizen participation and guarantees for political opposition;
3. End of conflict provisions including a cease fire, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration;
4. A solution to the issue of illicit drugs; and
5. Victims and reparations.

The specificity is significant. These negotiations are not about all aspects of Colombian policy, but rather they are about the five agenda items, nor is there a cease-fire. The Colombian security forces continue their efforts to secure all territory and citizens at the same time as the negotiations take place in Havana.

Canada has formally communicated to the Government of Colombia Canada's policy to support President Santos' entry into negotiations. At the same time, FARC remains on Canada's list of terrorist organizations. If these

negotiations prove to result in an agreement, and the greater percentage of FARC combatants reintegrate into licit activities, then we are on the verge of the end of armed conflict in our hemisphere. And if they do not, we have good reasons to be encouraged by efforts focused on victims, the broad deceleration of the armed conflict, improvement in human rights, and the momentum of Colombia's strategic policy directions.

And there is another piece of good news: Colombia is now a mentor on regional security, which Canada is a part of as well. We are working with Colombia to share its security sector expertise with Central American countries struggling with weak government institutions, limited government reach throughout the countries, and the increasing presence of transnational organized crime and the violence associated with it.

The security situation in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, particularly as a result of transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking and its associated violence, poses a significant challenge to the hemisphere. Nobody knows this better than Colombia, which has learnt valuable lessons through hard won advances and, with Canadian support, is sharing its expertise with Guatemala and Honduras. A trend has been observed in which Guatemala and Honduras are preferred entry points for the movement of illicit drugs northward from South America. Colombia is providing expertise and training to help the Guatemalan and Honduran authorities interdict this illicit traffic on land, on sea, and in the air.

Intelligence sharing at the regional level is a critical dimension of staying a step ahead of the criminals. In this respect, Canada is providing \$1.5 million in funding for Interpols Regional Intelligence Gathering and Criminal Analysis project which provides specialized regional training for law enforcement officers in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean to effectively gather and analyze criminal intelligence and data as they relate to illicit narcotics. Sharing real-time information among countries is an essential element in the successful investigation and prosecution of crimes.

Canadian Contributions to Prosperity

Unfortunately, the scope of this discussion does not permit me to describe in further detail the work of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to prevent and protect children from recruitment by illegal armed actors, the new robust bilateral defense MOU we are implementing, the work of the RCMP with its regional counterparts, and the security work of the Canadian Navy in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. Instead, I will turn to the Calgary connection.

Canada views increased engagement through trade and commercial-economic ties as one of the best ways to support positive change and growth in the Americas. With fifty-two Canadian petroleum and mining companies operating 240 projects in twenty-nine of Colombia's thirty-two departments, the security environment involves significant policy implications for the extractive sector. Of course, in Colombia the big story is about oil. We have some nineteen Canadian exploration and production companies working in this sector in Colombia with a combined market cap of over \$10 billion, most with their head offices right here in Alberta.

Moreover, Canada's role in Colombia matters. Some 50 percent of operated production and about 30 percent of net production in Colombia is thanks to Canadian companies in the context of over a million barrels a day production in the territory of the Republic of Colombia.

The role of resources in national development was the core message in Prime Minister Harper's address to the Business Forum at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in 2012. He began by saying that "[...]resource development has vast power to change the way a nation lives. It is also something which is tremendously responsive to the actions of government. Today I want to talk to you briefly about how to maximize the value of this great industry for a country and its people." Prime Minister Harper ended with an invitation: "[...]we believe in Canada that we have found the way to transform resource assets into a sustainable foundation for equitable national development. And it is also an area in which we are more than pleased to work cooperatively with willing partners for mutual benefit."

Colombia is one of the willing partners, and we saw that here in Alberta and British Columbia just last month in a remarkable event in which the Colombian environmental and regulatory leadership came to Calgary and Fort St. John to see how we manage our sector in Canada. It is a source of pride that Canada was the destination for this innovation in regulatory diplomacy. I believe it is also the beginning of an important new relationship.

Why talk about the extractive sector and security in the same presentation? Two reasons come to mind immediately. Firstly, in a conflict affected country like Colombia, the imperative for corporate social responsibility is very strong. Moreover, many resource projects are in areas that have suffered from conflict and the attendant social tensions can linger long. Fortunately, Canada has a strong policy that integrates business and human rights. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights is a key piece and the Embassy of Canada as well as leading Canadian companies are active members of the Colombian group promoting its implementation. It is called the

Mining and Energy Committee and it is chaired by President Santos' national security advisor.

Secondly, there is a new phenomenon that we might as well call criminal gold mining. This is illicit mining conducted by criminal organizations and sometimes with the collusion of illegal armed actors, providing working capital for future crimes. Criminal mining is visible in many areas of Colombia. Its primary visual manifestation is of large excavators aggressively mining alluvial gold and polluting rivers. What is not so visible is the unregulated use of mercury and cyanide for refining. There is an urgent need to replace criminal mining with responsible and formal mining that is inclusive of the artisanal miners who have been making an honest living for centuries from small scale mining. Here Canada is working to build dialogue around sustainable solutions and looking for ways to help the Government of Colombia formalize and professionalize the artisanal sector. As part of our engagement in Colombia and in the Americas, we are working to improve responsible natural resource development by sharing Canada's world-class expertise in corporate social responsibility practices. This is a critical and distinctive contribution by Canada to peace, security, and development in the region, and one that will expand as the new Canadian International Institute on Extractive Industries and Development (CIIEID) takes off.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to recall that it was six years ago that Prime Minister Harper launched Canada's engagement in the Americas as a foreign policy priority. Today, our engagement in the Americas and in Colombia is stronger than ever. Canada is a partner in peace and security, a trusted investor and a reliable friend. Canada has been present and made the right kind of contributions at the right time while Colombia has made rapid and remarkable progress. As Canadians, we have a stake in Colombia's success and we are making a significant contribution through our development assistance, peace and security projects, and through the investments of Canadian companies which are generating growth and opportunity for Colombians. In Colombia, Canada is working to build a stable foundation for our long-term engagement and increased influence in the hemisphere. I hope you will agree with me when I say that Canada is the ideal partner for Colombia, our commitment is for the long-term, and the future is bright.

The Canadian Military and Latin American Security Challenges

Major-General D. Michael Day, Director General,
International Security Policy, Department of National
Defence, Canada¹

Major-General Day shared his knowledge and experience as Director General, International Security Policy. Building on his recent travels throughout South America, Major-General Day addressed some of the significant and basic issues relevant to the Canadian strategy for engagement in the Americas as well as the current defence practices of Canada in the hemisphere, the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Forces (CF) partnership in the Americas, security challenges, how DND addresses these security issues, and the creation and future of the Canadian Defence approach. Throughout his presentation, Major-General Day emphasized the partnership, cooperation, and dialogue between the nations of Latin America and the DND/CF. Cognizant of operating in an “area of fiscal restraint,” Day argued that the best force is a tax-effective modest force.

Major-General Day reiterated the importance of the region to Canada, as was evidenced by the Western Hemisphere strategy, one of only two official strategies of this kind (the other being the Arctic strategy). Major-General Day lauded peacekeeping, language courses, and military training provided in Canada, formal defence agreements in the region, and highlighted Canada’s participation throughout the Americas. He outlined a myriad of issues and practices to combat existing challenges such as: countering illegal migration flows; dealing with natural disasters; protecting Canadian tourists; and addressing transnational criminal organizations, violence, and drug trafficking.

Major-General Day espoused that cooperation and capacity-building were vital in the Caribbean, and South and Central America in addressing these cross border threats, stating that he believed there were only “global security issues not regional security issues.” Citing extensive visits throughout the region by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Major-General Day described progress with DND/CF in training, education, exchange, and placement opportunities throughout the hemisphere, and recounted the

operations of CP Hamlet where partnerships, education, and training were advancing.

Day noted that practices such as anti-narco-terrorism learned in Afghanistan were aiding in the Americas. He highlighted the importance of a hemispheric over regional focus, and identified Chile as a very impressive example of both a regional and global participant, crediting their worldview. Day again re-iterated the need for effective, meaningful, and long-term engagement and partnerships in the region to combat threats, build capacity, and bolster relations.

He concluded by admonishing that Canada's role or involvement in the hemisphere would increase in the future, as the region was deemed significant. His final section of the presentation illustrated the "main tenets of our (DND/CF) approach." Here he shared current practices such as: coordinating and partnering with governments and governmental agencies for long-term relations; operating in a fiscally-responsible manner to ensure that relations are benefitting all parties involved; and lastly, he returned to a point which he had made earlier in his presentation—being attentive and aware of the "defence-security nexus." Nevertheless, he admitted that while these measures did not constitute the total solution to the problems of the region, they were significant to the resolution.

Note

1 Summary of presentation prepared by Adam Cahill, University of Calgary.

B:
**Canadian Private Sector
Engagement**

Introduction: Canadian Private Sector Engagement

Dr. Stephen J. Randall, Director, Latin American Research Centre, University of Calgary

In recent years the role of the private sector in Latin America, especially in the natural resource extraction industries, has become more complex and controversial. There have been pressures from host governments, local communities and countries in which companies are incorporated to ensure that corporate practices are in keeping with the highest standards of corporate social responsibility. One reflection of that broader societal concern with the role of Canadian natural resource extraction companies abroad was the focus on the mining industry, which such NGOs as Mining Watch brought to bear in 2011-2012 in support of Bill C-300. Bill C-300 was a private members bill tabled by Liberal Member of Parliament John McKay. The legislation, which its advocates argued was a response to allegations of human rights abuses and environmental damage inflicted by Canadian firms operating abroad, proposed giving the government authority to investigate complaints against resources companies operating abroad, and withholding public money from offenders. The bill came to a vote by Members of Parliament in 2012 and was defeated by a vote of 140-134. Some viewed the legislation as impractical, others as a missed opportunity.¹ Whatever the reality, the fact that it gained a significant degree of support among legislators and a number of NGOs is an indication that the concerns are widespread and one can anticipate that civil society will continue to press for Canadian government attention to human rights and environmental challenges in the region.

In some contexts, especially in conflict zones, companies also face security challenges. The closing panel at the conference brought together security specialists and company executives in the security and business development areas from the oil and natural gas industry and gold mining to discuss the kinds of security challenges they face and how they respond to them. Discussion ranged from a focus on hard security, including relations with private security contractors, local militaries, and military consultants to corporate social responsibility, community relations, and popular culture. This section includes the presentations of only two of the panelists and brief references to the others.

Among the speakers in the closing session, John Noyes, Director of Corporate Security for Goldcorp and a former RCMP officer, discussed the challenge of security management and the costs of social conflict. He noted that the rise of transnational criminal organizations particularly in Latin America has considerably increased security challenges, whether ensuring protection for employees and their families or company property. He observed that companies such as Goldcorp recognize that they have to ensure that security operations are conducted in conformity with international standards and the protection of human rights. Mark Lalonde, Director, CKR Global Risk Solutions and a former Program Director of the Justice Institute of British Columbia, echoed many of John Noyes' assessments of the security environment in the region. Gary Finley, Director of Corporate Security for Petrominerales, a Calgary-based oil company which operates primarily in Colombia but also has start-up operations in Peru and Brazil, focused his analysis on the company's security management programs. Finley reported that the company's hard security challenges derive from the two leading guerrilla insurgencies, which have been defined since 9/11 at least as narco-terrorist organizations, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) as well as from criminal gangs which are largely restructured paramilitary organizations following the large scale demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) over the past decade. Paul Nelson, Director of Global Security at Nexen, Canada, focused his discussion on the company's community relations and corporate social responsibility policies. He stressed that Nexen is committed to partnering with community members and other stakeholders where they operate, building long-term trust by sharing information, consulting with stakeholders about business decisions, and working collaboratively to understand the needs and expectations of local communities. Jeff Collins of Calgary-based Grantierra also emphasized the need of companies to work collaboratively with local communities in which they operate.

Terry Blevins, Mexico Security Manager for Yamana Gold, adopted an entirely different approach in his presentation in an attempt to explain the relationship between popular culture and narco-terrorism in Mexico. He stressed that government officials, military, police, and companies operating in Mexico need to understand the extent to which the images of drug lords have invaded popular culture in the country, impacting the hearts and minds especially of disadvantaged youth in society. A great deal of popular music, online videos, cinema, and even quasi-religious imagery glamorize the powerful lives of drug lords, creating a counter-culture of criminality.

Folk saints have emerged as “protectors” of those involved in the drug trade, whether it is “Santa Muerte” in Mexico City or “Jesús Malverde” in Sinaloa. Blevins indicated that “Jesús Malverde” images appear on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.²

Although Glenn Faass, Managing Partner of Norton Rose Group law firm in Bogotá spoke on an earlier panel, his discussion of the Rule of Law has particular applicability to the discussion of private sector operations in the region. Faass presented World Bank data on the extent to which Latin American countries adhered to the rule of law, with Chile not surprisingly the leading country in the region and Venezuela one of the weakest, with a ranking which placed it on a par with Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Faass presented data on levels of corruption and the ease of doing business in individual countries. He noted Colombia and Brazil have both shown considerable improvements in those areas in recent years. He added that although Brazil is considered a country where it is still challenging to conduct business, the country nonetheless has a comparatively low corruption ranking. Faass predicted that Mexico, Venezuela and to a slightly lesser extent Argentina, can be expected to experience economic challenges in the future unless they improve their rankings. Rule of Law is



Figure 1. Jesús Malverde: protector and patron saint of drug traffickers.

only one of the six World Bank Governance Indicators. The others are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption. The contrasts between Chile and Venezuela in the 2011 rankings are striking. Taking only two of the criteria, Control of Corruption and Regulatory Quality, the respective percentiles for Chile are 91.9 and 93.4; for Venezuela by contrast they are 7.6 and 6.2. Colombia and Mexico are close in terms of regulatory quality (60.7 and 61.1 percentile respectively), but Argentina fares badly in the same category at 25.1 percentile.³

Notes

- 1 For the missed opportunity perspective see Penelope Simons and Audrey Macklin, *Globe and Mail*, 23 August 2012.
- 2 See the work of Howard Campbell an Anthropologist at the University of Texas El Paso. "Drug Trafficking Stories: Everyday forms of Narco-folklore on the U.S.-Mexico border," *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16:5 (October 2005): 326-33.
- 3 Ed. Note. World Bank Data is from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp. Accessed 5 June 2013.

Challenges of Security Management

John Noyes, Director-Corporate Security, Goldcorp

There are two main issues that concern the private sector on an ongoing basis; firstly, the challenge of security management and secondly, the costs of social conflict. There are the obvious costs of physical security, which are higher in remote locations, but above that there are costs that do not turn up as budget line items but that can impact operating costs. Regardless of industry, companies are spending more than ever on security, and the cost to protect our people, assets, and reputation are increasing, particularly as companies move into areas of higher risk in pursuit of economic deposits to mine. Security within mining companies is often seen as a cost center, and not something that contributes to production. This perception is slowly changing particularly as we move into more difficult regions in search of quality deposits.

We have a duty of care to employees, especially expats. This has been a challenge in recent years with the rise in transnational criminal organizations particularly in Latin America. Executive protection and added security measures for families that were once considered perks are now essential, and substantially raise the cost of doing business. Associated insurance costs, plus vendors and contractors who refuse to provide goods and services in some areas, all impact our margins. In some areas the threat of extortion is now the principal concern for private sector operations, rivaling theft of copper and fuel, corruption, and internal fraud for preventative and investigational resources.

The Challenge of Security Management

In past years, responsibility for security often fell to the Safety or Human Resources Manager who contracted a private security provider and expected them to hire, train, and supervise security personnel. Little consideration was given to the need for contractors to implement security policies, procedures or rules of engagement such as Use of Force. Many companies now realize they cannot contract away their responsibilities to ensure security operations are conducted in a manner that conforms to international standards and respects human rights. To that end, investment in proper supervision for proprietary and contract security staff, plus recurrent training, is essential.

CHALLENGES OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT

In many Latin American countries there are few enforced regulations for security companies, and many operators are unlicensed. It is very common for many contracted security providers to have an internal system of “deductions” subjectively applied to the front line personnel for costs (such as uniforms) and offences (such as dirty boots). Left unaddressed through supervision, this will impact morale and ultimately the service you receive.

The average uniformed security guards in many of the countries we operate have no more than a grade four to six education. After a short training course they are provided a shot gun (they may have been allowed to fire the weapon once) then told to protect our facility. It is unreasonable to expect these well-meaning, often locally hired, security guards to understand concepts such as Use of Force. Most are not provided options, such as pepper spray or a baton, and training, such as in the legal parameters of their authority or what is expected in respecting human rights.

At Goldcorp we ensure security at our sites is managed by proprietary supervisors or managers that report directly to the mine manager. It is always challenging to find experienced security professionals to manage this function, and occasionally there is resistance to the additional personnel costs.

Security, like safety, should be seen as an investment. It is value added when properly conducted in a manner that enables geologist and exploration crews to add resources and reserves, allows unencumbered site development and exploitation permitting, and ultimately takes a project through production and into closure with minimal interruption. Investing in higher security standards pays dividends by attracting ethical investors and shareholders who demand compliance with the industry best practices and international standards. It also minimizes conflict with the communities in our area of influence.

Cost of Community Conflict

Latin America presents unique challenges and opportunities to mining companies, but there are often disconnects between the promotion of a mining project by national governments and the resulting negative reaction within local communities. Some of this can be attributed to an elevated awareness of mining companies’ Corporate Social Responsibilities programs and greater expectations for the benefits mining brings. Unrealized or oversold expectations often lead to conflict.

According to the Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, 176 mining projects in the region are currently in conflict with 231 communities (March 2013). Community issues with mining companies usually focus on

allegations of insufficient community consultation, environmental damage, and human rights abuses. This is compounded by a lack of trust in a national government to enforce social and environmental laws, which provides fertile ground for anti-mining and social NGOs.

The widespread use of mobile devices and social media has facilitated the exchange of information to the extent where simultaneous protests can be organized from Canada to Argentina. A common theme for protestors is the lack of community consultation in accordance with International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 (ILO 169) and The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: this is the right to redress for lands, territories and resources that could be adversely affected and a commitment by the state to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples before the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources. Countries experiencing the highest number of mining-related violent conflicts are usually those that lack the institutional structures to enforce the laws, or international conventions such as ILO 169, they have ratified. While companies do actively engage in community consultation, it is very common for NGOs to organize their own community consultations, which in many cases result in a rejection of mining.

Many of the conflicts mining operations face in Latin America can also be traced back to simmering, unresolved political, economic, social, and ecological issues. A failure to recognize, map and address these issues before they arrive at the mine gate can lead to physical confrontation, costly losses in project development or production, and the need to spend time, energy, and money in response.

Some of the costs most difficult to quantify are from lost productivity and those associated with the inability to pursue projects and opportunities for expansion as a result of company-community conflict. Additionally, expenditures for further studies and reports, legal advice and staff time when conflicts arise affect the viability of a project.

In terms of lost productivity, a major mining project with a capital expenditure of between US\$3-5 billion can realize about US\$20 million per week of delayed production if shut down. Even at the exploration stage, losses can be over US\$10,000 for every day of delay in terms of wages, idle machinery, and production. The working assumption is that 5 percent of an asset manager's time will be spent managing social risk, but in reality this can easily be over 10 percent for senior managers, and higher for department managers.

CHALLENGES OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT

Companies operating in areas of conflict or weak governance must take additional steps to mitigate risk and promote a positive security environment. There are opportunities to strengthen government institutions, such as public security forces, and to operate in a transparent manner. Implementation and adherence to international standard such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights should form the basis of the security management plan.

The ability to accurately assess risks present in a company's operating environment is critical to the security of personnel, local communities, and assets. A multidisciplinary team needs to regularly consider security, political/regulatory, economic, taxation, legal, corruption, environment, social, and industry specific issues and changes.

By addressing real and perceived community concerns, and working to resolve disputes before they escalate, companies have an opportunity to reduce the risk of actions such as blockades, protests, anti-mining campaigns, legal suits or sabotage, thereby also reducing social conflict and the costs to the company. An early investment in appropriate security that is proportionate to identified threats is money well spent.

Petrominerales: Security Management Programs in Colombia

Gary Finley, Director-Corporate Security,
Petrominerales

Petrominerales is a Canadian oil company with corporate head office located in Calgary, Alberta. Our operations are primarily located in Colombia, where we have been working for nearly eleven years. We also have startup operations in Peru and Brazil.

My discussion will focus on Colombia where we have operations in various departments (or, as we know in Canada, provinces). Our Colombian head office is in Bogotá and the majority of our employees in Colombia, numbering some 200, are Colombian nationals. We also have four expatriate families residing in Bogotá.

In addition, we have nearly two hundred personnel with contracted services, primarily located in field operations. Added to this personnel count, frequent visits are made to Colombia by corporate executives, engineers, geologists, accountants, and various other professionals. Thus, our security management programs involve not only security for personnel and assets in Colombia but also protective programs for visiting corporate professionals.

In the context of security challenges and the private sector, there are practical and policy issues that form the framework of our security management programs. Firstly, it is important to briefly identify the risks that we have faced in Colombia over the years. These risks emerge primarily from three hostile elements that have been active in the country for many decades:

1. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC) is an international recognized narco-terrorist organization.
2. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is also an international recognized narco-terrorist organization.
3. BACRIM refers to criminal gangs of organized criminals restructured after the demobilization of some 32,000 paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Suffice it to say that all three organizations are active in illicit drug activities, kidnappings, sabotage, extortions, and various other crimes. Risks for the private sector depend on what part of the country companies operate. In this regard, our risk assessment process at Petrominerales provides matrix guidelines for management decision on security measures required to mitigate risks.

Security Infrastructure

In order to address these risks, we have developed a security infrastructure that is designed for preventive and responsive measures to protect personnel and assets. We have established three levels of security in our security management program in Colombia:

1. **Security Department:** At the outset of operations in Colombia, a security department was created within the company, which consists of several Colombian nationals who are employees of Petrominerales. They serve various functions in the security department, ranging from Security Manager to Field Coordinators. The principle of employee positions within the company was to obtain experienced Colombian nationals with police and military backgrounds, enhancing loyalty through employee benefit positions. As part of this department, we also have on retainer a retired general from the Colombian Army, who serves as a special advisor within our security department.
2. **Security Contractor:** Security services for Petrominerales are required in Bogotá and the field. These are guard positions in various locations, as well as bodyguards (or *escoltas*). The *escoltas* provide services for expatriate families living in Bogotá and for corporate visitors. Every two years several security providers in Colombia are invited to bid for services with Petrominerales. This tendering process is examined by the company Contract Review Committee who awards final contract.
3. **Military Agreements:** From the outset of operations in Colombia eleven years ago, we have maintained excellent relations with the Colombian military. This started in the Putumayo department, adjacent to Ecuador where FARC threats were, and still are, a concern. These high risk areas are

under mandated jurisdiction of the military. Private security companies, and certainly the Petrominerales security department, are unable to address these high risk areas alone; thus, military protection is required for personnel and assets.

Formal agreements for use of the military are arranged between the Petrominerales legal branch and the Ministry of Defence. Our Petrominerales security policy is very clear on how and why we use the military. Agreements are very transparent, set out in accordance with regulations by the Colombian government. These regulations recognize that the private sector, in high risk areas of Colombia, is unable to operate without military protection.

As a practical example, we are currently drilling in an area in South Meta that at one time was covered in coca plantations. Through success by the authorities these plantations have been destroyed, FARC narco terrorists moved out of the area and we were able to proceed with our drilling plans. However, families and sympathizers of the FARC remain in the area, as do FARC militants in nearby mountain sanctuaries. This creates a high risk environment whereby military protection is required in circumference areas around drilling locations. Within the drilling site itself, security guards and a Petrominerales Security Coordinator are established for close quarter security of personnel and assets.

Support for the military is in the form of logistical support for soldiers on assignment to Petrominerales. No company support is provided in ways that assist offensive efforts by the military against the FARC and ELN. For example, we constructed a large shower and toilet facility in one of the army division locations, where soldiers are based and on rotational assignment to Petrominerales operations. In addition, our retired general on retainer works closely with these soldiers, reinforcing such matters as human rights protocols. To reiterate, then, we have three levels of security management in our company: Security Department, Security Contractor, and Military Agreements.

Indirect Impacts of Risks on Private Sector

I have provided a very brief overview of how we manage security in Petrominerales as it pertains to the direct impact of risks. In other words, things we can do ourselves to protect personnel and assets. But what about the indirect impact of risks? This is a question I often ask personnel in our security department. What are those elements beyond our control that will have an impact on our safety and what can be done about it?

The oil industry consists of several segments, some of which an oil company has control over and others it does not. The following are a few examples that could pose concern:

1. Seismic operations are the initial stages of any oil operation, whether it is in Alberta or whether it is in Colombia. It is often the case, as it is for Petrominerales in Colombia, that we do not assume security management responsibility for seismic operations. They are contract providers and experienced in conducting their seismic operations, often in areas where inhabitants are unfamiliar with oil companies. As well, with limited security presence, these seismic contractors are vulnerable to attack from hostile elements.
2. Other contractors working for the company have similar liabilities. Water trucks, oil tankers, and equipment movements may come to the attention of hostile elements.
3. Another example involves soft targets, such as unguarded pipelines and utility sector infrastructures, which are often attacked. These FARC and ELN attacks are another example of the indirect impact of risks against the company. This threat is very real at present, as the FARC undergo peace talks with the Colombian government, their venue of negotiations being in Cuba. Yet as these peace talks unfold, FARC have escalated their attacks on pipelines in the Putumayo to unprecedented levels during February to April of this year. (For example 52 attacks this year as compared to 13 for same period last year). Likewise, the ELN has committed pipeline attacks in other areas of the country, hoping to get on the peace talk bandwagon. This recent escalation of attacks on soft targets I identify as “political statements.” These terrorist groups feel they can gain negotiating advantages through such criminal acts.

But what does this all mean for Petrominerales and similar Canadian interests operating in Colombia? It means that security management is often beyond our control. We can provide assistance to seismic companies arranging for military liaison and we can mentor contractors on effective security management.

At the end of the day if something happens to these companies, it happens to us. An attack on a seismic company or an oil tanker creates a business interruption of essential services. Likewise, attacks on pipelines, all of which cannot be guarded by the authorities, may create storage backups and bomb damage repairs—all of which may also create a business interruption for Petrominerales. First and foremost, we would not want anyone killed or injured in these incidents. Secondly, business interruptions often have a very detrimental effect on the financial side of our business.

In conclusion, there is a very real security challenge for the private sector in Colombia, including Canadian interests. Before any Canadian company considers doing business in the country it is very important to conduct a due diligence process of risk analysis. Security management will be required in varying degrees, dependent upon threats expected in different parts of the country. The private sector can do much within their own control to develop effective security management programs, and in this way risks can be mitigated for personnel and assets. I am proud that we in Petrominerales have been successful in that regard during the past eleven years. However, nothing is cast in stone and surprises are frequent. Certain hostile acts are beyond our protective control and business delay is a reality. Most hopefully, loss of life from these hostilities never becomes a reality.

**II:
REGIONAL SECURITY,
HISTORY, AND TRENDS**

Those Elusive Common Interests and Objectives: The Evolution of the Inter-American Security System

Hal Klepak, Royal Military College of Canada

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the inter-American security system has known periods of cohesion and cooperation as well as others of division and distrust and that these periods have resulted from the degree to which the members of the “system” could be said to truly share objectives and interests in the international and strategic context of the day. It will suggest that the evolution of the system has been anything but smooth and that while today’s divisions may be the most dramatic in the more than seventy years of the existence of the arrangements, they are far from the first.

It is perhaps worth remembering, when reflecting on these matters, that hemispheric cooperation in defence can hardly be considered natural or automatic in the Americas or anywhere else. Defence and security are the core elements of national societies and cooperation with others in alliances or other structures is far from the normal way of conducting *national* defence, even for smaller powers and much less so for greater. Countries tend to wish to keep such matters firmly under their own control and as Antoine de Jomini argued so convincingly, alliances and defence cooperation are fraught with a lack of understanding, shared objectives, desires to do least but have the most political impact, and a myriad of other basic flaws and contradictions.

The Western Hemisphere: Ideal and Reality

If this has been true more widely in international affairs, it is equally so in the Americas. No one would conjure up easily an idea of *Eastern* Hemisphere cooperation in defence, or of *Southern* or even *Northern*. Yet in the Americas exactly such an idea has at least been present, if often only in rhetoric, for at least seven decades and there are structures, alliances, bilateral accords in this context, joint exercises, schools, meetings at high diplomatic and military levels and low, exchanges among national armed forces, and all manner of real reflections of a hemispheric idea in defence.

This is the result of three factors: the overwhelming power of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, its status as the only international player of weight in the region, and the popularity of what became the Pan American ideal at least in the United States. The United States has for all this period been much more populous and rich than any other country in the Americas. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, which at various times appeared as if they might be potential real rivals for the northern giant, were never actually able to compete with it. In no sphere was this clearer than in that of military capacity. This asymmetry was mirrored elsewhere after the end of the U.S. Civil War when the influence of the United States on the regional and then global scene grew steadily and in impressive fashion culminating with the construction of an actual U.S. empire after the defeat of Spain in the 1898 war and the transfer of essentially the whole of the Spanish Empire to Washington. The Pan American ideal, based on the belief that somehow the American republics were morally superior to the old regimes of Europe, and aiming to assure "the Americas for the Americans," gained considerable credibility, at least in the United States, in the last years of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century. Thus a context appeared in which one could at least imagine an inter-American system distinct from wider global ones.

Inter-American Security Before the Eve of the Second World War

At first the idea of a Pan American Union (PAU) of nations, or at least a zone of economic cooperation in the hemisphere, did not include strictly political and certainly not defence considerations. The United States, anxious to reduce or even exclude European, and especially British, economic penetration of the region, sought something like a free trade area or a customs union but at the least the founding of a grouping of countries cooperating on economic matters, when it called for a first meeting of American nations to discuss such a group in Washington in 1889. Canada, a monarchy with an immensely strong British connection, was seen as a potential Trojan Horse for the British in any such initiative, and was not invited.¹ Brazil, a monarchy when the idea of the conference was first put forward, was not to be invited either, but the military coup that brought in the republic in that country in that year, removed this obstacle and Rio de Janeiro was finally added to the list of those to attend as well as the other republics of the hemisphere.

Immediately, the contrasting objectives of the United States and the Latin American countries raised their heads. For in general, the latter were extremely keen on European investment, immigration, trade, technology, loans, and even military assistance missions as they modernized and en-

tered the new international division of labour so rapidly developing in the years after 1870. While they wished for good relations with Washington, they did not see anything like an exclusive relationship with the United States as a good thing and many feared, as U.S. expansion into the region unfolded in the years after 1815, that without European counterpoise the situation could end up being very dangerous indeed. This feeling had been developing steadily since the U.S. seizure of East and West Florida while Spain was prostrate during the Napoleonic Wars, its support for the Texas rebellion in 1835-6 and its acquisition of that vast territory a decade later, its defeat of Mexico in 1846-48 and the subsequent taking of half that country's northern spaces, its support for "filibustering" invasions of various Caribbean and Central American countries with the final intention of adding them to the Union throughout the 1840s and fifties, and finally its dramatic move into the Caribbean in the 1890s with the seizure of Puerto Rico and Cuba after victory in the war with Spain.²

The Pan American idea therefore was greeted by many Latin Americans as little more than "America for the United States" rather than the more generous objective mentioned above. In this context it proved difficult indeed for Latin American governments to do more than acquiesce to a very weak economic cooperation arrangement and an agreement to meet at various times in the future.³

Only in 1910 did real change seem to be occurring. Under the impact of repeated militarized European attempts to collect on the bad debts of many of the region's countries several capitals, and especially Brazil under its exceptional Foreign Minister Rio Branco, began to see the United States as less of a threat and even a potential ally against such actions.⁴ U.S. support for Venezuela in the debt and boundary crisis with Britain and other European countries in 1895 had been well received in many regional states and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, essentially *lettre morte* because of British naval power up to that time, did seem to some to be potentially useful in disputes with the Europeans over debt. But this did not mean that Latin Americans felt that U.S. domination was preferable to that of anyone else.

At the Rio de Janeiro Conference of that year, a breakthrough took place with Latin American countries agreeing that there should be a permanent secretariat for the grouping which should take the name of the Pan American Union (PAU). This would inevitably have its headquarters in Washington but would include among other activities those seeking to strengthen hemispheric peace and security. Regular meetings at foreign minister level were also foreseen as part of the new arrangements and these could be supple-

mented by emergency meetings if such were felt worthwhile.⁵ Thus was established the first structure dealing, at least potentially, with hemispheric security, although mutual suspicions ensured it did not really do so for some decades to come.

This came with a backdrop of more strictly sub-regional experience of truly dismal defence cooperation in the region and even such as there was among only a very few countries. When Simón Bolívar had held a first inter-American conference in Panama in 1824, his idea was very much one that included well to the fore the idea of hemispheric or at least Latin American mutual defence cooperation. The determination of the King of Spain to reverse the independence of his Spanish dominions, still alive for several more years, made such collaboration seem important to many of those who attended. In fact, nothing came of proposals for cooperation, not even the much touted idea of a liberating mission to be sent to Cuba, still a major Spanish base for three-quarters of a century to come.⁶

The United States, invited to the conference in the hope that it might commit to helping the fledgling southern nations in case of a Spanish counter-attack, and fresh from declaring its Monroe Doctrine for excluding European colonization, nonetheless instructed its delegates to make no such commitments to Latin American states and indeed hold aloof from even ideas of political collaboration. Mutual defence ideas were to be no less attractive in practice to the Latin American nations either.

In the long years of European interventions in the River Plate Basin, in Mexico, in the Caribbean, and Central America over the first forty years of independence, few initiatives were put forward by individual countries and nothing of consequence came of them. Indeed, instead of cooperating in mutual defence, Peru and Bolivia fought Chile, Brazil fought Argentina, Ecuador did the same with Peru, Mexico invaded Central America, and the countries of the latter sub-region fought each other regularly over those decades, although it must be said that they did show considerable disposition to cooperate in the defeat of the infamous Walker expeditions of the 1840s. But even Haiti and the Dominican Republic found themselves repeatedly at war over this period.

When later Mexico fell victim to the intervention of 1861 that eventually saw Maximilian placed on an imperial throne in that country, only neighbouring Guatemala raised much protest and no one at all offered to help the Liberals in that country resist the new regime supported by Napoleon III of France. When Spanish marauding naval vessels later in that decade maintained a lengthy and vicious blockade of western South American ports

and heavily bombarded some of them, the reaction, even of those directly attacked, included very little indeed of mutual support other than the declaratory. Everywhere European military efforts to collect debts found the Latin American debtor nations alone in their efforts to deter or defeat such initiatives.

It can thus be said that there was essentially no tradition of mutual assistance in the face of foreign attack at all in the Americas by the time of the outbreak of the First World War. Indeed, in the second half of the nineteenth century the trend to local wars showed no signs of abating with Paraguay involved in a disastrous and terribly costly war with three of its neighbours (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) in 1864-70, Brazil and Argentina at it again shortly before in 1855, Chile at war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879-1884, Central America wracked again repeatedly, and border disputes and skirmishes daily fare in most of the region.

Despite the accords of the 1910 PAU conference, World War I saw very little defence cooperation either. In fact, the only countries of the Americas that followed the United States into the war in 1917 were those physically occupied by United States forces at the time. Brazil did join in the conflict alongside the Entente allies but limited its active cooperation to the Navy and even then only worked with the British and not with the United States or other Latin Americans.⁷ The work of the PAU from 1910 to the mid-1930s was limited to few and far between and generally desultory diplomatic efforts to find solutions to the ubiquitous territorial and jurisdictional disputes plaguing the region. The great conflicts of inter-war Latin America usually found, as in the case of the Chaco War of 1935, ad hoc groupings of nations or single mediators more effective in searching for solutions than the hemispheric body. It did not help that the United States continued to adopt policies to the region based on the infamous "dollar diplomacy" of the pre-war years.⁸

Nonetheless, at least formally some progress was being made. At the Fifth Pan American Conference of 1923 there was agreement to, at a minimum, put in place some new arrangements for multilateral investigation of incidents and disputes. And in 1929 signatories of a new accord agreed that they would first exhaust PAU options before taking military measures in a dispute, although this promise was not to prove very much of a constraint in future conflict situations.

The Coming of Fascism

This situation was to change slowly but completely in the years to come because of dramatic changes in North America, Europe, and even Asia. In 1931,

Japan began the military occupation of Manchuria in flagrant violation of the terms of the League of Nations Covenant. In January 1933, Hitler became leader of Germany with firm plans to reverse the peace settlement of 1919. And less seriously, in 1935, Mussolini launched his first imperial adventure in Ethiopia. The unravelling of the international peace of the time seemed to be quickly occurring with unimaginable consequences.

At the same time, governments of the extreme right were not only taking power in Central Europe but also in Spain and Portugal, and in much of Latin America as well. The Great Depression found movements with rightist solutions well to the fore especially in the form of military governments promising order. Flirtations with fascism, and open admiration for the new regimes in Italy and Germany, were frequent and loud.

Little wonder then that the United States reacted to a threat on its southern frontier. By early 1934, the new government of Franklin D. Roosevelt was implementing a dramatically new policy that rejected military intervention in the region, supported democratic governments and reforms there, withdrew U.S. occupation forces from regional countries, removed restrictions on Cuban sovereignty put in place in 1902, and in general declared a new era of the "Good Neighbour Policy."⁹ This policy proved so firm that in 1938, in the face of the unprecedented Mexican nationalization of an oil industry with huge U.S. investment involved, Washington remained unmoved and for strategic reasons kept its response limited to diplomatic protest and negotiation.

The reaction of the Latin American political centre and left, and even of elements of the right, can be imagined. Pro-U.S. stances became common, anti-Americanism became increasingly limited only to sectors of the nationalist right, investment was welcomed as never before, U.S. naval ship visits were received by admiring throngs, and governments queued up to cooperate.

On the diplomatic front, despite the presence of rightist, military and even pro-Axis governments in several capitals, hemispheric friendship was in the air. In 1936, the Inter-American Conference for the Consolidation of Peace, held in the wake of failures to resolve the Chaco War, produced five accords on conflict resolution. They provided measures ranging from permanent mixed bilateral committees to study disputes to norms of neutrality during wars among American states. Here again though, these accords were rarely put into practice or of much practical effect.

In 1938, at the Eighth Conference of Foreign Ministers, against Argentine opposition, several countries joined the United States in a mutual effort to cooperate in order to hamstring Nazi and other fascist subversion in the

hemisphere in case of war.¹⁰ The next year Brazil and the United States signed an agreement on mutual consultation on political and strategic matters and, tellingly, the United States joined to this economic assistance for the hemisphere's second most important country. Dramatically, and unimaginable before this time and the maturing of the Good Neighbour Policy, when war broke out in Europe later that year, a special First Meeting of Consultation (at foreign ministers level) was held in Panama that approved a security zone for the Americas out of which belligerents were told to keep their forces and within which they should not engage in warlike acts. More striking still, all American nations agreed to a declaration of neutrality, a step so original in the inter-American context and such a victory for U.S. diplomacy, that one American diplomat referred to it as "a kind of Pax Americana."¹¹

World War II: Cooperation Rampant

The key moment was, however, May 1940. With the fall of virtually all of Western Europe to the Axis powers and *blitzkrieg*, and the collapse of Britain thought by most to be merely a matter of weeks, there was for the first time a real possibility that a future peace treaty would include the transfer of European possessions, that is potentially some of those of Britain, France, and the Netherlands, to the control of Axis countries. This would have meant the arrival of actual Axis political and military power in the hemisphere.

An emergency Second Meeting of Consultation was held in Havana in July to study this very real possibility. In another stunning victory for the United States, Latin American countries essentially signed on to the Monroe Doctrine in declaring their refusal to accept any transfers of territory in the Americas between the belligerent powers. They also stated that if any European country were no longer in a position to administer its American colonies, the Pan American Union would take over those responsibilities under a provisional PAU administration until the stricken country could recover. Almost as striking, Resolution XV of the final declaration of the conference included a statement that all signatories agreed to consult and decide on common measures to be taken if an American nation were to be attacked from outside the region as part of the wider war.¹²

The stage was thus set for the hemispheric reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Brazil immediately called for the Third Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers to be held in Rio de Janeiro in February of the following year. The conference called on all countries of the Americas to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and established the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) and an Advisory Committee on

Political Defence within the PAU. Within two months the Board was already meeting, although some Latin American nations had not yet declared war on the Axis (two were not to do so until 1945 itself) and several had not completed the rupture of relations.

Agreements on basing arrangements, radar posts, communications, standardization of weapons and doctrine, training and linguistic issues, military assistance with weapons acquisition, access to strategic materials and food, and a vast array of other cooperative accords were put in place either multilaterally through the Board or bilaterally in agreements reached under the Board's overarching mandate. This was all greatly simplified by a trend in place also from the late 1930s that had seen European military training missions, active officially in most of Latin America since the 1880s, and less officially from even earlier, gradually replaced by similar U.S. missions.¹³ This trend was completed by the need for France and Britain to withdraw those missions in any case in 1939 with the arrival of war in Europe. But the United States had been quick to move into the space created by such withdrawals and had even been firm with several Latin American governments that had Axis missions in insisting on their removal in the years preceding the outbreak of war.

In Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the levels of military cooperation reached great heights seeing the full re-making of regional forces. Mexico, despite its tradition of zealous distancing from the United States especially in the defence field, became the closest of collaborators with Washington even permitting the recruiting of labourers to replace U.S. farmers conscripted for wartime service, the opening of bases and radar stations on the approaches to the U.S. Caribbean and Pacific coasts, and access to food, petroleum, and other strategic minerals on a special guaranteed basis.¹⁴ Similar events marked Central America and the Caribbean including essentially the founding of regional air forces and navies in keeping with the U.S. need to fight the Axis submarine threat and secure its approaches and the Panama Canal.¹⁵

In a reversal of history, two Latin American countries actually sent forces to fight on the Allied side. The most exceptional of these efforts was that of Brazil, which sent a full infantry division to serve alongside the U.S. Army in Italy and accompanied that force with attached air force units. Mexico took the even more unheard of step of sending a fighter squadron to fight alongside U.S. Army Air Force units in the Philippines.¹⁶ The Good Neighbour Policy had paid off handsomely and common interests and objectives had been found around which a real hemispheric defence effort

could hang, even if Chilean and Argentine reluctance to break with the Axis always tended to remind Washington and others that shared views were not unanimous.

The Post-War Context and the Arrival of the Cold War

The war's end saw a new world appear into which Latin American governments knew they would have to find a way to enter effectively. The disappearance of Great Britain as a great power and counterpoise to the United States was nearly as serious for them as it was to be for Canada and the British West Indies. French and Dutch decline were also of importance and the end of Italy and Germany as political factors in the region was also noteworthy if not on the same scale. The United States came out of the war absolutely dominant on the world stage but dominant as never before in Latin America as well.¹⁷

With the exception of Argentina, all of the region now had armed forces organized, trained, equipped, armed, and even clothed along U.S. and no longer European models. The habit of defence cooperation, and coming to know the practical advantages of working with the United States, had also transformed much Latin American military thinking where the United States, and U.S. regional ambitions, were concerned.¹⁸ Politically, the region was in the U.S. pocket where the United Nations was concerned, and even Chile and Argentina had been obliged to acknowledge U.S. leadership as the war ended and their desire to avoid exclusion from the new UN organisation meant that they declared war on the Axis.

In the spring of 1945, at the invitation of Mexico, a conference to coordinate approaches to the end of the war and the new era of peace was held in Mexico City at the Palace of Chapultepec. But here, even if quietly, the lack of shared objectives and visions was to show at least its outlines. The Latin American delegations, hoping for gratitude on the part of Washington for their part in ensuring allied victory, suggested a revamped inter-American system to include defence cooperation but also to involve major efforts at regional development, access to U.S. markets for Latin American agricultural goods, and many other areas of collaboration. The United States came to the meeting uncertain on the defence cooperation in peacetime idea (after all, the United States had never engaged in such things in times of peace in continuation of the Washingtonian tradition of disengagement from international complications), and even more determined to avoid commitments on the economic front that would without doubt be untenable in the domestic political context of the peace on the horizon.

A further conference was held in Rio de Janeiro two years later, but with the United States now keener on defence as a priority but with development measures still the main issue dear to the Latin Americans. Despite these underlying contradictions, positive feelings prevailed as well as a context in which the Cold War's dawning seemed more and more evident to statesmen, and an Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was signed by all of Latin America and the United States, a first-ever peacetime collective security pact for the whole of the Americas except for Canada. On the basis that an attack on one state party was an attack against all, the formula for the later North Atlantic Treaty as well, the United States and many Latin American states abandoned peacetime neutrality and eschewing of defence commitments in favour of a formal mutual defence accord.

The next year, this treaty, generally styled the Rio Pact, was reinforced as the old Pan American Union was shelved in favour of a new Organisation of American States (OAS). The new inter-American "system" was to be based on three pillars: the Rio Pact for collective defence; the Pact of Bogotá for the peaceful resolution of disputes; and the Charter of the OAS for the general context of cooperation and relations. The IADB would stay as a permanent peacetime organ giving advice to, and being tasked by, the OAS on defence matters. The Charter, signed in Bogotá that year, repeated in its Chapters V and VI the collective security commitments of the Rio Pact, but the treaty on peaceful resolution of disputes, which included compulsory mediation and other, for many, vexing commitments, was as unpopular in most of Latin America as it was in the United States, and never entered into force.¹⁹

Nonetheless, a permanent security system in the Americas was now in place and its Charter and principal treaty provided an overarching rubric for all manner of bilateral, sub-regional, and bilateral agreements for the United States on the one hand, and individual Latin American governments and armed forces on the other. Even more promising, the new OAS soon proved its utility in dispute settlement in Central America as the late 1940s progressed.

The Korean War: Bilateralization Triumphant or "The Meat in the Sandwich"

When war broke out again, this time in Korea in 1950, the United States worried that the conflict in that peninsula might well be the beginning of something much bigger and on a world scale in line with the Cold War that dominated strategic thinking since at least three years before. The U.S. Congress soon authorized the signing of Mutual Assistance Pacts (MAPs)

with countries willing to commit to assisting the United States in case of crisis or widespread major conflict. In time, some seventeen of the twenty Latin American countries signed such accords with the United States, mostly between the end of the war and 1957.

The pacts usually provided for U.S. access to basing rights, transit, priority access to strategic minerals and agricultural goods at protected prices, and related military assistance provisions. In return Latin American armed forces got access to military equipment and weapons at reduced prices, and training and other assistance from the United States free or for nominal cost. These arrangements were soon truly the “meat in the sandwich” of the inter-American security system and provided much of the real cohesion it enjoyed since U.S. dominance ensured generally applicable standardization of weapons, equipment, training, doctrine, and ways of going about business virtually throughout the hemisphere south of Canada. While the multilateral arrangements continued to exist, their role seemed often secondary when compared with these lubricants which made the system actually work. U.S. funds, weapons, equipment, and especially training fuelled the creation of a real inter-American network of working relationships among armed forces that was frequently little understood by politicians in the Latin American countries or even in the United States.

Formerly secondary institutions, such as the inter-American air force college and the School of the Americas, were reinforced. U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force missions, usually already in place in most of the region, were strengthened and given much more in the way of resources. Despite attempts here and there, and especially in Argentina, to keep the door open to at least European influence in the military, the United States now stood absolutely supreme.

Those connections served the United States well when a reformist government, elected on two occasions in Guatemala, threatened legal and compensated but nonetheless unacceptable nationalisations of U.S. assets in that country in 1954. The reaction was swift and sealed the future of Latin America as nothing perhaps before or since in the post-war world. The United States moved to isolate the Guatemalan government internationally and to pillory it before the UN and especially the OAS as under the influence of international communism. Despite the lack of belief in such accusations in most of Latin America, U.S. strength prevailed and the Guatemalan government was declared incompatible with the peace and security of the Americas. Using its place within the Guatemalan armed forces and its MAP-related influence, the Central Intelligence Agency organised anti-government forces outside

the country into an invasion force that struck into Guatemala and gave the green light for a military coup which ushered in one of the fiercest military dictatorships ever to be seen even in that much suffering country. The Cold War had arrived in force in the Americas and moderate leftist and democratic forces were obliged to choose between no democratic progress at all or the way of armed revolution. The impact on Latin American democratic forces cannot be exaggerated as the United States renounced the Good Neighbour Policy with staggering results over time.²⁰

The Cuban Revolution: The System Works but at What Cost?

That radicalization of Latin American democratic forces took place just as the Batista dictatorship in Cuba, supported fully by the United States, faced the new challenge posed by the extraordinary figure of Fidel Castro. This young liberal lawyer, horrified by what he saw in Guatemala as well as Cuba, organised the bulk of the resistance to the Batista regime and in a long struggle ousted it in January 1959. Beset by U.S. and upper class resistance to his reform programme, Castro became ever more radical and, blocked and threatened by the United States, searched out a relationship with the Soviet Union.²¹

The United States quickly turned again to the inter-American security system to answer its call for support. The new Cuban government soon found itself under siege not only by the United States but by all the conservative governments of the region. Only moderate centrist or leftist governments withstood the brandishments for a time. Caught between a public opinion largely sympathetic with Cuba, and a United States and upper class deeply opposed to Castro, these governments hesitated to be drawn into the fray. While the United States sought by almost all means, including violent subversion, assassination and Guatemala-style invasion to topple Castro, the latter engaged in support for leftist movements aiming to unseat the very governments that supported the United States in its efforts.²² This "export of revolution" allowed the United States to bring in the system in its support in ways never before discussed.

Multilaterally, the United States called and got a revamped inter-American system with a new Inter-American Defence College to train staff officers for that system's organs, a new series of conferences of Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders of the forces of the Americas, a new series of joint exercises aimed at countering the threat, and the reorganizing of many national armed forces in order to permit them to defeat the insurgency backed by Havana and the reinforcement of what was soon to be seen as the infamous

School of the Americas. MAPs were strengthened and vast new resources in weapons, training, and equipment were made available to those armed forces whose governments backed the anti-Cuban campaign.

More sinister was the next stage of the modernization. In line with the policy of strangling the Castro regime, Washington sought to replace moderate or leftist governments with ones more of its choosing and more likely to reject relations with Cuba. Thus the system's institutions, and especially the IADB, the School of the Americas and the MAPs, were brought into play in order to help conservative forces locally engineer situations in which military coups would replace such governments with ones willing to tow the anti-Castro line. Government after government fell as military regimes replaced civilian rule in most of Central America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, and joined those, now reinforced by increased U.S. support, in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Paraguay. Only Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, already boasting essentially rightwing governments, seemed able to buck the trend towards military government.

The price was exorbitant for this success. The prestige of the inter-American security system suffered seemingly irreparable harm as democratic forces across the political spectrum denounced the violence, repression, and ferocity of most of the new governments. The "unholy alliance" of U.S. Embassy, Roman Catholic Church, oligarchy, and U.S.-influenced armed forces became the target of virtually all democratic forces, and not just the left, in most countries in the region. The security system, viewed as behind or at least supportive of the worst excesses of the new regimes, lost all the prestige that accrued to it during the period of the Good Neighbour Policy and after in most democratic circles. But this was in the future.

For the time being, the system had stood the test of the Castro challenge and the inter-American security "system," as we currently know it, at least formally, was completed. To make clear the elements of the system at the time, they were now as follows:

1. The Rio Pact (TIAR): Still the main defence and collective security accord at the base of the system although only signed by 21 countries;
2. The Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS) Chapter V and VI: Collective security elements of the TIAR repeated and signed by all members although with many reserving some commitments;

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3. The Inter-American Defence Board (IADB): Still formally at least the organ of advice and support in defence matters to the OAS;
4. The Conferences of Commanders of Armies, Navies, and Air Forces of the Americas;
5. The wide range of multilateral exercises set up at the time; and
6. The Inter-American Defence College.²³

On the bilateral level, however, there were the seventeen MAPs or similar accords linking the armed forces of other states with those of the United States in a largely dependent relationship, the arrangements for U.S. military missions in many countries, the School of the Americas specializing in special training against insurgency, the Air Force College of the Americas training Latin American pilots and other air force officers, and the various commands of the U.S. armed forces responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean. These were all supported by U.S. bases and other installations in the continental United States as well as in Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, and later on in Honduras and El Salvador. Many other sub-regional and bilateral Latin American arrangements were also added to this list of accords and arrangements but these were not always considered to be part of the "system" *per se*.

With all this in place, Cuban-supported or inspired rural insurrection and then urban insurgency were abject failures in the 1960s, seventies, and eighties. Military governments throughout the region were successful in putting down violent revolt and smashing leftist democratic movements as well. The coordinating role of the system could be considerable but generally it provided a context of assistance and welcome within which those governments could operate with some legitimacy. Only in Nicaragua was a rural insurrection successful as the Sandinista movement turned into a real popular insurrection leading to the military defeat of the conservative Somoza government, one of the most active members of the system, which replaced that government with one not at all to the liking of Washington, but much appreciated by the embattled Castro government in Cuba.

In the other guerrilla wars of the 1980s in Central America the system held firm and leftists were defeated in Guatemala and El Salvador, in Honduras they never really got started, and even in Nicaragua military pressure on the Sandinistas was crucial to their electoral defeat in February 1990 and their fall from power. Thus the system had functioned as the United States wanted but was unable to garner support for itself as the return to democracy gained

pace from 1977 on. Military governments “pacted” their way out of power except in Argentina where defeat in the disastrous Falklands War led to that country’s departure the next year. With victory assured, especially in Central America, and then the end of the Cold War, the United States could relax its stand on military governments and switch back to backing formal democracies in the region. Some of this, however, was forced upon the United States as the old problem of unshared objectives and perspectives came again to the fore.

Democratic governments continued to view the Cuban Revolution and the government that represented that movement as legitimate and by the mid-1970s it was clear that the isolation of the island from the Americas the United States had been able to achieve in the early 1960s could not hold. The OAS agreed that those countries that wished could re-establish relations with Havana and most did so as the late seventies progressed.²⁴ In addition, almost all newly independent ex-British colonies in the Caribbean rushed to establish relations with Cuba and it thus became difficult to maintain even the fiction of unity in the face of the Cuban “threat.”

The Cold War Ends

As the perceived threat of communism abruptly disappeared and the Cold War ended, the inter-American security system, like others in the world, was increasingly challenged to prove its relevance. The “export of revolution” phase of Cuban foreign policy was long gone, if it had ever really existed as seen in Washington.²⁵ The Sandinistas were also gone and Cuba was busily negotiating an end to its African internationalist interventions. The Soviet Union was no longer in an adventurist mood and in any case was about to disappear. Why not put the system to bed? Several countries added to this question the accusation that in the recent war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, the OAS and the Rio Pact had proven worse than useless to Buenos Aires, proving once more the irrelevance of the defence system to Latin American states parties.

Canada, the newest member of the OAS having only joined after a century of reluctance the inter-American system as a whole in 1990, was nonetheless active in suggesting a revised and updated security system as of the next year. Unwilling to consider such a thing when it first joined as it feared U.S. domination of the system and the dreadful reputation of the system in most of the Americas (including Canada) as a result of the dark days of the 1960s and seventies, Ottawa soon realized that without a secure and peaceful hemisphere, Canada’s hopes for a stable, democratic and prosperous region

in which to integrate itself would remain just hopes. Armed forces of many countries, long dependent on the United States, also wished to ensure that a revamped system could still prove of worth. And many in the United States feared losing the comparative advantage that country had in defence relations in the hemisphere at a time when political and economic dominance was no longer in the cards.

In this context, the United States Secretary of Defense in 1994 began a series of discussions with other American leaders and called for the next year a meeting of defence ministers of the hemisphere to discuss the future nature of the security system. The Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas (CDMA) was held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995 and almost all defence ministers were present or represented at the highest level except for Cuba, which was not invited, and Mexico, which came as an observer. There was agreement on the need for a continuation of defence cooperation in the hemisphere and even on the challenges before the region. Deep divisions surfaced, however, over the priorities to assign to such challenges as well as the approaches to take to them. These divisions ranged from subjects as diverse as the international illegal narcotics trade, illegal immigration, terrorism, and even proper civil-military relations in democracies. Once again, the ideal of shared interests and objectives within an inter-American security system was to be elusive indeed, even though no one felt that the system as a whole should be scrapped, the absence of the Cold War notwithstanding.

At this time other hemispheric trends were interesting and reinforced the desire to keep at least some cooperation in defence alive. The civil wars in Central America were drawing down with only Guatemala still causing major concern. The UN observer missions there were active and successful and backed by the OAS. De-mining was becoming a priority for several governments and the IADB could be and was helpful in this area. Haiti was a source of almost constant security concern as the decade progressed. And defence administration, progress with civil-military relations in many countries, cuts in defence establishments, and much else was of great interest to newly returned democratic governments. The short but sharp war between Peru and Ecuador in early 1995 also underscored the fact that the oft-touted "region of peace" Latin Americans liked to term their part of the world was not exact, and that progress with confidence-building measures, peaceful resolution of disputes, and arms control was not irrelevant in the region's still smoldering border and jurisdictional disputes.²⁶ Despite disagreements on priorities and approaches, there remained a sense that there was work still to be done by a revised system.

An ad hoc Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) was set up at the OAS in 1991 and four years later became permanent. An organ dealing with support for democracy which included handling issues of civil-military relations was likewise established in the organisation. The CDMA became yet another potentially important new element of the system as it decided to meet every two years and at defence minister level, making it the highest level meeting in the hemisphere for defence affairs. All this reflected the new Consensus of Miami of late 1994 when all hemispheric nations agreed to move together towards hemispheric free trade and political cooperation.²⁷

Consensus Questioned and Then Shattered, 1998 to the Present

The Miami Consensus was destined to last very few years indeed. The policies proposed by the United States in order to build a new economic order in the hemisphere were widely denounced as “neo-liberal” and anti-poor, and the future trickling down effect that was to bring greater prosperity to the poorer countries of the region was ridiculed as too little and too late. One by one, governments proposing to join in such hemispheric cooperation were defeated in elections and the tendency gathered steam steadily. But nothing prepared the hemispheric system for what was to come.

In 1998, with the election of former lieutenant-colonel Hugo Chávez Frias to the presidency in Venezuela, a trend began which was to become powerful indeed in regional politics. For Chávez was an open admirer of Fidel Castro, architect of an earlier coup attempt against the corrupt but pro-American Venezuelan regime, and something of a populist firebrand calling for the end of the old order not only in his country but throughout Latin America. Calling for a revolution to return to what he saw as the principles of Simón Bolívar, he launched a reform programme in Venezuela, fuelled by petrodollars, which soon had the region and the hemisphere in political ferment. Proposing a democratic but people’s revolution, he soon had followers throughout the region and his close friendship with Castro brought great succour to Cuba in the form of Venezuelan oil and cash in exchange for the loan of Cuban doctors, nurses, teachers, sports and music instructors, and other experts. This marriage made in heaven of the two most leftist governments in the region soon had Washington in particular worried.

This was, however, only the beginning. In a half-decade the rightist governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua were also replaced by deeply reformist if not revolutionary movements and leaders. These more extreme

forms of leftist leadership were merely part of the problem for conservative forces to face. In addition, more moderate leftist leadership took power in Argentina, Brazil, Chile for a time and eventually, if in some cases only temporarily, in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Only in Colombia and Mexico did the trend not result in power changes and even in the latter it was a near run thing. This “pink tide,” itself the reflection of centuries of conservative rule rejected in the first real context of possible victories by leftist democratic movements throughout the region, seemed unstoppable for a while.

The formation of a radical bloc of nations within this tide, to be termed ALBA after the Latin American People’s Alternative and similar evolving titles, and consisting of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, at first eschewed defence matters doubtless fearing the reaction in at least four cases of the heavily U.S.-influenced and still powerful armed forces. But soon, as early as the 2000 CDMA held in Manaus, Brazil, Venezuela formally proposed the end of the inter-American security system as it had been known up to then and its replacement with a two-tiered system based on Latin America and the Caribbean on one level and the hemisphere only at a second. While rejected by all other members of the CDMA, its merely being proposed was a sign of future trouble and divisions.

The system, recently reinforced by the CDMA process and the CHS, and given at least some direction by the Conference on Hemispheric Security, at foreign minister level, held in Mexico in 2003, still found itself unable to retain any degree of unity. The ALBA nations were increasingly unhappy with a system they saw as entirely dominated by the United States and with a dreadful past behind it, not to mention institutions which had blood on their hands at massive levels. The IADB came in for particularly negative reactions as did the Rio Pact itself. While some accusations spoke of institutional irrelevance, others spoke of institutional evil. CDMA’s for a time retained some degree of restraint and no one would actually openly denounce the system as a whole although the Venezuelans were to do so on several occasions after Manaus and then that country stopped attending at ministerial level altogether.

Even at the OAS the meetings of the CHS were increasingly irrelevant. The overall political context worsened as the United States accused the radical governments of abandoning democracy, and the latter responded with considerable finger waving that the United States was no longer in a moral position to be the judge and jury for the level of democracy of Latin American governments. The absence of Cuba from the inter-American

“family” also became a source of growing discord as not only the ALBA states and the other leftists but even rightist governments in the region joined the others, including Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean nations, in calling loudly for Cuba’s re-incorporation into hemispheric bodies.

Worse was to come. Despite the withdrawal of Mexico from the Rio Pact in 2001, the attacks on the Twin Towers that September had seen Brazil call for the Pact to be activated as part of a hemispheric coordinated response to terrorism. This rejuvenation had, however, ended there. By the end of the first decade of the century, most countries spoke openly of either ending the Pact altogether or at least reforming it to respond to the conditions of the moment and not those of 1947. Attempts by Canada and others to reform and make relevant the IADB, despite support from many of the region’s national armed forces, were rejected by capitals and came to almost nothing. The progress made with hemispheric and regional confidence-building measures stalled and then stopped being replaced by local initiatives in South America or in other sub-regions.²⁸ More and more it seemed that many countries attended hemispheric meetings on defence merely to stymie progress and not to further it. Dreams of greater hemispheric inter-operability among national armed forces, especially in countering terrorism but also in peacekeeping operations, fell afoul of the realities of the day and were shelved after sometimes promising beginnings. Civil-military relations were strained in several countries as armed forces wished to continue and even increase inter-American defence cooperation but faced national governments with no inclination to do so.

Repeated electoral victories returned ALBA governments, which felt greater freedom to embark on measures to reduce further the relevance of the inter-American system as a whole and its defence elements in particular. When calls by Venezuela for a South American “NATO” to deter U.S. interventions in the region failed to garner support from more moderate governments or even from Cuba, moderating efforts were made which included the founding in 2008 of a South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) which was soon given a defence element. UNASUR made no secret of its desire to build a South American identity in order to distance itself from the Pan American, Western Hemisphere, and inter-American concepts of ordering affairs, and its members even found fault with the idea of a Latin American identity. And when a defence dimension of the body, the South American Defence Council, was founded in 2010, it also quickly produced proposals distancing the group from Latin American and inter-American initiatives,

structures, and organisations. For the first time in the long history of inter-American security system, sub-regional organisations made no effort to link themselves to the larger system and even proudly declared their independence from it.

Thus by 2012 one had a hemispheric system shorn of its unity but still showing the old structures that had not completely disappeared over the long years of decline. No one leaves the OAS nor do states usually show a complete rejection of things as they stand. The Latin American tradition is to stay in and slow down, that is to be there in order to ensure that nothing happens that is not in one's interest. Never is this more true than in defence and never has it been more true than at the present moment in inter-American political and defence affairs.

Nonetheless, in 2012 the crisis brought out active disenchantment publicly admitted and even trumpeted. After the disastrous Cartagena Summit of American leaders had broken up in total disagreement over future Cuban participation in the hemispheric organs and the question of the future of the Falkland Islands, moves on the defence front followed quickly. All four current ALBA signatories of the Rio Pact denounced the treaty and announced their intention to withdraw from it. Thus a treaty signed by twenty-one states, which had already excluded one of them in the 1960s (Cuba) and seen another (Mexico) withdraw in 2001, now found four more leaving as soon as possible. And thus over a quarter of the original signatories are no longer such and the Pact's legitimacy as somehow Pan American is highly suspect. While it is true that the Charter still is in place and has not been similarly denounced, and that it carries the same collective defence commitments embodied in the Pact, this is splitting hairs. The system's main defence pillar is all but shattered at the present time.

In addition, at the X CDMA held in Montevideo in October 2012, Ecuador and Bolivia further announced they would no longer be taking part in attempts to improve the system and would specifically no longer take part in the IADB. Since Cuba is once again no longer a member of this body, and Venezuela has for some time eschewed participation, one can again speak of an organ of the system whose legitimacy can be questioned. Given that it never included anything like the whole of the hemisphere's countries, with Canada for long and most of the Commonwealth Caribbean still holding aloof from it, the IADB is in grave trouble. That its OAS funding, on which it depends, is in doubt as well, merely adds to the feeling that the whole system is tottering.

The Present Moment and the Possible Futures

Thus the system has arrived perhaps at its crisis point but certainly at its moment of most division, most lack of shared objectives, most uncertainty in general, in its history. Divisions of an ideological kind already discussed, added to the South American versus North American and even Central American and Caribbean perspectives, leave us with little immediate hope for a reinforced inter-American security system. Nowhere does one see common objectives, reducing tensions, etc. that are hemisphere-wide. Instead one speaks increasingly of joining the efforts of like-minded, that is either conservative or leftist governments, in projects in which only those like-minded will be interested or which they will be willing to support. In addition, other initiatives come within the new lines drawn geographically through the hemisphere. North American defence initiatives, *à deux ou à trois*, abound and others have seen the light of day for the Caribbean, Central America, the Southern Cone, Mercosur, UNASUR, ALBA, etc. But the idea of a hemispheric shared view of where we should be going is, alas, more absent than at any time known by the author.

The reality is that the hemisphere is divided ideologically between conservative governments keen on retaining the key elements of the inter-American system in place, and reformist governments absolutely unwilling to continue to play that game and proposing another way of seeing the hemisphere which is anathema to those same conservative elements. To this ideological divide is added one of geography as South America moves quickly to establish its own overall identity as not Latin American nor hemispheric but rather continental in the restricted sense of Colombia southwards to the southern cone. While every kind of cross-cutting issue may appear, those central elements of what one faces in the Americas today are undeniable. And the fact that those countries which might play a constructing honest broker or helpful fixer role, like Canada or Mexico in the past, are not interested because of their own evolution ideologically, merely means that no one is prepared to risk anything serious in order to save the system as it was known.

Chile and Colombia would doubtless be willing to support loudly the inter-American system but not if the price is too high in terms of South American solidarity. Ecuador at times would like to ensure that the system does not become a casualty of UNASUR or even ALBA efforts, but cannot face both those bodies and appear to be a spoiler of their wider objectives. Brazil, anxious to be helpful but restrained by its deep commitments to UNASUR, does its best but cannot do enough. Its virtually unqualified support of the

highly reformist government of Argentina limits what can be done in any case as do its own doubts as to the current value of the system as it stands. Virtually all countries call for a total re-making of the system, although the rightist Central American governments can be counted on for slowing down such demands. Unfortunately, such opposition to reform merely reinforces the arguments of those that suggest the system is dead and should be put out of its misery.

Conclusions

Thus the shared interests, objectives or even perspectives that might provide for effective defence cooperation remain elusive and perhaps impossible to find in the present context of inter-American relations. We have seen that this situation of stymied working together has only really been avoided once in the history of the Americas. The coming together of internal factors, such as the Good Neighbour Policy, with external ones, such as the rise of fascism, did produce more than a modicum of common perceptions of threat and shared interests. The result, with nuance, was a level of defence cooperation in pre-war conditions and then in wartime and in the post-war period never seen before or since.

When those conditions changed, however, with the arrival of the Cold War, the U.S. attempt to essentially bludgeon Latin America into taking the challenge of Soviet communism seriously was not able to produce common views where there were none naturally. Latin American societies were generally deeply Catholic and conservative and showed no signs of actually being threatened by communist penetration and such was the view of the bulk of regional governments. The communist threat simply could not act as the glue in a cooperative effort without the United States allying itself with the most reactionary forces in the region and assisting in the overthrow of civilian democratic governments which would have been its natural allies during the Good Neighbour Policy's reign of 1934-54.

When the conditions of the Cold War ended, the security system in place, used so dramatically to smash reformist forces over the long dark years of military dictatorship, could no longer garner significant shared support. Whether anything can be done to change this state of affairs is the open question. Major change in the actions of the principal actors on this stage would appear to be the only way for progress to be made.

Notes

- 1 The history of the Canadian perspective on the PAU and the Organization of American States (OAS) is given in Peter McKenna, *Canada and the OAS*, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995). See also the ground breaking work of James Ogelsby, *Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1866-1968* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976).
- 2 Josefina Zoraida Vázquez and Lorenzo Meyer, *México frente a Estados Unidos: un ensayo histórico, 1776-1988* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989), especially 64-112 gives a classic Latin American view on U.S. expansion not only into Mexico but into the region as a whole.
- 3 The symbol of the rejection of the Pan American idea came to be embodied in the writings of the Argentine thinker Manuel Ugarte. See his *La Patria grande y otros textos* (Buenos Aires: Theoria, 1996).
- 4 See his story and that of his appreciation for the potential role of the United States throughout Alvaro Lins, *Rio Branco* (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1995).
- 5 This story is well told in Pierre Queuille, *L'Amérique latine, la Doctrine Monroe et le panaméricanisme* (Paris: Payot, 1969).
- 6 Francisco Pérez Guzmán, *La Habana: clave de un imperio* (Havana: Ciencias Sociales, 1993). Liberating plans came to naught in the face of mutual suspicions among the potentially participating countries, Cuban opposition to independence, and priorities elsewhere for both Gran Colombia and Mexico.
- 7 This interesting story is found in the first chapters of Arthur Oscar Saldanha da Gama, *A Marinha do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Capemi Editora, 1982).
- 8 A good description of the workings of this policy approach can be found in Dana Gardner Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 1980).
- 9 For the policy dynamic and development of this new approach, see Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
- 10 Demetrio Boersner, *Relaciones internacionales de América Latina*, Caracas (Nueva Sociedad, 1990), 224-225.
- 11 Quoted in David Haglund, *Latin America and the Evolution of U.S. Strategic Thought 1936-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 148.
- 12 Boersner, *Relaciones internacionales*, 225.
- 13 Frederick Nunn, *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).
- 14 María Emilia Paz Salinas, "México y la defensa hemisférica," in *El México de los '40*, ed. Rafael Loyola (México: Grijalbo, 1986), 49-64. Useful also is in the same volume, Blanca Torres, "La guerra y la posguerra en las relaciones de México y Estados Unidos," *El México de los '40*, 65-8.
- 15 See the Caribbean national chapters in Adrian English, *The Armed Forces of Latin America* (London: Janes', 1984).
- 16 For the Brazilian side of this story, see Ricardo Bonalume, *A Nossa segunda guerra: os brasileiros ao combate 1942-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura, 1995), 43-53; and for Mexico, Mario Moya Palencia, *1942: ¡Méxicanos al grito de guerra!* (Mexico: Porrúa, 1992), 35-77.
- 17 G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), gives perhaps the best overview of this evolution and state of affairs.

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- 18 Freerick Nunn, *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professionalism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).
- 19 How this all fits together is presented throughout Hugo Luis Cargnelutti, *Seguridad interamericana: ¿un subsistema del sistema interamericano?* (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1993).
- 20 Walter Lafeber, *Inevitable Revolutions* (New York: Norton, 1983), gives examples of this impact.
- 21 For the only major study of this connection so far, see Yuri Pavlov, *The Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publications, 1993).
- 22 For context, see Morris Morley, *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- 23 See Rodolfo Garrié Faget, *Organismos militares interamericanos* (Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1968).
- 24 See the highly useful overview of this evolution in Ismael Moreno Pino, *Orígenes y evolución del sistema interamericano* (México: Secretaria de Relaciones Internacionales, 1977); and also F.V. García-Amador, *La cuestión cubana en la OEA y la crisis del sistema interamericano* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1987), 13-99.
- 25 Cuba has always argued that it was not an "export" of revolution but rather a defensive strategy to ensure the survival of the Revolution and that it should properly be termed a policy of "active defence." Even Che Guevara referred to his writings on guerrilla warfare as intended for defensive operations by Cuba in the event of another invasion and not aimed at taking revolutionary ideas abroad. See Paul Dosal, *Comandante Che: Guerrilla Soldier, Commander, and Strategist 1956-1967* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 20-22.
- 26 Those conflicts remained numerous and often troubling. See Jack Child, *Geopolitics and conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors* (New York: Praeger, 1985).
- 27 See throughout Richard Lipsey and Petricio Meller, eds., *Western Hemisphere Trade Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1997).
- 28 Progress in this important field had at first been impressive. See throughout Francisco Rojas Aravena, *Balance estratégico y medidas de confianza mutua* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1996).

Challenges of Collective Action in the Hemisphere

Frank O. Mora, Latin American and Caribbean Center,
Florida International University, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense–Western Hemisphere Affairs
(2009-2013)¹

In the Western Hemisphere, we face a strategic challenge that has not yet been fully appreciated. Whilst there is a litany of challenges that have been collectively agreed upon in the 2003 Mexico City Declaration, ranging from extreme poverty and natural disasters to transnational organized crime, experience as a policy practitioner in government over the past four years has made it abundantly clear that we are not collectively prepared, or able, to tackle these challenges. In fact, it is questionable whether the political will required to confront these challenges is present.

This “insecurity dilemma” is not one that is driven by traditional concepts such as power asymmetries, or arms races, but, rather, is a phenomenon presented to us by weak states, with significant institutional deficits. Over the past four years it has been apparent that while many states are able to “talk the talk” in terms of agreeing to promising and pragmatic solutions to the host of hemispheric security challenges, few countries have the institutional capacity or resources to “walk the walk” in terms of implementing meaningful countermeasures.

A mixture of globalization and weak state power has given rise to challenges of a complexity and magnitude never seen before, requiring more than ever a multinational, interagency, response which is sorely lacking. This paralysis of action is ominous. Global and hemispheric problems are multiplying whilst the capacity of governments and organizations to contain them is stagnant. It is a crisis of trust, expectations, and legitimacy. The nature and complexity of the challenges requires a level of collaboration and coordination across agencies and national border of the likes not seen before. The question is whether governments, agencies, and non-government organizations are up to the task.

When was the last time a large number of countries in the hemisphere agreed to a major regional accord on a pressing issue? Not since the 2003 Mexico City Declaration have we reached consensus on what the problems

are and how to respond. Diplomatic relationships in the hemisphere are not currently conducive to cooperation even towards modest goals. For instance, U.S. efforts to achieve non-controversial cooperation in the way militaries respond to natural disasters were met with significant resistance in the Defense Ministerials fora (CDMA). This has been the pattern towards U.S. leadership over the past decade. On the other hand, “chattering organizations” such as CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), CARICOM (Caribbean Community), SICA (Central American Integration System) and others have a tendency to issue a prolific number of international agreements that go unfunded, resulting in, effectively speaking, useless rhetoric.

Effective deals are elusive with high levels of distrust between states and, perhaps more importantly, between and within institutions of the same states. For instance, governments and institutions with weak political capital and institutional capacity, in the many incomplete or unconsolidated democracies in our hemisphere, cannot strike effective deals. These require political risks weak leadership has little incentive to attempt, and/or sacrifices their publics will not allow them to make. The current environment has led to the pursuit of bilateral, and smaller multilateral, agreements between small clusters of capable, or likeminded, countries that are not broad enough in scope to deal with the problems we face. What is required is to develop a new framework, or regime, or set of institutions, that are flexible and capable of dealing with the host of complex problems and flexible adversaries in the twenty-first century.

What should the response be in a post-Westphalian era where state borders and sovereignty mean less every day? Unfortunately, states, including the United States, are still too jealous of their sovereignty to contemplate “shared sovereignty.” What is doable now? Countries besides the United States and Canada can export their capabilities, such as Colombia is doing with security training. Chile is another promising leader punching above its weight by exporting security training to Haiti and El Salvador. We can continue to broaden the sense of burden sharing a bit beyond bilateralism to “mini”-lateralism, with three or four states working together such as the Pacific Alliance. At the end of the day, such measures will be insufficient without broader strategic consensus as to what the problems are and how to win.

Audience Commentary

It was noted that Mora’s recipe to successfully address future security challenges in the hemisphere appears to overlook significant U.S. role and leader-

ship. In reply, Mora noted the United States has been forced to act bilaterally within the hemisphere in the face of strong U.S. opposition. Moreover, the United States is tired of issuing financial backing to countries with a tendency to make excuses for why initiatives cannot work or who refuse to work together in an effective way. Brazil, for instance, despite its military's willingness to work with the United States, will only deal with the United States on security issues bilaterally, refusing to cooperate openly with the United States in regional fora for political reasons.

It was further observed that the United States appears itself to be disinclined to act multilaterally, putting forward weak multi-lateral delegations, and opting for unilateral policy stances on contentious issues such as Cuba. However, such critiques were dismissed as overly U.S.-centric. At the end of the day, even if Cuba were to be removed as an issue, it was argued, U.S.-Latin American relations would not improve substantively. The institutional problems of organizations such as CARICOM and the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American system in general are much deeper than whether or not the United States fields strong delegates in Latin American diplomacy or favors one position or another.

It was argued that hemispheric initiatives such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter contradict pessimistic prognostications regarding hemispheric agreement and cooperation. However, this claim was dismissed from the standpoint that the Charter itself holds little sway or meaning at this time. In the face of democratic reversals in Venezuela, for instance, there was no collective response, even from the United States, which fears its critiques will only serve to make matters worse. Then there was the perversion of the Mercosur and UNASUR reaction to events in Paraguay. The country was suspended despite following its own constitution.

U.S. intervention can be productive as it was with Plan Colombia, yet this success was only possible due to the collective epiphany of the Colombian people in the late 1990s who decided to make the sacrifices necessary to save their country. For instance, while the United States footed billions of dollars in aid, the Colombian government had the will to implement the tax on the wealthy to pay for most of what was required and the wealthy proved willing to pay for it.

Note

- 1 Summary of presentation prepared by Clayton Dennison, University of Calgary.

The Persistent Multidimensional Security Dilemma in the Caribbean and Requirements for Emergence: Trapped Between Dependence and Development—A Strategic Deficiency

Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Trinidad & Tobago Defence Force

I am appreciative of the important responsibility to contribute to discussion on the theme of security from the perspective of the Caribbean sub-region. I must emphasize that while I will refer generally to the reality of the entire Caribbean, I will focus on the small states of the Caribbean, and principally the island jurisdictions and the other nations that are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

The title of my paper describes the problem of multidimensional security in the Caribbean as a dilemma. I hope that upon conclusion, the nature of the problem of Caribbean security is made clearer. However, I trust that above all else, the potential for future Canadian, Caribbean, and international policy, defined as prerequisites for what I call “emergence,” will be recognized and embraced by representatives of the public, private, and civil society sectors and, equally important, by the representatives of academia and other actors with an interest in improving the global and hemispheric strategic security environment.

For the Caribbean generally and the small states of the English-speaking Caribbean and CARICOM more specifically, the issue of emergence has for too long remained an elusive reality. Whether applied to the requirement to either emerge fully from the culture of dependence created by its international political history, or from the clutches of underdevelopment that have been enabled by its international economic history, the small, highly open and still developing states of the Caribbean Basin remain trapped in a dilemma. The dilemma is that in the face of an increasingly multidimensional security environment, these small states must pursue sustainable economic development and political independence, or even better, interdependence,

amidst structural features that have historically been conducive to crime and other multidimensional threats to their security.

The character of security in the Caribbean has been historically and structurally multidimensional. Whether viewed from the perspective of plantation economy or international economic periphery, the reasons for the emergence of crime and insecurity in the Caribbean have all been associated with the features of:

- an exploitable and inescapable geography, on one hand, ideal for man-made illicit trade or illegal transshipment activity, whether in slaves and contraband of centuries ago, or drugs, guns, and humans today, and on the other hand, exposure to natural disasters, hurricanes, earthquakes, and climate change;
- an open and exogenously driven economy, and its propensity for the movement of pirated bullion of centuries ago to the accumulation of private unregulated off-shore accounts and money-laundering practices of today with the associated bribery and corruption of public officials;
- a dependence on the transfer of technology to the region, originally associated with industrialization by invitation models of the early post-colonial years that have been adopted by criminal actors including deportees in the form of ATM fraud, kidnapping, cyber-crime, and excessively violent crimes of today; and
- a migrant and pluralist society with the challenges of social diversity, income disparity, and divergent extra-regional loyalties that have all led to a high probability for undocumented migration, document fraud, identity theft, and human smuggling.


At the outset these features may be considered to be common to many other developed and developing regions of the world today. However, it is their debilitating and destructive presence in small states in particular, like those in the Caribbean with limited capacity to address them that renders the region vulnerable to what may otherwise be manageable threats to public safety and security. This was certainly not missed in the recent case of the response by Boston, granted with federal support, to the bombings at the Boston Marathon. In the vast majority of Caribbean states, sufficiently

capable and competent state institutions, such as law enforcement, intelligence, defence, criminal justice, border management, and corrections with the requisite organizational capacity to provide an acceptable level of public safety and security rarely exist. Where they do exist, and even with their constrained capability, capacity, and competency, there is the high level of exposure to corruption and bribery as was previously highlighted as a structural reality of the region.

An even greater cause for concern, however, is the reality that beyond the institutional level of analysis, there is a critical and persistent deficiency at the political and strategic levels to understand the realities and, more important, the requirements for decision-making and policy-making to accurately respond to multidimensional security threats, which in turn create circumstances of increased vulnerability because of already existing institutional weakness.

In fact, in some Caribbean states where time has been taken to examine the source of institutional weaknesses in the state security sector, it has been recognized that flawed or deficient strategic security decision-making and policy-making have also contributed to the persistence of weak security institutions. If ever there was a trap, or the proverbial catch 22, I would consider this situation of persistent vulnerability from a strategic deficiency to be a classic one.

Figure 1. Public Policy Conceptual Framework.



(Source: Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer).

TRAPPED BETWEEN DEPENDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Up until the end of the Cold War, the response to this under-estimated and miscalculated multidimensional and transnational security reality in the Caribbean was exogenously determined and understandably threat-driven on the basis of previous patterns and traditional approaches to global wars over territory or ideology. It was therefore only after the end of the Cold War by the mid-1990s that regional as well as extra-regional actors realized and accepted that the security response by the region, for the region, and to the region was overlooking the inescapable vulnerability-based reality of the Caribbean’s multidimensional crime and security experience. (See Table 1.)

However, the Caribbean region itself had also failed to diligently fulfil expressed commitments at regional integration and functional cooperation including in the area of regional security. These unrealized expectations have long denied and delayed efforts in the region for the pursuit of a strategic and integrated approach in response to the multidimensional and vulnerability-based challenges of the region.

In the process, Caribbean states, governments, and institutions have experienced a crisis of legitimacy and trust within their individual jurisdictions. Just as Holsti predicted, and as has now occurred in several Caribbean countries, this loss of legitimacy has undermined the strength of these states and has created what John Rapley has referred to as “statelets” in his 2006 article *The New Middle Ages*.¹ In fact, Cope and Mora offer the following accur-

Table 1. Historical Overview: Major Shifts in Caribbean Security Cooperation Environment, 1983-2010

Time Period	Nature of Interests	Engagement Focus	Basis of Interdependence
1983 – 1989	Territorial	Unilateralism	Ideological – Cold War
1990 – 1996	Extra-territorial	Bilateralism	Non-ideological – drugs, money laundering, disaster relief
1997 – 2001	Transnational	Regionalism – CARICOM*, ACS, OAS	Non-material and Non-ideological – Sustainable Dev., Climate Change, drugs, HR,
2002 – 2010	Multidimensional and Transnational	Multilateralism and Regionalism – UN, Commonwealth, G77, OAS,	Social, Non-material and Non-ideological – CT, TOC, MDGs, ICC,

(Source: Brigadier-General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer).

ate description of the problem confronting some CARICOM states today: “At the core of the turbulence is the decline of the state symbolized by deteriorating sovereignty and exacerbated by poverty, inequality, and ineffective governance at all levels of society.”² Based on the obvious multidimensionality of the vulnerability-based security reality of the Caribbean, the historical and traditional threat-driven response to territorial, ideological or other global threats, while still necessary, can no longer be considered as sufficient to address the security concerns of the Caribbean.

From my own exposure and experience over more than thirty years as a former practitioner in the field at the tactical level, to my current role as a policy advisor at the political-strategic level, I am now fully convinced, both by first-hand evidence and independent research, that the Caribbean is likely to remain trapped in its struggle to overcome the violent, destructive, and potentially destabilizing effects of its multidimensional security realities, principally because of the vulnerabilities that are certain to persist in the face of the deficiency that exists in the area of strategic security decision-making and policy-making, at the political and institutional, as well as individual levels of analysis.

The principal threats to Caribbean security, such as illicit trafficking, whether in drugs, guns or persons, cannot be ignored or avoided and must of necessity be addressed. However, given its structural and historical realities, the strategic security dilemma for the Caribbean is more accurately examined and understood with greater reference to the vulnerabilities of the region. It is the persistence of these vulnerabilities on account of limitations in institutional capacity, but even more so because of deficiencies at the political level in strategic security decision-making and policy-making that render the current multidimensional security experience of the Caribbean a dilemma.

CARICOM

CARICOM comprises twelve islands and three continental states within a geographical zone that lies directly in the path of one of the most active international drug trades: between the world’s primary source of cocaine (the Andean region of South America) and its primary consumer markets (the United States and Europe). Adding to the challenge of the international drug trade, CARICOM member states have extensive coastlines and vast territorial waters to patrol, and lack adequate law enforcement capabilities. The twelve islands are spread over approximately 60,000 square kilometres of the Caribbean Sea, which has an area of 2.75 million square kilometres. Just over

2 percent of CARICOM's area is land, within an overall area that is three quarters the size of the twenty-seven member states of the European Union combined. This makes it extremely challenging for each state to monitor its coastlines and territorial waters which are, on average, fifteen times larger than their land mass. Four member states share land borders with other sovereign territories.

Although diverse in terms of population size, all the member states of CARICOM are considered small states. The Community has inherent sustainable developmental challenges, which include small populations, very large maritime frontiers, susceptibility to external shocks and natural disasters, vulnerability to global economic developments, and the threat of both domestic and transnational organised crime.

As a Community with approximately 17 million people, over half of which are in Haiti, CARICOM member states are committed to the principles and values of democratic choice, freedom, justice, prosperity, respect for and promotion of human rights, and good governance. CARICOM's crime and security mandate is guided by these principles and values all of which reflect the convictions of the Community.

The Impact of Crime

Most CARICOM member states have high rates of homicide and violent crime. (See Table 2, p. 77.) This has reduced citizen security, impeded socio-economic development, eroded confidence in nation-building, and heightened fear among the population. The 2012 Caribbean Human Development Report indicates "that region wide, only 46 percent of respondents said that, overall, they felt secure or very secure living in their countries." The greatest threats to the region's security and sustainable development are transnational organised criminal activities involving illicit drugs and illegal guns; gangs and organised crime; cyber-crime; financial crimes; and corruption. Tier 1 Threats are the main drivers of criminality, have already crippled the development of a number of member states, and have the potential to undermine all hopes for socio-economic development in CARICOM and the advancement of the CARICOM Single Market & Economy (CSME).


In the recently adopted CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy, which I will later discuss, four Threat or Risk Tiers have been established. Tier 1 Threats are primarily responsible for the region's high murder rates and violence that burden socio-economic development. These threats have a particular impact on the most vulnerable members of the population, especially women and children in poor areas. The average homicide rate for

the Community is 30 people killed for every 100,000 inhabitants annually. In Mexico, a country suffering appalling widespread drug-related violence, the rate is just 18 while the global rate is approximately 7 (see Table 2). All CARICOM member states have significantly higher murder rates per capita than the United States, which has a murder rate of 4.6 per 100,000. More than 70 percent of the people who die a violent death in the region are killed with a gun. Young people under the age of thirty comprise 60 percent of the region's citizenry, and are both the main perpetrators and victims of crime. This very high level of violent criminality has reduced the citizens' quality of life, placed the limited resources of member states under extreme pressure, reduced local and foreign direct investment, and has threatened the ability of states to achieve their developmental goals.

Recent and Current Responses to the Dilemma

Given the misdirected and misplaced response to the Caribbean's multi-dimensional security dilemma until the mid-1990s, it should be noted and recognized first that the process of effective security institution-building in the region is now still less than two decades old. Second, the realization by regional and extra-regional security cooperation actors that the Caribbean security experience is multidimensional and not principally territorial or ideological, nor even purely transnational, occurred barely ten years ago and was significantly precipitated by a global strategic security shift in September 2001. Of course earlier projects such as the 1991 Santiago Commitment, and Ivelaw Griffith's 1997 articulation of a conceptual framework for understanding the multidimensional scope of drug trafficking in his publication *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Seige* (Griffith Framework) also

Table 2. Murder Rates for Selected Regions and States, 2011.



(Source: IMPACS 2012; UNODC 2011).

helped to reveal the necessity for a multidimensional approach to security generally, and for Caribbean security in particular.

It should therefore have been expected that the Multidimensional Approach to Security would have emerged in the form of the Declaration of Bridgetown in 2002 at the 32nd Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly. This hemispheric commitment more accurately expresses and defines an appropriate philosophy, doctrine, and concept to guide the response to crime and security in the Caribbean. The timing of the Bridgetown Declaration was also perfect when one examines the definition of security and crime in the 2002 Report of CARICOM Regional Task Force on Crime and Security.

Since the Declaration of Bridgetown in June 2002, the response to the Caribbean Crime and Security Experience has been consistently focused on the multidimensionality of the regional security experience. In fact, that process, which began with the Declaration of Kingstown on the Security of Small States in January 2003, served to propel the approval and establishment by the CARICOM Heads of Government of the existing CARICOM Framework for the Management of Crime and Security in July 2005. In this regard, it must be noted that while the necessity for effective state security institution-building in the region goes back to 1996, the actual framework and processes for doing so at the regional level, as well as for regional level strategic security decision-making and policy-making are in fact only now approaching their eighth year of existence.

Even so, it must be highlighted that the imperative for action during the first half of that short eight year experience of institution-building, decision-making, and policy-making was driven almost exclusively between 2005 and 2007 by the exogenously mandated security requirements for CARICOM to host the 2007 Cricket World Cup Tournament in ten of the member states. During this time even the strategic security decision-making organs and entities of the newly established CARICOM Framework for the Management of Crime and Security such as CONSLE and SEPAC, were themselves deeply engaged in operational level activities, and less focused on strategic security decision-making and policy-making.

Having a strategy makes it even more urgent to develop the capability and build the capacity at both the political and institutional levels for strategic security decision-making. If that capability and capacity is not developed in the flawed short-term, tactical decision-making of the past will continue and the strategy will become just another well written but failed security policy agenda. It appears the CARICOM region, due to its structural security chal-

lenges and insufficient capacity to meet threats, is likely to remain inextricably trapped between dependence and development. However, there are opportunities for emergence. The region's decision-making capacity needs to be reformed, ideally with outside assistance from nations like Canada and the United States, in order to strengthen security at an institutional level. There needs to be increased participation from civil society groups and the private sector. Together these groups can bring to bear significant underutilized capacities.

Notes

- 1 John Rapley, "The New Middle Ages," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61708/john-rapley/the-new-middle-ages>.
- 2 John A. Cope and Frank O. Mora, "Hemispheric Security: A New Approach," *Current History* 108, no. 715 (February 2009): 65-71.

Multidimensional Security Perspective

Ambassador Adam Blackwell, Secretary of Multi-dimensional Security, Organization of American States

The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, created in 2005, is tasked with coordinating political, technical, and practical cooperation among member states and other inter-American and international organizations to analyze, prevent, confront, and respond to emerging threats to national and citizen security. Politically, the Secretariat receives mandates from the Summit of the Americas, from the annual general assembly, as well as from our Permanent Council and its working groups. In fact, we are currently working on a drug study and TOC (Transnational Organized Crime) plan, both of which were mandated by the Presidents of the Hemisphere at the last Summit.¹

To fulfill these mandates and other obligations, the Secretariat has technical bodies; the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Department of Public Security (DPS) and the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). Each of these technical bodies has its own set of networks to address key themes such as: border and maritime security, cyber security, money laundering and terrorism financing, forensics, prisons, arms trafficking, drugs and organized crime, and terrorism, among others. These networks are made up of our National Points of Contact and are in my view our real force multipliers.

In my tenure as Secretary of Multidimensional Security, we have tried to move beyond supply driven solutions to build practical programs that connect the political and technical platform that we have at our disposal. Our work is united by a common philosophy, which we have termed “smart security.” Smart security is actually something simple and logical: an objective, evidence-based diagnosis of the problems; creation of proposals based on national and regional needs and capabilities, implemented in alliance with all relevant actors; a multidimensional and multi-stakeholder focus ensuring systematic problem-solving; and a rigorous evaluation of results and indicators.

Our work in the region has produced positive tangible results. We have helped countries set up Drug Treatment Courts as an alternative to incarceration for certain types of drug offenders and financial intelligence units

to prevent money laundering; implement computer emergency response teams to tackle cyber threats; strengthen detection techniques to identify suspicious cargo; expose cases of human trafficking and adopt better techniques to manage risks at airports and sea ports; mark and manage firearms; reduce the demand and supply of illicit substances; and help millions of victims. We have also been a lead player in the gang truce in El Salvador, leading programs to promote alternatives for at-risk youth and former gang members trying to reintegrate back into society, and I am a member of the Commission to Reform the Security Sector in Honduras where I have been tasked with investigating corruption and redesigning security institutions. These are important tactical results but it is clear that we need to be more strategic.

The Declaration on Security in the Americas is now ten years old. In its days, this was a forward-looking document that helped member states start to define the new and emerging threats to international security that have accompanied globalization, and the need to place a higher value on citizen security. It started to identify some of the future challenges in dealing with the multidimensional nature of risks we face, but left the possible mitigating strategies undeveloped.

I am not sure though that this Declaration could have predicted how rapid this evolution would be—how information, technology, communications, and transportation would challenge the norms of global governance and the international system. Never before have we had to contend with the sheer volume, speed, and diversity of people and commodities that cross our borders both legally and illegally. This openness, in the exchange of information and knowledge through the internet and social media, or global travel, migration, trade, and banking, has benefited Canada as we are a trading country, but it is this very openness that also places us and others at risk.

It is estimated that the illicit economy ranges from 1 to 15 percent of global GDP. Even on the low side, this puts it at US\$718 billion. We estimate in our soon to be released drug study that the trade in illicit drugs in our hemisphere alone to be in the range of \$150 billion per year. This is half the GDP of Alberta just from illicit drugs.

This vast illicit income has financed the growth and fortification of violent organized criminal enterprises. Their adaptability, innovativeness and increasing convergence gives them ever-improving ability to circumvent official countermeasures and overcome logistical challenges, as well as develop even better tools for exploiting weaknesses and opportunities within the state system, indeed attacking that system, not to mention the people.

We cannot forget that people and families are bearing a heavy cost. They are many times caught in the crossfire, both literal and figurative, of the battle between the criminal groups and law enforcement. In 2011 the hemisphere recorded 150,000 homicides related to organized crime. Firearms were used in 75 percent of these homicides, whereas the global average is 40 percent. USAID reports that there are over 900 gangs in Central America alone, resulting in a “fear of crime.”

Trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration has now become a major business line for transnational organized crime groups. While it is impossible to know with certainty, there are estimates from the International Labour Organization (ILO) that report as high as \$32 billion in annual income from these activities. According to a 2005 International Organization for Migration (IOM) report, trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation has become a \$16-billion-a-year business in Latin America.

At a recent Regional World Economic Forum meeting in Lima, I had a unique opportunity to mingle with the presidents of Peru, Mexico, and Panama, and many senior ministers and key business actors. At the Forum, I noted some common themes from the senior level speakers, regardless of ideology; comprehensive reform, continuity, state policies, social and economic development, inclusive societies, and open for business.

Similarly they all recognize that crime, violence and insecurity are a drag on their business and prosperity. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that Latin America’s per capita GDP would be 25 percent higher if the region’s crime rate were reduced to the world average. Crime increases costs; it drives away investment and forces states to re-direct their already limited resources towards security. Canada boasts low crime and violence rates, but it sends millions of tourists, invests billions of dollars each year, and has signed seven free trade agreements in the last five years. So clearly, Canadian interests are not immune to these security concerns.

This, unfortunately, is only half of the story. How much of the illicit economy is flowing across our borders? Where do the cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines come from? How many gangs do we have in our cities, some that were started elsewhere? All you have to do is look at the economics or business of crime to know that the risks are also here as we are major consumers of the illicit economy.

What Can We Do About the Problems: Smart Security

The solution to the problem of insecurity is not necessarily more security; such as police, troops, and heavy-handed anti-crime legislation. We know

that we are not going to arrest our way out of the problem. Rather, we need to refocus strategically on a humanistic approach; on areas like prevention and keeping youth out of the gangs in the first place. We also need to ensure that there is no impunity for those that do commit a crime, that they are punished by criminal justice systems that are professional and trustworthy, and that the punishment is humane and fosters the reintegration of offenders back into society to hopefully lead useful and productive lives.

Looking ahead for the next ten years I see Multidimensional Security converging to what I would call “shared security,” which looks at three core and interconnected themes; new concepts of networked sovereignty; inclusive multi-stakeholder states; and resilient communities where citizens have a renewed consciousness of their rights and obligations. Success will require, first and foremost, confidence. Confidence is the great enabler and multiplier; impunity is the enemy.

Networked Sovereignty: Strong States

Let us start with shared sovereignty. Historically, most countries used multilateral fora to try and protect their sovereignty rather than enhance it. This might have worked twenty-five years ago but we now live in an era of global borders and virtual territories. Globalization and our open economies, open societies, and open technologies have advanced so quickly it has far outpaced our traditional governance models. The lack of capacity in some countries has led to either the militarization of security, the privatization of security or, frankly, no security. What is required is a citizen-centred or a people approach. We also need to start changing the indicators or we are going to be stuck measuring homicide rates, prison populations and drug seizures. It is hard but essential that we rebuild the confidence of the citizenry in their police and rule of law institutions through well-articulated and well-designed prevention, community policing, and correction models.

We have successfully developed global financial systems, global telecommunications networks, and global supply chains. It is clear that the response to transnational threats require the same approach—a multi-state response system which must devise comprehensive and multidimensional strategies and policies that reinforce collaboration, build confidence across jurisdictions, and ensure that there is no sense of criminal impunity, which is surely the greatest threat to our sovereignty today.

Inclusive Multi-Stakeholder Approach to Governance

This leads to my next point about helping others create a modern multi-stakeholder approach to the building of robust, resilient, and responsive state institutions to support long-term public policies. The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) is over a decade old and we should be very proud that almost all of our countries have a democratically elected government, albeit of mixed quality, but democratic principles have advanced significantly. What, in my view, is the next challenge is the creation of professional and inclusive state institutions that are capable of providing essential services, opportunities, and support to their citizens on the one hand, and, on the other, are able to understand that a mature and sophisticated democracy at its best is messy and even messier in the multi-stakeholder connected societies in which we live today. Messy meaning that now we have even more actors with a multiplicity of interests and concerns.

Examples of this can be found in the fields of cyber security and money laundering. In both cases major parts of the infrastructure are in the hands of the private sector. Whereas if you look at the drug study we are working on, in many countries, NGOs or the not-for-profit sector are providing prevention and treatment services. The private sector can play a very important role here, by not corrupting and helping with the development of modern transparent tools like accounting, business management, and ISO-like (International Organization for Standardization) rigor in the development of the processes of government. This is important because for the multi-stakeholder approach to be effective, it must be built on mutual trust and confidence.

Resilient Societies

Petty/common or transnational organized crime in all its manifestations will continue to be insufficient if we do not address the underlying social conditions that allow these activities to take root. We must work to build up the social capital of our communities, which can be measured in levels of trust, teamwork, and cohesiveness. Young persons in a supportive, inclusive society are less vulnerable than those who are isolated. Resilient societies are built from the bottom up, through grass-roots level community-based initiatives like cultural programs for underprivileged communities, vocational training programs, basic skills for a successful life, programs for young and under-educated parents, and community-based policing programs, to list a few.

Resilient societies must simultaneously be supported from the highest levels of government. Leadership must address such issues as economic

inequity, access to quality education, healthcare, good governance, and public trust. The convergence of not doing this is what I call “social warming.” Today, we essentially have a better connected and better educated population. The lives and behaviours of persons in public office are more public than ever and today citizens are more outspoken and have higher expectations than in the past.

As democracy has improved in the Hemisphere, so too has the economy. The Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) says that we have been able to reduce poverty levels by over 40 percent over the last ten years. Unfortunately, we have not been as successful at reducing inequality by more than 4 percent. This remains the Achilles heel and it is clear that without shared development there is no security, and without security there is no development.

If all of this seems unobtainable, I can assure you that there are models of success out there that we need to start duplicating in a much more rigorous manner. To bring what I have mentioned so far to the ground and away from the abstract, take, for example, the story of Colombia. Ten to fifteen years ago this country was as close to being considered a failed state as possible. Through strong leadership, good international cooperation, and inter-state coordination, Colombia has begun the long hard slog to rebuild itself. Today, Colombia has stronger institutions, a robust democracy and civil society, and economic opportunities for a greater number of its citizens. Colombia is becoming a global player—potentially joining the OECD, promoting international security cooperation across the hemisphere and helping us at the OAS document their police experience and ISO certification models. Of course, this transformation did not happen overnight. It involved a lot of assistance and policy coordination to reduce impunity and rebuild the confidence of its citizens.

One such example was the OAS led Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia, or MAPP-Colombia. Established in 1994, the mandate of this Mission was to contribute to peacebuilding in Colombia by working with different sectors of society; providing support to the initiatives of the government and civil society groups; and supporting local initiatives in the conflict areas. In Colombian communities, MAPP worked to re-build trust, promote reconciliation, and strengthen democracy at the local level. The MAPP Mission employed three strategies to help in this re-building process: shared sovereignty; a multi-stakeholder approach; and stronger resilient societies. In using this three-pronged approach, it succeeded in re-instating trust and confidence, the real multiplier.

We know there are a variety of different problems, but we need to be smart about solutions and draw from successful models. Our office has drawn on the experience of MAPP in Colombia in our strategic approach to addressing insecurity in Central America and the Caribbean, which we have dubbed “MAS Centro- America” and “MAS Caribbean.” Using this approach, we are working at every level (regional, national, municipal) with different actors (including private sector, NGOs, civil society groups) to strengthen the capacity of states and institutions to respond to their security threats, as well as to emphasize the importance of community development and resilience through prevention programs. If, as in the case of El Salvador, this means open dialogue with the gang leaders, then so be it, as there is no solution in a country that a year ago was the most violent in the world without dealing with the major cause of that violence.

The TRUST of the Americas is an excellent example of this approach. The not-for-profit organization, run by Linda Eddleman, is building partnerships with local organizations in communities across the hemisphere to provide vulnerable populations with alternate development opportunities. At the same time, they are coordinating their activities with governments and the private sector to promote economic and social inclusion for maximum impact.

We are convinced that a multidimensional, multi-stakeholder, coordinated joint effort is the only logical way forward. What comes as no surprise is that we have found that the best solutions are those that are built on an accurate diagnosis of the problems, tailored to the local environment, and must adopt a multi-stakeholder horizontal approach in its delivery and evaluation. The international community also needs to do a much better job of coordinating its assistance, recognizing its role as illicit consumers, and helping those societies that are struggling.

Note

- 1 The Report on the Drug Problems in the Americas was released by the OAS on May 17, 2013, and can be accessed at www.cicad.oas.org.

The Future of Inter-American Relations

Peter Hakim, President Emeritus,
Inter-American Dialogue

In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, there emerged for a time what appeared to be a relatively wide agreement in the United States and much of Latin America regarding the direction hemispheric relations should take. The convergence focused on renewed efforts to achieve inter-American cooperation and integration along three axes—economic, political, and institutional.

Most nations welcomed the 1990 proposal of President George H.W. Bush to build toward an integrated economic bloc, a hemisphere-wide trade area that would allow for the free flow of capital and goods among all the countries of the Americas. The new bloc, later named the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), was intended to improve the competitiveness of the hemisphere's economies, and enable them to keep up with the economically integrated nations of the European Union and with Japan and the fast growing "tigers" of East Asia. The increasingly market-oriented Latin American economies had begun to unilaterally reduce their trade barriers, and saw the value of joining a regional free trade arrangement effectively led by the United States.

Second, the idea that democracy was the only valid form of government was taking firm root across the Americas. Free and fair elections were widely accepted as the only legitimate way to secure power. By 1991, every country in Latin America except for Cuba could boast an elected government. Moreover, the hemisphere's governments approved Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions requiring collective action to protect and strengthen democratic governance in all nations of the Americas. This commitment to collective responsibility was subsequently codified in 2001, when every country of the hemisphere (except Cuba) signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC).

Third, the OAS was seen as providing the crucial institutional framework for regional governance and cooperation. It was supplemented in 1994 by the newly launched Summit of the Americas process, which was designed to regularly assemble the hemisphere's heads of state.

This three-pronged convergence, which represented more of an aspiration than a firm commitment from the governments, has mostly evaporated.

Negotiations toward a hemispheric trade bloc were halted in 2005 after several years of limited progress, largely because the United States and Brazil could not find common ground on several key issues. The Democratic Charter has hardly ever been invoked, despite many notorious violations of democratic practice. And, after many setbacks, the OAS and Summit of the Americas are both weakened institutions. Today, there is a lack of anything near a consensus on hemispheric relations.

Diminishing Ties Between Latin America and the United States

The United States and Latin America have been drifting apart for a decade or more. Still, the United States remains the most important external economic presence in Latin America—even though it has been steadily losing ground to Europe and China, which is now the leading commercial partner of several Latin American countries. The United States is the first or second largest trade partner for nearly every country in the region. No other nation invests more in Latin America, transfers more technology, or is the source of more remittances and overseas aid (although the latter is focused mainly on public security and drug-related issues). While its relative economic significance will continue to diminish in the coming period, the United States will surely sustain a robust commercial and financial relationship with Latin America.

U.S. political engagement in Latin America has suffered a faster decline. Washington no longer has much influence on most issues and decisions in the region, particularly in South America. U.S. capacity to shape the region's agenda or affect specific decisions has diminished considerably—and its interest in doing so has shrunk as well. Washington has sharply reduced its involvement in conflict and crisis resolution in Latin America, both within or between countries. The Latin Americans themselves have taken on these tasks, often making use of new regional and sub-regional institutions in which neither the United States nor Canada participate.

The United States today has no unifying vision or common approach to Latin America. U.S. policy is largely directed to Mexico and Central America, driven by geographical proximity, economic and demographic integration, and concerns about security and drug trafficking. Brazil—because of its size, economic potential, and regional and global influence—also commands U.S. attention. The two countries, however, have not identified any clear path toward a closer, more cooperative relationship, either political or economic.

Diverging Trajectories in Latin America

Economically, Latin America has divided itself into two blocs. One includes the eleven countries that have free trade agreements with the United States, virtually all of which are seeking even stronger U.S. commercial ties. The other bloc consists of the five members of Mercosur and two aspirants. Nearly all of them enjoy substantial economic relations with the United States, but few have shown much interest in developing more formal commercial ties. There is currently no overlap between the two blocs. Of twenty Latin American countries, only Haiti and Cuba belong to neither.

Regional politics are even more divisive. Among Latin American countries, there is no agreement on (a) what norms have to be satisfied for a government to be considered democratic; (b) what should be viewed as a violation of democratic practice, to be corrected and possibly sanctioned; (c) how persistent violators should be dealt with; (d) who should be the judge of whether violations are taking place; and (e) what role the OAS should play in preventing, judging, and responding to violations.

Other trends are also evident. Perhaps the most important is Brazil's assumption of a more active and important regional leadership role, particularly in South America—although it does not yet appear fully comfortable in that role or certain of its objectives. Venezuela is in a transition. During the Chávez years, the Venezuelan government was time and again a disruptive force in inter-American relations. The new government of Nicolás Maduro remains hostile to the United States, but Venezuela's significance in the post-Chávez era is in question.

Latin American countries are diversifying and strengthening their ties outside the Western Hemisphere. China's presence is expanding almost everywhere in Latin America, including countries that still do not officially recognize the Beijing government. Chinese trade, investment, and land purchases have all exploded in the last ten years, particularly in commodity exporting nations. It is reasonable to expect growing political influence in the region as well, even as the Chinese government has insisted on its only limited interest beyond economics and commerce.

Looking Ahead

The critical question, however, is not where inter-American relations stand today, but where they are headed in the coming decades. What follows are four possible scenarios for the evolution of hemispheric affairs. They should not be viewed as predictions. Indeed, the most likely outcome is probably some unexpected combination of several of the scenarios. Instead they are

meant to contribute to an understanding of the principal factors that will likely shape the future of hemispheric affairs—and stimulate a discussion of policies that would lead to productive outcomes.

Scenario I: The Drift Continues

The most likely scenario is that inter-American relations remain on their present course. The United States continues gradually to disengage politically from most of the region. Economic relations expand with many countries, but the U.S. share of total trade and investments keeps falling as China and other extra-hemispheric nations increase their share. Reflecting evolving political forces, social changes, and national aspirations, hemispheric ties may become less structured and perhaps less coherent. Relations among the countries of Latin America could become more tense and divisive.

For the United States, the scenario involves increasingly selective engagement, directed to specific issues, countries, and events—without much attention to developing a broader strategy for U.S. relations with Latin America. U.S. interest in issues of regional scope will continue to recede.

U.S. engagement remains strong only in Mexico and Central America, but even there it will be less intrusive as the countries become more independent and assertive. Latin America's foreign relations grow increasingly diverse as globalization opens up new opportunities and weakens hemispheric ties. Within Latin America, countries continue to diverge and disagree; in some cases their differences may intensify in the absence of a significant U.S. presence. The distancing of the United States and Latin America combined with the divisions within the region will likely continue to diminish the importance of the OAS and Summits of the Americas.

Scenario II: A Return to the Pan-American Vision

With Chávez gone, the anti-U.S. alliance, ALBA, loses what is left of its drive, direction, and determination. Venezuela faces deeper political and economic challenges and no longer has the money or unity to play much of international role. No effective replacement for Chávez and Venezuelan resources emerge, and what is left of extreme opposition to U.S. engagement in Latin America fades in importance.

There is broad movement towards the center—regarding relations with the United States and political and economic issues generally. This shift may already be occurring in many countries and should lead to an easing of tension and division between Atlantic and Pacific nations, and between North and South American countries. Most Latin American countries in-

creasingly adopt orthodox macroeconomic policies, their economies become more closely aligned, and they expand attention to issues of equality and social justice. The continued emergence and strengthening of the middle class helps to sustain a pragmatic centrism in most countries, and allows for an increasingly shared understanding of democratic principles and the rule of law.

Mexico and Brazil recognize the value of closer bilateral ties and more regional and global cooperation. For its part, Brazil—whose differences with the United States have frustrated hemispheric economic integration efforts—becomes increasingly concerned about its long-term economic prospects. It recognizes the Mercosur trade bloc as mainly consisting of unstable, economically hobbled partners. Brazil is also painfully aware that other Latin American nations (Peru, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico) show greater dynamism and brighter economic futures than the Mercosur group. If U.S. negotiations with Europe and Asia are successful in creating new trade agreements, Brazil knows that its global competitiveness will shrink further. Meanwhile, its expanding middle class presses for faster growth and improved government performance. All of these factors should push Brazil toward greater economic pragmatism and openness, and toward stronger commercial ties with the United States and the higher performing Latin American nations.

The appeal of the Pan-American vision increases as the United States decisively emerges from slow growth and high unemployment, and manages to overcome its current political hyper-polarization. A more prosperous and unified U.S. modifies policies that have long caused friction with Latin America in the past, including Washington's approaches to drugs, immigration, and Cuba. The United States is viewed as a more responsible and more respectful neighbor.

In this scenario, hemispheric economic cooperation becomes more viable, perhaps opening the way for resumed negotiations toward a hemispheric free trade arrangement. The OAS takes on a more forceful role in regional affairs, and progress toward economic integration allows enhanced political cooperation.

Scenario III: Latin American Solidarity

Exactly as in the previous scenario, a broad movement towards the center leads to improved relations among Latin American nations. Most Latin American governments pursue similar economic and social policies, solid (not spectacular) growth rates are attained across the region, middle classes

continue to expand, and a shared understanding of democratic practice emerges. The left and right extremes are rarely able to win elections. Latin America's two giants, Mexico and Brazil, recognize the value of closer economic ties, and greater international coordination.

During this period of Latin American convergence around centrist politics and economics, the United States remains unable to regain an adequate trajectory of economic growth, the country's politics remain dysfunctional, and it finds itself overextended internationally. After conservative triumphs in presidential and congressional elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020, immigration legislation becomes more restrictive and exclusionary, harsher sanctions are imposed on a post-Castro Cuba, and U.S. policy in Latin America focuses mostly on drug and security issues and trade disputes.

Under this scenario, political and diplomatic relations remain cordial but the United States' importance in the region declines sharply. The United States no longer plays a major role in regional affairs. Conflicts between countries or crises within them are addressed by Latin American governments. The United States remains an important economic partner for many nations in Latin America, although a weak U.S. economy leads Latin America to focus increasing attention on other trade partners and investors.

The OAS and Summits lose most of their role in hemispheric affairs. Latin American institutions take on many of their responsibilities.

Scenario IV: A Hostile Relationship

There remains a possibility that Latin American nations could become increasingly hostile or antagonistic toward the United States. Some variant of the anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by Hugo Chávez could take hold in a significant number of countries in the region.

Developments in the United States would be the same as those outlined in the previous scenario—a continuing U.S. economic slump combined with highly polarized politics and increasingly isolationist foreign policies.

At the same time, Venezuela and Argentina unexpectedly rebound from their economic setbacks, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner takes firm control of Argentina politics, and Maduro or a Chavista successor does the same in Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico, along with several other countries, enter a period of slow or zero growth again, leaving both their low-income populations and what had been expanding middle classes vulnerable and frustrated. Populist, authoritarian leaders win elections in many countries.

Although extensive economic ties remain in place, neither the United States nor Latin America retains much interest in collaborating with the

other. Regional organizations, like the OAS and the Summits of the Americas become moribund, if they survive at all.

Some Final Observations

Interestingly, of the four scenarios, only the last (by far, the least likely) would necessarily be damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and probably to Latin American interests as well.

The Pan-American scenario (Scenario II) is most appealing—in part because we are long accustomed to hearing it portrayed as an ideal model for inter-American relations, but also because it would likely lead to most productive outcomes for both the United States and most countries of the region. But the factors responsible for the already attenuated U.S.-Latin American relationship may have sunk any prospects of a return to the Pan-American framework, at least anytime soon.

Since neither the United States nor the countries of the region seem willing to do very much at this point to rebuild vibrant, collaborative relations the best that is hoped is a continuation of some form of selective engagement (see Scenario I). This allows for countries, including the United States, to choose the partners and allies with which it wants to work, and establish appropriate distance from others. It does mean, however, that there will be only limited commitment to any common set of norms or hemispheric institutions.

Latin American solidarity (Scenario III) should not be considered a particularly intolerable outcome, particularly if it leads to improved and more constructive relations among the countries of Latin America, and enables them to develop joint approaches to critical domestic, regional, and international issues and needed institutional arrangements to put them into practice. The United States and Latin America might even benefit from a period of disengagement—rather than trying to sustain what has increasingly become, at least for most countries, a largely empty rhetoric of partnership and community.

**III:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND SECURITY POLICY**

Challenges to Institutionalizing Civil-Military Relations in the New Democracies of Latin America

Thomas C. Bruneau, Naval Post-Graduate School,
United States

Introduction

In this paper I define what I mean by the concept “civil-military relations” (CMR), discuss the different roles and missions security forces are currently expected to fulfill, and assess the challenges to implementing democratic civil-military relations by analyzing the incentives motivating civilian decision-makers in the broad areas of national security and defense. The paper builds on my previous publications in civil-military relations, and seeks to elaborate on the perspective of David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas in their work focusing on the incentives motivating civilian decision-makers in Latin America. It draws extensively from my work with the Center for Civil-Military Relations between 1996 and today in conducting week-long seminars for high level officers and civilians on various aspects of democratic civil-military relations throughout Latin America. Specifically I use the opportunity of looking back to more than a decade and a half of conducting programs promoting democratic civil-military relations in the region and analyze their impact, if any. I have kept notes and files on the programs I conducted, which included all countries between the United States and the Antarctic but for Guyana and Venezuela. Unfortunately, in looking back I have found in most countries minimal progress, and in several (including Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua) regression. While the emphasis in this paper will be on the lack of progress, I will also include, near the end of the paper, the cases of Chile and Colombia where there has been clear progress. And I will attempt to explain that progress in terms of incentives for civilians, in these two countries versus all of the others, to become interested and invest political capital and resources in national security and defense.¹ My overall analytical goal in this paper, as well as in my other publications, is to put on a more empirical basis the analysis of civil-military relations, which until now has been heavily normative and minimally empirical. To under-

stand the central issues of CMR, requires a framework, and that framework, with comparative evidence, is a key part of this paper. My focus is on the necessary, if not sufficient, requirements for the components of civil-military relations that I posit. To suggest what could be possible, I will compare and contrast the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Partnership for Peace (NATO/PfP) regions with those in Latin America. And, since in democracies, including even new democracies, civilian politicians make the main decisions, the focus will be overwhelmingly on them and not on military officers.

Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations

Traditional concepts of civil-military relations focus almost exclusively on the one dimension of democratic civilian control of the security forces, and on these forces in terms of their preparation for and engagement in traditional territorial defense and war fighting.² Yet, if we even superficially review what the armed forces and other security forces in fact do, and are prepared to do in the contemporary world, war-fighting is probably the least likely role and for which most forces in most countries are only minimally prepared. In a recent chapter on roles and missions of the armed forces by a retired U.S. Navy captain, he posits five different macro roles that he argues predominantly characterize countries and their armed forces. Of these five, citing as examples the United States, Russia, China, France, and India, only one is concerned with war fighting. The others include what he terms roles as *defender*, *peacekeeper*, *fire fighter*, and *police officer*. According to this author, the Latin American countries fit within the last three categories.³ In an article by a respected British scholar on civil-military relations and security sector reform, the title alone conveys the sense of the article. In *What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe*, Timothy Edmunds identifies four roles for European militaries in the post-Cold War era. These are the following: war-fighting, peacekeeping, internal security, and nation-building.⁴ Going beyond Europe, in our own work with a global perspective, we have identified six major roles. These are: war-fighting, fighting internal wars, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, supporting the police in combatting organized crime and gangs, and supporting civilian authorities in humanitarian disasters.⁵ There could be a seventh if we consider the fifty countries under NATO in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as something other than peacekeeping, fighting internal wars, or combatting terrorism.⁶ Further, there could be yet another role if we take Paul Collier in his *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous*

Places seriously where he apparently advocates the use of armed forces to intervene and overthrow dictatorial regimes, mainly in Africa. (Lest I am accused of misunderstanding his point, here is Collier's text: "The core proposal of this book is a strategy whereby a small intervention from the international community can harness the political violence internal to the societies of the bottom billion. This powerful force that to date has been so destructive can be turned to advantage, becoming the defender of democracy rather than its antithesis".⁷ It is clear to me that if we even minimally investigate what military forces are in fact doing, what becomes obvious is that there are 116 countries that are currently involved in peacekeeping under the United Nations.⁸ There are the fifty countries participating in ISAF. In certain countries and regions, including Brazil, most of Central America, Mexico, and South Africa, the armed forces support, or have even supplanted the police in dealing with domestic sources of violence. And everywhere, military forces support civilian authorities in responding to humanitarian disasters brought about by volcanoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and the like.

Once we broaden the focus on military roles and missions to what they are in fact doing today, we encounter yet greater problems in logic and methodology in assessing their effectiveness. For, even if we limit our focus to only traditional territorial defense and war fighting, we encounter the logical fallacy of proving a negative. That is, how to evaluate wars that do not happen? It can be argued, for example, that due to nuclear deterrence between the United States and former Soviet Union in the Cold War, there was never a hot war. Or, when a country does not attack another due to the perception of military strength of the latter? Or, how to assess intelligence successes vs. intelligence failures, when those involved, either intelligence professionals or special operation forces, cannot talk or write about operations? When we broaden the focus to the roles and missions that armed forces are actually fulfilling, it becomes all but impossible to assess effectiveness. Peacekeeping can continue, as is the case with the UN missions in India and Pakistan since 1949, Cyprus since 1964, Syria since 1974, Lebanon since 1978, and the Western Sahara since 1991, for as long as troop-contributors can be found.⁹ Failed states, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, will require peacekeepers for the foreseeable future. Organized crime, street gangs, and natural disasters result in serious human and security challenges that can be mitigated, but probably never resolved. In short, it is all but impossible to assess effectiveness without making so many assumptions as to seriously damage reality.

A Broader Concept of Civil-Military Relations

If I have accurately identified a major problem in traditional approaches to civil-military relations for focusing only on traditional territorial defense and war-fighting, an equally important lapse is the exclusive focus on democratic civilian control. This is the focus in the traditional literature, beginning with Samuel Huntington, and it has been brought forward in the more recent focus on democratic transitions and consolidation.¹⁰ My colleagues and I have argued tirelessly in print, that in addition to control, the conceptualization of CMR must also include effectiveness in the implementation of the roles and missions.¹¹ In our recently published *Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations* we have assessed sixteen countries in terms of either control or effectiveness, or both. The assessments can be found in Table 1.

Considering that, as argued above, effectiveness is virtually impossible to assess, short of making a great number of unfounded assumptions, we focus on the necessary, if not sufficient, requirements to achieve control or effectiveness, or both.

It is clear in Table 1 (p. 103) that there are major differences between the NATO and PfP countries and those in other areas. For example, the only NATO/PfP country that ranks low in any of the six categories is Moldova, whereas in the other, non-NATO/PfP countries the lowest rank is 2, 3, 3, 4, 3, 4. Or, conversely, in the high rank, whereas the NATO/PfP countries are 8, 3, 7, 2, 5, and 2 for the other countries there are 4, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1. It is particularly clear that the lowest, or the least high, pertain to the dimensions of effectiveness.

My argument is that the requirements for accession to NATO and PfP, the Bologna Process, not to mention European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and ensuing membership demands, motivates them to create the institutions for both control and effectiveness. I have found in doing CMR programs in older NATO members, including Portugal, as well as newer ones, including Bulgaria and Romania, and even those desiring less than NATO membership (Armenia and Moldova), that the requirements of the Membership Action Plans require these countries desirous of membership to fulfill extensive categories that amount to democratic civilian control and effectiveness (on Membership Action Plan for accession to NATO, NATO 2012). These requirements are not duplicated in other parts of the world, and my argument is, therefore, the presence, or more likely absence, of these requirements is up to the civilian decision-makers. In analyzing whether or not they will fulfill these requirements, we turn to the concept of incentives; that is, the incentives for the civilian decision-makers to provide these requirements.

Table 1. Requirements for Achieving Democratic Civilian Control and Effectiveness

<i>Civil-Military Relations</i>	<i>Three Requirements for Civilian Control</i>				<i>Three Requirements for Effectiveness</i>			
	Institutional Control Mechanisms	Oversight	Professional Norms	Plan	Institutions/ Structures (incl. interagency)	Resources		
Country								
Argentina	High	Medium/low	Medium?	Low	Medium	Low		
Chile	Medium/high	Medium	High	Medium/high	Medium/high	High		
Portugal	Medium/high	Medium/high	High	Medium/high	Medium	Medium/high		
Spain	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium		
France	High	Medium	High	High	High	High		
Germany	High	High	High	Medium	High	Medium		
Austria	High	High	High	Medium	High	Medium		
Slovenia	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Medium		
Hungry	Medium/high	Medium	High	Medium	Medium/high	Low/medium		
Romania	High	Medium/low	High	Medium/high	High	Medium		
Lebanon	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low		
Iraq	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Egypt	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
Moldova	Low/medium	Low	Low/medium	Low/medium	Low	Low		
South Africa	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Low	Medium		
North Korea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		
United Sates	High	High	High	High	High	High		
Mongolia	Low/medium	Low/medium	Low/medium	Medium	Medium	Low/medium		
India	High	High	High	Low	Medium	Medium		
Russia	High	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low		

Incentives to Use Resources for National Security and Defense

An approach analyzing the incentives civilian decision-makers possess to use the resources to which they have access will, I believe, prove useful in further elaborating my approach to analysis. I will apply the concept of resources to each of the requirements for control and effectiveness. One cannot only examine the resources in a positive way, what may be gained, but equally in a negative manner in terms of what may be lost; what may be the costs to the political decision-maker. Further, I will illustrate each of the dimensions I review with anecdotal evidence from my own personal observations in fourteen countries in Latin America since 1996 in order to illustrate the points. Again, the ratings are based on the balance, or net result, of the positive and negative aspects regarding politicians and the resources to which they have access.

What are the resources that political decision-maker have access to? There are two prior considerations before we discuss resources. First, aspiring politicians are not decision-makers until and unless they are elected. Max Weber provides some insight on this issue: "We wish to understand by politics only the leadership, or the influencing of the leadership of a *political association*, hence today of a *state*." He continues by stating: "*All party struggles are struggle for the patronage of office, as well as struggles for objective goals*".¹² Today, in modern democracies, elections—votes—are the key to politicians' calculations. And in power, politicians have access to resources by virtue of their role in using the powers of a government. This can be as directly elected members of the executive or legislative bodies, or as advisors or staffers proximate to these decision-makers and influencing their decisions. It seems to me, based upon research on secondary materials and observation of and interviews with civilian decision-makers, that they have access to two main resources: first, political capital, meaning the ability, or influence, to affect or change something using their access to the powers available in government. Second, the use of money, derived from taxes and other government generated sources, and applying it to one purpose or function and another. And, to emphasize again, the focus here is on civilian decision-makers, for once a democracy has been consolidated the civilians can take control over all areas of policies, including national security and defense. They may decide not to, but they can and in most cases do. My basic question here is—what do the politicians gain, or lose, in attempting to implement any of the requirements for control and effectiveness? What, finally on balance, is the cost—high, medium, or low—in terms of use of resources for the following six dimensions?

Control	Power	Money
Inst.	Low	Low
Oversight	High	Medium
PME	High	High
Effectiveness		
Plan	High	Medium
Inst.	High	Low
\$	High	High

Indicators of the Dimensions

Utilizing evidence from countries that are members of NATO and PFP, the following indicators are used to evaluate each of the six dimensions. As the central institution of democratic civil-military relations, the creation of a ministry of defense is clearly the main indicator of institutionalization of democratic civil-military relations. Indeed, for NATO membership, the presence of a civilian-led ministry of defense (MOD) is the sine qua non for membership. Thus, the mere creation of a civilian-led MOD is the criterion for this dimension.¹³

Oversight requires not only a MOD, but also a MOD staffed with knowledgeable civilians who are qualified to make inquiries and empowered to do something about what they find. And, it also requires either a functioning national security council, or its equivalent, and/or a defense committee in the legislature that can keep track of what is, or is not, going on.¹⁴

Reform of professional military education (PME) is necessary to democratic civil-military relations since during pre-democratic times the military everywhere had a monopoly on education. There is little point in changing structures to more democratic civil-military relations unless the culture of the officer corps is changed. This is the case in the NATO/PFP countries, and has been accelerated by the so-called Bologna Process by which civilians have asserted their control over all education, including military education.¹⁵ For our purposes here, reform of PME means, at a minimum, proof that civilians have asserted control over PME, either through a ministry of education or through reforms directed by a civilian-led MOD.

A plan or strategy is necessary to demonstrate to the security forces, the population itself, and the outside world, that there is some plan or strategy for what the country intends to do with the forces. In the NATO and PFP areas, this is included in the individual partnership action plans (IPAP).

Organizations for operational effectiveness encompass, today, the creation of joint or general commands whereby the forces can be employed for specific purposes. The emphasis must be on joint commands since it is hard to imagine any military situation that does not require the use of more than one of the armed forces. This is a tricky issue since creation of such a structure demonstrates that a country has gone beyond taming the armed forces, to once again empowering them. But, there are cases, including Portugal, where the author has personally verified that the civilians have gone beyond control to effectiveness.¹⁶

Finally, without some level of resources, it is inconceivable that a country's security forces can be effective. Obviously the question comes up as to "effective at what" since not all countries will seek to implement a full spectrum of roles and missions. But, if we can identify the level, and also identify the percentage assigned to personnel costs, we can have an idea of what is involved.

As I reviewed my notes from conducting programs in Latin America since 1996 what stands out most clearly are two facts: first, it has been a relatively long period of time during which countries stated publicly and were expected to create the institutions for both control and effectiveness; and, second, how little progress has been achieved in all but a few countries.

Creating the Institutions for Control of the Armed Forces

1. This is the one area that is relatively positive in Latin America. The fundamental organization is a civilian-led ministry of defense. Even so, it was only in 1999 and 2000 that a MOD was created in Brazil and Nicaragua respectively. It should also be noted that there is still no MOD in Mexico, but rather two secretariats, one for the army and air force and another for the navy, headed by a general or admiral respectively. It takes neither much power nor money to establish a ministry of defense. In short, all but Mexico have created MODs, although by law in Guatemala the minister is an active duty senior officer, and the same is the case by tradition in El Salvador. On balance, creating a MOD demands relatively low political and economic resources.

Establishing Oversight Mechanisms

2. To create oversight mechanisms, however, is much more onerous in terms of politicians' resources than just creating

a MOD. Oversight can be done by a MOD that is well staffed by sufficient numbers of prepared personnel, and by either a functioning national security council or well-staffed committees in the legislature. What stands out clearly in the vast majority of countries in the region is the lack of these well-staffed institutions. We have seen clear regression in the staffing of the MODs in Ecuador and Guatemala, and the prepared civilians we have helped train in El Salvador and Honduras have never achieved decision-making positions in these defense institutions. I have verified in Bolivia and Ecuador that the National Security Council (NSC)—equivalent, Consejo Nacional de Seguridad (COSENA) in both countries—do not function. To achieve these civilian capacities, which would go against the tradition of military dominance, will require both political capital and substantial funds. So far, but for Chile and Colombia, this has not been done.

Reform of Professional Military Education

3. Currently, the vast majority of the instructors in professional military education (PME) are active duty or retired military officers. There are some changes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, with the assertion of civilian control over PME, and the hiring of some civilians. Elsewhere in the region, however, there is no willingness to change PME. To overcome the resistance in the military, recognizing that this could involve a cultural change, requires political capital. And, to hire qualified civilians to replace the officers, who are already receiving salaries as either active duty or in reserve or retirement, would involve a cost. The demand for political resources, then, to change PME is high on both dimensions.

Developing a Plan or Strategy

4. The most useful definition I have seen on strategy is by Hew Strachan: “In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process—a process called strategy—is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result—also called strategy—is a compromise between the

ends of policy and the military means available to implement it".¹⁷ Unfortunately, the political demands are high, and the resources are medium at least. I have seen promises to develop strategies in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras, for at least a decade, but the most these countries, and others including Argentina, produce are the so-called *white books*, which are basically coffee table books displaying some defense equipment and personnel. The main reason why these countries, lacking the motivation of NATO and PfP, do not produce national strategies is the vulnerability they would create for themselves if they publish a plan, with any degree of detail, and then do not fulfill it. The opposition would attack them, and they know it. Therefore, they simply do not produce plans.

Institutions to Achieve Effectiveness

5. To achieve military effectiveness requires the creation of some kind of joint or general command. To do so requires a sense that democratic civilian control has been established, and is no longer questioned. This took at least a decade in Portugal and in the newer democracies of East/Central Europe. Throughout Latin America there are real joint or general commands only in Colombia, with nascent structures in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In all of the other countries, there are totally separate forces, as in Mexico, a primitive military structure doing "its own thing" in Nicaragua, or haphazard arrangements between a weak MOD and confused command structures in most other countries, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala.¹⁸ To change this situation would require heavy investment of political capital, and some funds.

Money to Achieve Effectiveness

6. To provide the resources for military effectiveness requires high political capital, as everybody knows that "defense does not bring votes" and money for which there are other huge and obvious demands in poverty relief in the economic, social, and health areas, and which do bring votes. Therefore, it is not surprising that the percentage of GDP devoted to national security and defense in the region is minimal. Utilizing data from SIPRI from 2010, the percentage of GDP to national

security and defense is as follows: El Salvador 1.1 percent; Guatemala 0.4 percent; Honduras 1.1 percent; Mexico 0.5 percent; Nicaragua 0.7 percent; Argentina 0.9 percent; Bolivia 1.7 percent; and Brazil 1.5 percent. (By contrast, Canada is 1.5 percent and the U.S. 4.5 percent). And, also in contrast, Chile is 3.2 percent and Colombia 3.6 percent.¹⁹

In short, the requirements for achieving democratic civilian control, and especially military effectiveness, are high in terms of the resources to which political decision-makers have access. It is no surprise that in terms of the framework, most countries in Latin America show little, or no, progress. There are two deviant cases, however, which are Chile and Colombia. Not only do they spend a great deal more on national security and defense, but also in my other publications I demonstrate that they have developed the institutional bases for both control and effectiveness.

How to Explain Deviant Cases: Chile and Colombia

In seeking to explain why Chile and Colombia are different from other Latin American countries, what stands out first is their shared emphasis on institutional development in national security and defense by the civilian political elites.²⁰

Chileans have felt threatened by their neighbors, particularly Bolivia and Peru, for reclaiming territorial gains made by Chile during wars in the nineteenth century. In 2008, Peru brought suit for conflicting territorial claims (really a large maritime zone) before the International Court of Justice in The Hague (International Court of Justice). Meanwhile, the Peruvian and Chilean media keep the issue alive at home. The conflict with Bolivia, and Bolivian President Evo Morales, also threatens to go to the International Court of Justice, is yet more pressing. A constitutional referendum passed on January 25, 2009, mandates that in 2014 the Bolivian president must abrogate the 1904 treaty between Bolivia and Chile recognizing the current territorial situation. While there is some progress in confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Chile and Peru, with Bolivia there is much less progress since the Bolivians want to maintain pressure on Chile regarding access to the Pacific Ocean.

Colombia's investments in institutional development, PME, and strategy formulation are due to nearly fifty years of fighting several leftist insurgencies, particularly the well-organized and well-funded (through drug money) FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The threat became

particularly acute during the presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), when the country was decertified by the U.S. government for its anti-drug policies. President Andres Pastrana, (1998-2002) attempted negotiations with the FARC which, by the end of his term of office, were widely recognized as a failure. In 1998 and 1999, while ostensibly negotiating an end to the conflict, the FARC launched extensive attacks, persuading many analysts that they were a more capable armed force than the Colombian military (Serafino 2001, 10).

Álvaro Uribe was elected president on a “law and order” platform, in the first round of voting in May 2002. Upon taking office on August 7, 2002, Uribe immediately declared a state of emergency and used the increased powers to impose a special tax that was allocated mainly for defense.²¹ President Uribe was easily reelected president on May 26, 2006, with 62 percent of the vote, 40 percent more than his nearest competitor and left office in August 2010. His approval ratings were between 79 percent and 84 percent during his second term. Despite the traditional reticence of the Colombian civilian elite to become involved in issues of national security and defense, civilian officials finally perceived that the danger to the country was extremely serious, and instituted major reforms to several aspects of national security.

In short, Chile and Colombia have made much greater progress than other countries in the region toward creating the institutional capacity for democratic control and effectiveness in the security and defense sector, and in funding this sector, because civilian political elites in both countries perceive threats, and have clear political incentives to commit financial and political resources. At a minimum, the incentives are votes. It is significant that Michele Bachelet of Chile and Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia were both elected president of their countries immediately upon leaving their ministerial position in the MOD. I can think of no similar experience in any other South American country. Elsewhere, the MOD is not a trampoline for political ascendancy, but rather a millstone perpetuating political irrelevance. Or, in popular terms, “defense does not produce votes.”

Conclusion

My argument in this paper is that in most countries of Latin America the political decision-makers lack incentives to utilize their resources, power or money, to improve CMR, here understood as including both democratic civilian control and effectiveness. Utilizing a framework developed to compare and contrast CMR globally, I attempt to demonstrate that political decision-makers have little or no incentive to use their resources, as they will not get

any votes by doing so. Making reference to my previous work on Chile and Colombia, I argue that in both countries there are indeed incentives and the countries have indeed made major improvements in CMR. To highlight the political relevance I note that in both countries, previous ministers of defense were subsequently elected president of their countries.

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Militarization of Public Security in Latin America: Where Are the Police?

Lucía Dammert, Universidad de Santiago, Chile

Crime and violence have increased in Latin America in the last decades. The scenario is multiple and complex with high levels of violence specifically localized in some areas of the region. Despite the evident differences even within countries, the criminal phenomenon is at the center of the public agenda.¹ The diversity of the phenomenon is not only linked to the magnitude of the crime wave: there are some countries with the highest homicide rates in the world, while others show rates similar to developed countries.² But also to its characterization: there are countries that are facing important levels of violence, while others have non-violent property crime as their main concern. Additionally, in recent years the main element of differentiation between crime problems is the link to organized crime. Although drug trafficking is present throughout Latin America, in some areas the problem is linked to specific battles against the state and between drug cartels. In any case, insecurity is a phenomenon that pervades the entire region with social, cultural, economic, and political consequences.

Unfortunately, the structural weaknesses of police institutions reported by several authors in recent years have not been resolved.³ Quite the contrary, the sophistication of the criminal phenomenon has highlighted the limitations of the criminal justice system as a whole. The challenge for governments is not only to improve the quality of police service, but also to increase the quality of justice, to prioritize the modernization of the prison systems, and to increase health coverage for addiction problems, among many other specific needs.

Specifically in the case of police institutions, many reforms have been designed and implemented in the last decades. Ranging from modernization processes to complete restructuration of the police institution; the initiatives in most cases have little long-term results. The literature on this issue is comprehensive and recognizes the need to continue or rather start a real transformation agenda of police services.⁴ Nonetheless, it also recognizes its limited achievements and effective progress.

At the same time, many governments have decided to use the armed forces for public security purposes. Based on the assumption that police

forces are either incapable or ineffective to control crime, armed forces have been called to patrol the streets. The range of functions done by police personnel varies greatly in each country but the undeniable process towards the inclusion of the military in the fight against crime continues.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss both processes as complementary faces of the same problem. Lack of results in police reform initiatives and growing military response to crime in many ways are elements of the same problem. Both linked to the incapacity of governments to effectively prevent and control crime with adequate policies as well as to the electoral debate that highlights the need for direct and quick action.

The simple analysis presents the situation with two elements. On one hand, there is an increase in crime, corrupt or inefficient police institutions, and the difficulty of preventing crime and controlling frightened citizens. On the other hand, there are military institutions consolidated in budgetary terms, in many countries with high levels of citizen's trust accompanied by limited military conflict scenarios.⁵ For many, all the elements are in place to call the military as the main force to tackle criminal activity, especially crime related to drug trafficking.⁶


A Difficult Context

Latin America faces an increasing problem of violence and crime. Homicide rates are an example of the magnitude and the diversity of the problem. As shown in Figure 1, homicide rates have different levels but a growing trend in most countries. In any case, it is clear that those closely linked to the drug market have higher rates. Interestingly, the main cocaine consumer in the hemisphere, the United States, is the exception to the rule.

But homicides are only one part of the criminal picture. In most countries violence has not reached this point, but increasing levels of non-violent crimes mark the public policy agenda. Altogether, crime is one of the most important public concerns throughout the region and greatly impacts political discourses and actions. Figure 2 shows that countries traditionally considered safe in terms of homicide have victimization levels similar to those with higher homicide rates. It seems that any victimization has a direct impact on the population since that problem is more decentralized, while homicides are a localized problem, not only in terms of territorial presence but also in the definition of the victims. While almost every group in society is a victim of street crime, those related to homicides are mostly young males from the most precarious socioeconomic groups of society.


As crime starts to emerge as one of the main problems for Latin Americans, the confidence and trust in institutions in charge of the problem are at a minimum. Figure 3 shows that an important part of the population has expressed zero trust in the police since 2004. It is important to mention that we have witnessed a decreasing trend, but still by 2010 more than 15

Figure 1: Homicide Rates, Latin America 2000-2011.



(Source: Organization of American States 2011.)

Figure 2: Victimization and Homicide Rates 2010.



(Source: Barómetro de las Américas.)


MILITARIZATION OF PUBLIC SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

percent declared having no trust in the very institution in charge of crime control. On the other hand, those who declared having no trust in the armed forces ranged from 15 percent to 8 percent in the same period.

Furthermore, the same source included a question on the possibility of supporting a military coup under specific circumstances, among them security problems. For many, the results are shocking since more than 50 percent declared support for a military coup in 2004 and 41 percent in 2010. In fact, after military coups and civil wars during the 70s and 80s, the armed forces have regained a role in public security issues.

Missions and functions of the armed forces have been changed in many ways in the region. The reforms have been mostly focused on keeping the armed forces as far as possible from the political arena but still most institutions could play an array of roles. An analysis of the functions of the armed forces in Latin America divided the roles in three: policemen, social workers, and firefighters. As Figure 4 shows, most countries have armed forces that could be part of any activity linked to the development and protection of the country. In that sense, the presence of many countries in the area where all three roles overlap is a clear demonstration that at least in legal terms the armed forces are still defined as an institution with no specific function.

Figure 3: Zero-Trust in Police and Armed Forces, Latin America 2004-2010.




(Source: Barómetro de las Américas.)

Militarization: Fast Answer?

Democratization and the end of civil wars generated more civilian intervention in military issues. There was an increasingly strong desire to limit the political role and ambitions of the military in domestic affairs. At the same time, since conflict between countries is not normally a threat in Latin America, there was increasing scrutiny of large military budgets to evaluate their effectiveness.

But do not confuse urgency with actions, because the military incursion into internal security issues is longstanding with the result that change has only come slowly. In Colombia, for instance, since the end of the 1990s, with the development of Plan Colombia the armed forces became increasingly involved in the drug war. Colombians followed the experience developed in Peru during the previous decade in the fight against terrorism and its relationship to drug trafficking. Both strategies were supported and developed under the umbrella of the U.S. regional strategy to combat drugs. Later on, this perspective was confirmed with the participation of more than 45,000 Mexican soldiers under the Mérida Initiative in Mexico.

Figure 4: Functions of the Armed Forces in Latin America.



(Source: FLACSO 2007.)

The results of such military engagement in the war on drugs are mixed, and although it is clear that combating drug trafficking, especially if linked to guerrilla movements, is an area of possible military involvement, the use of military forces for public security is a different issue.

In Uruguay in late 2012, the Secretary of Defense of the United States Leon Panetta, as part of the Tenth Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, urged the countries of the region to use the police and not the military in the control and enforcement of the law. He recognized that military involvement is not a good recipe for long-term solutions. In order to have a professional response to crime, Panetta committed U.S. help in the development of local police, and to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Unfortunately, Panetta does not represent the general consensus among Latin American governments. Many, as the result of a lack of alternatives, have brought the military to the streets to perform police functions. There are many different types of military involvement in the fight against crime in Latin America, from full operational groups that patrol specific areas of the cities to border patrol.

Governments in Latin America are at a crossroad facing a citizenry desperate for more security and fearful of institutions marked by inefficiency and corruption. The military has become the tool to be used to show signs of governmental power and strength. As mentioned before, this situation is present not only in countries marked by the presence of organized crime in the region but in general. For example, in November 2011 the Honduran government voted to change the constitution and allow the military to be used for police roles. Similarly, the President of Guatemala during his first speech to the nation, urged the army to “neutralize organized crime.” The government of Venezuela, for its part, motivated by high homicide rates, created the “People’s Guard,” a military-type organization that shares the security police roles, even investigating crimes.⁷

In Ecuador, President Correa referred to the battle against organized crime as a military priority, noting “there cannot be a successful battle against organized crime without considering the military in it.”⁸ These statements are at least contradictory with Ecuador’s constitution (2008), which states clearly that “the maintenance of internal order and the rule of law are exclusive powers of the national police role” while the armed forces are devoted to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity.” However, the political rhetoric included a complementary perspective that President Correa noted: “A poor country cannot afford to have their armed forces only for conventional warfare.”⁹

In Peru, President Humala authorized the military to collaborate with the police in a social conflict in Cajamarca where roads, schools, and hospitals were closed. In Bolivia, military units were deployed to assist the police in high-crime areas of Santa Cruz and El Alto. However, Bolivia's constitution allows the military assistance once the police have been overwhelmed.

In El Salvador, President Mauricio Funes defended the 2009 reform that allowed a greater role for the military police in the context of the battle against organized crime. In this respect, and in front of the rumors that most of those allocations would increase with further reform, the president stated that citizens' fears are anchored in past actions of the armed forces, but now with democracy the armed forces must play a role in security matters.¹⁰

Guatemala installed three task forces against crime that were part of the proposal of Pérez Molina in his presidential campaign. These task forces are staffed with Police Special Forces, researchers from the Specialized Criminal Investigation Division, Public Safety personnel, and army paratroopers.¹¹ Nonetheless, the United Nations has been pressing to put limits on the military use of force in law enforcement.

Honduras with "Operación Libertad"¹² has recently initiated a new operation with the aim of lowering the high levels of violence plaguing the country's major cities. However, the military legitimacy is often disputed by denunciations of personnel accused of being involved with torture, injuries, and threats against citizens. Furthermore, there have been increasing indications and charges of corruption among officials.

In Mexico, the strategy developed by President Calderón included broad participation of the military, which was replicated at the state level and even with local efforts.¹³ With the return to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the drug strategy was modified and one of the signs of this change would be the gradual withdrawal of the military from the streets. However, in his first months in office, Enrique Peña Nieto has not been able to show progress.¹⁴

In South America, Brazil has expanded the military's role in crime control tasks. Since 2010 army troops have been located in the *favelas* to contain organized crime. What initially was conceived for a brief period of time, it has been extended until today with the "peacekeepers" that are present in many intervened *favelas*.¹⁵ That is why the military involvement in a diverse range of missions that it has been assigned is not a good omen for democracy in Brazil, a country where deep social problems remain and civil institutions are weak and traditionally inefficient.¹⁶ Beyond the urban patrolling, in Brazil a priority has been given to military involvement in crime control tasks at the

borders where it has developed multiple operations, including the installation of high-tech equipment to increase seizures of illegal material.¹⁷

In Argentina, the federal government has resorted to using middle forces (Gendarmerie) for operating support in the fight against crime in the city of Buenos Aires and greater Buenos Aires.¹⁸ Additionally, President Cristina Fernandez's government recently named an active military officer as secretary in the Ministry of National Security, raising all kinds of questions and doubts about the strategy that seeks to ensure civilian government control over military affairs.

The brief overview presented in the previous paragraphs shows that the phenomenon is across the region and is supported, at least currently, by the citizenry. As previously explained, it is not clear what the positive consequences of this involvement will be. No country has evaluated the military involvement in terms of their effectiveness in reducing crime. In fact, information gathered on the initiatives described above is scattered and most of the time does not include details on the consequences of such actions. Nonetheless, many voices have been heard regarding the difficulties and challenges of military intervention. However, there are multiple problems, and these are described below.

Corruption, Human Rights, and Politicization

Multiple voices directly criticized the use of armed forces in the fight against crime. Many cases focused on a classical doctrinal position that divides the work of the military and police since the early nineteenth century. It is best to leave aside definitions open to confusion, such as Huntington's conceptualization, which makes explicit that the military's main role is the application of violence under certain conditions (1957) or when Bayley and Shearing (2001) note that both police and military are security forces but their main difference is their jurisdiction. Clearly for many authors who develop their theories in contexts of high levels of professionalization and modernization of the armed forces, the challenge to study the Latin American dilemma is massive.

In the last two decades we have witnessed a narrowing of the distinction between these roles.¹⁹ The increased importance of the types of military-style policing strategy and the incremental use of technology and military instruments, not to mention the military involvement in police work in multiple peacekeeping operations and military action in internal order, are only examples of the porous border between the two institutions.²⁰

While the debate is global, Latin American specificity is evident. This is a continent marked by multiple forms of political involvement by the mil-

itary in the recent past. Armed forces that participated in clear actions have been denounced and investigated for human rights violation and corruption. However, as Stepan enunciated, the main danger of military involvement in crime control tasks is its possible politicization.²¹

In this analytical framework it is noteworthy that in many countries the process of democratization does not necessarily limit the real powers of the armed forces, but rather high levels of autonomy are still the norm. Maybe this is clearly shown in the budget analysis that indicates that only the military has been subject to measures of transparency and accountability of their revenues and expenses.²²

In this sense, the 2010 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report states that the involvement of the military in this issue lies in the official position of the forces, which can seriously compromise their political isolation, and may even try to use this power to influence policy in government decisions.²³

Human rights violation is one of the problems mentioned repeatedly as a result of military actions on issues of public safety. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in particular has emphasized the problems encountered especially in Mexico and Central America where various press reports and complaints of civil society organizations have revealed the presence of torture, disappearances, and even murders in the context of actions not yet recognized by soldiers in crime control efforts.²⁴

Another of the recognized problems of military involvement in internal security tasks is corruption. Linking unprepared soldiers, narrowly professionalized with minimal specialization in tasks related to prevention and control of crime with organized crime agents opens the space for the development of illegal actions. Thus, there is concern that this recognized corruption in the police will penetrate the armed forces. Multiple media allegations on these practices in various countries of the region suggest that rather than being just a threat, corruption in the armed forces is a reality we must face in the near term.

Thus, the impending military involvement in the fight against crime seems not to bring major benefits except institutional budget increases and a greater political role. This strategy does not appear to address the increase in crime. To the contrary, several authors argue that it is precisely the military response to organized crime which is one of the triggers of the exponential growth of violence in Mexico.

Finally, as Bailey (2012) indicates, in various debate forums on the best strategies to address organized crime the central question is not whether

the military will continue to play a police role in the medium term. Rather, the main question is whether this intervention has led to changes in learning, adaptation, and innovation processes to address previously identified problems. The answer is not clear and requires more specific analysis to determine its impacts.

A Way Out?

In this paper, a clear gap emerged. The problems of armed forces participation in public security policies are evident but that realization has not had any impact on public policy decisions that increasingly call for more military involvement in the fight against crime.

What to do? For many there is no way that the military should be allowed to participate in this issue. For instance, an IACHR report stated, “the Commission has repeatedly observed that the armed forces are not properly trained to deal with citizen security; hence the need for an efficient civilian police force, respectful of human rights and able to combat citizen insecurity, crime and violence on the domestic front”.²⁵ Furthermore, the same report mentioned that “states must restrict to the maximum extent the use of armed forces to control domestic disturbances, since they are trained to fight against enemies and not to protect and control civilians, a task that is typical of police forces”.²⁶

Although there are valid reasons for the opposition to the use of military intervention, at this point it should be recognized that in most countries with serious problems of violence and crime the reasons that motivate governments to use the military in police functions persist. In that sense, pragmatism meets doctrine and decisions are not easy to take. In any case, two processes should be addressed in the short run: an internal process of training and institutional change in the armed forces, and a strong police reform agenda.

Both processes would ensure an effective crime control policy and a clear path towards a recentralization of the role of the police while leaving the armed forces for the national security agenda. Among the steps that should be considered as urgent in those countries where military personnel are participating in public security strategies are:

- **Training in public security principles** that govern the actions of the security forces in the area of security, which clearly define and guide their actions in relation to citizens;

- **Limiting abuse** by explaining that prevention is the main goal and the arrest of the offender should be done under strict rules of law;
- **Training in community involvement** in order to enhance trust and to limit possible problems in the interaction between military personnel and the community;
- **Training in the exceptionality in the use of force:** The use of force is allowed for exceptional situations in which crime cannot be prevented or controlled;
- **Training in due obedience:** Like any police force, subordinates are bound only to lawful orders given to them by their superiors;
- **Training judicial police:** For the military to ensure the safety of citizens in the best possible way, it is key that personnel be trained with legal procedures and that they be accompanied with judicial police in any activity;
- **Use of appropriate weapons** to the requirements of public safety, particularly in urban centers.

Finally, governments should recognize that this is a limited solution. Not only that the military involvement will not ensure success in the crime control strategy, but also that it will not necessarily help the process of police reform.

*The Agenda for Police Reform*²⁷

The improvement of the police service is an issue in Latin America's political and civic agendas. The difficulties are not minor because of the institutional variety, multiplicity of structural challenges, limited sustained political will and institutional corporate pressure. Despite this recognition, advances are slight and evaluations of the processes developed are very precarious. In fact, it lacks an evaluative gaze of the progress and challenges in almost two decades of interventions. The necessary structures for the development of a professional police force have not been able (or willing) to be installed in most countries.

Latin American police institutions are diverse in terms of origin, type of structure, organization, agency, scope, and objectives, to name a few items. This diversity limits a comprehensive analysis and a design of unique initiatives that impact on major problems. Despite this limitation, it becomes increasingly urgent to review these institutions at a regional and sub regional

level, identifying common trends, challenges and especially possible areas of intervention.

Police can be characterized in general terms as “(...) the persons authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relationships within the group through the application of physical force”.²⁸ This definition has three key elements: institutional nationalization, use of force, and professionalism. As *police force*, the institution responds to the needs of society as a whole, which requires responding to the various pressures of the citizenship. This feature has been eroded over the past decade in most countries of Latin America by two parallel processes: the rise of private financing and the lack of regulation of this funding, and the explosive growth of private security, which puts a halt to policing, occupying their spaces, and limiting and, in some cases, weakening their ability to respond. The proliferation of security companies paradoxically increases the sense of vulnerability of many citizens who do not have access to that service, as well as those that invest in these mechanisms of confinement and collective alarm. Multiple studies now show that the number of police in most countries is significantly lower than the number of private sector operatives.²⁹

In the area of the use of force, the police should be the institutions that hold the monopoly on the use of legitimate force of the state. Various factors have undermined this principle, not only by the aforementioned increase in private security but also by the increasing use of weapons by citizens in some countries. Furthermore, the exercise of the use of force requires a significant degree of social legitimacy that is in doubt due to cases of “easy trigger” (cases recognized by the press in countries as diverse as Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala) or alleged involvement in criminal schemes as organized crime.

The third element of this conceptualization is the *professionalization of the police exercise*. This professional preparation also gives the police some autonomy from the political leadership in relation to intervention in decision-making and the implementation of expertise in their work; however, in no way does this give them full independence. The security responsibility should be assumed by the political power, which also has the responsibility to evaluate and assess the impact of the strategies used.

The three main elements in the definition of police work are seriously called into question in the daily actions in Latin America. While most institutions have undergone major modernization and reform processes in the last two decades, these have been insufficient. In fact, at the present the information gathered by the authors shows with force the pending agenda of

roads to advance and accomplish the decrease of the three central problems: corruption, inefficiency, and abuse of the use of force.

While the challenges are many and of various kinds, police modernization requires change in at least four areas:

- **Institutional processes:** The challenges of reforming police work include a weak selection process of police personnel, who often lack the educational background required for the type of work to be done. The precariousness of the initial process and subsequent training prevents the development of early responses to problems and leaves the police work on a purely reactive level of action. The professionalization of the police is also a problem in many countries where the police do not have a system of promotion, grades, and benefits; the health and pension coverage are not appropriate; and, in some cases, wages are clearly insufficient.
- **Relationship with the community:** High levels of distrust expressed towards the community police institutions are a serious problem. It lowers the legitimacy of the policies developed to prevent and combat crime, provides a look away from possible innovation capabilities and further isolates the police officer in spaces often marked by violence. Community policing programs that sought to improve relations with neighbors have been ineffective because of their limited impact and short time sustainability. It is necessary to seriously tackle the initiatives to improve police-community relationship.
- **Integration in the criminal justice system:** Police work by itself will not solve the problem of crime in any of the countries analyzed. It requires a system that is able to integrate from prevention to post-prison rehabilitation. This should be a process in which the police play a specific role to be professionalized, transparent, and respectful of the rule of law while recognizing the relevance of other interventions. Likewise, the clear differentiation between the tasks that the military and police develop becomes an unavoidable task to prevent the militarization of security responses; many of which are daily as seen in Central American countries.
- **Private security coordination:** Sustained increase in private security provision as well as the ability to carry weapons has

ended with the monopoly of the use of force in most Central American countries. This situation poses a serious risk over the police capabilities to generate effective action strategies and market control of weapons and their use inside the countries. Similarly, the lack of effective control over the industry (especially informal) increases security problems and enhances the sense of impunity.

All the proposed action areas are complex; they require a financial investment and political support sustained over time. Besides, the intervention requires a clear prioritization to avoid duplication of efforts and the building of expectations in officials and citizens who will be able to enhance the feeling of security in the future.

In other words, police reform should be a strategy that is here to stay. The threat of organized crime and state weakness leads to a permanent agenda based on the modernization of institutions and reform focused on the goal of effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.

The participation of the armed forces in public security initiatives should not be perceived as a barrier for further development of the police reform agenda. On the contrary, in Latin America strong and professional police forces are needed in order to clearly define the differences between military and police doctrines.

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The Armed Forces: An Analysis of the Role of the Forces and the Distinction Between “Defence” and “Security”

Hector Luis Saint-Pierre, Universidade Estadual Paulista
Translated from Portuguese by Monique Greenwood Santos,
Latin American Research Centre, University of Calgary

There is a clear tendency in Latin America for the armed forces to be employed on secondary and parallel missions. This tendency dates back to the end of the Cold War when the United States attempted to recuperate their strategic hold on the region. Several events contributed to this concern such as the emergence of the so-called “new threats” associated with the Palme Commission Report on *Common Security*, and the proposed regional implementation of the “Washington Consensus.” This new setting initially emerged at the first Meetings of the Ministers of Defense of the Americas in Williamsburg. At these meetings, which tried to impose a hemispheric security agenda on the countries of the region, the concept of “multidimensionality” was first used in relation to the region.

The term “multidimensional,” which until then had been used exclusively in relation to threats, was moving towards a focus on stability to define “security” as a whole. When applied solely to threats, it was possible to understand that the term referred to new kinds of threats which, once the traditional influences had diminished, could be viewed in more detail. As a result, the origin of the threat was not limited to the state but rather spanned various spheres such as the social, economic, political etc., and the new conceptual neologism “multidimensionality of threats” emerged. One of the last attempts at placing a limit on the reach of the term “security” was left for Ambassador Patiño Mayer, who warned that the emerging threats did not necessarily affect security and did not require a military response. In light of a multidimensionality of threats, the state deployed an array of “multi-faceted” responses that should have been articulated by the various specific state agencies. Mayer proposed that the state rely on various institutional tools, apart from the armed forces, in order to deal with these challenges. The Ministries of Education, Health, Justice, and Economy, among others, seemed to be the more appropriate options than the Ministry of Defense in organizing the measures needed to successfully deal with the new challenges.

The 2003 Declaration on Security in the Americas¹ outlines both the diversity of challenges, concerns, and threats, as well as the “multidimensional” scope. Accordingly, these challenges, concerns, and threats extend to different spheres of the state. However, many concerns and challenges, such as environmental, political, economic, and those related to extreme poverty,² do not appear to threaten sovereignty or the legitimate monopoly of violence guaranteed by the state. Indeed, many of the challenges are not simply threats but rather clear symptoms of incomplete sovereignty and undesired consequences of deficient democracies. Nevertheless, according to the signatories of the Declaration, “security is multidimensional in nature” and in some ways, the implicit philosophy in Patiño Mayer’s warning rings true, as outlined in the Declaration: “The new threats, concerns, and other challenges are cross-cutting problems that require multifaceted responses by different national organizations and in some cases partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society all acting appropriately in accordance with democratic norms and principles, and constitutional provisions of each state.”³

However, confronted with the institutional weakness of some countries in the region, the lack of confidence in the police system and sometimes in the judicial system, added to the generally limited politicians who are mainly concerned with the timeframe of their four-year term (until the next election), military responses are much more appealing than appropriate institutional responses. Consequently, the new threats, which, according to Patiño Mayer, do not require a war, normally need to be dealt with by strong state institutions. On the other hand, even if proven to be ineffective in solving the new “challenges,” the armed forces, because of their capacity to mobilize and maneuver as well as their logistical amplitude, create almost immediate and impressive results. In the streets, the armed forces create a “sense of security” for citizens, allowing for “good levels of popular approval” which are important for politicians and the government, even without changes in the level of violence or decreases in criminal activity. In actuality, for some countries the only institutional option with the capacity for national mobilization is the armed forces. This echoes the warning from some analysts of the “securitization” of some problems afflicting the region⁴ and the militarization of the response. Others fear that the irresponsible use of this conceptual method can lead to the “militarization” of the police service, which in some countries is exhausted due to high levels of intolerable crime, or lead to its counterpart, which can be equally harmful to the state: the “policization” of the armed forces.

The concept of “multidimensional security,” which could be appropriate for discussion at hemispheric summit meetings given that the objective is to specify all aspects that impact security of the state, societies, and people, becomes a trap when incorporated in the Hemispheric Conferences of Ministries of Defense (CHMD), because as the name implies, it is a forum exclusively for defence. In fact, ministers meet to discuss issues relevant to their ministerial agenda of defence. However, a “multidimensional provision” of security has been incorporated into recent meeting agendas and relates to the development and progress of the nations of the region. As stated in the second paragraph of the 2004 Quito Declaration:

Security constitutes a multidimensional condition for the development and progress of our nations. Security is consolidated when its human dimension is promoted. The conditions for human security improve with the full respect for dignity, human rights, and the basic freedoms of the people, in the framework of the rule of law, as well as by promoting social and economic development, education, the fight against poverty, disease, and hunger. Security is indispensable to create economic and social opportunities for all and to generate a favorable environment to attract, retain, and productively use the investment and trade that are necessary to create sources of employment and fulfill the hemisphere’s social aspirations. Extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population are also affecting stability and democracy, eroding social cohesiveness and undermining the security of the States.

It is true that “each State has the sovereign right to identify its own national security and defence priorities; to define strategies, plans, and actions to address threats to its security, in keeping with its legal framework.” Yet, given the difference in perceptions between the countries of the region and the range of institutions for confronting these threats, dangers, and challenges, I am cautious to agree that the Ministry of Defense is able to “attract, retain, and productively use the investment and trade.” I doubt the ability of the Ministries of Defense to make sound decisions on mitigating HIV; on the reconstruction following natural disasters such as earthquakes and tornadoes; containing forced migration; and combatting organized crime, when in many countries these are the concern of other Ministries. It is understandable that the armed forces could be able to play a role in responding to natural

disasters, supporting the fight against crime and at some point play a role in migratory control; however, it must depend on the judicial orders and subsidiary functions of the armed forces. These types of missions should never become specific objectives of defence policy, as in the case of some Ministries.

The misunderstood concept of “multidimensional security” does not appear in the official documents released by the Ministries of Defense of the South American Defense Council (*Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano*, CDS). This particular detail perhaps reflects one of the motives for which South America began to acquire an identity based on strategic interests and values, differentiating its position in successive CHMD meetings from that of other countries in the Americas. The effort to minimize the defence agenda to specific items, along with the intent to distinguish between issues of public security and defence, and maintain the institutional mechanisms combatting challenges and threats separate, highlights the convergence of the positions held by the countries of the South American region.

The avoidance of the use of the discursive concept “multidimensional security” is considered a sign of maturity on the part of the sub-regional defence forum, as was the creation of a separate Commission specifically for dealing with issues pertaining to public security. On 10 August 2009 the *Conselho Sul-americano de Luta Contra o Narcotráfico* (South American Council Against Drug Trafficking, CSLCN) was created as part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) as a “forum for consultation, coordination and cooperation in preventing and combatting the global problem of drugs.”⁵ The creation of the CSLCN was related to the clear intention of the CDS to separate the defence agenda from that of security, not only for conceptual considerations but also for institutional and operational reasons as well (the institutional representation of CSLCN is comprised of government ministries and/or entities specialized in combatting drug trafficking in the region).⁶

Before discussing the semantic inaccuracy and heuristic ineffectiveness of the concept in question, I will first consider two relevant aspects that are often left unnoticed. On the one hand, there is the notion of a single agenda for hemispheric security that contains a list of common threats to all the countries in the region, as well as a set of prescribed responses for all of the countries. Security declarations and conferences have already recognized the different perceptions of threats and the presence of institutional and organizational idiosyncrasies in confronting them, which I will discuss in further detail and include my personal point of view. I will reflect on the difference in the nature of defence and public security, without neglecting to recognize that it remains nebulous and unclear, be it because of a lack of

conceptual definition, constitutional precision or institutional resources and, at times, political orders and electoral interests.

Perception as the Original Source of Security

A critique of the idea of an agenda of common threats to the hemisphere, which I discussed in other settings,⁷ is based upon the definition of a threat as a purely perceptive phenomenon. Thus, a threat itself does not actually exist; rather it constitutes itself and acts in the perception of who is or feels threatened. I describe the threat as “a representation, a sign, a certain disposition, gesture or manifestation perceived as an announcement of an undesirable or risky situation for the existence of whoever perceives it.”⁸ In this sense, the threat is not an *object* that can itself be analyzed, but rather a *relationship* that requires an assessment of all its components, from the emitter of the signal and the emission to the receptor. Since a threat simply exists in and for a perception, and since perceptions are relative to the specific makeup of the receptor, when we refer to national threats we are referring to a phenomenon conditioned by a specific and unique geopolitical, historical, cultural, institutional, and political context that reflects the idiosyncratic aspects of each country, filters inputs, and constructs perceptions. Therefore, a single threat to the entire continent does not objectively exist, but the particular perceptions that make up threats are numerous: migration, for example, while one of the principle threats for the United States, constitutes an important (when not the principle) source of foreign capital for other countries of the region. Even if we are able to agree on a single theory of threats (whether it be militarily, economically or politically imposed), the question remains whether we can also agree on a single strategic response: for example, some countries in South America have declared armed combat to be the only possible solution to drug trafficking, while others have identified precisely this type of combat, along with the local and armed presence of extra-regional military personnel, as the principle threat to their sovereignty and freedom of action.

As a last resort, security, as a central aspect of international politics, is made up of the same empirical material as the perceptions. Consequently, the exercise of external politics produces, consolidates or alters perceptions of neighbouring decision-making bodies. The threatening act or attitude of a political body, as an expression of its external politics, tries to provoke in others a certain perception, such as intimidation or insecurity. As such, a political body seeks to carry out acts of friendliness, transparency, and trust in order to create a perception of security and even cooperation.

These simple arguments, while perhaps obvious, were sufficient to dismantle the untenable notion of “common threats” that were the basis of the proposal for a hemispheric security agenda. What was disguised in the background was the need to rely on a common base of threats and their respective responses in order to apply a single “security doctrine,” which would allow the region to strategically recover from its position of irrelevance during the Cold War. In line with this doctrine, and as part of the continental security initiative, countries of the region, with the help of their armed forces, set out to overcome what the United States considered to be threats. In turn, the United States would offer a defensive cover for a powerless region, and the national armed forces would be transformed into mere police forces responsible for public security.

Philosophical Basis for the Difference Between “Defence” and “Public Security”

Despite the operational difficulty of some countries⁹ to recognize the distinction between defence and public security because of severe internal conflict, I argue the need to debate¹⁰ this issue based in a constitutional distinction assumed by different countries. Here I attempt to outline another approach that justifies the distinction between defence and public security through a philosophical analysis.

Several philosophical anthropologists consider humans to be social beings by nature and consider society to be an intrinsic characteristic that defines humans.¹¹ Conversely for others, human nature is solitary, and society is a product of debate and agreements between humans. These philosophers¹² believe that at the beginning there was a pact; not a chronological or historical beginning, but rather strictly a logical one. Prior to this, the gods had not yet been created, and as a result, there was no good or bad. Furthermore, there were no laws or norms that guided human behavior, and without which there was no crime. Therefore, without moral restraint or normative or legal limits, force became the preferential form of contact between humans who, as a result, perceived themselves to be the most powerful in nature. It was perceived that each human should look out for themselves in an endless cycle of self-defence; every person for themselves and against others in a state of permanent war that Hobbes called “state of nature” in which “man is a wolf to man.”¹³

It was not love for a fellow being, but rather fear that led humans to make a pact in which they renounced their will to make decisions, ability to defend themselves, and their force and tools, concentrating on conceding themselves

to someone (a person or group of people) that, because they were not part of the agreement, lacked obligations and restraints in addition to controlling the absolute and monopolized concentration of force. To be above of the pact was to be sovereign; a pure will without limits. As such, the other beings became subjects through this voluntary pact and legitimated the leader as a monopoly of force and political decision.

Total liberty of the sovereign is founded in the incontestable exercise of his total decision-making power. This decision-making ability, as a product of the freedom of the leader, constitutes the material content of his expression and syntactic form of his obligation. As such, the sovereign exerts his freedom and manifests his will in the way in which he makes decisions. As a result of this manifestation, the sovereign creates a network of norms, and with the normative expression of freedom the sovereign legally commands the relations between him and his subjects, and amongst his subjects. He creates interconnected obligations that constrain will and limit freedom. The tragic paradox of the sovereign exercising freedom is that the manifestation of his absolute will organizes the world and his place in it, and with this he limits the freedom of his will.¹⁴ It is not a pure form of the norm - as Carl Schmitt would say in response to Hans Kelsen - that is the basis of rights, but rather total absence, and therefore, the exercise of total will: the materialization of the decision.

In the inevitable order created by the expression of freedom, one condition guides sovereign will within its normative realm. However, the leader (who has no obligations whatsoever) is not connected to the agreement, the basis of which guarantees the protection of the subject and, as a result, is an implied condition, albeit a founding one as well. As a result, humans renounce their ability of self-defence and surrender their instruments of violence knowing that neither the accumulation of powerful abilities nor instruments of violence would be enough to guarantee their security. They concede these capabilities to the leader with the expectation that they will receive protection from the legitimate monopoly of force (because it is collectively voluntary). Therefore, a principal characteristic of this monopoly is the nature of decision-making and violence towards the subjects, which is both the organizer (in the way in which it normatively manifests) and protector (of both the subjects and the normative *status quo* that guarantees security). The nature of the use of legitimate monopoly of force towards the subjects is to guarantee security and order, which is to resolve internal problems and internally dissolve the concept of "enemy,"¹⁵ inasmuch as the leader owes security to his subjects. The internal exercise of sovereignty is for neutral-

izing conflicts within the limits of security of all citizens.¹⁶ Internally, the leader represents “police”¹⁷ and, in the strict sense of the term, externally the leader represents “politics.”¹⁸

The normative order that produces the will of the leader establishes the relationship between humans and constitutes the social sphere between the inhabitants of the territory under the monopoly of violence. The relationship between the leader and its subjects is expressed within a legal univocalism established through the normalcy created by the leader and maintained by the legitimate monopoly of violence, the political monopoly. This univocal expression constitutes, in international political terms, the “decision-making unit” or, in stricter terms, “political unit.” In turn, this decision-making unit makes up a “unit” in an area in which other political units independently reclaim the respect for their particular legal univocalities applied exclusively to a community within the territorial space.¹⁹ They try to defend the normative principles of their units against whichever other units can threaten their existence. It is vital for each unit to develop their strategic sensibility that allows them to perceive amongst the neighboring political units those that can empower their unit and those that can threaten it. This perception is based on the ability to distinguish between friends and enemies, which is the basis of its external political function. The presence of this plurality of political units, which can end up fighting for their existence, configures the external sphere as a *pluriverse*, as opposed to a universe, as Schmitt observed. In this pluriverse, each political unit tries to preserve its own normative order and achieve recognition from other political units. Faced with a lack of normative order that regulates the relationship between the political units within the pluriverse, each unit projects an image of its power ability, looking to define and obtain recognition of the limits of its sovereignty. Moreover, its perceptive sensibility tries to perceive and demarcate its strategic sovereign position from other political units. As such, with the projection of the image and the perceptive sensibility, the limit of the normative order and the decisions of each political unit, and the relationship between them, are established. This external projection of power of the political units makes up the network of forces in the mutual recognition and delimitation of the respective strategic statures of the decision-making units, or *empirical material* of “international security.” The legal formation of this relationship of forces constitutes the “international law” that defines and normalizes war and peace, conflict and cooperation, and the core of international politics. In this way - as Raymond Aron affirms - the internal sphere of the decision-making unit and pluriverse is defined in relation to the difference of use of force (internally a monopoly

and externally open to competition).²⁰ Also, vice-versa in which the same phenomenon unequivocally shows the different nature of force used in each case: as internal organizer and protector, and external and lethal defender, as I will now discuss.

The Institutional Difference Between Defence and Security

The principal challenge and *ongoing* concern of the leader is, on the one hand, the security of the subjects and the maintenance of order that ensures the *status quo* of the decision-making unit, and on the other, the defence of this *status quo* in the face of eventual threats to the group of decision-making units that make up the pluriverse. Internally, the role of force is the *protector* of the subject and the *preserver* of order within the monopoly, producing what is known as “public security,” “internal security,” “citizen security,” that, in the complexity of the modern state, is normally administered by justice ministries, interior ministries, and more recently ministries of security²¹ created in light of the growing gravity in the types of threats that make the general public uneasy. With the lethal nature of defence, the monopoly of force, in an environment of open competition with other units, is intended for combatting and eliminating sources of potential hostility and deterring hostile intentions of military organizations that go against the *status quo* of the political unit and its decision-making capacity.

This double role of the legitimate monopoly of force, in compliance with its specific purpose, requires the expansion of a jurisprudence that legalizes and normalizes the conditions and limits of its use, and that univocally defines the responsibilities that allow legal proceedings in the case that these conditions and limits are not respected, both internally and externally. In the majority of national constitutions, the regulation of the use of force in each of its roles is addressed in specific sections.²² With respect to this regulation and attempt at efficiency, each of these roles relies on a general doctrine and specific purpose, and as such, requires certain preparations and weaponry. The specific double nature of force in both these manifestations and its functional permanence, obliges it to depend on administrative bureaucracies that are also specific and permanent to fully follow through with the constitutionally defined role, and to efficiently carry out the constitutionally assigned missions with adequate professional training and education. The maintenance of both institutional structures and their correct function depend on a specific and adequate budget because they are vital to the preservation and operation of the political unit, internal order, and external strategic status. The government, which is in charge of administering the political unit, is

obligated to provide the appropriate and necessary means for the correct operational function of both armed institutions. In the case that one of them is inadequate or insufficient, the government should ensure its recovery. The substitution of one for the other²³ (a tendency that is increasingly more frequent particularly in Latin America) can result in instrumental inadequacy, ineffective results, and loss of specific function (because it has been diverted from its original function), perpetuating the deficiencies of the state apparatus that it is substituting.

Difference in Purpose Between the Military and Police

Tyrtaeus said,

Not if he had all splendors except for a fighting spirit. For no man ever proves himself a good man in war unless he can endure to face the blood and the slaughter, go close against the enemy and fight with his hands. Here is courage, mankind's finest possession; here is the noblest prize that a young man can endeavor to win, and it is a good thing his city and all the people share with him. When a man plants his feet and stands in the foremost spears; relentlessly, all thought of foul flight completely forgotten.²⁴

For Aristotle, the warrior was made up of something particular and different from other humans. Whether it is ethical character or a particular inclination, the moral constitution that drives a young person to embark on a military career, knowing that his/her life is at stake while fighting in defence of their country, against other warriors that put themselves at risk, is clearly different from those that enroll in a police academy to fight against delinquents and misdemeanors. This motivates one to protect citizens, repress delinquency, and maintain social order, and prepares them to confront threats that put the decision-making and sovereign capacity of the political unit at risk. Police prepare themselves to help citizens and, through detention, deal with those that operate against the laws regulating social relations. The military is prepared to deter, kill or be killed in combat against foreign forces and the enemy that put the political unit at risk. To the Greeks, war (Polemus) was waged against non-greeks and against the "other" (Xenos). For internal conflicts, other terms were employed such as stasis and metabole.

Notwithstanding, police also run risks; their beliefs and values, upon entering the police force, are different from those that enter into a military

career. For that matter, “career in arms” refers to a career in the military and not in the police force. I believe that any change in a profession defined by a clear vocation is frustrating, and as such, I imagine that it must not be very gratifying for military personnel to be employed as police.

Differences in the Means of Defence and Public Security

In relation to the instruments available for carrying out their function, there are many differences that can be observed. Whilst defence requires weaponry of large scale lethal power and destruction, sufficient for deterring or confronting other armies of large operational and destructive capabilities, the police are armed with non-lethal weaponry, sufficient to guarantee police security, repress delinquent acts, and preserve social order. In the external sphere in which defence is meant to be employed, the use of destructive and lethal violence is limitless beyond political needs. Even though domestic violence statistics are alarming,²⁵ police need to be preventing and decreasing violence using non-lethal means.

The difference in doctrine between control of internal security and external defence can be summed up in the following way: even the worst criminal assassin and drug trafficker should have their life and dignity guaranteed by police and the judicial system, while even a saint can die in war without it constituting a crime. Human rights guide the behavior of police, and humanitarian rights guide the warrior.

Lastly, intelligence, a tool used by both professions, is also radically different. On one hand, defence intelligence comprises the eyes and the perceptive system of the political unit, as detailed by Sun Tzu, and is necessary to anticipate certain actions in an unpredictable environment that, through the fault of the normative univocalism, requires calculation - as Aron affirms.²⁶ Intelligence has to try to understand the strategic meaning of the gestures of the neighbouring political units as well as the situation and use of the defence mechanisms in comparison with its own. In the case of public security, intelligence serves the judicial system by collecting evidence that will be part of the judicial process leading to the arrest and conviction of the delinquent, who will remain isolated from society to avoid reoffending. In some cases, for example drug and arms trafficking and organized crime, intelligence is carried out via infiltration into the crime group, which entails a high level of familiarity between the intelligence agent and the crime. It is precisely within this context of familiarity that the agent becomes vulnerable to the economic opportunities of crime and becomes fragile to corruption. By placing the armed forces in this combat role is to run the risk of failing to collect

intelligence and corrupting the forces; as a result, a soldier, upon entering a *favela* (shantytown or slum), will not be able to distinguish between a delinquent and a regular worker.

Final Considerations

In all scientific areas, conceptual definition is central and thus occupies an important place in scientific production. On the one hand, conceptual precision strengthens the univocalism that allows for the comprehensive communication of scientific activity; and on the other, a well-defined concept guarantees important access to the part of reality under analysis. However, in the specific area of security the significance of these norms is intensified, since, given prior epistemological concerns, these concepts become operational in political discourse with real political and social consequences for which academics do not assume responsibility.

“Multidimensionalism,” as a general focus or even notion of security, is heuristically infertile, analytically insufficient, and operationally dangerous. It had been gradually introduced in the hemispheric declarations in the area of security under political pressure by those who rely on force to make decisions about conceptual ambiguities.

The perceptive nature of threats contradicted the hegemonic pretensions of defining hemispheric agendas, but permitted the search of strategic sub-regional identities. This search identified and distinguished such identities not just based on the perception of threats, but also the conceptual, institutional, and operational distinction between defence and security.

Lastly, as a general conclusion resigned to the limits of objectivity: for science that strives for recognition in international scientific dialogue, it is insufficient to simply study concepts, test theories, and repeat the processes of mainstream scientists. Instead, scientists should identify their own problems, formulate questions and concepts, practice their methods, and construct their theories with the precision of someone that does not fear the autonomous and comprehensive discussion of their results.

Notes

- 1 “Declaration on Security in the Americas,” adopted October 28, 2003, accessed July 20, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/DeclaracionSecurity_102803.asp.
- 2 Ernesto López ironically says, “‘pobres extremos’ puedan devenir ‘pobres extremistas’ y amenazar la paz social y/o política de una región o país,” in *Nuevas Amenazas: Dimensiones y perspectivas. Dilemas y desafíos para la Argentina y el Brasil*, eds. Ernesto López and Marcelo Sain (Quilmes: UNQ, 2004), 57.
- 3 “Declaration on Security in the Americas,” adopted October 28, 2003,

- accessed July 20, 2013, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/DeclaracionSecurity_102803.asp.
- 4 See, for example, the article by Gastón Chillier and Flaurie Freeman "O Conceito Novo de Segurança Hemisférica da OEA: Uma Ameaça Potencial," *Informe Especial de WOLA*, 2005.
 - 5 UNASUR, accessed July 25, 2011, <http://www.pptunasur.com/contenidos.php?menu=3&submenu1=8&idiom=1> [site discontinued].
 - 6 Ibid.
 - 7 "Una reconceptualización de las 'nuevas amenazas' de la subjetividad de la percepción a la Seguridad Cooperativa," in *Nuevas Amenazas: Dimensiones y perspectivas. Dilemas y desafíos para la Argentina y el Brasil*, eds. Ernesto López and Marcelo Sain (Quilmes: UNQ, 2004). More recently in E. Rizzo de Oliveira, "As 'novas ameaças' às democracias latino-americanas: uma abordagem teórico-conceitual," in *Segurança & Defesa Nacional. Da competição à cooperação regional* (São Paulo: Ed. Fundação Memorial da América Latina, 2007).
 - 8 Ibid., 23.
 - 9 For some countries, such as in the case of Colombia, that confront important and chronic internal conflicts and are involved in a confrontation in which they cannot gather sufficient institutional efforts to maintain the monopoly of violence and a legal univocalism for the national territory, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make conceptual differences between security and defence. Therefore, decisions about methods of combat seem cynical because in reality they are obligated to use everything at their disposal to weaken the threat that confronts them.
 - 10 Marcela Donadio "Las Definiciones Políticas" in *Atlas Comparativo de la Defensa en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Ser en el 2000, 2008).
 - 11 In reality, the Greeks did not have a concept of "society" but rather they believed man was a political animal where the politicity was a specific difference that defined men (see Aristóteles, *Política*). The conflict, for the thinkers of this hypothesis, is inherent in the socialization of man. See Julien Freund, *Sociologie du conflict* (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1993).
 - 12 Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were the first to defend the agreement as a social foundation from different theoretical perspectives.
 - 13 Rather unjustly, Hobbes is remembered for this statement and the chaos or anarchy normally associated with the "hobbesian state." However, it is important to remember that for Hobbes this was merely a pre-social situation at which perhaps he arrived while being confronted with the horror of the English revolution, from which he escaped to France. His intellectual efforts philosophically founded society through a pact that allowed men to overcome their situation to live in peace and security.
 - 14 As a result, freedom is exercised in voluntary decision-making between possible alternatives, but, as J.P. Sartre says, the result of redundant selection is the death of alternatives (once one is selected, the others cease to be alternatives) and consequently freedom.
 - 15 The Greeks considered *Pólemos*, war, to be an armed confrontation with "others," such as non-Greeks. Amongst themselves, there could be discord, subversion and revolts that they called *metabole* or *stasis*. However, the Greeks were aberrant to the idea of an "internal enemy." From this point of view, the idea of an "internal enemy" that was introduced in Latin America with the erroneous National Security Doctrine is a digression on the part of the government, a social pathology, and a political deviation. The introduction of the concept "internal enemy" presents the possibility of eliminating, without

- constituting a crime, all of the fellow citizens that do not agree with the regime or form of governance, with the governing party, social or economic order; therefore, breaking the social pact and the actual idea of society.
- 16 Carl Schmitt, *El concepto de lo "político"* (Buenos Aires: Folios Ediciones, 1984) especially pages 3 and ss.
- 17 Note that the origin of the term "police" is the same as "politics," *Polis*.
- 18 For Schmitt, just as the essence of ethics is what allows the distinction between "good" and "evil, an aesthetic of "beautiful" and "ugly," an economy of "profitability" and "unprofitability," the essence of politics is what allows the distinction between "friends" and "enemies." Internally nonexistent, the enemy is created in relations with other political units through which it distinguishes groups of friends and groups of enemies.
- 19 As Schmitt observes, "Del carácter conceptual de lo "político" deriva el pluralismo del mundo de los Estados. La unidad política presupone la posibilidad real del enemigo y, por consecuencia, de otra unidad política coexistente con la primera" *El concepto*, 49.
- 20 Raymond Aron justifies the existence of the discipline International Relations by referring to the use of force (internationally legal and internally monopolistic) that allows to divide the international subsystem. See this author's *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (Paris: Éditions Calmann-Lévy, 1962). Also his epistemological analysis regarding the issue, "Qué é uma Teoria das Relações Internacionais?" in *Études Politiques* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972).
- 21 The institutional design and the structural name attributed to the maintenance of security vary country to country. The Republic of Argentina, in March 2011, created the Ministry of Security in light of increasing organized crime. The creation of this ministry, apart from allowing for a better organized response to specific threats, provides a clear separation of the national defence and public security agendas. As such, Argentina is on the vanguard of a clear distinction between defence and security and is taking institutional steps to confront the challenges of each use of force.
- 22 See the specific analyses by country and the comparisons made by the research group ADEFAL at <http://iugm.es/adefal/inicio/documentacion/>.
- 23 A tendency that is increasingly frequent in Latin America, given the uncontrolled growth of violence and criminality improving public security initiatives, is the reinforcement of the police force, and even its substitution by the armed forces. This has resulted in the unprofessionalization of the armed forces because of the misuse of its original purpose and, in many cases, corruption in the face of economic opportunities of crime. The results were, in the best case scenarios, merely superficial, related to the "perception of security" and not the actual levels of violence. Removing the armed forces from their specific role weakens them, and does not solve the issue of public security but rather hides the problem, making it appear to be resolved. In order to truly resolve the issue of public security, the police force must be adequately adapted in order to confront the current challenges.
- 24 Werner Jaeger, *Paidéia. A formação do homem grego* (Brasília: Martins Fontes, 1986), 83.
- 25 In some cases, the number of deaths caused by police violence has been considered to constitute a "war."
- 26 *Paix et Guerre*, Introduction.

Multidimensional Security, “Ungoverned Areas” and Non-State Actors

Bernardo Pérez Salazar, UN Habitat and
Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris

Introduction

Today the threat to the countries of the region is not the military force of the adjacent neighbor or some invading foreign power. Today’s foe is the terrorist, the narcotrafficker, the arms trafficker, the document forger, the international crime boss, and the money launderer. This threat is a weed that is planted, grown, and nurtured in the fertile ground of ungoverned spaces such as coastlines, rivers, and unpopulated border areas. This threat is watered and fertilized with money from drugs, illegal arms sales, and human trafficking. This threat respects neither geographical nor moral boundaries.

General James Hill, Commander of U.S.
Southern Command, 2003.

As recognized by the President’s *2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, transnational organized crime is a global issue with global implications that directly impact the United States. In the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, these powerful groups exploit under-governed areas —where state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are rampant— to consolidate control over drug, money, weapons, and human smuggling networks that span the hemisphere.

General John Kelly, Commander of U. S. Southern
Command, 2013.

A decade ago, at the time when General James Hill as Commander of U.S. Southern Command stated his appreciation about “ungoverned spaces” as a major source of hemispheric insecurity, the Organization American States (OAS) was broadcasting multidimensional security as a renewed approach to deal with threats and challenges to the se-

curity of states in the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-first century. Apart from geopolitical and military matters, these threats concern terrorism and the possible access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists; the global drug problem, trafficking in persons and other forms of transnational organized crime including corruption, asset laundering, attacks to cyber security, and illicit trafficking in weapons; environmental degradation and natural and man-made disasters as well as HIV/AIDS and other diseases coupled with extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population; and the potential for damage arising from accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste.

To face these cross-cutting challenges the OAS's *Security in the Americas* Declaration, adopted in Mexico City on October 28, 2003, posits the need for appropriate hemispheric cooperation and multifaceted responses involving partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society. Specifically in regard to the challenge represented by transnational organized crime, the multidimensional security concept commends criminalizing money laundering, kidnapping, illicit trafficking in human beings, corruption, and other related crimes in order to strengthen domestic legal frameworks so that the assets from the proceeds of these crimes are identified, traced, frozen or seized and are ultimately confiscated and disposed of. It also commits governments to increase multilateral cooperation in particular through the exchange of information, mutual legal assistance, and extradition in order to reinforce national institutions dedicated to preventing and sanctioning transnational crimes and identifying and prosecuting members of transnational criminal organizations.

Yet, judging by the statement made before the U.S. Senate Armed Services by the present Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General John Kelly in March 2013, the measures implemented in the multidimensional security framework have not succeeded in modifying major aspects of hemispheric insecurity, in particular, the consolidation of powerful criminal structures exploiting "under-governed areas" that control illicit drug, money, weapons, and human smuggling circuits by means of networks that span the hemisphere.

This article discusses the theoretical flaws as well as evidence concerning the shortcomings of this hemispheric security concept, which has tacit underpinnings related to standard doctrine of counterinsurgent and stabilization operations, particularly in dealing with the challenge represented by

non-state actors criminalized by the state-centric multidimensional security doctrine. Following this introduction, a first part criticizes the view that the state is necessarily the best actor capable of providing governance goods and services. It also deals critically with subsequent “development agendas” focused on strengthening state military and policing capacity as the main cornerstone of state-building. The next part will look specifically at the case of Colombia, where counterinsurgent, antinarcotic and stabilization doctrine and operations have been applied for decades with increasing troop density to no avail as all the country’s border areas continue to rank among the major “terrorist safe havens” identified by the U.S. State Department in the Western Hemisphere. A third part discusses the risks associated with nation-building agendas that unintendedly favor partnerships between criminal organizations and local political entrepreneurs. A final section pulls overall conclusions from the balance presented concerning multidimensional security, ungoverned areas, and non-state actors.

The State, Non-State Actors and Hybrid Political Orders

In the future, will governments or non-state actors lead in solving problems caused by growing world population, rapid urbanization, and climate change? Which will be more successful in confronting global challenges such as boosting economic productivity, managing efficient and sustainable use of water, energy, and land, and generally procuring safe and healthy livelihoods and environments? Which will find the path to deliver overall upward social mobility and control of corruption?

Such is the scope of the questions posed by the National Intelligence Council in its most recent outlook of the world in 2030.¹ Though there are no straightforward answers, the study presages that the future will probably reward those able to adapt fast enough to harness change instead of being overwhelmed by it.

States in the Western Hemisphere are committed to fighting new threats to security, among them transnational crime, by means of confidence and security-building measures based on international law, the respect for state sovereignty and non-intervention, faithful compliance of treaties and covenants and acting appropriately in accordance with constitutional provisions of each state, respect for and promotion and defense of human rights, solidarity, and cooperation. Yet, even though the concept of “multidimensional security” formally addresses other public concerns that can negatively affect human security, such as global pandemics, climatic variability, and its influence on natural and man-made disasters as well as massive environmental

degradation and extreme poverty and social exclusion, its main objective is clearly focused on national security.

This is especially evident in the case of transnational organized crime, which is not dealt with as a public security problem but as a “national security threat” precisely because these criminal structures allegedly have the ability to challenge state sovereignty in areas where local governance structures are not under state control. These areas naturally offer favorable conditions for criminal activity to thrive without detection and with impunity, and provide their perpetrators refuge from efforts to combat or counter them, making them convenient launching pads for terrorist attacks against nation-states and the interests they represent.²


Understandably, diplomatic apprehensions render inadmissible the use of terms such as “ungoverned territory” in official OAS documents. Yet, the concern for territorial “vacuums” outside the control of a nation-state is a major feature in the security doctrine that guides counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antinarcotics, and stabilization and peacekeeping operations that are carried out by member states in dealing with the challenges identified in the framework of the multidimensional security approach.³

Yet as Robert Kaplan (1994) notes, understanding authoritative territorial governance in today’s world is not well served by political maps comprising hundreds of countries marked by sharp, bold borders and uniform colors. An invention of European colonialism, these political maps are conceived to offer “... a way to classify... national organisms, making a jigsaw puzzle of neat pieces without transition zones between them” (58). However “countries” such as Sierra Leone and Nigeria, or Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Indonesia, constantly ridden with ethnic and religious strife and violent political instability, are far from the “national organisms” which appear as evenly stained blots in political maps because they are not populated by homogeneous cultural identities.

The U.S. Department of State’s *Country Reports on Terrorism*, which in August 2010 identified a dozen “terrorist safe havens” in the world,⁴ seems to corroborate Kaplan’s 1994 insight⁵ that the state as a governing ideal cannot be transported functionally to areas outside the industrialized world as a fool-proof model for successful territorial governance. Apart from the “countries” named above, the State Department’s map includes the “Trans-Sahara” (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger), Yemen, Somalia, the maritime borders of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, Venezuela, the Colombia “border region” (Brazil, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú, and Venezuela), and the “Tri-border area” (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay).

Indeed the U.S. State Department’s map (Figure 1) may be an understatement, as “quasi-states” or “areas of limited sovereignty” characterized by a disconnection between legal and effective sovereignty account for about two-thirds of the planet according to studies carried out during the past twenty-five years.⁶ Yet the fact that governance structures are not controlled by nation-states in these territories does not mean that they are “ungoverned.” Instead, alternative forms of governance controlled by non-state actors based on tribal, sectarian or clan relations or even persistent insurgencies, are better positioned to compete for the loyalty of populations they serve or control because they are often more effective than the nominally “legal” territorial sovereign in providing for protection from violent threats to individuals and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity, as well as access to sources of income, shelter, health, and educational services, among others. In sum, the notion of “ungoverned areas” mainly reflects a biased conception of governance rooted in a normative preference for territorial rule by “sovereign States”.⁷

Figure 1. Terrorist Safe Havens Identified by U.S. Department of State, 2010.



(Source: U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 2010, cited by GAO 2011, 5.)

Perhaps a better conceptual framework to understand territorial governance outside the Western industrialized world is the model of "hybrid political orders." Emergent in the context of constitutional liberal democracies, hybrid political orders operate according to formal, legally enforceable rules, but must compete with conflicting and alternative territorial governance models based on other forms of socio-political order that are rooted in non-state, indigenous societal structures that rely on a web of social relations and mutual obligations to establish trust and reciprocity. In some cases, cleavages observed in state territorial authority, capacity, and legitimacy are so deep that the control of violence, resources, and rulemaking is firmly accrued by territorial elites by means of their own militias, courts, and even basic services.⁸

The expansion of authoritative territorial governance structures controlled by non-state actors is favored by the fact that globalization undermines effective territorial authority of "sovereign" nation-states. As a result of conditions tied to economic aid and development assistance from Western and international donors during the 80s and 90s, global diffusion of neo-classical economic liberalism has led to increasing private control in markets and decreasing state regulation. Deregulation of trade and financial markets have increased porousness of national borders compromising governments' ability to regulate cross-border flows of goods, services, information, technology, and people, as well as to collect tariffs and taxes. Fiscal restraints progressively have undermined social and economic safety nets as well as the ability and legitimacy of government efforts to provide the governance goods that create favorable conditions for equitable domestic economic prosperity and "national" social cohesion.⁹

The bottom line is that in the context of globalization, economic growth has ceased to be a path leading to distributive justice for many social groups in many places, undermining the legitimacy of state controlled territorial governance structures where this trend pervades. Consequently in settings where misdistribution of wealth increases, working conditions deteriorate and social safety nets shrink, parallel markets and "governance" structures controlled by non-state actors may become socially, economically, and politically relevant, if they prove capable of connecting willing suppliers with willing customers for goods and services (including "criminalized" goods and services such as drugs, smuggled goods, and money laundering, among others); warranting protection from hostile law enforcement and public regulators; defining property rights and regulating disputes; operating social safety nets to take care of vulnerable households and dependents of those killed or jailed; and even serving as lenders of last resort.¹⁰

With the global diffusion of ideas about democracy and human rights, and the spread of standards that equate good governance with the rule of law, government accountability, respect for human dignity, and universal provision of access to basic goods and services, these alternative governance structures are commonly framed as transnational and subnational challengers of state sovereignty threatening national and international security. Consequently, areas under control of non-state actors that do not comply with the referred standards, tend to be prime targets for stabilization and nation-building operations, whether in the form of humanitarian non-governmental organizations providing emergency service delivery, or international financial institutions and Western governments conditioning assistance on improvements in transparency, human rights, and environmental protection, and, in extreme cases, by means of armed intervention directed to support “nation-building” processes based on strengthening state military and policing capacity in order to reestablish state-centric “democratic governance standards”.¹¹

States legitimize these interventions by “criminalizing” non-state actors and their activities, often in accordance with the multidimensional security guidelines, even though in many cases the latter have local support and legitimacy precisely because they are able to offer working solutions that satisfy local needs. Naturally, non-state actors labeled as “criminals” in these settings do not define themselves as criminals and instead frame their activities as strategies to sustain or improve their livelihoods under specific given circumstances. As a result, “criminalization” in these types of settings tends to blur the line between “war” and “crime,” and burdens the task of the occupying military and police forces trying to “win the hearts and minds” of the locals. Thus, as the case of Colombia discussed in the next section will illustrate, counterinsurgency and stabilization operations in areas controlled by non-state actors prove ineffective, even when military and police forces are deployed with high troop densities.

Counterinsurgency and Non-State Territorial Governance Dynamics

Counterinsurgency doctrine assumes that competing territorial governance structures controlled by non-state actors can be undermined and defeated by occupying and transforming the targeted political hybrid order. The strength of these “feral” governance structures lies in the relationship between non-state actors that control these structures and the general population, which provides intelligence, logistics and, ultimately, a sanctuary that

allows non-state actors to blend into the population and disappear under pressure. Counterinsurgency argues that severing this relationship is possible by offering economic incentives, making deals with emergent elite factions and protecting the population from “insurgents” who might conduct retributive attacks for collaborating with the occupying force. In this reckoning, counterinsurgency misjudges the fact that values as well as social and political identities such as kin relationships, religion, and tribalism are very real among many populations. Therefore the “occupying” force’s ability to alter these values is dubious, no matter how helpful, sincere, and sympathetic the occupying force is. In sum, the assumption that a mass of military and police troops can achieve more than intimidate an occupied population for a given period of time is highly questionable.

And yet, after the debacles that followed the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq during the decade ending in 2010, estimating military and police forces’ needs for occupation control in “critical limit situations” remains a crucial issue for defense and security planners.¹²

Multiple questions have been raised concerning troop density in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Should the number of troops deployed be defined based on enemy strength, population density or the extension of the territorial area of operation? In calculating troop density needs, are indigenous police forces counted as own troops? What proportion of troops should be used to perform police work?

Presently, there seems to be consensus on some answers to these questions. Military manuals agree that the main criterion for determining troop density in occupation scenarios is population density, so troop per population rates are now universally used. Historical experience of successful counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in different contexts suggests that required troop densities are in the range of 60–210 per 10,000 of the local population (McGrath 2006, 162). There is also consensus concerning the need for greater troop density where the intensity of insurgent activity is higher. In this regard, some analysts propose troop density for three different levels of intensity in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. In settings where insurgencies exhibit ongoing military activity (intense level), troop density needs are estimated in the range between 100 and 200 per 10,000. In situations characterized by frequent clashes between civilian factions (intermediate level), troop density requirements are reckoned in range between 40 and 100 per 10,000 inhabitants. In generally peaceful contexts (low level), a typical troop density is assessed in the range of 20–40 per 10,000.¹³ Furthermore, historical experience suggests that about one third

of the force in counterinsurgency or stabilization operations should be allocated to address police work, including vehicle checkpoints, protection and escort of persons, crowd control, tactical operations, crime prevention and control, and conflict mediation, among others.¹⁴

These parameters drawn from counterinsurgency doctrine shed light in considering present day military and police troop density figures for Colombia, a country where counterinsurgency operations persist in peripheral areas and scarcely populated areas while stabilization operations mainly prevail in more densely populated areas to counter the activities of criminal structures dealing with the challenges focused on by the multidimensional security approach, among them, drug trafficking and other activities such as trafficking in persons, corruption, asset laundering, and attacks to cyber security and illicit trafficking in weapons, among others. An outstanding feature in the case of Colombia is widespread diffuse social violence expressed in a national murder rate in 2012 of around 33 per 100,000 inhabitants, with more than a quarter of its 1,122 municipalities recording murder rates equal to or above the national average.

The overall situation in Colombia corresponds to an intermediate stage of operational intensity, which according to counterinsurgency parameters reviewed above, demanding troop density in the range between 40 and 100 troops per 10,000 inhabitants. Recent reports on the size of the security forces in Colombia mention figures in the range of 285,000 troops in the armed forces and 161,000 troops in the national police.¹⁵ Based on an estimated total population of 46,581,823 for 2012,¹⁶ Colombia currently has a density of 96 troops per 10,000 inhabitants, of which nearly a third are committed to police work, suggesting that troop density is situated in the upper end of the range established by counterinsurgency doctrine for intermediate intensity operational scenarios.

This “balanced” troop density in Colombia is the result of efforts for more than a decade spent fighting guerrillas, paramilitaries and, more recently, “criminal gangs linked to drug trafficking” (CGLDT)¹⁷ in order to regain government control of territories previously under the influence of these groups, many of which were home to large extensions of illicit coca crops. Combined counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency efforts have significantly reduced the numbers of guerrilla, paramilitary, and CGLDT combatants as well as of illicit coca cropping areas.


In 1999, when the illicit coca cropping area in Colombia was nearly 160,000 hectares, 85 percent of this area was concentrated in twenty-nine municipalities. A decade and US\$5 billion later, coca cropping area was

slashed to nearly 67,000 hectares, and the 30,000 strong standing forces of non-state illicitly armed groups had been cut to a quarter of their original size. Municipalities affected by their activities fell from over 500 in 2004 to around 300 in 2009.¹⁸ See Figure 2.

Figures provided by the Colombian Ministry of Defense reckon that numbers of non-state illicitly armed units, as well as their standing forces operating in different parts of the country have significantly declined since 2004:

- In 2004, 168 non-state illicitly armed units totaled a joint standing force estimated in the range of 24,500–49,200 combatants; nearly 40 percent belonged to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (estimates range between a minimum of 10,300 and a maximum of 20,000), 40 percent to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) (10,025–19,950), and the remaining 20 percent to National Liberation Army (ELN) (4,175–9,250).
- In 2006, 111 non-state illicitly armed units summed together an estimated standing force in the range of 11,850–23,350 combatants; two thirds belonged to FARC (7,775–16,150), 20 percent to CGLDT (2,425–4,300), and the remaining 15 percent to ELN (1,650–2,900); and
- In 2009, forty-eight non-state illicitly armed units gathered an estimated standing force in the range of 7,850–17,550 combat-

Figure 2. Total Illicit Coca Cropping Area, Colombia 1999-2010.



(Source: SIMCI, 2000 -2011.)


ants; three fourths belonged to FARC (5,475–13,350), 20 percent to CGLDT (2,075–3,650), and less than 5 percent to ELN (300–550)¹⁹ See Figure 3.

Despite these significant reductions, the shortcomings of the combined anti-narcotic and counterinsurgency strategy are increasingly visible as a result of the successful adaptation of these non-state armed actors to counterinsurgency and coca crop eradication efforts: according to the Ministry of Defense and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), illicit armed groups persist in approximately 150 municipalities where major coca cropping areas have been resilient to eradication efforts.²⁰

As the number of illicit armed units and their standing forces have declined over time, a trend has emerged: there is growing concentration of illicit armed units in forty-nine municipalities that persistently record 78–80 percent of the total annual coca cropping area in Colombia during the second half of the decade ending in 2010. According to the location and estimated force of non-state illicitly armed units reported by the Ministry of Defense, the referred municipalities sheltered 36 percent of their estimated standing forces in 2004, 42 percent in 2006, and 73 percent in 2009.²¹

Several hypotheses can be offered to interpret this trend. An obvious one has to do with the financial support provided by rents forcefully extracted from coca croppers and buyers. Another is the fact that municipalities where coca crops have persisted in the past usually have areas which are densely

Figure 3. Illicit Armed Groups in Colombia: Estimated Standing Force 2004, 2006, 2009.



(Source: UNODC/ Government of Colombia 2005; 2007; 2010; calculations and graph by author.)

planted with landmines, mainly to resist manual crop eradication implemented by the government since 2005, making them more defensible in the face of ground based counterinsurgent operations. Finally, areas where coca cropping persists over time are likely to have been affected by permanent forced displacement of their original tenant, and in many cases have been repopulated with households that are subordinated or loyal to the locally dominant illicit armed group.

Complementing the counter-narcotic effort is the counter-insurgent National Territorial Consolidation Plan (PNCT), which aims to ensure sustainable security and peace in regions affected by illicit crops and the presence of illicit armed groups. Consolidation areas are selected based on the historic convergence of destabilizing factors such as fragile state presence, persistent illicit cropping and presence of illicit armed groups, high rates of forced displacement and victimization, as well as widespread environmental destruction. The implementation of the PNCT began in the Macarena region (Meta) in 2007 and is expanding to other keys areas such as Catatumbo (Norte de Santander), Montes de Maria (Bolívar and Sucre), northern Antioquia, Córdoba, Putumayo and the Pacific Coast Lowlands in Nariño, among others. To achieve its goals the PNCT develops and maintains local legal economic activities supported on strategies designed to “ensure institutional presence with social development”.²²

Weighing the results of a decade’s worth of “war on drugs” in Colombia it seems that government policy makers and officials have helplessly painted themselves into a corner while leaving open room for non-state illicitly armed groups to carry on with their business. In effect, anti-narcotic and counterinsurgent efforts have pushed drug traffickers and non-state illicitly armed groups to find an extended number of locations within the country’s vast and scarcely populated territory that offer them adequate conditions to continue pursuing their business, thus overextending the state military and police force capacity to sustain authoritative “legal” territorial governance structures on a permanent basis, even with troop densities in the high end of the range established by counterinsurgency doctrine in medium intensity operational scenarios.

In the process of being displaced by counter-narcotic or counter-insurgent operations from one location to another, non-state armed actors have figured out local governance arrangements that allow them to readily reestablish their cash flows by means of illicit coca crops in areas abandoned in the past by forceful pressure. Upon their return, fallow cropping areas and economically viable cropping extensions are easily reactivated on the

basis of past experience, as are sources for local labor and production input. Processing infrastructure is easily set up as well as commerce for produce. As the cycle repeats itself, traffickers and non-state illicitly armed groups have become more efficient in expanding coca cropping areas rapidly with the aid of previously trained locals that remain loyal or subordinated to them, as well as by exploiting other cash generating activities such as extracting rents from gold mining, timber, and land grabbing activities, together with certain local legal enterprises. In short, the “war on drugs” has taught them to adapt temporary governance structures to take advantage of an immense territorial extension (the combined area of the forty-nine municipalities in observation totals nearly 300,000 km², roughly an area equivalent to the size of Poland), with quick access to cash and broad opportunities to momentarily gain military and political initiative in the pursuit of their businesses.

In fact, after a decade of being targeted by combined counter-narcotic and counter-insurgent operations, Colombia’s non-state illicitly armed groups have successfully installed in their tactical book what Bruce Bagley has labeled the “cockroach effect.” That is,

...the displacement of criminal networks from one city/state/region to another within a given country or from one country to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state authorities.²³

Nation-Building or Building Local Partnerships Between Political Entrepreneurs and Criminal Organizations?

In the framework of efforts directed to regain state control of territorial governance structures functioning under hybrid political orders, nation-building initiatives represent the other side of the same coin of counterinsurgent and stabilization operations. Nation-building is promoted as a strategy for constructive state-society engagement.²⁴ States often tend to legitimize counterinsurgent and stabilization operations as a necessary step in order to introduce democratization. Yet in many cases democratization unintendedly favors partnerships between political entrepreneurs and criminal organizations, delivering them control of “official” rule-making powers which can be used to benefit a few and to put the majority at graver risk than in previous social and political orders.

Political entrepreneurs are usually figures specialized in leading struggles for legitimacy and recognition of a social group and its claims. They normally specialize in creating and manipulating political identity as a

powerful lever to encourage collective action. They also motivate and drive collective action by means of their connections with specialists in violence, such as non-state illicit armed groups or organized criminal structures, willing to provide their technical and professional skills. In sum, political entrepreneurs generally specialize in threatening to use violence in order to advance their claims.²⁵

Thus "electoral" democratization in local contexts incentivizes politicians to seek votes in poorer, "under-governed" districts by establishing relationships with local strongmen and exchanging personal or public assets for votes. The outcome is the development of complex relationships between local strongmen, some of whom dominate criminal structures, and public administration circuits. The resulting alliances usually gain incontestable position to manipulate local "electoral machines" and take over the local state apparatus through the corruption of political authorities eager for cash to finance their campaigns. In time, these relationships usually allow the former to accumulate enough influence on their own to shed their original political patrons, and substitute them putting up their own candidates in office.²⁶

Criminal activities thrive as local authorities are overwhelmed by the task of governing conflicting interests and claims, particularly in environments of inequality, exclusion, and progressive informalization. In the resultant hybrid political system, "law and order" emerge as a result of a variable symbiosis between officials (local government agents, police, and justice administrators), local "power players" (common criminality, non-state illicitly armed groups), and "moral authorities" (local leaders, priests, evangelical pastors, and successful local entrepreneurs), in shifting alliances that oscillate between selective involvement, insulation, and abandonment, alternately seeking forms of accommodations and confrontation with the local legal and illicit "power brokers".²⁷

Colombia provides an illustrative case of the political and institutional dynamic described above. As a result of political and fiscal decentralization reforms that were passed during the 1980s in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system, non-state actors gained and strengthened their grip on public budgets in territories and populations under their influence. In this manner a significant share of decentralized public resources were in fact made available to finance the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right.²⁸

Subsequently, in 2003 new political movements backed by right wing paramilitary groups were able to elect 251 mayors and nearly 400 town councilmen in different regions of the country.²⁹ Over the past ten years,

many elected officials representing these movements have been brought to justice before Colombia's Supreme Court, and legal electoral reforms have raised the voting threshold needed for a political movement or party to be officially recognized by the National Electoral Organization.³⁰

Yet in 2011 the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), a non-governmental organization monitoring local electoral campaigns on the ground in order to assess risks concerning use of political violence and electoral fraud, found the highest risk ratings in municipalities located in border areas associated with drug, firearms, and ammunition smuggling routes operating through Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as municipalities included in the National Territorial Consolidation Plan mentioned in the previous section. This, in spite of efforts and resources spent for more than a decade on major counter-insurgency and antinarcotic operations in Colombia.

Even more alarming, the findings point to the fact that the overall risk of electoral fraud has not declined since 2006 and that most of the present risk is endorsed to corrupt politicians and public servants threatening to rig elections from within the Electoral Organization.³¹

Conclusions

This article began by considering the scope of the future outlook of the world in the next couple of decades, as recently proposed by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). According to the NIC the probable outcome will be shaped by the way in which tensions between governments and non-state actors are resolved in the different dimensions of development, including economic, social, political, and cultural issues. The result will depend on how each part proves able to adapt in order to harness change instead of being overwhelmed by it.

The NIC's framework offers a vantage point to consider governments' concerns regarding security in today's world. Presently government efforts in this respect are increasingly focused on non-state actors involved in drug trafficking, sex slavery, corruption, asset laundering, attacks to cyber security, and illicit trafficking in weapons, all of which have emerged in the globalized world as a multidimensional challenge to human and state security. Thus the "multidimensional security approach" argues for the need to develop appropriate hemispheric cooperation and multifaceted responses involving partnerships between governments, the private sector, and civil society in order to successfully deal with these complex challenges.

Yet when considering concrete cases in which states are committed to fighting these new threats to security, as in the case of Colombia for the past

couple of decades, measures are clearly directed to warrant a state-centric model with evident underpinnings related to the standard doctrine of counterinsurgent and stabilization operations, bluntly reducing security priorities to national security objectives. This perspective generally overlooks the security needs of people with particular identities, political values, and demands that may best be met by responses led by non-state actors. This omission is one of the main flaws of the counterinsurgent and stabilization doctrine that aims to impose democratic governance standards in a top-down fashion, as is reflected in the unsatisfactory results obtained to the present with this type of operations in areas of the world labeled by the U.S. Department of state as “terrorist safe havens.”

Lack of nuance in this regard has led policymakers to characterize territories not under control of state-centered governance structures as potential threats to national security. Hence the concepts of “ungoverned” or “undergoverned” areas negatively express the preference of states for state-centered territorial governance structures, and legitimize international crusades to criminalize non-state actors that govern these territories not following proper “democratic governance standards.”

Clearly some of these “safe havens” are under control of criminal organizations and offer favorable conditions for criminal activity to thrive without detection and with impunity, and provide their perpetrators refuge from efforts to combat or counter them, making them convenient launching pads for terrorist attacks against nation-states and the interests they represent. Yet, universal contempt for territorial “vacuums” outside the control of a nation-state may lead to wrongful demonization and criminalization of non-state actors that are able to legitimately deliver to a compliant social base adequate governance services and goods more effectively than the nominally “legal” territorial sovereign. Such policies may lead to more instability in the future without bringing the world any closer to resembling the simplistic, nation-state based “political map of the world.”

In 2030 it is probable that concerns related to the security needs and demands of people—that is, human security—as well as the security of the state, will still be linked to principles and institutions such as international law, the respect for state sovereignty and non-intervention, faithful compliance of treaties and covenants, and acting appropriately in accordance with constitutional provisions of each state. However, the relevance and incidence that these principles and institutions will have in delivering governance goods and services—security among them—will depend on the ability of national and international policymakers to expand their understanding of

security beyond the state-centric conception, and to develop approaches that allow states to live with territorial governance responses that have non-state actors at their heart.

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SECURITY, "UNGOVERNED AREAS" AND NON-STATE ACTORS

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**IV:
INSURGENCIES AND
ORGANIZED CRIME**

The Background and Current Negotiations with FARC

Ambassador Alfonso López Caballero,
Former Colombian Ambassador to Canada

When I was first elected to Congress, another junior congressman was Iván Márquez, who today heads the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) negotiating team in Havana, Cuba. He had been elected with the slate of the recently created *Unión Patriótica*. At the time, nobody knew he was a FARC Commander. We had a cordial relationship and on one occasion I invited him and his girlfriend to have lunch at my home. One day, as the leaders of the *Unión Patriótica* started to get killed, he soon vanished, having gone underground. Some ten years later, I was appointed minister of the interior. As such, I was partly responsible for security in the country and the Ministry was the ward of the leaders of the guerilla groups that had demobilized, such as M-19 (*Movimiento 19 de abril*/19 of April Movement), EPL (*Ejército Popular de Liberación*/Popular Liberation Army) and ELN (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*/National Liberation Army) during the Barco and Gaviria peace processes and with whom the government had made some commitments. During this time, I got to know them and became friends with some of the former guerilla leaders who I occasionally consult on matters regarding security. A couple of years later, the new government made me part of the negotiating team in the peace process. As a government negotiator, I went to San Vicente del Caguán for a couple of days every other week to meet with the guerrillas. I then had the opportunity to again see Iván Márquez, who was one of the rising stars in the FARC.

Regarding the ongoing peace talks, I am cautiously optimistic. Circumstances have changed substantially over the past years. I think there is an important incentive for FARC to negotiate on three levels: at the military, political, and international level. At the military level, the armed forces have been tremendously strengthened with over 7 billion dollars of American aid through Plan Colombia, with a very substantial increase in the number of professional soldiers (vs. recruits) and with a very effective intelligence service, especially on the part of the police. As a result, whereas the historic leaders of FARC died of old age while still in the leadership, their successors

were killed by the army after only a few years of assuming leadership. Mono Jojoy was bombed by the air force, and Alfonso Cano was followed by police intelligence and killed by the army in his camp. Of particular importance has been the fleet of war helicopters Sikorski Blackhawks that came with Plan Colombia. They are armored craft, equipped with intelligent missiles, and fly fast and quietly, including in poor weather conditions. The days when FARC could concentrate on over a thousand guerrillas and overrun an army base like Patascoy or Las Delicias are over. Now the rapid deployment force of these helicopters can reach any point in the country within hours and dispose of attackers. As a result, FARC has had to revert to old guerrilla tactics: isolated ambushes, snipers, and attacks on infrastructure. Their offensive capability has been substantially reduced. Even though they have not been defeated and they continue to have the potential to cause substantial harm, they are contained and it is unrealistic that they are able to come to power through the force of weapons—and they know it. The only fate the leaders can expect, if they continue the war, is to end their days in the jungle running from the army (as was the case with Cano) until one day they are killed.

At the political level, the paradox is that FARC has become an obstacle for left-wing populism to gain power by the regular electoral process, as has been the case in most of Latin America. The former guerrilla leaders, or sympathizers, are in office by popular elections. Such is the case with former guerrillas in Brazil, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and Salvador, or persons close to that ideology, such as the leaders of Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Ecuador. FARC has had the effect of a vaccine against left-wing populism. As a result, the country, in contrast with most of Latin America, has turned right. The current progressive government is center-right and the strong opposition comes from the hard right.

At the international level, countries that might have supported FARC in the past have changed priorities. Russia and Eastern Europe are no longer communist, nor is China interested in guerrilla wars. Cuba, which in the 1960s and 1970s, sponsored guerrilla groups and supported guerrilla invasions in Colombia with the M-19, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia with Che Guevara, who had vowed to turn the Andean Mountains into a new Sierra Maestra, is no longer interested in playing that role. Cuba's priority today is to get the United States to lift the fifty-year old trade embargo, which is strangling them especially after the end of the support of the Soviet Union. For that, Cuba needs the solidarity of the rest of the continent to pressure the United States. Consequently, the country is induced to play a constructive role and have done so. Fidel Castro declared not long ago that

guerilla war is no longer a valid option to reach power, and in the case of Colombia, his influence has been positive. When the brother of President Betancur was kidnapped by the ELN in 1983, it was through Castro's intermediation that he was freed (President Betancur had just reestablished relations that had been broken after the M-19 invasion). When the brother of President Gaviria was kidnapped by a fringe guerilla group in 1996, President Gaviria appealed to Castro for assistance, who sent an envoy that managed to liberate him shortly before he was due to be executed. When, after the capture of Rodrigo Granda (now FARC negotiator) in the streets of Caracas in 2004, Chávez broke off relations with Colombia and the two countries were on the brink of war. Subsequently, Castro sent his vice-minister of foreign affairs to Venezuela and another official from the Ministry to Colombia to normalize relations. Thus, for Cuba it is an advantage to play a constructive role and host the current peace negotiations.

As for the Venezuela of Chávez, it is evident that to appear as an ally of FARC does not produce sympathy in Colombia. On the contrary, FARC is an obstacle for the expansion of *chavismo* in Colombia by electoral means, as has been the case in other countries. It is in their political interest also to support the peace process.

There are clear indications that the current peace negotiations are moving in the right direction. The five point negotiating agenda agreed to by FARC closely mirrors the government's program:

- Agrarian issues (*Ley de tierras*)
- Victims of the conflict (*Ley de víctimas*)
- Participation in politics (*Marco jurídico para la paz*)
- Drug trade
- End of the conflict

The government has declared emphatically that any major changes in the political or economic structure can only be brought about through the regular political process by obtaining the required majorities to pass the desired laws.

What is really at stake is some form of amnesty for the guerrillas and the potential opportunity to participate in politics. In past peace processes with the M-19, the EPL, and a sector of the ELN, upon demobilizing they were not prosecuted and many quickly entered politics. The leaders of the M-19 became presidential candidates, governors and mayors, and one is currently the mayor of Bogotá. Several guerrillas from the EPL became mayors

of towns in the Urabá region, and one of them joined the Uribe government and was in charge of human rights in the vice-presidency. But now things are not so simple. On the one hand, there are international factors such as the International Criminal Court, and the fact that some of them have extradition requests from the United States. On the other hand, and more importantly, the climate of public opinion has changed and there is a very strong current against granting them impunity.

There are many very influential voices that are against the peace process if it means impunity for the guerrillas. Among them the most popular politician in the country: former President Álvaro Uribe, as well as the Attorney-General and the National Federation of Cattle Breeders, to mention only a few. The president has said that the agreements reached at the negotiating table require some popular validation, presumably a referendum, and it is not absolutely certain that it would be won. However, as previously mentioned, I am cautiously optimistic.

If the peace process is successful, the political element will be withdrawn from the violence that affects some sectors of Colombian society. Presumably, it will mean the end of attacks by FARC on the armed forces and the country's infrastructure (pipelines and power installations). It will not be translated immediately into increased security since, for the most part, violence in the main cities is due to common criminality.

Corruptive Destabilizing Influences of Powerful Organized Crime Groups on Weak Security Institutions in Latin America: An Intelligence Perspective on Mexico and Colombia

Greg Purdy, International Risk Advisor,
CKR Global Risk Solutions

In an extensive assessment written by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's (CSIS) Research and Analysis branch back in 2000 on the subject of international corruption and the rapidly growing global threats by various transnational criminal groups throughout various areas of the world, the Service noted the following in its initial preamble on this very tangible and growing threat:

In any nation where transnational criminal groups are extremely powerful, even though the state may have nominal control over its sovereignty, the reality is that criminal syndicates are likely holding the reins. This has security implications not only for the country itself, but also, given the borderless nature of crime in today's world, for the neighbors of any such criminalized state. Unchecked transnational criminal activity can challenge a nation's sovereignty in other ways. Other nations may adopt (tactical and strategic) measures designed to protect their country and citizens from transnational crime which may have (far-reaching) extra-territorial consequences...Given that transnational crime groups do not consider international borders as impediments, they are not only a threat to the nations where they are based, but threaten any society where they conduct their activities...in the case of less advanced nations with weak structures and/or tenuous legitimacy, the power wielded by transnational criminal organizations can even rival that of the state.¹

In addressing the internal corruption problems even further, the Service went on to add that “cooperation among transnational criminal organizations, already a major factor in the new world order of crime, is expected to continue and expand. Partnerships, bartering arrangements and alliances, either short or long-term, allow these syndicates to better evade law enforcement agencies, to share existing infrastructure and to improve risk management (through corruption of existing state security organizations).”² This intelligence assessment also noted that, in many regions of Latin America, extremely powerful organized crime groups (also sometimes referred to as “drug cartels”) have a stranglehold on local and regional economies and their various security institutions. Further, they have also become entangled with such terrorist organizations as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru and, to some extent, smaller domestic reactionary movements throughout the region. When there is close cooperation between the drug organizations and these various other reactionary forces that have long held sway in Latin America, an additional dimension is added to the corruptive issues already existing within weak national, state, and local security institutions.³

The Service also has previously assessed that “while the relationship between drug dealers and these groups has been contentious at times, insurgents are sometimes paid (in some form whether it is cash or the actual narcotics itself) to provide security services for drug traffickers—they often ‘tax’ drug operations in areas they control and, in some instances, they are directly involved in narcotics cultivation.”⁴ In so doing, the organized crime group/cartels and the insurgent organizations have clearly formed an important bond, which is central to their continued operations and which, together, can undermine the overall stability of the countries in which they operate often with impunity and freedom from investigation and/or attacks by the local, state, or national security agencies in the region that have been corrupted. It would not be incorrect to suggest the weaker developing third world countries in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are extremely susceptible to the corruptive influences of existing transnational organized crime groups and, unfortunately, this can also apply to even stronger Western countries as well. Fast-forward to 2013 and this critical assessment still holds true and, in many ways, is perhaps even more valid now in certain Latin American countries of note. For the purposes of this rather short and limited study, the two most maligned countries discussed are Mexico and Colombia, which have received the most notoriety of all the countries battling the drug cartels and corruption within Latin America as a whole.

Mexico

Perhaps no other country in Latin America has been more pointedly tainted or perceived as being out-of-control with corruption and drug wars as Mexico where daily headlines of the ongoing pitched, violent battles between the security forces and drug cartels and inter-cartel battles have seemed unending. Mexico has been experiencing a tremendous upsurge in violence in recent years and to put a perspective on all of this, it is important to remember that of the numerous major drug cartels throughout the world today, eight are Mexican-based and they include the Sinaloa, Tijuana, Gulf, Beltran Leyva, Los Zetas, La Familia, Carillo Fuentes, and the Arellano Felix organizations. Other so-called “splinter groups” include the Cartel Pacifico Sur, New Federation and the Knights Templar. They all currently control a minimum of seventeen to eighteen of the thirty-two Mexican States with thousands losing their lives since former President Calderón came to power and declared war on these gangs in Mexico, deploying more than 50,000 military troops and federal police into the battle. These statistics include more than 47,000 people having been killed since Calderón launched his military offensive against the cartels back in 2006 and this figure is likely to climb higher as the new Peña Nieto administration continues its war on the cartels.⁵ With more than 90 percent of the cocaine now entering Canada from Mexico, that country has truly become a major source of concern for Canadian police authorities with various news sources now reporting the growing influence of the Mexican cartels into the lower mainland area of British Columbia and the local organized crime groups operating there.⁶

During a recent meeting with two former and current senior officials with the Mexican security establishment, the subject of internal corruption arose and one bluntly admitted that Mexican security institutions cannot even protect their own citizenry now, let alone foreigners who visit the country.⁷ His reasons were clear: the reach of the various drug cartels throughout the entire Mexican security apparatus is so pervasive and the corruption levels so high that to even consider successfully combating this well organized and clearly overwhelming threat must acknowledge the inherent failings and weaknesses of the state’s security institutions themselves, which continue to be unable to effectively battle the ongoing corruption from within. In February 2009, a U.S. government report warned that Mexico had certainly made significant inroads in the battle against its various domestic organized crime groups (cartels) but cautiously also noted that “the Mexican government’s progress...comes against a backdrop of continuing high levels of corruption and turmoil within Mexico’s security and judicial bodies...cor-

ruption throughout Mexico's public institutions remains a key impediment to successfully curtailing the power of the drug cartels."⁸ Two years later, the Rand Corporation would state that in assessing the overall roots of corruption within Mexico, it would appear that while corruption levels in some security institutions have indeed fallen due to Mexico's serious attempts at serious reform, which include heightened "continuity in elected officials and their policies, coordination within and between levels of government, and transparency and accountability," unfortunately "police corruption (itself) has remained generally stable at a high level."⁹

Of course, much of these problems can be traced to poor salaries, inadequate training, no accountability and non-existent "whistle-blower" mechanisms with which to report incidents of corruption and cooperation with organized crime groups by individual security officers. The National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) has reported that these incidents include "police, especially at the state and local level, [being] involved in kidnapping, extortion, and in providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of, organized crime and drug traffickers.... [with] local forces in particular being poorly compensated and directly pressured by criminal groups, leaving them most vulnerable to infiltration."¹⁰ The CNDH goes on to note that the overall responsibility for investigation abuses at the federal police level rests with the Attorney General or the Secretariat of Public Administration, depending on the type of offense; but it is important to remember that corruption also extends into these latter two federal offices as well, thus complicating the entire question of official "oversight" both within and outside the Mexican government security apparatus.¹¹

In January 2009, the government took a more stringent line to try and get a handle on the overall corruption problem by passing legislation that established a four-year deadline to (in essence) "vet" all the personnel then serving in Mexico's roughly 2,600 police forces using what was then termed a series of "testing mechanisms." This particular legislation, termed "Operation Cleanup," required all police forces to not only meet certain "compensation and/or training standards" but also gave federal, state, and local authorities the power to fire corrupt or officers deemed unfit for duty. Following the commencement of "Operation Cleanup," authorities began arresting politicians, judges, and police officers and this included: the arrest of ten mayors, a judge, and sixteen police officers in Michoacán;¹² the arrest of ninety-two police officers in Hidalgo; the takeover of the entire police force of Guadalupe; the arrest of senior officers (including the police chief) of Ciudad Juárez; the dismissal of some 3,200 federal police officers (or 10 percent) of the

federal force; the dismissal of an additional 465 state and local police officers; and the arrest of several prison guards and officials implicated in the mass prison escape of over 130 gang members in the State of Coahuila.¹³ Other arrests included federal migration officers, custom officers, and other private security officials working in the corporate sector. While this so-called “national vetting” process has been successful in weeding out some of the worst instances of police corruption, it is important to note that ten of the thirty-one states have not even evaluated half of their overall police forces yet and there is no indication exactly when the program can be considered completed and deemed a “success.”¹⁴

Of course, this unprecedented effort to “clean house” within the nation’s police forces and other security institutions throughout the country also involved the role of another key security institution: the Mexican Intelligence Service (CISEN). CISEN itself is relatively new in the intelligence world having been established in 1989; however, this security institution has since its inception certainly progressed in a very positive and professional direction through the recruitment of trusted officers. Indeed, CISEN has long played a very strong role in trying to root out corruption within the various federal, state, and local government and security institutions throughout the country. Several years ago, CISEN and other trusted departments were allocated a relatively new but important responsibility, namely the lengthy and time consuming task of polygraphing all individuals working in various key security sectors of the Mexican federal government. While a seemingly admirable and effective attempt to clean up corruption within the country, it unfortunately has only been successful in processing 10–15 percent of the designated personnel at various government levels throughout the country.¹⁵ This is largely due to the sheer immensity of the task and the fact that Mexican public officials involved in ongoing security investigations are constantly moving around to different positions as the government changes every six years and the screening process is simply not designed to be conducted on a regular basis.

In many ways, it is a losing battle not so much because the effort is not there but more because the sheer power of the drug cartels, which have in so many ways destabilized an already weak Mexican security structure whether it be at the federal, state or local levels where poor salaries and almost negligible training have served to cripple the government’s war against the various organized crime groups throughout the country. Hillary Clinton, then U.S. Secretary of State, paid a visit to Mexico a couple of years ago and proclaimed before her official arrival that Mexico was looking more like

Colombia roughly twenty years ago when the narco- traffickers under Pablo Escobar controlled certain parts of that country.¹⁶ While good headlines, literally, nothing could be further from the truth. Mexico's drug cartels are collectively far more powerful than the old Escobar cartel ever was in Colombia and it could be said that there are perhaps nine or ten Pablo Escobars now running around in Mexico right on the very doorstep of the United States and each have the capability to destabilize certain regions of Mexico should they choose to do so. To date, these various violent groups have left the Mexican tourism industry alone although they have carried out attacks against security forces and other gangs within such tourist zones as Puerto Vallarta, Cancún, and Mazatlán. The Mexican government is extremely concerned about the impact that its public perception of being a dangerous country with corrupt security forces could have on its very vibrant and lucrative tourist industry, and it has launched a very public campaign to reassure visiting tourists that it is a safe country to visit. The important difference to remember here is that the tourism industry in Mexico is still very strong but the various government departments linked to this industry are themselves open to corruption by the various drug organizations operating in the same tourist zones. With corruption running rampant throughout the police and security institutions, the new Peña Nieto administration is now reportedly intent on continuing an intensive and wide ranging policy review previously initiated by the Calderón government as to the best way to proceed from this point forward and get the country's corrupted security institutions back under some form of manageable control.¹⁷ This now includes the creation of a new national police force that will seek to recruit some 10,000 newly vetted and screened police officers and the creation of a unified command of all state police forces throughout the country.¹⁸

While much of former President Calderón's counter drug cartel efforts have involved the use (and reliance upon) the military due to the seemingly systemic corruption within the ranks of the local, state, and even federal law enforcement agencies at the highest levels of the security bureaucracy, the situation is now becoming both very dire and increasingly urgent in Mexico. In a recent U.S. security publication, it was noted (in stating the obvious) that:

Bribery/corruption has long been widespread throughout Mexican politics. Mexico is well known for its illegal drug trade and the corruption the industry fosters...Corruption is rooted in the national culture of Mexico. There is a deeply entrenched culture of impunity and corruption in Mexico's government,

particularly at the state and local level...Mexicans view their police (and security agencies) as having the lowest legitimacy of all governmental functions due to corruption and lack of professionalism...Police corruption and involvement in criminal activity occurs in most parts of Mexico.¹⁹

It is well known that the so-called “cartels” have successfully infiltrated most security agencies at all levels throughout Mexico. In 2008, the government arrested its own Director of Counter Narcotics who had been recruited by one of the organized crime groups to pass along any and all critical operational intelligence related to the ongoing counter-narcotics activities in the country.²⁰ Intelligence sources that advised this shocked U.S. drug enforcement authorities and revealed just how high up within the Mexican security bureaucracy at all levels both the corruption and overall reach of the drug cartels had gone. Over the past two years, while the government has made its usual pronouncements of making positive headway against the various organized crime groups and corruption within even the highest ranks of its security institutions, these pronouncements did not factor in the combination of high levels of poverty, weak institutional security frameworks and increasingly powerful organized crime groups, which have created what the Guardian calls a “perfect storm” of increasing corruption and drug-related violence within Mexico.²¹

The Latin America Monitor further noted in 2011 that “countries with weak institutions will (inevitably) fall victim to narco-trafficking with greater ease, and the lure of drug money has proved difficult to resist for many poorly paid army and police officers—and often higher ranking officials—across the Latin American region.”²² Fired police officers in Mexico often tend to join the criminal ranks (taking their training and information with them) thus only further complicating an already serious situation for all local, state, and national security authorities. President Calderón commented on this fact as far back as March and October 2009 when he stated that corruption was an extremely serious problem within the various levels of police forces throughout Mexico and was thus a primary reason for his government’s decision to turn the counter-narcotics fight in Mexico over to the military adding that “the future of democracy in Mexico is at stake in the government’s fight against corruption and organized crime.”²³ This despite continued reliance on U.S. security support which was outlined in a U.S. diplomatic cable back in 2009 (and “outed” by Wikileaks in 2010) which indicated the Mexican security apparatus was “fractured, ad hoc, and reliant

on U.S. support” to weather the high levels of corruption within.²⁴ It has been the degree of U.S. support that has always been a contentious issue within Mexican political circles but it has also been accepted as a necessary evil and one which often receives unwanted publicity not only for Mexican security officials but also their U.S. counterparts. In early August 2012, two C.I.A. officers were wounded in an Embassy vehicle travelling south of Mexico City. The vehicle, which also held a Mexican naval officer, was attacked by gunmen believed to be Mexican federal police officers. President Calderón had previously authorized a much larger role for U.S. counter-narcotics operations within Mexico but this latest incident (similar to the killing of an I.C.E. agent in 2011 in a U.S. Embassy vehicle), has again called into question the overall “quality” of the federal police force, with one observer stating that “we are seeing the unraveling of what was supposed to be the main achievement in the fight against Mexican organized crime, which is the creation of a trustworthy national police.”²⁵

These latest incidents have only given added firm credence to one of President Calderón’s final public statements on the overall progress against organized crime in Mexico when he said that “after six years and 60,000 deaths, it is impossible to stop the drug trade,” an ominous prediction for incoming President Peña Nieto and President Obama in dealing with what some analysts have characterized as a country which may currently be in the throes of a second Mexican Revolution with corruption within its security institutions at its very heart.²⁶ As one U.S. “think-tank” stated back in 2010, Mexico has ironically become a tremendous beneficiary of the drug trade and internal security corruption with some \$35–\$40 billion now flowing into the national economy each year, with the Mexican police and military almost unmotivated to take the necessary risks to stem this huge assault on its internal stability and security which, ironically, also provides jobs and added income to Mexican families throughout the country.²⁷ This economic impact is another very important factor to consider when looking at Mexico’s inherent inability to successfully combat corruption within its security ranks.

Colombia

With the longest running democracy in South America, Colombia has had a long and violent history with terrorist and criminal groups, which, at one point in the mid-1990s, gave rise to Colombia being characterized as likely the most dangerous and corrupt country in the world. As with Mexico, corruption within Colombia’s security institutions has been instrumental in its ongoing problems in dealing with these domestic threats to peace and

stability within the country. The major difference now is that the corruption is being increasingly driven by the power of the Mexican drug cartels that control both their Colombian counterparts and the degree of corruption within the Colombian security apparatus, particularly the recently disbanded Departamento Administrativo del Servicio (DAS) in 2011.²⁸ This prompted the Peña Nieto administration to plan to increase its overall strategic and tactical ties with Colombia in the fight against crime and drug trafficking as it impacts their own respective security institutions in Mexico.²⁹

Peter Reuter of the University of Maryland asserted in 2002 that Colombia is the only instance where a criminal group has directly attacked a modern government through successfully exploiting the corruption issues within a country's security institutions and the power of narcotrafficking.³⁰ This certainly sets Colombia apart from other countries in Latin America where attacks upon security forces and intelligence agencies, rather than the foundations of government, have been the norm. Most discussions with security officials within the Colombian government tend to center on how the federal government itself will engage the hostile FARC and its related tentacles in so-called "peace negotiations" rather than how the government can tackle internal corruption, which is acknowledged as "self-evident" throughout even the most recent history of Colombia.

Throughout the years, Colombia's security forces have consistently been deemed to be one of the most challenged, sophisticated, and yet problematic institutions in that particular region of Latin America as a whole. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that the primary concern for Canadian security interests is less the FARC, ELN (National Liberation Army) or paramilitaries per se, although we have always been concerned about any members of these terrorist "entities" being able to successfully enter Canada via an already swamped immigration visa process. The real concern is how our own intelligence and police agencies deal with an organized crime and narcotics trafficking network in Colombia whose activities often reach well into Canada and are supported by corrupted security forces throughout the region, the least of which is Colombia itself. Most foreign security forces operating within Colombia do so in the context of cooperation and trying to counter the flow of drugs and weapons that transit that country to/from various destinations around the world. Both the United States and the United Kingdom are the first and second largest donors of security assistance to Colombia, which comes in various forms such as military equipment, advisors, training, and intelligence sharing to select Colombian security departments. As with U.S. military help, this British assistance has included SAS training to the nar-

cotics division within the Colombian National Police, military advice to the Colombian army's counter-insurgency forces, additional military hardware and intelligence equipment, and assistance in setting up an elite "intelligence center" and a joint intelligence committee.³¹ In addition to contributing to these pro-active measures and further to the concerns about known corrupt elements within Colombia's overall security apparatus, this security assistance has also had to deal with any links it may have with violations of human rights activities by domestic security forces within the country as a whole.³² These combined factors provide an extremely difficult and challenging operating environment for all Western foreign police and intelligence services presently working in Colombia.

Evidence of Russian, Irish, Asian, and other organized crime groups as well as Mexican drug gangs cooperating with the FARC have been detected for years and this influence has added to the whole corruption scene within Colombia's security environment. As evidenced in other past and publicly available reports, Colombia has struggled for years with corruption within the old DAS itself with at least three of the former Directors being arrested on various charges. In response to this fact, foreign security and intelligence services had tended to rely more on the military and Colombian National Police (CNP) intelligence directorates for key liaison and operational purposes, although certainly dealing with the DAS was still a requirement in the interests of overt diplomatic cooperation with Colombia in the ongoing fight against the organized crime groups throughout Latin America.

The ongoing requirement for foreign agencies to liaise with the DAS in Bogotá was complicated by the high turnover rate within the intelligence service that included key individuals right up to and including the Director of the DAS itself. In this regard, it is important to note that unlike Mexico, which uses its intelligence service to root out corruption within the nation's security bureaucracy, Colombia had exactly the opposite situation where its former intelligence service was one of the major security institutions to be distrusted. This had tremendous ramifications for those foreign intelligence services operating in the host country where daily operational requirements necessitated close liaison with the very agency that was suspected of being corrupt. In such an operating environment, ongoing efforts to maintain a cooperative and trusted relationship between Colombian and various foreign security forces as a whole often was very problematic to the detriment of all joint counter-narcotic/terrorist operations in the country.

Allegations that the DAS was corrupt are not new and have come from a range of sources including those within the DAS itself. This included an

allegation in 2009 by a former DAS official, Rafael Garcia, that the Colombian intelligence services as a whole have facilitated paramilitary drug trafficking.³³ This also covered ongoing suspicions that the DAS had both supported the paramilitaries in their anti-FARC and narco-trafficking activities as well as defended the prevailing governing political party against its political opponents. The latter allegations took on major implications in 2008 when information surfaced that María del Pilar Hurtado, a former Director of the DAS, may have cooperated with the prevailing President Uribe administration in spying on the political opposition and court judges through the use of unauthorized wiretaps.³⁴

Ms. Hurtado's actual role and whether President Uribe knew what was going on may never be known as she defected to Panama in 2010 causing a brief flurry of protests from Colombia to the Panamanian government, an issue which continues to occupy the new Santos administration but which will likely not receive any firm resolution anytime soon. Ironically, Panama's own Attorney General at the time, Ana Matilde Gómez, had been earlier suspended and banned from travelling abroad for having allegedly illegally authorized wiretaps against some of that country's political opponents.³⁵

Without question, the Hurtado/DAS scandal was a major one for the Colombian government of the day and it is one which continues to impact the credibility of all Colombian security institutions to this very day. Even as far back as 2000 during the Pastrana administration, the FARC and ELN were making comments that the entire Colombian government was so corrupt that "only a revolution" would resolve the situation, a claim that clearly was self-serving but certainly brought the issue even further into the political spotlight.³⁶ In 2010, *The Economist* published an article entitled *Spying and Corruption in Colombia - The Dark Side* that essentially dealt with corruption within Colombia's political and government structure as a whole noting that even the nation's presidents had been complicit in the ongoing web of deceit and lies all in the name of "national security."³⁷

As noted earlier, the influence of the Mexican organized crime groups cannot be overestimated when dealing with their strong influence over both the power of the Colombian organized crime groups and the actual level of corruption within the Colombian security apparatus throughout all sectors of government. One of the major Mexican cartels, Los Zetas, has combined its operations in Colombia with a Colombian group known as Los Rastrojos and together they control much of the territory within Colombia's La Guajira department.³⁸ It is important to remember in this discussion of the weaknesses of the Mexican and Colombian security structures that the level of

sophistication and depth of the various organized crime groups in both countries is extremely effective and the capabilities of their own respective intelligence networks should never be underestimated. It is both extensive and professional and includes counter-intelligence operations, covert surveillance (including electronic), false flag and undercover operations against government security forces, rival cartels, and other targets of interest. These are operational capabilities that work in the favour of these crime groups at all times. In the mid-1990s, a key member of the Cali Cartel was recruited by U.S. and Colombian security authorities and was instrumental in the destruction of the cartel, which was making over \$7 billion per year at that point. Jorge Salcedo would go on to write a tell-all book entitled *At the Devil's Table* and briefly noted the following:

Drug cartels, whether in Colombia or Mexico, cannot function without massive assistance from compromised officials at all levels. Corruption is the oxygen that keeps organized crime alive... the Colombian (and Mexican) public needs to...sweep out officials at all levels who have sold their souls to organized crime... neither country can succeed against its drug gangs without choking off much of the bribery and intimidation that sustain them.³⁹

Salcedo's primary job was overseeing "security" for the Cali cartel and was directly paying bribes to hundreds of high-level Colombian security and political officials. This included one chief of staff to a military commander who received \$20,000 a month, paying off justice officials and prosecutors to lose evidence, misplace paperwork, block search warrants or release prisoners before they could be arrested. He added that "some judges became overnight millionaires ...while politicians were considered a long-term investment... (and) a total of \$6 million in secret donations made Ernesto Samper our President."⁴⁰

Having effective and timely advance intelligence about internal police, intelligence, and rival gang operations is a primary objective for each of the organized crime groups in Mexico and Colombia and they have shown to date that they are not only very good at securing that information but getting it at any cost. The Zetas are particularly adept at this particular activity as many of their members are ex-military and/or ex-police previously trained in intelligence functions for the Mexican government. This "specialty" has been passed along to their Colombian counterparts including the FARC and ELN. Coopting informants within a host country's intelligence and/or police forces

is a major preoccupation of the organized crime groups in Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere in Latin America and that process is greatly enhanced when there are already problems within the host country's security apparatus that make potential informants susceptible to a recruitment approach (i.e. poor salaries, inadequate training, and threats to family members).

Conclusions

Clearly, corruption reigns supreme in both Mexico and Colombia and this short paper only begins to touch on both the extent and depth of this problem for most, if not all, of the security institutions within this large region. In addition to those noted above, most other Latin American countries notably Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, and Argentina have been wrestling with corruption within their own domestic security agencies for years. This battle has taken on added complexity as the Mexican drug cartels have extended their influence further down into those particular countries in South America. In many ways, the Mexican drug cartel problem has become a Latin American problem as a whole from a corruptive destabilizing standpoint. The power and the reach of the Mexican cartels are both far-reaching and overwhelming for the vast majority of security officials who are extremely susceptible to these forces for a variety of reasons already stated. This is particularly true for the smaller countries, which have little resources and even less money to employ in any protracted counter-narcotics war in Central and/or South America as Mexico and Colombia have done in recent years. Unfortunately, the respective drug cartels operating throughout Latin America are also very aware of this deficiency. Indeed, it has only reinforced their own efforts to pursue any and all corruptive actions to both undermine every facet of police, intelligence, and military security operations being employed against them and bring instability to many countries in this particular region of the world.

Notes

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Organized Crime, Institutions, and Security in Central America

José Miguel Cruz, Florida International University,
United States

In March 2010, Guatemalan authorities arrested the national police director and the chief of the police anti-drugs unit on charges of drug-trafficking, abuse of authority, and obstruction of justice. Those detentions came only six months after the preceding head of the Guatemalan national police had been also linked to drug cartels and criminal networks operating inside the police.¹ Two years later, in March 2012, another former director of the Guatemalan police, the first woman leading a law-enforcement institution in the country, was also arrested for her involvement in a number of extra-judicial killings in 2009.²

These cases exemplify the extent of the infiltration of criminal networks within Central American state institutions. Guatemalan institutions are a particularly egregious case but similar events also appear in other Central American countries besieged by criminal violence. In the last five years, top law-enforcement officials in Honduras and El Salvador have been linked and prosecuted for criminal activities ranging from murder to connections with criminal organizations. The cases of top government officials regularly involved in illegal activities reflect an important aspect of the current crisis of public security in Central America: the participation of state agents as perpetrators and partners in criminal structures.

The northern triangle of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) stands as one of the most violent in Latin America and the world. According to the latest official statistics on crime in the region, by 2010 these three countries had a combined average murder rate of 62 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.³ In the last decade, the countries of Central America have experienced an increase in homicidal violence and an unrelenting process of penetration of the security forces by criminal organized groups. Most literature has explained the current security crisis as a direct result of the proliferation of youth gangs known as *maras*,⁴ as well as an ever deeper penetration of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Central America following the Mexican drug on wars launched in 2007.⁵ According to these views, there are two factors that explain the emergence and rise of the main

security threats mentioned above. One, the shifting routes of drug flows in the 1990s from the Caribbean to Central America and Mexico; and two, the policies of deportation that led to the arrival of thousands of gang members from the United States to northern Central America at the end of the 1990s.⁶ While these phenomena have indeed contributed to the increase of violence in the region, I contend that the current security crisis cannot be understood without looking at the history of policies and political decisions that have repeatedly ignored the importance of strengthening criminal justice institutions. These strategies have derailed efforts to develop comprehensive approaches to fight corruption and the penetration of organized crime in local institutions while pumping up the heavy hand approaches in tackling crime.

During the last decade, security policies have swung back and forth between suppression-only approaches and well intentioned overreaching, but haphazardly implemented, policies of security. The result has been that the governments of the northern triangle of Central America have neglected the development of security policies that incorporate long-term strategies aimed at mitigating the structural causes of violence, while tackling at the same time the situational and contingent precipitants of crime. Governments, furthermore, have neglected the creation and enforcement of accountability mechanisms within the security and justice apparatuses. Corruption and lack of accountability are, arguably, the main obstacles to implement a criminal-justice system capable of dealing with the crisis of security in Central America, especially in the northern triangle. As such, they are also one of the most important causes of the current security governance crisis in the region.

In light of this, the decision of the governments to authorize and privilege the use of military forces in their fight against criminal organizations has had negative, even if unintended, consequences for the states' institutional capacities to confront crime and to maintain (and in some cases attain) citizens' trust in its institutions. As pointed out by Santamaría and Cruz (2013), the use of the armed forces and law-enforcement tactical teams has been justified under two interrelated premises. First, the persistence of weak, corrupted, and poorly coordinated police forces at the local and national levels; and second, the upsurge of criminal organizations which proliferating levels of violence and state penetration have demanded a rapid and alternative security apparatus capable of articulating effective responses to crime. Based on these two premises, the governments of the region launched a set of militarized strategies under emergency decrees followed by a declaration of war against gangs and criminal organizations. The most famous decrees

revolved around the so-called *mano dura* plans, which became popular in northern Central America between 2000 and 2007. These strategies constitute what Santamaría and Cruz (2013) have referred to as “the new wars,” that is, wars directed against criminal actors whose main objective is not to attain and/or transform political power but maximize profits from criminal and illegal activities.

The aim of this paper is to describe the security crisis in Central America and examine the institutional efforts that have been implemented to address the issue of insecurity in the region. This paper has four sections. First, it delineates the current security crisis in the region. Second, it reviews the main strategies adopted by the governments of these countries in order to confront criminal organizations, particularly criminal organizations and the *maras*. In the third section, the paper discusses the main contributions in terms of regional cooperation with particular emphasis on the Security Commission of the Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Regional Initiative for Central America’s Security (CARSI). Finally, the paper concludes with a fourth section where potential policy recommendations are presented in order to improve current sub-regional cooperation strategies on issues of security.

The Security Crisis

According to different sources, the countries of the northern triangle of Central America are now considered the most violent region of the world. In the late 2000s, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) entertained the idea that Central American nations “may have recently surpassed the traditional world leaders in the number of murders committed per 100,000 members of the population”.⁷ By 2011, there is little doubt that countries such as Honduras and El Salvador have gone well beyond the historic threshold established by other Latin American countries. Police figures indicate that in 2011 Honduras topped the homicide rate of 86 per 100,000 inhabitants mark, whereas El Salvador reached more than 70 murders per 100,000 populations.⁸ According to unconfirmed official data from 2011, only Guatemala has experienced a relatively stable trend in homicides (42 per 100,000 inhabitants), although the northern region of Petén might see rates above 90 per 100,000.⁹ Still, the Guatemalan rate of homicides is noticeably high, even for Latin American averages.


Homicide rates are just one of the most dramatic indicators of the recent security crisis in the sub-region. Equally important are the high levels of perception of crime and insecurity amongst Central Americans. According

to the 2012 Americas Barometer, in Guatemala and El Salvador, more than 30 percent of the population feels insecure due to crime.¹⁰ In Nicaragua and Costa Rica, perceptions of insecurity are also high, although their levels of homicidal violence do not reach the soaring levels of the northern neighbors.

Besides victimization itself, the role played by criminal organizations of different sort in the production and reproduction of higher perceptions of violence cannot be underestimated. Extensive networks of youth gangs and domestic criminal organizations linked to Mexican and Colombian drug cartels constitute an important variable of this crisis in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These organizations are responsible for extortions, kidnappings, arms trafficking and hit-men networks. Youth gangs are perhaps the most prominent among these groups. Estimates for gang membership reach 28,000 in El Salvador, 20,000 in Honduras, and more than 15,000 in Guatemala.¹¹ There are conflicting data about the extent of gangs' participation in homicides in those three countries, but a review of the most consistent data collected in El Salvador shows that the participation of gang organizations in homicidal violence has been mounting throughout the 2000s. Figure 1 shows the percentage of murders attributable to youth gangs in El Salvador since 1999.

According to an internal report of the Investigation Division of the Salvadoran police, 76 percent of extortions committed in that country were

Figure 1. Percentage of Gang-Related Homicides Recorded by the IML per Year in El Salvador, 1998–2008.



(Source: Author's research based on data from Instituto de Medicina Legal, 1999, 2002, 2009.)

perpetrated by youth gangs, primarily the *Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)* and *Barrio 18*.¹² The same report indicates that in those cases investigated by the police, street gangs demanded nearly \$4 million from their victims in 2011. Guatemalan police reported that local *maras* collected an estimated \$2 million in the suburban community of Villanueva.¹³ Youth gangs have also become an indispensable labor force for criminal activities conducted by stronger cartels in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Street gangs provide security to the corridors of drugs in Central America, conduct retaliation operations against other groups, and control some of the street markets for narcotic leftovers.

In the case of Nicaragua, street gangs had, up until recently, retained a much more “traditional” profile. That is, they had operated in atomized groups whose main goal was to create a sense of cohesion, solidarity, and respect amongst their members. What is more, they were characterized by a rather marginal presence in the production of violence and their participation in criminal activities, limited regularly to robberies and other minor offenses, was aimed at getting resources for drug and alcohol consumption within the gang but did not appear as a main driver of the organization.¹⁴ However, Nicaraguan youth gangs have become more closely associated with drug trafficking organizations in recent years, participating in the local distribution of drugs and providing illegal arms for these groups. Among other things, Nicaraguan gangs have lost their connection with the communities in which they operate, integrate less and more disciplined members, and their organization is oriented towards the sale of drugs, particularly crack.¹⁵ Nonetheless, it is important to say that in the case of Nicaragua, more than the street gangs of the urban centers of the countries, it is the local criminal organizations working in the economically and socially neglected region of the Caribbean Coast who have developed a greater role in the transnational trafficking of drugs and arms from Nicaragua to other countries in the Americas.¹⁶ This penetration of DTOs is even more ostensible in the Atlantic coasts of Honduras and Guatemala.¹⁷

The current landscape of violence and insecurity is mainly driven by the increasing and overpowering presence of transnational DTOs, but in reality, drug trafficking organizations have been operating in Honduras and Guatemala long before the end of the political conflicts of the 1980s, when they established drug transshipment routes in Central America with the help of government officials and military personnel.¹⁸ However, the deranging of the drug flows in the Caribbean in the 1990s and the drug wars in Colombia and Mexico during the 2000s led to the consolidation of transnational crime

in the institutionally weak states of Central America. DTOs in Guatemala and Honduras have effectively taken control over wilderness areas along the Atlantic coast and used them as safe havens and launch pads for international drug trafficking. Groups such as the Mexican Zetas, the Sinaloa cartel, and the scraps of former large Colombian criminal organizations have introduced new conflicts over the control of territories and drug routes, and contributed to the growing death toll. The increasingly transnational character of Zetas in the sub-region deserves closer attention. In contrast to other Mexican DTOs that have established collaborative networks in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala through alliances with local criminal organizations (mostly engaged in smuggling of drugs, firearms, and contraband products),¹⁹ the Zetas have actually decided to recruit nationals from Guatemala that report directly to their organization without the use of intermediaries. In particular, building on their own experience as former Mexican Special Forces units, there is evidence of Zetas having been able to recruit former members of the Kaibiles, an elite counter insurgency unit of the Guatemala army.²⁰ The expansion of the Zetas, through the recruitment of former Guatemalan officials, further illustrates the level of vulnerability of Guatemala's institutions in regards to DTOs and organized crime. It also highlights the need to work towards cooperation initiatives that can strengthen this country's institutional and accountability capacities and should serve as a cautionary tale in regards to the inclusion of Kaibiles in counter-narcotics operations along the Guatemalan-Mexican border.²¹

The Security Strategies

Since the mid-1990s in Central America, security policies have constantly swung back and forth from zero tolerance, heavy handed all-out-war-against-crime campaigns, to rather vague initiatives along some notions of community policing and prevention. The *mano dura* plans implemented with different degrees by the three countries of the northern triangle constitute the best example of the zero tolerance type of programs in vogue during most of the 2000s. *Mano dura* policies revolved around new laws and penal codes that dictated the criminalization of youth by banning any "street group," the expansion of police power by providing them with discretionary faculties, and the limitation of civil rights.²² They allowed police intervention based heavily on military-type strategy.

Honduras and El Salvador both approved laws or legal reforms allowing security forces to pursue and capture youths suspected of belonging to a gang without evidence. In doing that, governments moved to reclaim the use

of national armies in operations against gangs, and developed operations that allowed for the capture and mass incarceration of gang members, thus saturating and overpopulating inadequate penitentiary systems. In fact, one of the first controversial results of the zero tolerance programs in Central America was extreme prison overcrowding. In El Salvador, the National Civilian Police captured nearly 31,000 gang members from 2003 to 2005, although most of them were released immediately after.²³ In Honduras, operations aimed at incarcerating gang members resulted in a much smaller number of gang members in prison. Approximately 5,000 persons were incarcerated in a two-year span, accused of forming part of “illegal associations,” a legal category under which gang members could be jailed.²⁴ The intensity of operations in Honduras, which legal system permitted longer prison sentences for gang members, reduced the number of gang members on the streets during the first months and, along with them, the number of later arrests. However, human rights conditions deteriorated as these policies were implemented.²⁵ Guatemala never reformed or enacted a special anti-gang law as part of a zero tolerance plan, but under the Alfonso Portillo administration (2000-2004), this country was the first in allowing the police to use artifices in the existing laws to carry out massive crackdowns on gangs. Between 2003 and 2000, more than 22,000 persons were detained for gang-related crimes. However, the operations frequently returned poor results in sending all detainees to prison, as judges did not find sufficient evidence for indictment or determined that the evidence was collected illegally.²⁶


Mano dura programs yielded mixed results in Central America. In Honduras, homicide rates remained high but relatively stable (around 45 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) during the implementation of President Maduro’s zero tolerance program. However, homicides increased rapidly during Zelaya’s administration and skyrocketed following the 2009 coup d’état. By 2010, murder rates had increased by nearly 190 percent in comparison with 2004.²⁷ In Guatemala, rates increased from 26 murders per 100,000 people in 2000 to 36 per 100,000 during Portillo’s tenure and continued to climb to 46 by 2009.²⁸ Nonetheless, it is in El Salvador where the *mano dura* programs seem to have produced a significant increment in the levels of crime. Rates went from 36 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003, the year of the implementation of the first *mano dura* plan, to 49 murders per 100,000 people in 2006, when a new phase of the plan was announced by the administration of President Antonio Saca. By 2006, rates reached 65 murders per 100,000 populations. The explicit heavy-handed plans were abandoned in 2007. Although murder rates experienced important declines during 2007

and 2008, the last two years of the Saca administration, violence soared again in 2009, the first year in the government of President Funes (see Figure 2).

In sum, zero tolerance programs left the region not only with more homicidal violence but also with pressing problems in the penitentiary systems, human rights crises, and stronger street gangs. Post *mano dura* initiatives have been characterized by tensions between continuing with aggressive crime-suppression approaches and designing more comprehensive approaches that include intelligence gathering, prevention, and accountability. For instance, the failure of the heavy hand plans in El Salvador prompted President Saca to declare in a summit of the Central American Integration System (SICA) in 2007 that crime prevention should be the most important element in the regional initiatives against crime.²⁹

In Honduras, after the zero tolerance years of President Maduro, President Zelaya adopted a preventive approach, which nevertheless turned out to be more rhetorical than real. After some time, security programs under Zelaya slipped back to more traditional law-enforcement-only approaches, while increasingly using the police and army for political tasks. The growing political conflict and the economic crisis of 2008 ended up diverting the main attention of Zelaya’s government on security. Public security issues and the fight against organized crime were then almost completely neglected during the 2009 coup d’état and during the Micheletti’s government. The police

Figure 2. Number of Homicides in El Salvador, 1998-2011.



(Source: Policía Nacional Civil de El Salvador, 2012.)

as well as the armed forces devoted most of their attention to control the political opposition and the pro-Zelaya movement.

After the restoration of constitutional order with the general elections of 2009, President Porfirio Lobo refocused government's efforts on security. He increased the urban police patrols, enacted an emergency decree in order to send military troops to perform public security tasks, and promoted laws to increase accountability over drug seizures.³⁰ However, these efforts did not stop the spiraling levels of violence, the infiltration of international drug cartels, and, more importantly, the involvement of law-enforcement officers and top government officials in organized-crime activities. Scandals that unveiled the vast networks of corruption within the Honduran police ended up pushing the civilian security apparatus back to the military.

Guatemala, as noted in the introduction, is an interesting case for revealing the conflictive relationships within the governments when enacting and implementing policies against criminal violence. It is also a cautionary note about the spins of the extreme reliance on repression to combat crime. By the mid-2000s, during the administration of President Oscar Berger, top officials in the social and economic cabinets were not inclined to repressive approaches to gangs, but favored preventive plans. In 2005, the government enacted a comprehensive National Policy of Youth Violence Prevention as part of an effort to implement a broader approach to crime. However, law-enforcement officials, including the minister of the interior and the chief of the police, promoted a harsher line to the crime problem. The prevention policy was never fully implemented and the police continued cracking down on criminal groups supported by the public opinion. Some crackdowns degenerated into extralegal cleansing operations, such as the extrajudicial execution of seven inmates in the top-security prison of Pavón.³¹ Top government officials were later indicted and imprisoned for their involvement in illegal operations. Given the levels of corruption and chronic weakness of Guatemalan institutions, this country approved the creation of an in-situ international body capable of conducting investigative and prosecutorial activities within the country. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was sanctioned by the Guatemalan Congress in 2007 and started its operations in January 2008. Although mired in controversies during the first years of the mandate given its faculty to participate as an external complementary prosecutor in criminal proceedings against Guatemalan public officials and organized crime, the Commission has quickly produced significant results. It has successfully conducted investigations regarding high-profile cases, against organized-crime organizations, and against corrupted offi-

cial. In some way, CICIG has become the underpinning of the Guatemalan criminal justice system. It has contributed to the professionalization of rule of law institutions, and has pushed for regulations, policies, and institutional reforms that advance the capability of the government to fight against crime.³² Yet, critics point out that such advances would fade away as soon as CICIG ceases operations in 2013, as institutional transformations have not taken root across the system.³³

In El Salvador, after the cessation of the *Super Mano Dura* plan, the government turned to a more balanced approach against crime, and devoted significant efforts to promote regional cooperation in the fight against organized-crime groups. The new government of Mauricio Funes pledged to a comprehensive anti-crime program. The president backed his approach by reshuffling his security cabinet and creating high-cabinet commissions that would oversee the advances in the areas of law-enforcement and prevention. He also proceeded to the formulation of a national policy of public security and mid-term institutional strategies in every area of public security. These strategies included the strengthening of the investigation capabilities in the police, the underpinning of accountability mechanisms within the law-enforcement institutions, reforms in the penitentiary system, and a significant increase of funds for prevention programs to 14 percent of the security budget.

However, the latter were also characterized by tensions between continuing with aggressive crime-suppression approaches and designing more comprehensive approaches that incorporate intelligence gathering, prevention, and accountability. In El Salvador, for instance, a new government initiative has promoted the creation of municipal committees for violence prevention. These groups aim to increase citizen participation in crime prevention activities. However, a survey conducted by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) showed in 2012 that only 20 percent of Salvadorans have heard of those initiatives.³⁴

Despite these changes, law-enforcement agencies were unable to prevent crime rates from ascending, and the effort to enact a comprehensive prevention strategy stalled as a result of internal disputes at the different levels of the government. In late 2011, Funes responded to the security crisis by reorganizing his security cabinet. He appointed a military general as the new minister of security and an army colonel as the new director of the National Civilian Police. As a result, another reshuffle in the police ranks brought the old guard to the forefront of the law-enforcement institutions and the government turned again to the traditional suppressive approach. However,

in a startling policy turn in 2012, the Salvadoran government engaged in a process of talks with the leaderships of the major gang organizations in the country. Those negotiations yielded a truce between the chapters of MS-13 (*Mara Salvatrucha*) and the Eighteenth Street Gang (*Pandilla 18*) in exchange for the decision of the government to transfer gang leaders to less-restrictive prison facilities and some concessions to the gang organizations.³⁵ The pact abruptly reduced the number of killings, and the average murders went down nearly 45 percent from 2011 to 2012. While government officials have refused to disclose the details of the negotiation process to the public, and important sectors of the Salvadoran society remain skeptical about the implications of the truce for the rule of law in a country already affected by weak institutions and poor governance, the truce has received credit and support from the Organization of American States (OAS), and has been promoted as a model for reducing violence in the region.³⁶

Regional Cooperation

Since the end of the civil conflicts in the 1990s, Central American governments have stated their willingness to work together on security issues and to form a unified block when approaching external donors to fund regional initiatives. However, their integration has been more symbolic than factual.³⁷ The Security Commission of SICA led the efforts to prepare a regional security strategy that was adopted by the Central American governments in 2007. Such strategy addressed eight threats to regional security: organized crime, drug trafficking, deportees with criminal records, street gangs, homicide rates, arms trafficking, terrorism, and corruption. However, the 2009 coup in Honduras and the difficulties to secure enough funds upset the operational development of the strategy. In 2011, after a significant revision of the strategy and the involvement of new international actors, SICA secured the promise of nearly US\$1.1 billion in additional funding for the regional security initiative.

External cooperation has been instrumental in advancing security initiatives in Central America. Since the 1990s, international organizations, such as the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, USAID, and the World Bank have significantly supported security efforts by investing and funding criminal-justice reform programs, especially in the areas of law-enforcement, prevention, and justice administration. According to a study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank and the Washington Office on Latin America, between November 2009 and June 2010, Central American countries benefitted from 375 internationally

funded security programs that added up to nearly US\$1.6 billion. Ninety percent of those funds were allocated to national governments, whereas only 7 percent of the recipients were local governments and municipalities. However, most prevention programs are conducted from city halls, not national governments, and that has contributed to scattered efforts in the implementation of preventive measures.

The United States stands as the most important single source of international cooperation for the Central American countries with a total of US\$377.9 million (33.4 percent of total funds), whereas the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and Spain have each contributed with a little more than US\$140 million (12.5 percent each). Other donors are the European Union, the United Nations, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada. Nearly thirty-five percent of the funds are channeled to institutional strengthening; that is, the development of institutional capacities related to citizen security and management. Twenty percent of the international funds for security are aimed to support prevention programs. Projects for enhancing the institutional capacity to fight against organized crime receive nearly 13 percent of the cooperation funds, and only 0.6 percent is devoted to strategic information development.³⁸

The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) represents the most important cooperation program on matters of security between Central America and the United States. CARSI was created originally as part of the Merida Initiative, an anti-drug trafficking program developed by the Bush Administration focused on Mexico in 2008. As conditions of crime and insecurity have worsened in most Central American countries during the last years, the Obama Administration decided to strengthen the capacities of the seven countries of the isthmus to address the security challenges as well as the underlying economic conditions that contribute to them. From 2008 to 2012, Central America has received more than US\$460 million in security assistance from the United States through the CARSI package. Although an important share of the funds has been devoted to economic development programs, more than 62 percent of the assets have been oriented to narcotics control and law enforcement, in addition to foreign military funds—which represent less than 7 percent of the appropriated funds. In any case, these resources are heavily oriented to support drug interdiction operations and enhance law-enforcement capabilities of the Central American institutions. However, not all U.S. security assistance is channeled through CARSI. In 2011, the United States announced another program called the Central America Citizen Security Partnership, which would add nearly US\$200 mil-

lion to security assistance in the region through other bilateral and regional programs.³⁹ While most of those funding programs have revolved around tackling drug-trafficking and suppressing criminal organizations by stepping up manpower capabilities, weapons, and military resources, most resulting strategies have neglected the necessity of dealing with the problems of corruption and crime inside Central American institutions. Consequently, criminal justice institutions remain chronically pervaded by criminal organizations and crooked officials.

Some Policy Recommendations

The security strategies adopted by most Central American countries have privileged heavy handed and all-out-war approaches to criminal violence. Considering the limited results that such policies have brought in, how could the current security strategies and cooperation initiatives in the region be strengthened? The institutional reforms developed to date have focused on improving the professional and technical capabilities of the criminal-justice systems while they have neglected the enforcement of accountability mechanisms and of preventive measures, which are urgently needed to secure sustainable effects in combating crime and violence. However, any successful security strategy requires state institutions and operators that are robust and accountable enough to fulfill their mandates without violating the rule of law. Regional efforts and international cooperation should put this issue at the top of the list of initiatives to be implemented in the short term.

It is possible to consider three different potential ways in which international cooperation agencies can contribute to reinforce institutional capabilities and transparency mechanisms in the region. These options go from the characterization of institutional strengthening as an essential goal for security reform to a more refined redirection of funds to accountability institutions. Firstly, in many cases, international cooperation agencies can advance significant institutional reform if they are willing to affirm and demand unrestricted transparency and political commitment to institutional accountability on the side of recipient countries. This course of action means a reconsideration of the institutional structure of the security apparatuses, and is, perhaps, the most radical among the set of choices available to actors involved in reform process. In addition, it is also highly politically sensitive. But it also should be one of the options that has to be put on the table as recourse to address the problems of lack of transparency and institutional weakness. Often, in the absence of a strong political commitment on the side of the international community, local institutions continue tolerating ineffec-

tual structures and illegal practices that reproduce the problems of security from the same government operatives.

Secondly, cooperation agencies can lobby for the creation of external independent commissions responsible for investigating abuses, criminal involvement, and impunity in institutions. The implementation of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) by the United Nations, with the support of the Guatemalan government, is an important case in point. The CICIG has been operating in the country since 2007 and aims to support and consolidate Guatemala's investigative and prosecuting capacities against clandestine security organizations and state agents participating in illegal forms of violence. Although some observers claim that the CICIG is supplementing but not necessarily strengthening Guatemala's institutions, it is important to underscore the fact that the commission has taken steps in the right direction. Some authors have suggested that this model could be followed by Honduras and El Salvador, which share some of the challenges that Guatemala's security and justice apparatuses have. As in the case of Guatemala, however, a political coalition would be needed in order to be able to "invite" this initiative. Up until now, there seems to be an ongoing dialogue in both of these countries in order to consider a Honduran or Salvadoran commission, and some have even suggested that a sub-regional commission could be created. In any case, this path of action involves a strong sense of intervention from external actors, and a solid engagement from the international community to see the commission become operative and its recommendations implemented.

Finally, international cooperation agencies can redirect an important share of their assets to the development of comptroller's offices and accountability mechanisms in the criminal-justice institutions of the region. This is no easy task. In the seemingly insurmountable need to tackle the extreme levels of insecurity and crime, international cooperation gets caught in the never-ending urgencies of blocking the latest threat, and institutional reform is pushed back in the queue of tasks. Thus far, most of the programs directed to institutional strengthening, such as CARSI, have been concentrated in equipment and training of public security forces, in the hope that better equipped and skilled personnel will yield more professional and transparent institutions. Except for some early programs supporting the creation of internal affairs units in the Central American police organizations, very little has been done to underpin accountability mechanisms within law-enforcement institutions. Even so, international cooperation can play a significant role in reducing the problems of institutional weakness and corruption by concen-

trating key assistance funds to programs of vertical and horizontal accountability, and by raising the overall political importance of these programs.

Although the intervention of international cooperation agencies in the support and implementation of needed anti-corruption reforms in the region can be perceived as an unacceptable course of interference, it may be a politically helpful strategy in order to sidestep the common internal resistances and hurdles that every reform process faces. Under a regional commitment to institutional reform, in which all countries participate and establish a common set of goals, policy makers and reform stakeholders may garner not only political support and legitimacy for their efforts, but also set the basis for other constructive cooperation across the region. The seeming success of countries such as Colombia and Brazil in exporting their security reform models to other Latin American countries has gone hand in hand with the promotion made by third-party cooperation agencies, who understood the importance of using their leverage to bestow legitimacy to some local and previously overlooked initiatives.

In Sum

The levels of transnational crime and violence present a significant challenge to Central America, especially its northern triangle. The expansion of DTO's, the evolution of youth gangs, and the skyrocketing rates of local crime demand comprehensive responses. Given the regional and transnational character of the problems, policy makers and stakeholders should correspondingly incorporate concerted cross-national responses to those challenges. This paper has focused on the magnitude of the crime problem in the region and the extant international cooperation around it. Although massive, most of the cooperation has neglected the need to address the problems in a regional perspective and the importance of local institutional strengthening beyond training and equipment of criminal justice institutions. Hence, in addition to the initiatives that are already in place across the region, it is essential to put institutional reform to boost accountability mechanisms at the top of policies to confront violence in Central America. These countries have already devoted a significant amount of resources, manpower, and equipment to beef up institutions and programs that are nonetheless flawed and ridden with corruption. It is time to use the political capital that international organizations, cooperation agencies, and the countries themselves have when they work in tandem, as well as when they engage in the creation of models that can be used by their closest neighbors. International cooperation agencies have an essential role in such tasks. They cannot only create the

incentives and spaces for this enterprise to happen, but they also can help to ease the tensions that every effort of institutional transformation produces by creating regional consensus and local responsiveness.

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(In)Security in Latin America: Three Policy Options

Pablo Policzer and Elizabeth Pando-Burciaga,
University of Calgary

The Problem

Latin America is arguably the most violent region in the world.¹ More people die as a result of armed—mostly criminal—violence in Latin America than as a result of civil wars in Africa, the next most violent continent.² Arguably the most visible face of this problem of violence and insecurity are gangs and drug trade related violence (i.e. violence produced as a result of states' efforts to curb drug trade activities or as a result of rivalries between drug cartels). A common assumption is that the criminal and state spheres are two separate domains without significant interaction other than repression by the state in order to maintain its monopoly on the use of violence. However, this paper challenges this view and argues that the relationship is more complex than commonly assumed. There are two types of complexities that need to be understood. The first is that criminal actors and the state are not always antagonistic to each other, but often have an organic, complex, and at times mutually beneficial association. In such cases, the state may not have a clear interest in eliminating or even antagonizing criminal organizations. Second, the organizational structure of criminal organizations such as gangs is itself complex. This means that traditional policies of repression and force toward gangs may not be effective, and different types of tactics may be required. Some Central American states have already begun implementing innovative strategies beyond simply applying force in their dealings with criminal organizations, with some level of success.

The first section of this paper provides a brief illustration of the crime problem in Latin America, especially as posed by gangs and drug trafficking organizations. The second section discusses the kind of complex interaction and relationship between states and criminal groups, and suggests why it may undermine traditional state approaches to containing violence. The third section considers these traditional approaches in more depth, and focuses on some innovative new approaches to dealing with gangs.

The Gang Problem

Although gangs have long featured in Latin American societies, they have grown in the past few decades. Reliable information on the scale, dynamics, and demographics of gangs is scarce.³ Estimates of the total proportion of contemporary regional violence attributable to gangs vary wildly from 10 to 60 percent, while they have been accused of a whole slew of crimes and delinquency, ranging from mugging, theft, and intimidation, to rape, assault, and organised/petty drug dealing.⁴ Reports from Central America estimate anywhere from 70,000 (official figures) to 200,000 (academic figures) gang membership.⁵ Even a lower estimate suggests that the numbers of gang members rivals the armed forces of most countries in Central America: Nicaragua and Honduras each have armies of about 12,000 active soldiers, while El Salvador and Honduras have about 15,000 each.⁶ In other words, even though gangs do not aim to take over the state, such as a rebel group might, they are a serious challenge to the state's ability to enforce the rule of law and maintain sovereignty.

There are two main types of gangs in Central America: the *pandillas* and the *maras*. *Maras* have transnational roots, while the *pandillas* originate during the transition from war to peace in the region during the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this period, demobilised youth combatants in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala returned to their home communities and faced situations of heightened uncertainty, insecurity, and socio-economic flux within a broader context of weak and fragile states unable to enforce the rule of law. Some of these young men formed localised vigilante-style self-defence groups in an attempt to provide a measure of order and predictability both for themselves and their local communities.

The *maras*, on the other hand, are groups that can be directly linked to specific migrations. Formally, there are just two *maras*, the *Barrio Dieciocho* (18) and the *Salvatrucha* (MS). They originate especially in Los Angeles, dating back to even the 1960s. 18 and MS rapidly became bitter rivals, and frequently fought each other on the streets of Los Angeles. During the 1990s the State of California implemented strict anti-gang laws and prosecutors charged young gang members as adults instead of minors, sending hundreds to jail for felonies and other serious crimes. By 1996, the U.S. Congress established the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which ensured that non-U.S. citizens sentenced to a year or more in prison were to be repatriated to their countries of origin. Even foreign-born U.S. naturalised felons could be stripped of their citizenship and expelled once they served out their prison terms. As a result, between 2001 and 2010 the United States

deported almost 130,000 convicts to Central America.⁷ Deportees rapidly began to found local chapters of their gang in their communities of origin, which in turn rapidly began to attract local youth and either supplanted or absorbed local *pandillas*.

In Brazil, the gangs have somewhat different origins, dating especially to the prison populations of 1970s-80s. During this time, when Brazil was under authoritarian rule, political and criminal prison populations were held together in the same Brazilian jails. Originally small-scale and loosely organized criminal gangs grew in scale and organizational sophistication when their leaders learned operational and organizational tactics from the political prisoners with whom they were jailed.⁸ Today a number of sometimes well-organized gangs operate throughout Brazil, especially in some of the largest cities. They maintain close connections to the prison population, but extend their reach into many sectors of society, and even the upper echelons of the economic and political hierarchies.

The Drug Trade Problem

Drug trade organizations are not only an illegal economic activity, but have proven to be a threat to Latin America security. In Colombia drug cartels resorted to terrorism in their efforts to continue to freely pursue their economic activities, sometimes including the murder of state officials, judges, military officers, and politicians. In Mexico, drug cartels have also resorted to terrorist practices against the civil population and regularly engage in gruesome public violence against their competitors and enemies. In addition, these organizations are capable of co-opting judicial forces thanks to the profitable business that the drug trade represents, as well as branching out into other illegal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and human trafficking.

Initiatives such as the Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative illustrate the amount of resources governments need to enlist as well as the limited success of such initiatives in trying to establish security in the region. Initiatives of this kind, aimed at fighting organized crime, terrorism, and drug trade organizations, focus on the transfer of technology, intelligence, and military assistance in the war against drugs. Colombia, considered during the 2000s one of the most dangerous places in the world due to drug-related violence, has been in the centre of U.S.-led efforts to combat drug-trafficking organizations in the region. Almost US\$8 billion during the ten year period from 2000 to 2010 were provided by the United States and used primarily for the disruption of paramilitary involvement in drug trade.⁹ Under the Merida

Initiative, Mexico and Central America have received nearly \$1.4 billion from the United States to be used to provide equipment, training, and technical assistance in the fight against organized crime and in the promotion of the rule of law.¹⁰

In spite of initiatives such as the Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative, drug-related violence in Latin America has not been eradicated in the last decade. Whereas in the 1990s and early 2000s governments faced mainly hierarchical drug cartels (such as the Cali and Medellín cartels in Colombia, and the Tijuana and Juárez cartels in Mexico), as a result of such efforts, drug organizations have undergone a process of fragmentation and decentralization.¹¹ The vacuum left by the disappearance of large centralized organizations such as the ones mentioned, has been occupied by a larger number of smaller groups, in which members have more autonomy and less control from the upper cadres. This mode of organization has made drug cartels, albeit smaller and less capable of openly confronting the state, much more resistant to law enforcement and dismantling. Given the proliferation of drug trade organizations, Latin America is subject to the violence and criminality caused by the fight for drug routes and markets by these smaller cartels. Populations in slum neighbourhoods from Medellín to Ciudad Juárez are subject to violence as drug traffickers fight for control of routes and access to consumers. Here, the gang phenomenon becomes intertwined with the drug-trade; gangs such as MS, 18, Barrio Azteca or La Línea, act as protection and enforcers for these new smaller drug cartels.

For example in Mexico, the government has pursued a strategy of “disarticulation” by capturing cartel leaders. This strategy has, however, had the consequence of creating intra cartel violence as members seek to become leaders, resulting in internal splits, and the creation of additional cartels.¹² Thus, for example, while in 2007 drug cartels were present in twenty-one Mexican states, by 2010 they were present in all except but one state.¹³ While in 2006 there were six major cartels operating in Mexico, the number of active cartels increased to sixteen by 2011.¹⁴ As the Mexican government increased the arrests of major cartel leaders, individuals in middle management, usually *jefes de plaza* and *jefes de sicarios*, obtained more autonomy to establish their illegal activities such as extortion and kidnapping. In addition, a cartel leader’s sudden departure creates a vacuum, resulting in internal conflict for control, and usually in the fragmentation of the organization.¹⁵ To illustrate the decentralization of Mexican cartels, the Sinaloa cartel has come to be known as “The Federation,” as control of a territory is delegated to a different chief.¹⁶

States and Criminals

The connections between the state and criminals have been noted in recent literature.¹⁷ Some authors have focused on uncovering the connections between criminal groups and state formation in Latin America, or more specifically how formation and solidification of the state was advanced thanks to the association between state officials (as well as political parties) and criminals. In the case of Mexico, for example, Knight (2012) argues that the Mexican state of the early twentieth century depended on practices such as corruption and rent seeking from illicit activities. As the post-revolutionary state attempted to regulate the life of its citizens more comprehensively and systematically but without strong judicial institutions, rent seeking and corruption became institutional strategies. Rent seeking from illicit business is fundamentally different from that of licit activities; illicit business is particularly vulnerable to rent seeking because the state has an obligation to close it down. This leads Knight to state that, “in the relationship between *políticos* and *narcos*, the real Mafia was found among the former”.¹⁸ What Knight suggests is that the Mexican state operated like a Mafia, in that it provided protection (from itself) to drug organizations in return for high payments. It is important to notice that for Knight, politicians sought personal rents from this kind of practice, while preferring traditional forms of clientelism to gain mass political support.

In the case of Colombia, Schulte-Bockholt (2006) argues that political elites have used violence in their efforts to contain insurgent groups, noting, “the Colombian state is part of a protection racket that employs violence against the excluded to maintain the supremacy of the oligarchic structures”.¹⁹ Schulte-Bockholt argues that politically and ideologically, drug cartels and political elites are much more integrated, and their goal is virtually the same: both are interested in containing guerrillas to protect, in the case of the former, their economic investments and political advancement (what he terms *narcoburguesía*), and for the latter, a stable economy for Colombia and to maintain the political structures created after the civil war. In sum, in the mutually beneficial relationship between drug cartels and political elites in Colombia, elites provide drug cartels with political and economic power, in return for drug cartels’ application of violence (through paramilitary and counterinsurgent groups) to “the enemies of the regime”.²⁰

Other analyses focus on more contemporary interactions between the state and rival criminal groups. For example, Arias (2006) does not subscribe to the view advanced by O’Donnell (1993), which derives criminality from the state’s incapacity to penetrate certain social and geographic areas, or

brown areas, where in turn the rule of law does not operate systematically. Instead, Arias argues, the case of Rio's *favelas* points not to the absence of state or democracy, but to a "particular articulation of state, social and criminal relations which actively deploy state power in the service of criminal interests".²¹ According to Arias, the predominant view that criminality is caused by state failure fails to analyze the interactions between the full range of actors (criminals, society, and state officials) which make criminality and violence possible. On the one hand, traffickers depend on the residents of their *favela* for protection, thus, they must maintain good relationships with the community. Thus, once civic leaders have entered into an arrangement with a politician for specific resources, criminal organizations appropriate the distribution and access to such resources by the community. On the other hand, politicians need the support of criminals in order to secure votes; it is not enough for politicians to pact with civic leaders, because traffickers control the distribution of selective incentives. For Arias, this relationship becomes mutually reinforcing and beneficial for criminals and politicians. The former need politicians who will bring in funds for community development; by appropriating distribution of funds and resources, they maintain their status as benefactors of their *favelas*, thus, ensuring protection by the community. The latter need criminals in order to secure access to votes; however, civic leaders broker the negotiations and in this way, politicians do not have to appear to be making concessions to criminal groups. According to Arias, such networking arrangements are highly sustainable, thus, supporting the ongoing criminal and violent context.

Thus, the literature converges on the idea that the arrangements and cooperation between criminal groups and the state is not accidental. While at times either may have a political, military or economic advantage over the other, both groups actively seek arrangements that are mutually beneficial, because they depend on each other to fulfill their goals. The second finding is that this mutually beneficial and reinforcing relationship occurs within a democratic state. While the state may maintain its presence and reach, its authority need not be confronted by criminals, but may be supported by them, in mutual support of each other's goals. Democratization has advanced in Latin American countries, with the weakening of one-party hegemony or the end of authoritarian regimes, and the establishment of relatively free and fair elections. For the foreseeable future, criminality and violence will likely coincide with democracy. Against this backdrop of sometimes close connections between the state and criminals, in the next section we discuss the broad range of policies—ranging from force to dia-

logue—that states in the region have resorted to in addressing the problem of criminal violence.

Policies to Combat Crime

States have traditionally adopted three broad sets of policies to deal with armed actors that challenge them, whether political or criminal groups: force, public goods, and dialogue.

Often the first response to the problem of insecurity is the use of force. There are many examples of such policies throughout the continent, especially in areas such as Central America, where the crime and insecurity problem has been most acute. For example, in 2003, El Salvador adopted a *Mano Dura* policy to combat the threat posed by criminal gangs. Under this policy, gang members who flashed signs in public or bore gang tattoos could be immediately jailed for up to five years. Between 2003 and 2004 about 20,000 gang members were arrested, although most were eventually released without charge when the *Mano Dura* law was declared unconstitutional by the Salvadoran Supreme Court for violating the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).²²

A new *Mano Super Dura* package of anti-gang reforms was rapidly approved, which respected the provisions of the UNCRC but stiffened the penalties for gang membership to up to five years in prison for ordinary gang members, and nine years for gang leaders. Although under the new law the police are required to demonstrate proof of active delinquent behaviour in order to arrest an individual, El Salvador's prison population has tripled from 4,000 to 12,000, a large portion of whom are gang members.²³ Similar policies have been adopted elsewhere in the region (e.g. *Cero Tolerancia* in Honduras, *Plan Escoba* in Guatemala, similar programs in Brazil and of course many places in North America, especially major U.S. cities), usually with wide public support. Yet at the same time, the use of force—especially indiscriminate force that results in human rights or humanitarian law violations—also carries a significant risk, especially to a state's legitimacy.

One of the consequences of the increasingly connected world we live in is that states need to be concerned not only with domestic but also with international legitimacy, including how they treat their own citizens. Fewer and fewer states around the world can brutalize their own citizens with impunity. In Latin America, where democratic regimes are the norm, the use of indiscriminate force is politically more difficult than it was a generation ago, when authoritarian regimes were the norm. Yet such use continues, despite the fact that *mano dura* policies have failed to curb the rise in violence; and

there is evidence that these interventions have been generating significant changes in gang dynamics, with increasing reports that the widespread heavy-handed repression of gangs is leading to their becoming more organized, more adept at evading government authorities, and more violent.

When force fails or proves counterproductive, states sometimes try a second approach, to provide public goods, or “carrots” as incentives to get armed actors to move out of gangs, or to prevent them from joining gangs in the first place. In Central America some states have shifted from a “first generation” of *mano dura* policies to a second generation of *mano extendida* policies, which include a range of activities, e.g. environmental design in slums, targeted education and public health initiatives focusing on “at risk” youths, gun-free zones, neighbourhood watch or public awareness programs.²⁴ While it is difficult to generalize about such a varied range of programs and policies, it is safe to say that they are visible throughout the region, directed either by governments, non-governmental organizations or both in cooperation.

It is perhaps too early to say whether these policies have resolved the problem of gang violence. This kind of second generation or public goods approach is part of an emergent new framework that stresses an “integrated” approach to violence prevention and reduction, which aims to address the root causes of violence. What we can say, however, is that these policies are often accompanied by what can be distinguished as a third approach, which is different from simply providing public goods such as education or health programs: dialogue. Dialogue involves direct engagement with an armed actor: talking to them. This is part of some—not all—public goods policies. In many cases, non-governmental organizations or other actors (even states) directly engage gang members, for example to persuade them to leave the gang and move from violence to peace. Although such direct engagement is a central component of other policies (such as disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs), it bears considering as a separate policy instrument because it has its own challenges.

First, it poses a political challenge, insofar as many of the critical actors that need to be engaged are by definition outside the law, and states especially are as unwilling to “talk to criminals” as they are to “talk to terrorists.” Yet we know that notwithstanding such bluster, direct engagement is as commonplace with criminal organizations as it is with political groups. If force fails to defeat the group in question, states in many cases move from a “we don’t talk to criminals or terrorists” position to directly engaging the same actors they previously demonized.

One example of this is the innovative experiment in dialogue in El Salvador in 2012, where leading political and civil society authorities—including the Salvadoran government, the Church, and even the Organization of American States (OAS)—helped broker a truce between the country’s two major gangs, the 18 and the MS. While gangs have always negotiated with each other (in addition to fighting each other), what is significant here is the involvement of the government and the OAS, which have provided good offices for the dialogue. In December of 2012, the gangs accepted a plan, in which the *maras* promised not to commit crimes in ten violence-ridden municipalities, and to hand their guns over to the authorities to prove that their intentions were sincere. Under the plan, the gangs would work with non-governmental organisations, churches, the government, and local mayors, to create the conditions necessary for the social reinsertion of gang members. This example shows that the security threat posed by gangs in El Salvador is such that a desperate state is willing to think outside the box and experiment with an innovative policy.

The second and probably the most critical challenge involved in dialogue with armed actors is that it is easier to engage an organization with a clear central command than one that is more loosely organized. If an NGO or even the government engages with the leaders of a hierarchical and centrally organized group, they can reasonably expect their counterparts to be able to “deliver” their organization’s compliance with an agreement they reach. But notwithstanding the fact that political leaders such as the OAS’s Secretary General met the gang leaders, the *maras* themselves, and certainly many other gangs in the region and elsewhere, are really networks of actors and organizations, lacking such a hierarchical central command, or complex blends of hierarchies and networks. Who does one talk to, and how?

When a decentralized group lacks a coherent central command, dialogue and engagement are possible but need to be decentralized. What engagement means needs to be redefined: it is not necessary to engage the core of the network in order to engage its periphery, and it is not necessary to address the whole of the issues dividing the state and its challengers in order to address some of them. This can be called decentralized and dispersed engagement.²⁵ At the same time, it is more difficult and easier than centralized engagement with an organization’s leadership. On the one hand, multiple peripheral parties and players matter and may need to be engaged. On the other, such engagement often involves a series of local problems and concerns that may be more amenable to resolution than the single overriding conflict between the state and the group in question.

Decentralized engagement may be more time-consuming and involve more transaction costs (because more people may need to be engaged), and it may be more ambiguous (because there are likely to always be holdouts, meaning it is harder to reach a decisive “end” to the problem). But at the same time it has lower start-up costs, because it is possible to engage a part of the network, and address some very local issues or concerns without having to address all of them.

This network and decentralized system perspective is consistent with what we are coming to understand about the dynamics of insecurity in the region. A common assumption about the problem of insecurity in the region is that it is caused by the absence of the state. Guillermo O’Donnell distinguished between blue areas of strong institutions and high presence of the state, and brown areas of state absence in Latin America, where only “low intensity citizenship” is possible.²⁶ Framing the problem this way immediately suggests the solution: to reinforce the state and the rule of law. While this view certainly has a great deal of merit, others dispute this approach.

E. Desmond Arias (2006), for example, notes that criminal and public interests are deeply linked; that the rise of crime occurs not in the absence of but in partnership with state agents. Criminal activity emanates from state actors themselves. Referring to the *favelas* in Rio, he writes:

Persistently high levels of violence... result not from the failure of institutions, [but] rather, from networks that bring criminals together with civic leaders, politicians, and policemen... Rather than creating “parallel states” outside of political control, these networks link trafficker dominated areas with Rio’s broader political and social systems.²⁷

In other words, there is a complex network of connected state and criminal actors and activities, *not* a hierarchical state pyramid versus strictly separated criminal groups.

Conclusion

The seriousness of the security crisis in the region, and the failure of force to address it, has forced a reassessment of failed policies, and innovation with sometimes very counterintuitive ideas. But this crisis—especially in light of a complex networked system with multiple actors with overlapping boundaries and jurisdictions—also forces us to engage in a broader reassessment: this is not only a security crisis but a governance crisis.

In a hierarchy, the top of the state pyramid makes policies, and the rest of the organization implements them. In a complex networked system, even hierarchically organized states cannot necessarily do this. The system continuously evolves as different actors innovate and adapt to changing circumstances. The nature of the problems that need to be addressed also changes. Solutions to past problems no longer work, and can create new problems of their own. Governance in such a system requires flexibility, adaptation, experimentation, and continuous re-evaluation: learning by doing and by monitoring what others are doing.²⁸ Governments in this system are not necessarily the final deciders, but key coordinators and facilitators. In Latin American societies historically accustomed to hierarchical governance, this conceptual shift may be the greatest policy challenge.

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incentive to hide problematic information.

4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire* (Vienna: United Nations, 2007), 61.

5 Small Arms Survey. *Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 139.

6 James Hackett, *The Military Balance 2010* (London: Routledge 2010).

7 Steven Dudley, "Gangs, Deportation and Violence in Central America." In *Sight Crime* November 26, 2012. (<http://www.insightcrime.org/violence-against-migrants/part-ii-gangs-deportation-and-violence-in-central-america/>)

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9 Bruce Bagley "The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Latin America." *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas* 71 (2013): 103.

10 David A. Shirk, *The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), 6.

Notes

- 1 The Geneva Declaration, *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011: Lethal Encounters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011) estimates violent death rates in Central America for 2004-2009 as follows: Global 7.9/100,000; Central America above 30/100,000; Jamaica ~40/100,000; Honduras ~47/100,000; Colombia ~46/100,000; Venezuela ~44/100,000; Guatemala ~39/100,000.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Official statistics are unreliable, due to chronic underreporting, poor data collection, and even political interference, given that governments often have an
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Eduardo Gutierrez-Guerrero "Los Hoyos Negros de la Estrategia contra el Narco." *Nexos: Sociedad, Ciencia, Literatura* 32, 392 (2010): 27-35.
- 13 Ibid., 29.
- 14 Ibid., 30.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Thomas Kellner and Francesco Pipitone "Inside Mexico's Drug War." *World Policy Journal* 27, 1 (2010): 31.
- 17 Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt, *The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: A Study in Crim-*

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- 18 Knight, 122.
- 19 Schulte-Bockholt, 105.
- 20 Ibid., 137.
- 21 Arias, 523.
- 22 Dennis Rodgers Robert Muggah, and Chris Stevenson. 2009. "Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs and Intervention." *Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper #23* (2009): 12. Accessed August 6, 2013. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP23-Gangs-Central-America.pdf>.
- 23 Ibid., 12.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ram Manikkalingam and Pablo Policzer, "Al Qaeda, Armed Groups, and the Paradox of Engagement." in *Transnational Armed Groups: Legal and Policy Challenges Portal* (Harvard University and University of Geneva, 2007).
- 26 Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Some Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries." University of Notre Dame Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, *Working Paper #192*. (1993).
- 27 Arias.
- 28 Charles Sabel "Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets: Some Consequences of the Reintegration of Conception and Execution in a Volatile Economy." in *Social Theory for a Changing Society* James Coleman, and Pierre Bourdieu, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 3-63.; Pablo Policzer "A Complex Adaptive State System: Networks, Arms Races, and Moral Hazards." *Revista de Ciencia Política* 32 (2012): 3, 673-685.

V:
**MEXICO: HUMAN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY**

The Anti-Femicide Movement in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico

Zulma Y. Méndez,
The University of Texas at El Paso, United States

The work described in this paper is part of a larger project on which Dr. Kathleen Staudt at the University of Texas at El Paso and I have collaborated. It focuses on the topic of activism and resistance in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juárez, across from the Texas town of El Paso. That larger project documents and analyzes the last five years of activism in Ciudad Juárez, a city with a long tradition of organizing and activism across a wide range of issues. In particular, Staudt and I focus on the emergence of what we identify and recognize as an “anti-militarization” movement and its convergence with the anti-femicide movement, the latter with a much longer history that may be traced back to the last two decades.

Our analysis of these two social movements also considers the bi-national character (across the U.S.-Mexico border) that they have acquired as activists and organizations have strategically sought and efficaciously built coalitions with their counterparts in the United States but especially in the city of El Paso, Texas, where organizations and activists have effectively visibilized and exerted pressure on social issues that many view as binational in their origins and in their possible solutions such as gun control, drug policy reform, and immigration.



I will focus on the description of the anti-femicide movement and a part of that ample organizing process in which activists and women's groups especially have engaged in the city of Ciudad Juárez. I describe it and show our analysis of how activism within the anti-femicide movement has played a key role in the work towards a more equitable, non-violent society. In particular, I describe the ways in which the anti-femicide movement has:

- 1) visibilized gender violence against women;
- 2) monitored, documented, and denounced the problematic or lack of implementation of security policy;
- 3) shaped and re-shaped policy aiming at the eradication of violence from women's lives.

This work abbreviates and responds to a body of literature that is multi-disciplinary. We have looked into this literature to understand the political, social, cultural, and economic environment, but also the local, national, and bi-national context in which activism and the anti-femicide movement we have witnessed in Ciudad Juárez operates.

Thus, our look into and review of the literature is extensive, as is our project. It moves between narratives that frame and describe the city of Juárez as a chaotic space, violent and lawless, implying a future of hopelessness¹ in a "failed state",² to work representing the city and the U.S.-Mexico border from a state-centric approach by focusing on the relative easiness of commercial trade and transit.³ The literature also advances a narrative about the border that characterizes it as an interdependent region⁴ and hybrid⁵ with dynamic and shared cultural and social ties in a context of common political and economic issues that make the region and its inhabitants highly complex.

Moreover, an important segment of the literature inquires into the already complex U.S.-Mexico border region by examining it through a theoretical frame that draws from social constructions of gender to provide a more nuanced analysis of the social context in the Mexican border city.⁶

Other research offers rich descriptions and analyses of the Juárez/El Paso border region as one that is highly surveilled,⁷ or at war (against and among drug cartels),⁸ but also one where activism has flourished and grown at the local city level,⁹ and at a transborder, bi-national level¹⁰ to visibilize gender violence and femicide.

Our review of the literature allowed us to understand the context in which the anti-femicide movement unfolded in the last twenty years. For instance, Fregoso and Bejarano (2012), Pérez (2011), and Staudt (2008) focus on documenting the political work and networks women have developed

locally, nationally, bi-nationally, and internationally to denounce and situate gender violence and femicide as a public issue. However, there less is said on the ways in which they have organized to influence, shape, and reshape policy. For as it is true that mobilization has provided them with political leverage with which to demand governmental response, it is important to recognize and detail how they network and develop a policy agenda around various issues of interest. One in particular, which I will discuss further, concerns a policy on security.

To understand and document how the process of influencing policy occurred, we employed an ethnographic approach. Guided by Edward Schatz' (2009) work on political ethnography, we recognized the reach and power of cultural immersion—a cornerstone of ethnography as a method—to provide a first-hand understanding of the dynamics and processes shaping certain actions within the anti-femicide movement. That is why, in this work, participant observation is privileged as well as the collection of documents and other artifacts that we have managed to gather in the last five years. Participating since the year 2009 in some of the actions called by some women's groups in Ciudad Juárez, we had the opportunity to attend meetings, talk formally and informally with the leadership and membership of NGOs and grass-roots organizations within the anti-femicide movement. We also generated and had access to visual materials such as photos and videos of meetings and activities, and we were able to collect—with their consent—a series of documents that include flyers, public pronouncements, newspaper clippings, and documents such as technical reports that NGOs produced as part of their work.

Access to and the production of our own qualitative data during fieldwork was possible as Staudt and I are academics and activists. We have lived, taught, and conducted research at the U.S.-Mexico borderlands throughout our professional trajectory, but in addition, we have witnessed and have actively participated in some of the organizing processes that we narrate in our work. Our analysis, in fact, draws from that experience and funds of knowledge. In doing so, we assume our academic endeavor as one that, as Agar suggests, moves away from assumptions or presumptions of objectivity or subjectivity, to achieve reflexivity. Thus, the experiences we document and densely describe, following Geertzian tradition, are analyzed systematically as they are sifted through our use of method and theory.

We believe that a method should not just guide the interpretation of experiences, but also document and intervene; that is, to document, record, and memorialize, as Riaño-Alcalá (2006) suggests in her ethnographic work in Colombia. For, as Ruth Behar (1996) asks in her book *The Vulnerable Observer*,

in the face of horror—such as the horror that the anti-femicide movement has confronted—shouldn't the observer who cannot stop it, at least try to document it? And in our case as scholars, in the face of a complex social and political context, shouldn't we, as Barsalou and Baxter (2007) contend, document the efforts of the surviving communities to eradicate violence and femicide through mobilization and efforts at shaping policy?

What we experienced and witnessed makes up the bulk of our qualitative data; qualitative data that we organized and have begun to analyze, not just following the ethnographic convention, but also guided by theory. In this case, we analyze the anti-femicide movement guided by Tarrow's (1998) theory of structural political opportunity in which he affirms that the processes that are exhibited in a particular social movement reveal much about the political structure as these—movements and structure—exist in consonance with the political environment. That is, social movements are a reflection of a given state's political structure and of a given institutional environment, though movements are not constrained or determined solely by it.

Thus, using Tarrow's (1998) theoretical lens, we have begun to analyze the ways in which women groups within the anti-femicide movement have visibilized gender violence against women, as well as monitored, documented, and denounced the problematic or lack of implementation of a policy of security; and shaped and re-shaped policy aiming at the eradication of violence from women's lives in the last ten years.

But before I go into the description of the anti-femicide movement and a preliminary analysis of their contributions to policy on security, let me first briefly describe the social and political context that shapes it.

Anti-femicide movement emerged at the end of the peak years of the transnational manufacturing industry that had settled in Ciudad Juárez in the early 1960s given its strategic proximity to the United States. Initially, this industry attracted and employed young female labor that until then had remained unemployed. As the transnational manufacturing industries expanded in the city, they demanded more and more labor and so males became a significant part of its labor force too. By the 1970s and 90s, manufacturing plants contributed to the huge demographic explosion in the city as it created and promoted migratory flows into an urban space that grew chaotically and without any planning. Most maquila workers, with less than nine years of education, settled in non-developed land or colonias that lacked basic services such as water, electricity, and transportation and earning less than ten dollars a day. The economic and social precariousness of this growing population added a layer to a sociocultural context that was already characterized by unequal relations across gender, class, region, and ethni-

city. In this complex environment, drug cartels also found the border region strategic, and political elites and their economic interests all contributed, according to various analyses, to a socioeconomic context that propitiated violence and impunity.¹¹

Between 1993—the year when civil organizations and scholars at academic institutions began to record and document the cases of disappearance, sexual torture, and murder of women in that border city—and 1997, Juárez civil society organizations recorded 180 femicides. However, it was not until after five years of monitoring and documentation from women's organizations that authorities began to recognize the problem, if only symbolically and partially; that is, by calling for a minute of silence for the murdered women of Juárez and by forming a legislators' committee to inquire about the state of investigations of those murders, which organizations denounced as remaining in absolute impunity.

Notwithstanding the legislators' committee, it took another year, in 1998, to create the first Office of the Special Prosecutor for the investigation of murders of women in Ciudad Juárez—just a month prior to the ratification by the Mexican State of the Convention of Belém do Pará (1994) which requires that governments prevent, sanction, and eradicate all forms of violence against women. By 1999, the political pressure was such that President Ernesto Zedillo requested assistance of U.S. authorities and experts in the investigations. Yet in Juárez, at the turn of the millennium, local authorities had embarked in full-fledge campaigns and programs that addressed the disappearances and murders of women in discriminatory and misogynous ways; that is, blaming the victims by stating that they were killed as a consequence of their "lifestyle" and going out at night, walking the streets alone, or being provocatively dressed.

Table 1. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 1993–1999.

<i>Year</i>	<i>#</i>
1993	24
1994	20
1995	50
1996	45
1997	41
1998	39
1999	25
Total	244

(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez's data base at Colegio de la Frontera Norte.)

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From 2000 to 2007, a total of 257 women were added to the list for a grand total of 501 murdered women since 1993—again, the year when organizations started to document the murder of women in Juárez.

Table 2. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 2000-2007.

<i>Year</i>	<i>#</i>
2000	38
2001	41
2002	41
2003	30
2004	20
2005	34
2006	23
2007	30
Total	257

(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez's data base at Colegio de la Frontera Norte.)

However in the period between 2000 and 2007, a series of important events in women's activism and anti-femicide movement took place beginning in 2001 when eight bodies of women who had disappeared one to two months earlier were found with clear signs of sexual torture on what had been a cotton field prior to the expansion of the manufacturing transnationals. The finding of these bodies represented to some observers the ways in which women in Juárez—a city devoted to mass production—were construed as disposable. Public outcry and anti-femicide groups' pressure was such that within a few days two men were arrested and later confessed to the rape and murder of the eight women. Yet, as it has been the case with other cases that produce such public outcry, the men stated that they had self-incriminated under torture. With this development, further exacerbating social indignation, the federal congress approved and established a Special Commission to monitor the investigations of the murders of women and girls in Ciudad Juárez.

However, advised by women's groups with binational networks, in 2002 mothers of three of the femicide victims at the cotton field presented a petition to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights. By 2005, the Inter-American Commission admitted the three cases to be tried by its court, which finally condemned the Mexican State for human rights violations in the cotton field in 2009.

The Cotton Field case, as anti-femicide groups recognize it, was a key catalyst for much of the policies and programs that emerged between 2002,

when a petition was first presented to the Inter-American System of Justice, and 2009 when it finally found the Mexican State responsible and required that it establish no repetition mechanisms. Among those changes were: the creation of a joint agency for the attention of women's murders in 2003; the creation of the Special Prosecutor for the attention of crimes relating to the murders of women in Juárez; supervised by the Attorney General's office in 2004, the creation of the Commission for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women in Ciudad Juárez; also in 2004, the creation of a special commission by the Federal Congress for the awareness and monitoring of investigations relating to femicides in Mexico and the procuration of justice; and the promulgation of state law on the right of women to a life free from violence in the state of Chihuahua where the municipality of Juárez was established in 2007. In 2009, the authority of the Commission on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women was extended from exclusively Ciudad Juárez to national jurisdiction.

Despite the fact that the bureaucratic response in the form of commissions and the creation of offices and posts to attend to the gender violence that never ceased was suspended in 2010, in the face of extreme social violence caused by militarization authorities once again began to minimize and distort the extent of femicide in Juárez.

Though the number of women killed seemed to vary slightly, it was stable until 2008 when former President Felipe Calderón launched what he called interchangeably "a war against drugs" or a "war against cartels." The latter involved the militarization of the city with the deployment of more than 2,000 troops, and 2,500 federal police as part of what became known as Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua which aimed, according to federal authority, to combat organized crime, most specifically drug cartels that had purportedly launched a war for the control of the distribution routes. Juárez was a strategic location given its vicinity to the United States. Towards the end of 2009, according to the various journalistic accounts¹² it was estimated that more than 10,000 military and federal police elements patrolled the city, in addition to the 2,000 municipal policemen.

The Operativo Conjunto Chihuahua that the federal government launched as part of its security strategy in the so-called war against drug cartels was implemented with the endorsement and support of the state and local authorities, thus generating a highly tense political and social environment as highly armed, face concealed, military personnel and policemen patrolled the streets with their weapons aimed at people and their fingers on the trigger. This display of force escalated the climate of fear and insecurity

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that was perceived as a result of the violence that stemmed from criminal organizations' disputes throughout the streets of Juárez. Between 2007—at the beginning of President Calderón's war—and 2012, when the military and federal police were returned to their military posts and removed from the city, 935 women were killed. So, 935 women were killed in a period of five years of militarization, versus 501 in a period of fifteen years prior to militarization.

Table 3. Femicides and Murders of Women in Ciudad Juárez, 2007-2012.

<i>Year</i>	<i>#</i>
2007	30
2008	131
2009	201
2010	304
2011	216
2012	83
Total	965

(Source: Femicide and murder data from Julia Monarrez's data base at Colegio de la Frontera Norte.)

Between 1998 and 2000 a number of governmental actions were taken, none of them can be said to formally constitute a policy of security. Instead, there were scattered efforts with little input from women's groups who, at the time, continued to protest, march, and were very present on the streets of Juárez. Notwithstanding the absence of a clearly articulated security policy, women's groups have insisted on the importance of public policies, and in particular, of security policies that emphasize a gender perspective. A notable case has been Red Mesa de Mujeres with the launching of the European Community funded project *Seis Ciudades*.

*SeisCiudades*¹³ is an initiative involving six cities in Mexico with the purpose of monitoring, evaluating, and influencing security policy with a gender and human rights perspective. The initiative is an important and promising attempt to bring governmental authorities, including those in charge of security, and human rights advocates and organizations in Ciudad Juárez, Guadalajara, Chihuahua, Culiacán, Tijuana, and Monterrey into monitoring and evaluation of security policy. Most importantly, *Seis Ciudades* seeks to influence the definition of policies and programs of security that are sensible to women's issues and their right to a life—and cities—free of violence. Thus, despite the long struggle, women's groups continue to work and contribute to the construction of viable communities.

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Notes

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- 2 George Grayson, *Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009).
 - 3 Tony Payan, *The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security* (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2006).
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 - 12 El Universal, 2009
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The National Security Policies of the Felipe Calderón Administration: Toward a Human Security Dimension?

María-Cristina Rosas,
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Introduction

In 2006, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was proclaimed winner of a highly disputed presidential election in Mexico. In December of that year, he became President and shortly after he announced a security strategy to fight criminal organizations, particularly those involved in drug trafficking. This policy was the priority of his administration.

In order to secure the cooperation of the United States in this endeavor, the Felipe Calderón administration (2006-2012) opened the doors of its security bodies to their American counterparts. This was done, mostly, in a pragmatic way, without a national security doctrine capable of contributing to better use of the material and human capital available to fulfill the ultimate goal of fighting organized crime. It was not until 2008 that the Felipe Calderón government announced a National Program of Public Security (2008-2012)¹, and a year later, the National Security Program (2009-2012) (*Diario Oficial* 2009). Previously, his administration had endorsed a very general security policy, as defined in the National Development Plan (2007-2012).²

Despite the policies endorsed by Mexican authorities, between 2007 and 2012 violence perpetrated by organized crime, particularly drug trafficking organizations, was perceived as a threat to citizen security and governance in some parts of Mexico. Even though Mexico is not a failed state,³ there are areas and regions within the country where the absence of governance is a reality. This was also a point of concern for Canada, since violence in Mexico during the Felipe Calderón administration created a negative perception of the country in the eyes of Canadians at a moment when the profile of Mexico-Canada relations had deteriorated.⁴

Violence in Mexico has increased U.S. and Canadian concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. As it has been demonstrated,


Mexican criminal organizations control the U.S. illicit drug market and are considered the greatest drug trafficking threat the United States faces.⁵ On July 25, 2011, the Obama administration even endorsed a Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in which the prevailing situation in Mexico is considered of concern, and criminal organizations such as the Zetas are targeted as major threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere.⁶

Security and Violence in Mexico, 2006-2012

In general terms, violence in Mexico has in fact declined since late 2011 (Luhnow 2012). However, analysts estimate that it may have claimed between 60,000 and 70,000 lives over the presidential term of Felipe Calderón.⁷ As suggested before, as soon as his term began in 2006, President Calderón launched a large-scale crusade against organized crime, especially drug trafficking. To do that, the administration faced several shortcomings both in material and human capital, being of particular concern the absence of honest, professional, and well-qualified civilian police and law-enforcement agencies, as well as technological obsolescence of intelligence capabilities, among other problems. Thus, the Calderón administration decided to increase the budget as well as the human capital for national security tasks (see Figure 1).

Given its weak capacity to face the threat of organized crime, the Mexican government decided to use the military as the leading force to deal with the monumental challenge. The use of the military to confront organized crime has been considered an “understandable” yet “risky” decision, since the toll includes deaths of military officials, corruption, desertions, and presumed human rights violations. Also, the fact that the military has taken the lead in public security matters raises concerns about diminished and limited capabilities of these bodies to face additional national security threats.

Figure 1. Public Security Ministry: Human Resources by Category, 2001-2012.



(Source: Presidency of Mexico.)

In Mexico there is no consensus about national security, threats, risks or vulnerabilities. Each government body in charge of security issues, such as the National Defense Ministry (SEDENA), the Naval Secretariat (SEMAR), the Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB), and the General Attorney's Office (PGR), has its own concept of national security (Rosas 2011), and there are important differences among them. The same applies to the existing legislation on national security. For instance, the National Security Law (2005)⁸ provides a standard definition of national security that does not even address drug trafficking as a threat. This law was enacted during the government of Vicente Fox (2000-2006). In the Calderón administration, the National Development Plan (2007-2012) did include drug trafficking as a threat. Despite this significant difference, important overlaps do exist when it comes to national and public security issues.

Probably the most important achievement in defining threats to national security was accomplished in the National Security Program (2009-2012) in which a broad concept of security and specific threats and risks are identified. This program was announced in the context of the A H1N1 flu outbreak that started in April 2009. Yet, both the National Development Plan (2007-2012) and the National Security Program (2009-2012) are governmental initiatives valid only for the Calderón administration, meaning that under Peña Nieto, new programs and plans are being created with specific emphasis on those that could be accomplished in the 2013-2018 period.

During the Felipe Calderón administration, several members of criminal organizations were arrested, while many others were killed. It seems that the effort of the Calderón administration has contributed to a more favorable perception about security within the country; however, his national security policy was perceived as one in need of adjustment and reconsideration under his successor, particularly in dealing with the resulting death toll.

Achievements of the National Security Strategy, 2007-2012

In 2006, five criminal organizations dominated drug trafficking in Mexico and the surrounding region. They were strong, well organized and had important transnational connections. By the end of the Felipe Calderón administration, the situation had changed dramatically due to a "decapitation" strategy. As a result,

- between 2008 and 2010, the Sinaloa Cartel witnessed the demise of two important branches; one led by Nacho Coronel and the other by Beltrán Leyva;

- the Gulf Cartel and its army wing, the Zetas, was severely damaged after the leader, Heriberto Lazcano, was captured;
- the Tijuana Cartel, once dominant in the 90s, was unable to deal with the ascendance of the Sinaloa Cartel in the new century and, as a result, is presently very weak;
- the Juárez Cartel faced a similar fate as the Tijuana Cartel; and
- la Familia from Michoacán, following the capture of leader Nazario Moreno, split into two rivals factions, los Caballeros Templarios and a smaller la Familia.⁹

This does not mean that criminal organizations disappeared from the Mexican landscape. Rather, small and medium-sized groups became prominent, fighting each other and taking advantage of some institutional weaknesses. For instance, problems in cooperation and coordination between the several security bodies in charge of fighting organized crime increased. Also, the fact that the American security bodies could work openly with any of the Mexican institutions, such as the Naval Secretariat, contributed to a perception in Mexico that the “war on drugs” was conducted entirely from Washington D. C., meaning key decisions on strategy were not even discussed with their Mexican counterparts.

Other achievements of the Felipe Calderón administration include the initiative to create a proactive, as opposed to the current reactive, Federal Police to anticipate the moves of criminal organizations. To do that, the government implemented a strategy to recruit and incorporate members of the armed forces to serve with the Federal Police, whilst current police officers were being trained and subjected to confidence controls to determine whether they were capable of accomplishing the required tasks. Intelligence was another area that was reinforced within the police, so that it could anticipate the strategies of criminal organizations. At the same time, the Calderón administration initiated a judicial reform so that crime could be better and more efficiently prosecuted.

Yet, these achievements required a long term approach, that is, beyond the Calderón administration, since organized crime is very dynamic and changes on a daily basis. Criminal organizations function as networks by taking advantage of the globalization and communications revolution. In other words, this means that,

the diverse groups of a movement [criminal or not] are not isolated from each other. Instead, they form an integrated network

or reticulated structure through nonhierarchical social linkages among their participants and through the understandings, identities, and opponents these participants share. Networking enables movement participants to exchange information and ideas and to coordinate participation in joint action.¹⁰

To the contrary, the security structures of governments tend to be hierarchical, from top to bottom, less dynamic and thus less capable of anticipating the strategies of criminal organizations. In order to face the challenge of organized crime, government security bodies may need to think, organize, and act, at least partially, as networks for the sake of efficiency.

In Mexico, criminal organizations have taken advantage of globalization in terms of obtaining the required resources to operate. They possess advanced weapons, financial logistics, human capital, and, in many cases, social support to carry out their activities. This explains some of the challenges the authorities face in succeeding in the “war on drugs.”

The Role of the United States

The Calderón administration’s policy against drug trafficking was initially met with enthusiastic praise by the United States. In fact, the most important cooperation program between the two governments has been the so-called Merida Initiative, an assistance package that started in 2008 consisting of counterdrug and anticrime programs for the benefit of Mexico, Central America, plus Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Beyond the resources that the United States allocated to finance the Merida Initiative, this program is important because it engaged Washington in an effort that was largely pursued by the Mexican authorities alone at great material and human resources costs. The fact that the Bush and the Obama administrations have pushed the U.S. Congress to approve the initiative shows a significant change in attitude on the part of U.S. authorities in dealing with organized crime.

This is not so say that counter-narcotics and anticrime initiatives did not exist between the two countries before the Merida Initiative. Yet, it is expected that similar programs with improved funding will be supported by the United States, which is the country with the largest market for drug consumption in the world.

The United States began providing Mexico with equipment and training to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy fields in the 1970s, but bilateral cooperation declined dramatically after

Enrique Camarena, a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, was assassinated in Mexico in 1985. From the mid-1980s through the end of the 1990s, bilateral cooperation stalled due to U.S. mistrust of Mexican counterdrug officials and concerns about the Mexican government's tendency to accommodate drug leaders. At the same time, the Mexican government was reluctant to accept large amounts of U.S. assistance due to its opposition to U.S. drug certification procedures and to concerns about sovereignty. The Mexican government also expressed opposition to the DEA carrying out operations against drug trafficking organizations in Mexican territory without authorization. Mexican military officials proved particularly reticent to cooperate with the U.S. military due to concerns about past U.S. interventions in Mexico.¹¹

The context, however, dramatically changed by the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century. Once Colombian cartels were "decapitated" and weakened, Mexican drug lords became prominent in delivering drugs to the U.S. market.

The Merida Initiative was born due to the escalation of violence in Mexico as part of the national security policies of the Felipe Calderón administration. From the point of view of the United States, a possible "spill-over" effect into American soil was of concern, and thus Washington was convinced that something needed to be done.

The Merida Initiative consists of four pillars:

- Disrupting the operation capacity of organized criminal groups;
- Institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect of human rights;
- Creating a twenty-first century border; and
- Building strong and resilient communities.¹²

The Merida Initiative needs approval from the U.S. Congress on a yearly basis. Thus, the U.S. Congress has played a major role in determining the level and composition of the Merida Initiative funding for Mexico. From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than \$1.9 billion for Mexico to finance the Merida Initiative. In the first years the U.S. Congress contemplated funding for Mexico in supplemental appropriations measures in an attempt to hasten the delivery of certain equipment. The U.S.

Congress has also allocated funds in order to ensure that certain programs are prioritized, such as efforts to support institutional reform. In fiscal year 2012—the last of the Felipe Calderón administration—funds provided for pillar two have exceeded all other aid categories and has become a key concern moving forward.¹³

A key concern of the U.S. Congress is the human rights situation and, as a result, it has encouraged efforts to combat abuses and impunity in Mexico by placing conditions on the Merida Initiative assistance. The American Congress stipulated that 15 percent of certain assistance provided to Mexican military and police forces would be subject to certain human rights conditions. However, most recently, the Peña Nieto administration has changed the way Mexican security institutions cooperate with their American counterparts, namely by concentrating dialogue and responsibility under the Mexican Ministry of the Interior. This development has not been well received by the Obama administration, and may lead to delays in delivering the assistance to Mexico.

The National Security Priorities of Peña Nieto

In December 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto became President of Mexico. On December 17, 2012, he outlined a strategy that aims to achieve a “Mexico in Peace” where human rights are respected and protected by implementing a “state” security policy that involves binding commitments from all levels of government and civic participation. The six pillars of the strategy include:

Table 1. Fiscal Years 2008–2014 Merida Funding for Mexico by Aid Account and Appropriation Measure.

(\$ in millions)										
Account	FY2008 Supp. (P.L. 110- 252)	FY2009 (P.L. 111- 8)	FY2009 Supp. (P.L. 111- 32)	FY2010 (P.L. 111- 117)	FY2010 Supp. (P.L. 111- 212)	FY2011 (P.L. 112- 10)	FY2012 (P.L. 112- 74)	Account Totals	FY2013 Request	FY2014 Request
ESF	20.0	15.0	0.0	15.0 ^a	0.0	18.0	33.3	101.3	35.0	35.0
INCLE	263.5	246.0	160.0	190.0	175.0	117.0	248.5	1,400.0	199.0	148.1
FMF	116.5	39.0	260.0	5.3	0.0	8.0	Not applicable ^b	428.8	Not applicable	Not applicable
Total	400.0	300.0	420.0	210.3	175.0	143.0	281.8	1,930.1	234.0	183.1

(Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 2008-2014.)

Notes: ESF = Economic Support Fund; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.

- a. \$6 million was later reprogrammed for global climate change efforts by the State Department.
- b. Beginning in FY2012, FMF assistance is not included as part of the Mérida Initiative.

- Planning;
- Prevention;
- Protection and respect of human rights;
- Coordination;
- Institutional transformation; and
- Monitoring and evaluation.

As suggested before, President Peña Nieto has centralized the structure of Mexico's security apparatus under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and pledged to replace military forces engaged in public security efforts with a gendarmerie (militarized police). Although President Peña Nieto has said that his government will not abandon the fight against organized crime, the primary goal of his security strategy is to reduce violence in Mexico. He insisted that its success will be measured in reductions in homicides and other crimes, rather than in drugs seized or kingpins arrested.

In mid-2013 President Peña Nieto presented its National Development Plan (2013-2018) in which these pillars are included under the "Mexico in Peace" label. However, the project to create a gendarmerie is not even mentioned, despite the fact that it has been considered a key component of the current administration security strategy.

Peña Nieto implemented some changes to the institutions in charge of security. One of the most important decisions, for instance, is that the Federal Police, that under the Felipe Calderón administration was a very powerful, well-financed, and autonomous body, has been put under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Also, new provisions to prevent money laundering were enacted. Another visible change is the media coverage of violence in Mexico, which tends to be more discrete as opposed to the previous administration.

Final Remarks and Concerns

Mexico is a developing country facing national security threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. The nature of threats and risks has changed over time. During the Felipe Calderón administration, the National Security Program (2009-2012), the most comprehensive security policy coined at that time, identifies the following as threats:

- Organized crime;
- Drug trafficking;
- Armed groups;

- Terrorism; and
- Border vulnerabilities.

The same document defines the following as risks to Mexican national security:

- Political and social conflicts;
- Lack of social cohesion;
- Migration;
- Epidemics and pandemics;
- Global warming and environmental degradation; and
- Inequalities in national development.

The National Security Program (2009-2012), however, lacks an approach on addressing vulnerabilities. As a developing country, Mexico faces developmental problems that would allow certain vulnerabilities to contribute to an already unstable environment in which serious threats to national security could potentially develop. Vulnerabilities relate directly to development problems such as poverty and income distribution. Thus, a comprehensive national security policy may have to include vulnerabilities as a key point due to the fact that security should go hand in hand with development.

As suggested before, Mexico needs a long-term approach to national security. One of the reasons for the National Security Program (2009-2012) was the flu outbreak (A H1N1) that badly hit Mexico starting in April 2009. Before the flu outbreak, the Felipe Calderón administration focused mostly on organized crime as a threat to national security by considering that the survival of the Mexican State was being challenged by the actions carried out by criminal offenders, particularly drug lords. Yet, a disease challenged this view and forced the authorities to redefine threats to national security.¹⁴

At that time, Mexico received international support in combatting the flu outbreak. A H1N1 was a new version of the 1918 influenza virus. It developed when a previous triple assortment of bird, swine, and human flu viruses combined with a Eurasian pig flu virus. This disease is contracted via person-to-person transmission through respiratory droplets. It was first considered an outbreak in Veracruz, a state located in the Gulf of Mexico. It then spread throughout the country and the rest of the world. In Mexico City, the authorities decided to close public and private places to prevent the disease from spreading further. By June, the World Health Organization (WHO) had declared the outbreak a pandemic because it was present in all regions.

In the case of Mexico, the flu epidemic demonstrates that threats to national security are diverse and that a wider and more comprehensive approach is needed. Since 1994, human security has been discussed in international circles as such an approach. This human-centered concept is endorsed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which considers threats to security to be those that harm primarily people, since for societies to be secure, people need to be free of fear—such as human rights violations and violence—and free of want—such as hunger, epidemics, unemployment, and environmental degradation.¹⁵

In Mexico and Latin America in general, human security has been endorsed with reservation, and only the governments of Chile and Costa Rica have defined policies under that label. Due to the Special Conference on Security sponsored by the Organization of American States in 2003 in Mexico, the western hemisphere has adopted a “multidimensional” security approach, a concept strongly influenced by, and similar to, human security.¹⁶

One of the risks of the concept of human security, according to academics and politicians, is the possibility that all issues become “security” issues. Moreover, every country is different and has distinctive capabilities and vulnerabilities. For instance, for the Caribbean countries, natural disasters, such as hurricanes, are a threat to national security. For Panama, vessels transiting through the Panama Channel may pose risks to national security if they are to capsize or incur severe damage, especially if carrying toxic waste or weapons. For the United States, of course, terrorism is the most important threat to its security. Thus, multidimensional security carries different meanings for countries and the 2003 conference in Mexico was successful in including in the security agenda not only terrorism but also a wide range of threats that are of concern to the western hemisphere. Yet, for many countries both human security and multidimensional security should be endorsed with caution so that problems are faced according to their nature, such as specific vulnerabilities, risks or threats, so that human and material resources are properly used.

In the National Development Plans endorsed by Mexican governments since the times of Miguel de la Madrid (1980-1986) when the first plan was implemented, security has become a broader concept, at least on paper, which goes beyond police and military assumptions. Previously, national security was intentionally linked to the government, so that “threats,” such as dissent from social movements and students, demonstrations by trade unions, and guerrillas were of concern to the authorities. The new concept of security was the result of a democratization process that started from the mid-1980s until

today. The current Peña Nieto administration, and the previous Calderón administration as well, however, do not use the concept of human security in reference to national security and/or its threats. Yet, many developmental issues are included in the National Development Plans, though not under the security-development label, but rather as separate goals. Only in Mexico City is there a special report on human security published in 2008, in which the concept is introduced to provide a better understanding of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities that the capital is facing.¹⁷

At the national level, however, there is the need for a comprehensive approach, including areas such as education, culture of law, health issues, crop substitution, confidence in the police force, and the demilitarization of security tasks and law enforcement. There is recognition in both Mexico and the United States of the high human and financial costs that Mexican society is incurring in dealing with the current approach to combatting organized crime.

Another issue of concern, of course, is the emphasis placed by the current Obama administration on organized crime. The strategy, endorsed in July 2011, suggests that criminal gangs are now a top priority in his national security policy. For many academics and politicians on both sides of the border, this endorsement comes too late, given that Washington has kept terrorism and Osama Bin Laden at the top of its security concerns. Had the United States placed more attention on organized crime and its “spillover effect,” it is believed that criminal gangs in Mexico today would not be as prominent as they have been since the beginning of the century.

There is another concern in this respect. The Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime clearly states that,

transnational organized crime (TOC) poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security, with dire implications for public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe. Not only are criminal networks expanding, but they also are diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once distinct and today have explosive and destabilizing effects. This Strategy organizes the United States to combat TOC networks that pose a strategic threat to Americans and to U.S. interests in key regions.¹⁸

This means that in many respects, after the “decapitation” of Al-Qaeda, terrorism remains a threat but has been given a lower profile, and could be re-

placed by organized crime gangs as the top security concern. This raises concerns about what the United States is willing to do to “decapitate” the leaders of criminal organizations, especially those based in Mexico. On July 15, 2013, Mexican marines captured one of the most wanted criminals, Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales (also known as *Zeta 40*), one of the leaders of the organization the Zetas operating in Mexico. At first, this was seen as an achievement of the Peña Nieto administration despite the fact that cooperation with Washington on security issues had apparently changed in terms of the access U.S. security institutions used to have to their Mexican counterparts under Felipe Calderón. Later, it was revealed that it was thanks to the logistics and information provided by American security institutions that the capture of Treviño Morales was possible, which leads to questions about how much cooperation on security matters really has changed between Mexico and the United States under the current administration. Furthermore, President Peña Nieto took the opportunity to explain that there are no longer rivalries between Mexican security bodies in dealing with national security threats.¹⁹

In the end, there is the general feeling that the current Peña Nieto administration is pursuing a policy not so different from that of Felipe Calderón, even though the general consensus is that there is a need for a change of strategy so that the security-development binomial becomes the cornerstone of a policy towards a more secure and prosperous country. To do that, a national security doctrine is needed so that human and material resources are channeled properly. The ultimate goal is that Mexico finds its own formula to deal with the security challenges posed by organized crime, whilst development is conceived as a vacuum to deal with vulnerabilities and risks that may, otherwise, turn into threats to national security.

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Notes

- 1 Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, *Programa Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2008-2012* (México: SSP, 2008).
- 2 Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2012* (México: Presidencia de la República, 2007).
- 3 In general terms, the concept of failed state is often used by political commentators and the media to describe a state perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign entity. The Fund for Peace (www.fundforpeace.org) has proposed the following criteria to determine whether a state has "failed":

org) has proposed the following criteria to determine whether a state has "failed":

- Loss of physical control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force therein;
- Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions;
- An inability to provide reasonable public services; and
- An inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.

The term is highly controversial since the declaration that a state has "failed" may carry significant economic, political, and even military consequences.

4 At the beginning of 2006, relations were at a relatively high level. Canada had identified Mexico as a strategic partner; the Canada-Mexico Partnership had just been founded; and the language, at least, of trilateralism was still in fashion in Ottawa. Within the Canadian business community, a gradual realization that North America extended south of the Rio Grande had taken place, so that a progressive "discovery of Mexico" by Canadian firms was steadily underway. This was the result of a series of economic reforms developed by Mexico in previous years, as well as the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that paved the way for closer economic, investment, and trade relations between the three "amigos," and certainly between Mexico and Canada. Then a series of negative factors affected the relationship. First, the election of Stephen Harper as prime minister of Canada in February 2006 brought concerns that Canada would refocus its attention on bilateral relations with the United States at the expense of Mexico. This was previous to the presidential elections in Mexico (July 2006) when Felipe Calderón Hinojosa was proclaimed the winner amongst accusations of fraud by the

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- other leading presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Second, Mexico's catastrophic drug violence severely damaged Mexico's image in Canada, and Canadians began to fear that the situation in Mexico would expand to Canadian borders. Third, the handling of visa applications for Mexican citizens created a negative reaction among Mexican political and social elites, and strained relations at the diplomatic level. Lastly, the Harper government's cancelling of Canadian studies funding globally decimated what was one of the world's most active and enthusiastic Canadian studies communities in Mexico. Subsequently, it was difficult to reestablish strong and active relations between Mexico and Canada.
- 5 Hayes Brown "Report: Mexico's Drug Cartels Increasing U.S. Presence." *Think Progress*, April 1. <http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/04/01/1802711/mexico-cartel-united-states/?mobile=nc>. 2013)
 - 6 The White House, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf. Accessed July 5, 2013.
 - 7 Tim Johnson, "Mexico's war on crime now ranks among Latin America's bloodiest conflicts." *The Miami Herald*, February 21, 2013.
 - 8 This law was endorsed by the Vicente Fox Administration (2000-2006).
 - 9 Alejandro Hope, "Peace Now? Mexican Security after Felipe Calderón," *Working Paper 2013* (Washington D. C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 2013), 4-5.
 - 10 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Network and Networks. The Future of Terror, Crime and Military* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 295.
 - 11 Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin M. Finklea, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond* (Washington D. C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 5.
 - 12 *Ibid.*, 6-7.
 - 13 *Ibid.*
 - 14 The United States faced a similar scenario after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As a result of the threat posed by terrorism, the new Department of Homeland Security considered terrorism a major threat to national security. Yet in 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused massive loss of human lives and infrastructure, and the Department of Homeland Security included natural disasters as a threat to national security.
 - 15 UNDP, *Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
 - 16 OAS, *Final Declaration. Special Conference of Security* (Washington D. C.: Organization of American States, 2003).
 - 17 (Comisión de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal, *Informe especial sobre seguridad humana en el Distrito Federal* (México, D. F.: CDHDF, 2008).
 - 18 The White House, 5.
 - 19 El Universal "Hoy no hay rivalidad entre agencias de seguridad." July 17, 2013.

Contributors

Adam Blackwell is currently the Secretary of Multidimensional Security at the Organization of American States (OAS). Prior to this, Mr. Blackwell held a number of positions in the OAS as Secretary for External Relations and as the Assistant Secretary of Finance and Administration (Treasurer). From 2002 to 2006, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Ambassador Blackwell returned to Ottawa to act as the Director General of Strategy and Services in the Bilateral Relations Branch of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. He is also an international Commissioner on the Committee to Reform Public Security in Honduras.

ABSTRACT: Ambassador Blackwell's paper focuses on the work of the Secretariat of Multidimensional Security, which was created in 2005 by the Organization of American States to coordinate political, technical, and practical cooperation among member states as well as other inter-American and international organizations concerned with threats to national and citizen security. Its work in the region has produced positive results; for instance helping countries establish drug treatment ports as an alternative to incarceration, countering money laundering, strengthening detection techniques for identifying suspicious cargo and exposing human trafficking. Blackwell argues that the solution to the problem of security is not more security and that *mano dura* policies have not proven successful. He suggests that over the next decade solutions will likely hinge on such concepts as "shared sovereignty" and "resilient communities."

Thomas C. Bruneau is a Distinguished Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. In addition to his position as Professor in the NSA Department, he was the Academic Associate for the curriculum in International Security and Civil-Military Relations. Bruneau has published extensively in English and Portuguese in numerous journals and has published several books. Professor Bruneau was a Fulbright Scholar to India (1962-63) and to Brazil (1985-86), and has been awarded fellowships from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the International Development Research Centre, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Gulbenkian Foundation, and the Luso-American Development Foundation.

ABSTRACT: This paper explores civil-military relations in Latin America in an international comparative perspective, drawing particular comparison

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with NATO-member countries. Bruneau deals with civil-military relations in terms of both traditional war-fighting roles and peacekeeping as well as internal security, including counter-terrorism, organized crime, and human and natural disasters. He outlined a range of conditions which tend to be preconditions for successful civil-military relations, including: the establishment of professional norms for conduct; effective oversight mechanisms; reasonable levels of resource allocation; a clear strategy or plan; the use of civilian instructors in professional military training; and ministries of defense controlled by civilians. The paper concludes that only Colombia and Chile among Latin American countries have effective civil-military structures. He notes as well that one of the factors that accounts for success is having a clear incentive, such as the detection of an identifiable threat which results in the mobilization of resources.

José Miguel Cruz is currently a visiting assistant professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University. He has worked as a consultant for the World Bank, the IADB, the Pan-American Health Organization, and the UNDP. As Director of the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the University of Central America (UCA), he supervised more than fifty national public opinion polls and conducted several survey-based research projects on political behavior, criminal violence, and human rights. He has been working on Central American gangs since 1996. He holds a Doctoral degree in Political Science from Vanderbilt University and a Master degree in Public Policy in Latin America from Oxford University, England.

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a review of the security initiatives during the last decade in Central America. It provides an overview of the public security crisis in the region and how that is intertwined with regional security, particularly regarding the penetration of organized crime groups across borders. The paper highlights the disparate trajectories followed by the governments in the region to tackle the rising levels of organized crime. The paper also briefly examines the international efforts directed to security cooperation. In doing this, the paper underlines the importance of creating and enforcing accountability mechanisms in the criminal-justice institutions of the Central American countries.

Lucía Dammert was an Associate Researcher at the Center of Security and Society at the National University of General San Martín and Academic Coordinator of Universidad Empresarial Siglo XXI in Córdoba. In Chile, she directed the Civil Society and Security area of the Center of Citizens

Security Studies at the University of Chile and the Program of Security and Citizenship at FLACSO-Chile. Currently, she is an Associate Professor at Universidad de Santiago de Chile. Dr. Dammert has been an advisor for the governments of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, and the Department of Public Security of the Organization of American States. She received academic fellowships and grants from the Tinker Foundation, the University of Pittsburgh and the Government of Argentina.

ABSTRACT: Dammert's paper stresses the extent to which Latin American countries, in spite of differences, have increasingly turned to the military to address problems of criminal activity, especially narcotics trafficking. She notes that high homicide rates are not in themselves an adequate measure of the level of insecurity in the region since a high percentage of people report a general sense of insecurity in their daily lives. Individual citizens have thus pressed for *mano dura* policies in responding to general levels of violence. She observes as well that one of the factors that has led to an increased use of the military for what are normally considered police responsibilities has been the high incidence of corruption and inefficiency among police forces. Dammert notes that the increasing use of the military for policing operations has contributed to some problems, one of which has been human rights abuses, another of which has been less transparency.

Major-General D. Michael Day has been the Director General International Security Policy since July 2012. Major-General Day has served in the Chief of Defence Staff's Professional Development Section as the Chief of Staff and Acting Director - Counter Terrorism Special Operations. Following the events of 9/11 he deployed to Afghanistan as part of Canada's initial response. In July 2005 Major-General Day returned to Ottawa as Commanding Officer JTF 2 and in June 2007 assumed Command of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. Promoted to his present rank in April 2011, he deployed again to Afghanistan serving as the Deputy Commanding General of the NATO Training Mission where he was directly responsible for the development of all Afghan Security Forces.

Gary Finley is currently the Director Corporate Security, Petrominerales Ltd. for Colombia, Peru, and Brazil. He is retired from the RCMP/CSIS and previously worked in Security Management for Canadian oil and service companies in Yemen, Africa, Ecuador, Mexico, and Argentina.

ABSTRACT: Gary Finley, Director of Corporate Security for Petrominerales, a Calgary-based oil company which operates primarily in Colombia but also has start-up operations in Peru and Brazil, focuses his analysis on the com-

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pany's security management programs. The paper outlines the challenges that the company faces in dealing with both criminal organizations, which are often tied to narcotics trafficking, and the two main guerrilla insurgencies, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The author indicates that the company's security operations focus on the development of a structure and process that provide protection for personnel and assets. He notes the role of security contractors in the company's security structure and the ways in which the company engages the Colombian armed forces.

Peter Hakim is president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue. From 1993 to 2010, he served as the organizations president. Mr. Hakim writes and speaks widely on hemispheric issues and has testified more than a dozen times before the U.S. Congress. Prior to joining the Dialogue, Mr. Hakim was a vice president of the Inter-American Foundation and worked for the Ford Foundation in New York, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. He taught at MIT and Columbia, and served on boards and advisory committees for the World Bank, Council on Competitiveness, Inter-American Development Bank, Canadian Foundation for Latin America (FOCAL), Partners for Democratic Change, and Human Rights Watch.

Hal Klepak's research covers a wide spectrum from Latin American security and the region's diplomatic and military history to Canadian and Cuban foreign and defence policy. In addition to teaching at the Royal Military College of Canada, he advises the Departments of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and International Trade on hemisphere issues. Professor Klepak has authored numerous books and articles and his most recent scholarship focuses on Cuba. Professor Klepak also is a retired infantry officer who served with and commanded in the Black Watch Regiment.

ABSTRACT: This paper traces the evolution of inter-American security cooperation from the early nineteenth century in the aftermath of independence from Spain through the end of the Cold War. Other than the failed attempt to establish a regional organisation at the 1820s Panama conference, the first formal effort to institutionalize cooperation came with the formation of the Pan American Union at the end of the nineteenth century. The author stresses that the presence of an external enemy, whether it was European efforts to regain control of lost colonies, fascism and Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s, or Communism and Soviet-Cuban challenges in the region during the Cold War, tended to be the single most important factor in encouraging inter-

American cooperation. In the absence of such an external threat and with the evident decline in U.S. interest and influence in Latin America, major countries in the region, in particular Brazil, have looked to other regional groupings such as UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas).

Ambassador Alfonso López Caballero started his professional career in the economic sector, first as Assistant Manager of CitiBank in Colombia, and then as a consultant for Arthur Young & Co. He received a Master of Business Administration from the European Institute for Business Administration and a Master of Economics from Columbia University. He was ambassador to France, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and served as minister of agriculture and minister of the interior. Mr. López was appointed one of the government's negotiators during the peace process with the FARC guerrillas.

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the Colombian government peace negotiations with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). As a former peace commissioner, the author draws a comparison between the earlier negotiations, which ended largely in frustration, and the current negotiations about which he is far more positive. He notes that the internal and international pressures on FARC to reach a peace agreement are far more difficult for the FARC leadership to resist now than they were a decade ago. Some of the factors which have changed the context in which the negotiations are taking place include the professionalization and modernization of the Colombian armed forces and their more effective counter-insurgency operations; the dwindling support for FARC from Cuban and Venezuelan governments; and the effective "decapitation" of FARC's leadership. He notes that there is still opposition in Colombian political circles to any agreement with FARC which would appear to be lenient, and in some circles opposition even to negotiation with terrorists.

Ambassador Tim Martin joined the Canadian International Development Agency in 1983 as a project officer in the Leeward and Windward Islands Program. After serving abroad in Bridgetown as second secretary (development), and subsequently at Headquarters as a senior project manager in the Central America Division, Mr. Martin moved to the Department of External Affairs and International Trade in 1992. He has since served in Buenos Aires, as ambassador to Argentina and Paraguay. At Headquarters, he has served as political-economic officer for the Horn of Africa; deputy coordinator, Middle East peace process; director, peacebuilding and human security; and senior director and deputy head of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force.

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ABSTRACT: Ambassador Martin's address outlines current trends in the Colombian security environment, the successes the country has had in the past decade in meeting its challenges and the contributions the nation is now able to make to multinational efforts to address similar problems on security and violence in Central America. He notes that there is optimism about the current negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and that the Santos government is making progress in such difficult areas as anti-personnel mine clearance, poverty reduction, and land restitution, following several decades in which several million people were displaced by conflict. The presentation outlines the range of Canadian involvement in the country, from the extensive investment in the oil and gas sector to Canadian foreign aid projects to promote peacebuilding, assist victims of violence, and alleviate poverty.

Zulma Y. Méndez received her PhD in Education from the University of California-Riverside and her MA in Sociology from the University of Texas in El Paso. She is currently the Coordinator for the Centre for Inter-American Border Studies and is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Leadership & Foundations at the University of Texas at El Paso. Research interests include violence, activism, and resistance in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, particularly that of Juárez, Mexico, and El Paso, Texas.

ABSTRACT: In this paper Zulma Méndez examines the development and impact of the movement in Ciudad Juárez which has sought to address the high level of violence, including homicide, against women. She traces the violence back to the early years of the maquiladora expansion when thousands of young women moved to the region to provide a workforce for the burgeoning new industries. She also places the violence in the context of the militarization of the war against the narcotics cartels in the area, a militarization that intensified significantly during the presidency of Felipe Calderón. Her paper demonstrates a clear correlation between the intensified military campaign and female homicides. She notes that the anti-femicide movement has had a longer history in the Juárez area than the anti-militarization movement that arose in reaction against Calderón's policies.

Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., is Director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center and Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations in the School of Public and International Affairs at Florida International University. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, under the first Obama Administration. From 2004 to 2009, Dr. Mora

was Professor of National Security Strategy and Latin American Studies at the National War College, National Defense University and Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of International Studies, Rhodes College (2000-2004). Dr. Mora received his M.A. in Inter-American Studies (1989) and a Ph.D. in International Affairs from the University of Miami (1993).

John W. G. Noyes has been the Director of Corporate Security at Goldcorp since January 2011, following a 25-year career with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (1978-2003). From 2008 to 2011 he was Regional Director of Security and Risk for Central and South America. Prior to joining Goldcorp, he was Regional Director of Risk for Guatemala with Glamis Gold. In 1997/98 he was seconded from the RCMP to the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala. He is the recipient of the Canadian Peacekeeping Medal, the RCMP Long Service Medal, and the United Nations Peacekeeping medal.

ABSTRACT: This presentation outlines the challenges faced by one private sector mining company and the ways in which the company seeks to respond constructively to those challenges. The author notes that the rise of transnational criminal organizations particularly in Latin America has considerably increased security threats to company personnel, property and the communities in which the company operates. He observes that companies such as Goldcorp recognize that they have to ensure that security operations are conducted in conformity with international standards and the protection of human rights. One of the specific issues which confront such companies is the lack of enforced regulations for private security contractors in many Latin American countries, with resulting low levels of training not only in the technical aspects of security but also in human rights issues. Noyes also notes that there are often “disconnects” between what national governments contend will be the benefits of mining projects and the expectations of local communities.

Bernardo Pérez Salazar is a senior policy adviser on urban safety and security issues. He regularly contributes to research projects with the Instituto Latinoamericano de Altos Estudios and the recently established Fundación Paz & Reconciliación in Bogotá, Colombia, as well as with UN-HABITAT in South and Central America.

ABSTRACT: In this article Bernardo Pérez Salazar explores and explains the issues associated with multinational security in the Americas. He suggests that the principles and goals articulated in the Organization of American States 2003 Mexico City Declaration on hemispheric security have not been

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successful in making significant inroads in reducing hemispheric security. He stresses that this ineffectiveness has been especially apparent in dealing with organized crime operating in “under-governed” areas, a challenge that has been especially persistent in the case of weak states where either or both political and military/police presence and credibility have been lacking.

Brigadier General Anthony WJ Phillips-Spencer, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, is a military officer with thirty years of professional experience since his enlistment in the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force in 1981. In addition to his professional training, Brigadier General Phillips-Spencer has successfully completed undergraduate study in Economics and post-graduate study in International Relations, both at the University of the West Indies. He was awarded the degree of Master of Science in International Relations from the University of the West Indies, and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts, Security and Defence Management and Policy at the Royal Military College of Canada.

ABSTRACT: The paper outlines the security challenges faced by the countries of the Caribbean, many of which suffer from a culture of dependence and the legacy of colonial rule. Phillips-Spencer stresses that many of the small island nations of the Caribbean do not have the resources to address such problems as narcotics, arms and human trafficking, and the high levels of violence that plague some of the countries in the region. The paper identifies problems of weak leadership and poor planning along with inadequate capacity to meet security challenges, and concludes that the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) region, due to its structural security challenges and insufficient capacity to meet security threats, is likely to remain inextricably trapped in its dilemma. The author suggests that the opportunity for reform will require the assistance of outside nations like Canada and the United States, but he also calls for more engagement of civil society and the private sector.

Elizabeth Pando-Burciaga is currently a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary. Her studies are in the fields of Comparative Politics and International Relations. Elizabeth obtained an M.A. (Interdisciplinary Studies) and a B.A. (Philosophy) at the University of Texas at El Paso. Her research interests include policies on violence against women in Latin America, Mexico’s war on drugs and its gendered dimensions, as well as policies of transnational domestic and care work. Elizabeth is originally from Chihuahua, northern Mexico.

ABSTRACT: In this paper the authors explore the complex relationship between the state and criminal gangs, with particular focus on Central

America, Mexico, and Colombia. They note that the main policies pursued by governments in the region, the *mano dura* and the *mano super dura* approaches, have proven less than effective in reducing either criminal activity or levels of violence, and have been subject to considerable critique for the violations of human rights, which have been associated with their implementation. They suggest that given the complexity of the state-gang relationship, governments and the gangs need to engage in dialogue, and governments need to adopt flexible, adaptive policies in which governments are not necessarily the final deciders.

Pablo Policzer, a Chilean by birth, specializes in comparative politics, with a focus on Latin America. His research focuses on how democratic and authoritarian regimes regulate armed actors—including militaries, police forces, and non-state armed groups. He holds a Canada Research Chair in Latin American Politics, and is a Fellow at the University of Calgary's Latin American Research Centre, and the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He obtained his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his BA (Honours, First Class) in political science from the University of British Columbia.

ABSTRACT: See Pando-Burciaga.

Greg Purdy joined CKR Global as their International Risk Advisor after approximately thirty-three years with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service. He worked in the Service's foreign liaison, counter-terrorism, and counter-intelligence departments, and was previously Deputy Chief of CSIS Headquarters' Foreign Liaison Department in Ottawa as well as First Secretary at the Canadian Embassies in Mexico and Colombia. He is a member of the Canadian International Council (CIC), Canadian Council for the Americas (CCA) and currently holds a Fellowship with the Latin America Research Center (LARC) at the University of Calgary.

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on the transnational nature and impact of organized criminal groups in Latin America with a particular focus on the narcotics cartels in Mexico and their expansion into other countries in Central America. The paper notes particular concern that such organized criminal groups as the Mexican-based narcotics cartel, the Zetas, are composed of former military and have been able to infiltrate or gain the cooperation of the militaries in other countries. The author notes that the narcotics industry in Mexico alone generates revenues of some \$40 billion per annum, as well as generating high levels of corruption among govern-

CONTRIBUTORS

ment and law enforcement officials. The paper suggests that the Mexican situation continues to deteriorate, that the militarization strategy pursued by former President Felipe Calderón was not effective in containing the cartels and resulted in increased violence. He observes that although Colombia has made considerable progress in the past decade in containing narcotics and guerrilla insurgency, problems remain.

Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, PhD (Toronto), is Professor of History and Director of the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary. He served as Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences (1994-2006) at the University of Calgary. He served as director of the Institute for United States Policy Research in the School of Public Policy (2006-2009). In Calgary he was the founding director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (West) and a founding member of the Canadian Council of the Americas. He is an elected member of the Royal Society of Canada as well as a fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and he holds the Grand Cross, Order of Merit from the Presidency of Colombia.

María-Cristina Rosas is a full-time professor and researcher in the International Relations Center at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), where she obtained her doctorates in International Relations and Latin American Studies. Dr. Rosas has worked as a consultant for Mexican and foreign governments, the private sector and international organizations in topics related to economics and international relations. In 1993, 1995, and 1998, she received the “Maestro Jesús Silvia Herzog” prize for her economics research from the Institute for Economic Research at UNAM. Currently she chairs the Olof Palme Center for Peace, Security and Development based in Mexico City.

ABSTRACT: This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Mexican government of President Felipe Calderón in attempting to curb the influence and impact of organized crime in the country, in particular the major narcotics cartels. The author suggests that the administration approached the challenge without a clearly developed national security strategy, and the decision to use the army to confront the cartels was not only controversial but also resulted in a significant escalation of violence. She argues that the strategy nonetheless did weaken the power of the main cartels: Sinaloa, Gulf, Tijuana, Juárez, and Michoacán, even if it resulted in the diffusion of smaller criminal organizations. The paper notes the relationship with the United States on narcotics and border security and Canadian concerns with the high levels

of violence in the country and its impact on trade, investment, and tourism. The paper concludes with a discussion of the national security strategy pursued by Calderón's successor, Enrique Peña Nieto from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), with his administration's stronger commitment to human rights and socio-economic development.

Hector Luis Saint-Pierre holds a PhD in Political Philosophy from the State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Brazil. He is currently Adjunct Professor of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in History and International Relations at the Paulista State University (UNESP) in São Paulo, Brazil, and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Inter-institutional San Tiago Dantas. He is a researcher of the National Research Council in Brazil and acts as advisor to several national and international scientific organizations. He founded and coordinates the Study Group for Defence and International Security and directs the Center for Latin American Studies at UNESP. He is a member of the Academic Board of the Inter-American Defense College (OAS).

ABSTRACT: Saint-Pierre in his paper draws an important distinction between concepts of security and defence and how those differences have impacted policy in Latin American countries. He notes that non-traditional security threats, rather than traditional threats to the state from outside forces, have moved to the fore, with the result that the military has increasingly found its role shifted from defence of the state against external enemies to domestic issues normally considered the responsibility of police. The complexity of the security challenges, he suggests, led governments to introduce the concept of "multidimensionality" of threat to security and to argue that the challenges had to be met by a range of state institutions. Saint-Pierre argues that the military and the police should have more clearly delineated and separate roles in addressing security challenges.

