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A Man (or Woman) for All Seasons: What the Canadian Public Expects from Canadian General Officers

David Bercuson

Carl von Clausewitz was a man of the early nineteenth century who spent his life as a professional soldier in the service of despots. This makes even more remarkable his observations in his treatise On War that war is a "paradoxical trinity" of the blind force of primordial violence provided by the people, the channelling of that violence into usable power by the army, and the application of that power for political ends by government. "A theory [of war] that ignores any of them," he wrote, "or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless" (von Clausewitz 1984, 89). Thus a military that is not "in synch" with the society that generates it cannot be effective.

It follows, then, that for a military to effectively serve a society which is dynamic and democratic, it must mirror the talent, creativity, ambition, drive, educational achievement, scientific and technological competence, and even the humanitarianism of that society. If a military is properly organized, administered, and led, then the goal of keeping the armed forces and society united is achievable. From the recruitment process to the system of promotion to the highest ranks of general officers, selecting and educating leaders is the key to that objective, because the higher a man or woman is in rank, the greater is his or her potential impact on the process of ensuring that the military evolves in parallel with society. War is ultimately the pursuit of policy.

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by other means, and at the highest levels, commanders ultimately act in a grey area between politics and war. As the men and women who epitomize the military profession in a given country, it is their responsibility to create a national armed forces that will work in harmony with society to achieve its goals and reflect its strengths.

The most successful military leaders in history understood the importance of building armies that mirror their societies. George C. Marshall, for example, the architect of the United States Army that fought the Second World War, was a man in touch with the pulse of American society. Marshall spent so much time with civilians between 1927 and 1937 that, in the words of his official biographer, "he became familiar with the civilian point of view in a way rare for professional military men [and] regarded civilians and military as part of a whole" (Stoler 1989, 60). One major result was that unlike some other major American military leaders of his day – George S. Patton comes immediately to mind – Marshall was a full participant in American society, and his military philosophy reflected the unique characteristics of that society.

As a nation, the United States was a great and successful experiment in self government; the United States Army in the Second World War reflected both the experimentalism and the success of American society owing to Marshall and his protégés. They designed an army that replicated unique qualities of American society—mobility, mechanical know-how, democracy, and lack of rigid class divisions.¹ One historian of the United States Army in the Second World War, Michael D. Doubler, specifically analyzes what was, without doubt, the most important of those characteristics, the ability of Marshall’s army to adapt. "If armies are a reflection of society," Doubler wrote, "the approach a military organization uses to effect change in wartime should reflect the major characteristics, attitudes and values of society at large" (1994, 5). As a main theme of his book, he demonstrated how that took place. Put simply, the United States Army showed itself to be extraordinarily good at changing tactical doctrine and either adapting or altering basic pattern equipment to meet the exigencies of field conditions.

Marshall prepared the United States Army for a war of manoeuvre, for example, but when combat was eventually joined, the American forces often found themselves deficient in fire power. They found that movement alone was not enough to win against the Wehrmacht in many of the field conditions encountered in Northwest Europe. As Geoffrey Perrett put it, when the battle of the hedgerow
country in Normandy "starkly exposed failures in training and leadership" (1991, 327), the most important of American characteristics emerged—inventiveness. The ability to innovate quickly, from bottom to top and vice versa, was epitomized by Sergeant Curtis G. Culin Jr., of the 102nd Cavalry Squadron. It was he who field-modified the Sherman tank to re-establish movement in the hedgerow country. Seeing how tanks exposed their thin undersides to anti-tank fire when they rode up and over hedgerows, he thought of welding four large metal bars, or "tusks," to the front of a Sherman tank to enable the tank to plow through the hedgerows instead of riding over them. Within days, Culin's idea took hold across the entire American front as dozens of tank repair units worked to adapt hundreds of tanks for hedgerow fighting (Perrett 1991, 333). The United States Army succeeded in the Second World War because its general officers organized it to allow the talent, intelligence, and self-reliance of American society to emerge within all of its ranks. The American Army was in tune with the American people.

Despite some popular belief in the myth, nurtured by some very questionable scholarship, that Canadians are not, in general, dynamic when compared to Americans, the earmarks of Canadian society show all the characteristics of a unique Canadian inventiveness. Without attempting to re-tell the entire history of Canada, it is axiomatic that "making do" began when the first settlers arrived from New France in the seventeenth century and found a climate very different from the one they had left, even though the latitudes of Quebec and Normandy are about the same. "Making do" is still a major part of Canadian life. Was it the case, then, that Canadian armies demonstrated that same adaptability when they went to war? Did Canadian general officers build military forces that allowed one of the unique strengths of Canadian society—the ability to "make do"—to emerge under the realities of the field? The answer is complex.

In the First World War, the Canadian Corps, led by Julian Byng and Arthur Currie, is acknowledged to have become one of the most innovative formations on the Western Front by mid–1917. Very little historical research has been done on the question of how adaptable the Canadian Army of the Second World War was when faced with the inevitable gap between preparation for war and war itself, but one recent doctoral dissertation concludes that the Canadian Army was not as adaptable as it needed to be, at least not during the Battle of Normandy. Russell A. Hart concluded that the Canadian Army was so weak at the outbreak of war, and so unready, that it was forced "into an unhealthy dependence" on the British Army and became "an inferior clone of its British counterpart" (1997, 547). To some extent,
Hart’s conclusions regarding the Canadian Army in Normandy add evidence for what military historian and former Lieutenant-Colonel John English has called in the title of his book, a “failure in high command” (English 1991). Yet in the first weeks of the Sicily campaign, 1st Canadian Infantry Division showed a high degree of adaptability when forced to fight without much of its motor transport, field artillery, and command and control apparatus (Bercuson 1995, 149–63).

Though there is no study comparing the composition, leadership, or adaptability of the Canadian Corps in the First World War to the Canadian Army of the Second World War, it is highly possible that the virtual non-existence of a professional Canadian Army in August 1914 allowed the Canadian Corps to evolve doctrine that reflected the inventiveness and the innovation of the country it grew out of. It is equally likely that in the inter-war period the straitjacket of British doctrine, inculcated into the minds of men such as Harry Crerar, Guy Simonds, and Charles Foulkes, made it difficult for that same inventiveness and innovation to emerge when war began. Not until the fall of 1944, when the battalion commanders who had led the Canadian Army in Normandy were largely gone – their places taken by men who had been company or even platoon commanders on D-Day – that the Canadian Army really began to develop effective fighting power at the tactical level. The Canadian Army also developed an acceptable degree of competence at the highest formation level, demonstrated when it launched Operation Veritable in early February, 1945. In that battle – the opening phase of the Battle of the Rhineland – a Canadian Army headquarters barely able to function in early August 1944 showed sufficient staff proficiency to handle a major attack of some thirteen divisions, most of them British.

Military forces have only two reasons for existence: fighting wars and preparing to fight wars. A modern, post Cold War corollary to this rule might well be; to fight wars and enforce peace in near-war conditions, and to prepare for either. It is the primary task of the general officers to prepare militaries for war, or near-war, to build into those militaries the innovation such situations will demand, and to lead them. There are many ways to achieve those aims, but nothing will be successful that does not go with the grain of society. That is why the expectation Canadians must have of their general officers is that the Canadian Forces be trained, equipped, and prepared in ways consistent with the aims and characteristics of Canadian society for whatever missions the government assigns. This does not mean that Canadian Forces leaders should ignore the modern requirement of inter-operability. To the contrary. The Canadian experience of war (and
near-war) has always been within a coalition context. Inter-operability is really the military equivalent of the institutional liberal internationalism that Canadian political leaders have sought for the past half-century via organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization, and others. Inter-operability, in other words, is as solidly within the Canadian tradition as was the adoption by Canada of the United States standard rail gauge in the mid-nineteenth century.

As the new century dawns, Canadians are more secure in their identity as a people and the world is more complex than at anytime since the outbreak of the First World War. Thus the demand on the general officer corps to lead a military that is both effective and Canadian has never been greater. As recently as the 1950s, Canada was dominated by the two founding linguistic groups and was a Parliamentary constitutional monarchy which valued the "peace, order, and good government" of the community more than the rights of individual citizens. The past three decades have witnessed major change in the rules which govern this nation, in the composition of Canada's population, and in the way Canadians see themselves. What has emerged is a nation that is quasi-republican in its constitution, raucous in the nature of its politics, and zealous in the protection of individual rights. The Canadian military is trying to change in response to these trends, but it has failed many times in the past decade. One major job at hand for Canadian Forces general officers is, therefore, to wrestle with the traditional conservatism that has characterized most militaries, most of the time, to ensure that there is not too great a lag between change in the nation and change in the armed forces. At the same time, of course, Canadian Forces general officers must struggle against the desire of some political leaders to use the armed forces as a captive instrument of social or political change at the expense of military effectiveness.

This task must be attempted alongside that of developing an advanced body of Canadian military thought to guide the Canadian Forces in these times of immense global change. With the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the old "balance of power" world created by the Great War of 1914–1918, the twenty-year cease-fire that followed, the 1939–1945 war that was fought to finalize the outcome of the Great War, and the Cold War, all of these rapidly disappeared. The emergence of American hegemony drastically altered the political, economic, and social environments within which Canadian forces will be deployed. From 1914 to 1989, the Canadian government basically decided when its military would engage in war, or in war-like
circumstances, largely in lock step with Great Britain or the United States. There was little need for original doctrinal thinking in the Canadian military because in the only truly important activity Canada's military engaged in—the defence of Western Europe—Canada's soldiers were expected to act synchronously with Canada's allies and/or coalition partners.

Alliance or coalition military ties are still of immense importance to Canada, but events in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Kosovo demonstrate that Canada's military must exercise a greater degree of independent judgement than at any other time in Canadian history. A Canadian infantry brigade commander in the Battle of Normandy, for example—the lowest rank of general officer at that time—had to deal with a tenacious and skilful enemy. But he was essentially a coordinator ensuring that his battalions acted in concert on the battlefield and that the supporting arms, logistics, air support, etc., they needed to fight the battle were available and prepared. The army determined that brigade commanders needed military staff school skills, but given the haste with which the Canadian Army grew in the Second World War, there was neither the time nor the opportunity to seek general officers who had demonstrated imagination and initiative, whether in a more formalized educational setting or in the heat of combat itself. Some of those Canadian brigade commanders were as good as, or better than, any among the Allied forces. Others fell short. But the overall goals a brigadier needed to achieve—basically to advance the brigade to the objective assigned by the division commander—were elementary, though in war, as von Clausewitz pointed out, the simplest things are hard to do (1984, 119).

Although general officers in the Canadian Forces today see little opportunity to command in the field and are not likely to in the near future, they must prepare the military for tasks that are much more complex and that require quicker and more imaginative judgements than has been the case at any time since the end of the Korean War. They must also do so in a national environment when more Canadians than ever are highly educated, aware of the world around them, and conscious of the "rights-driven" society they live in. Today's general officers must also prepare the Canadian Forces for a world of invasive news media coverage, in which "OOTW" (operations other than war) have become closer to real war than classic "Chapter VI" peacekeeping ever was, a world where one error at a roadblock in the Balkans can become a causus belli—and world headline—when CNN broadcasts its half-hourly summary of what is happening around the globe.
case is being made here that anything a general officer does today is harder than ordering soldiers to die in combat. But ordering a soldier to do anything today is more complex than it ever was in peacetime, and may well prove more difficult in war, both in the giving of the order and in the manner of its execution.

What are some of the more significant characteristics of Canadian society today? The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides the basis for a strong belief that all Canadians have basic human rights that must be protected from possible abuse by government. Thus, the courts play a greater role in the lives of Canadians than ever, and governments must be mindful of the rights of citizens, landed immigrants, and even of potential refugees when acting. Soldiers have no fewer rights than other Canadians, even though judges have upheld the special need for a system of military law to supplement civil and criminal law in regulating the actions of military personnel (Madsen 1999).

Canada now draws its people from all over the world, and the influx of immigrants to some of the larger cities has created a visible and dramatic change in the nature of the population. The full-time military is lagging badly in attracting visible minorities into the ranks of the armed forces, and both the militia and the cadets are more reflective of Canadian society today. Whether or not the Canadian Forces will ever come close to mirroring the multicultural nature of Canadian society, Canada’s military leaders must always remember that the Canadian public pays the bills for the military and expects the military to be responsible to all the public, including Canadians of ethnic extractions whose friends or family may be in conflict with Canadian troops in places such as the Balkans.

Canada is, today, a highly educated society. Almost five out of ten Canadians go on to post-secondary educational institutions. In some areas, more than a third of the population possesses a university degree. Graduate degrees are becoming commonplace in some occupations. This had led to a higher degree of technical competence, but also to greater knowledge of the world at large, the place of the citizen in the state, and the importance of maintaining international political and economic ties. It is inconceivable that Canada’s general officers should not be the equal of other Canadians of advanced station in their education or in their ability to solve problems.

The Canadian Forces (CF) must now not only be able to fight and win in war, it must prepare itself for war by strengthening its links to the community, being sensitive to the rights of its members, displaying
immense media savvy, and reflecting the values and characteristics of Canadian society and the history and development of the nation. The Canadian public will not tolerate a CF leadership class that does not meet these high standards. Canada’s general officers for the new century must be warriors, leaders, intellectuals, and organizers who are aware of, and sensitive to, the CF’s role in society and its links to it and to the nature and history of the nation they serve—men and women for all seasons. But how will we ensure that these high standards are met? Only through an interlinked system of selection, education, and training that will allow general officers to emerge who can fill these stringent requirements.

The process must begin with basic officer education. The government has already taken the first step by requiring that, with a small number of exceptions, a university degree be a prerequisite for a commission in the Canadian Forces (Young 1997). But what sort of university education should be required? Aimed at what purpose? To train military professionals the way professional schools train physicians or engineers? Or to teach and nurture creative thinking and problem solving as a basis upon which to build the tenets of a military education? Surely it must be the latter, and surely it must begin with a solid foundation in the liberal arts.

In the social sciences and the humanities—the core disciplines of the liberal arts—there are few clear answers. Learning comes not by amassing information but through the process of thinking and evaluating. That process helps to separate those men and women who can find solutions to problems from those who can merely describe the components of problems. It helps to identify those minds that can adapt quickly to new knowledge, or respond quickly to new ideas or facts and then draw new conclusions. Debate, the challenge of ideas by other ideas, looking at old problems in new ways, sharpens minds and teaches lessons. The liberal arts teach process. They do not teach “stuff,” they teach “thinking about stuff.”

The heart of a military liberal arts education must be military history. There can be no other. As the renowned American journalist Robert D. Kaplan observed in a recent article in Atlantic Monthly:

Military campaigns, because they are fights for the sheer survival of nations and cultures, offer the most telling insights about the values, technologies, social relations, and intellectual life of historical periods. And because both death and defeat are undeniable, a military historian is forced to pierce the
accumulated fog of philosophical abstractions and political agendas that frustrate other historical disciplines. Though rarely regarded as such, military history is as august a field as any in the liberal arts. (Kaplan 1999, 18–19)

How much more applicable are those observations to the military professional? And yet, although military history is taught to Canadian Forces personnel in a variety of ways, it is far behind technical studies and even managerial studies as a discipline favoured either by CF students or by the CF educational establishment. A Canadian general officer must have an education rich in Canadian, and Canadian military, history.

Other “liberal arts” disciplines are also vital to a modern general officer. Chief among them is the study of philosophy. Philosophy not only promotes precision in thought and language, it also teaches how human beings have tried for millennia to analyze the basic human condition. Philosophy is essential to the study of ethics, and a solid background in ethics is necessary for today’s general officers, because today’s societies are founded on liberal principles such as individual rights, the rule of law, and the importance of safeguarding civil society. The public, which the military in a democracy serves, no longer countenances the wasting of human life, though the public has demonstrated as recently as the spring 1999 bombing of Serbia that they are prepared to accept the destruction of some human life to achieve goals they believe to be central to their values. In other words, the public is prepared to accept ethically-sanctioned killing. This puts considerable onus on the military professional to understand just what ethically-sanctioned killing is, especially within the context of wars or peace enforcement actions that have limited political objectives. This is why the study of ethics is vital. It tempers the training of a profession that is, at bottom, dedicated to the taking of life.

Today’s military leaders must have a comprehensive understanding about the human condition and the underlying sanctity of life and the lives they may be called upon to destroy. There is a parallel here to the practise in the Jewish religion of ritual slaughter to obtain kosher meat. The man whom the community designates as the ritual slaughterer is not simply trained in the technical points of how to kill quickly and painlessly. He must also know the basic texts of oral and written Jewish law and discourse. His education in the basic sources of Judaism is second only to that of the Rabbi. He must know and truly understand the ethical relationships that are at the heart of Judaism. He learns why he must sanctify his life with holiness in order to become a humane killer.
Democratic societies are increasingly insisting that their war fighters have a broad understanding of the human condition as preparation for undertaking the solemn responsibility of dispensing death and destruction. As former Canadian Forces Chaplain Captain Eric T. Reynolds observed in an award-winning essay:

Our military institutions must foster personal reflection, detachment and thought ... The greatest challenge for military institutions is that they, like their personnel, must learn to question themselves, share their solutions with others, discuss life-sustaining and life-enhancing values, seek consensus in basic questions, and practise open dialogue. (1993, 33)

Political science is another discipline vital to the general officer. Von Clausewitz observed that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (1984, 87). It is, therefore, incumbent on a modern officer corps to understand politics in all its institutional forms.

And what else is required for today’s officer corps? Many of the same elements that have traditionally formed core curricula in the western world’s great institutions of advanced education, including: literature – the Great Books, or classics, of western civilization; basic experimental sciences such as physics or chemistry (to teach scientific method); even comparative religion. Only after that base has formed should military professionals begin to tackle whatever areas of technical expertise they are interested in – from psychology to geomatic engineering. From the establishment of the earliest universities in Western Europe during the first millennium to now, a true advanced education always combined theoretical and practical learning – learning “stuff” and “learning about stuff” – in a symbiosis of examining both the “real world” and the human condition upon which it exists.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Jack English so recently argued, war is not a technological phenomenon but a social one; technology and technological innovation is not a precondition for war. Technological change will most assuredly enhance, sharpen, concentrate, make easier or make bloodier, the enterprise of war, but it will not change the essence of it. War is decided upon, planned, and fought by human beings whose actions are not quantifiable and never fully explainable. War is not science; it is a terrible form of art. “Strategy,” insisted English, “is the art of war, tactics the art of battle, and operations the art of campaigning” (1996, 67). Thus, the preparation for it is best done by
a basic education in the arts, not by an undergraduate education based on, or which emphasizes, science or engineering.

In a recent article in the *Military Review*, Lieutenant-General Montgomery C. Meigs, Ph.D., Commandant of the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and Colonel Edward J. Fitzgerald, MS, Director of the Centre for Army Lessons Learned, also at Fort Leavenworth, presented their vision of the next generation United States Army. They foresee the evolution of a synthesis of instantly accessible, advanced education knowledge from both civilian and military universities, and actual warfighting. They call the embodiment of this coming process *University After Next (UAN)*, which will serve the *Army After Next (AAN)* through real-time, high-tech, rapid communication connections with virtually all the training, education, war preparation, and warfighting elements of tomorrow’s United States Army (Meigs 1998, 37–45).

General Meigs and Colonel Fitzgerald are both imaginative and high-powered dreamers of what is to be. They may be correct, or they may turn out to be very wide of the mark. We will find out soon enough. But regardless of the precise accuracy of their predictions, there are several important implications of the requirements for Canadian general officers which flow from their vision. First, Canadian general officers will be incapable of exercising the required sophistication of Command, Control, and Communication that this vision projects without the highest educational qualifications consistent with their specializations. Second, if these educational qualifications are insufficient, it will be very difficult for the Canadian Forces to play a role of significance in coalition operations with the United States. Third, in the future, a graduate level education may be as much a requirement for warfighting among high ranking CF officers as charisma, courage, an ability to think quickly and act decisively, or even a broad right shoulder.

The advanced education that tomorrow’s general officers will require will supplement the more traditional leadership qualities already mentioned such as charisma, courage, and an ability to think quickly and act decisively, but it will never replace those characteristics. In future, an effective advanced military education will need to accomplish two inter-related goals: to impart advanced technical and professional training and to teach leaders about the larger world around them and how to think critically about that world as a prerequisite to understanding the human context of war. This dual
mission parallels the centuries-old dual, but integrated, mission of universities themselves; liberal arts-based education forming the foundation for vocational training.

In the mid-1980s, when the United States was just embarking on the massive transformation that changed the hapless military of the Vietnam War into the highly professional military of the late 1990s (Kitfield 1995), a book appeared written by a life-long civilian whose speciality was military education. Originally published in 1985 and widely used by the United States Marine Corps, the Manoeuver Warfare Handbook was written by William S. Lind to help the Marines grasp the concept of manoeuvre warfare. In the foreword to that book, retired marine Colonel John C. Studt wrote:

Why [is this book] from a civilian instead of a professional soldier? In fact, the entire movement for military reform is driven largely by civilian intellectuals, not military officers ... When you think about it, this is not surprising. We have never institutionalized a system that encourages innovative ideas or criticism from subordinates. (Studt, in Lind 1985, xi–xii)

On reading Lind’s book, it is easy to see why he may not have been particularly popular with those who administered the United States military academies of the last decade. In his section on educating and training the Marines for manoeuvre warfare he wrote:

Education is more than the learning of skills or acquisition of facts. It includes acquiring a broad understanding of one’s culture, its development and the principles upon which it is founded. Education develops the ability to put immediate situations into a larger context built of history, philosophy, and an understanding of the nature of man. Inherent in education is the ability to think logically, to approach problem solving methodically, but without a predetermined set of solutions ... Military education requires much the same process of development. Thoroughly grounded in the art of war – the soldier’s “culture” – an educated officer must understand the guiding concepts of his profession, why they are held to be true, and how they evolved. He must be able to put whatever military situation he faces into a larger context of military history, theory, and men’s behavior in combat. The development of an ability to think logically under the stress of battle must always be a fundamental objective of military education. (Lind 1985, 41–42)
This is the same challenge that the Canadian general officer must meet today. Formal education is not a sufficient condition for effective military leadership. Leaders are born, not made. Just as Bachelors in Commerce and MBAs do not make entrepreneurs, so Masters of War Studies or Masters of Strategic Studies do not make war fighters. All the leadership training in the world is of no use in instilling leadership qualities in men and women who are not natural decision-makers and who do not also have the personal charisma, the certainty of self, or the ability to evoke trust that are the essential ingredients for leadership of any sort. But once leaders have been identified and selected, education is essential to reinforce their natural leadership abilities and to broaden their understanding of both the technological and the human contexts within which they must exercise that leadership.

The Canadian Forces do not have a long history of strategic thinking. The response to the public's demand that Canadian soldiers should be taught "ethics and values," to give but one example, is often to mount a course or two, as if such programs can truly teach "ethics and values" any more than a lecture or two (and a movie on diversity training) can truly explain racism to soldiers. Education is not a check list. A few hours discussing Canadian military history cannot expose a future general officer to how the nature of our civil society, the development of our economy, overcoming the challenges of climate and geography, our efforts to maintain an existence separate from Britain and the United States, and the struggle of Francophones to survive the overwhelming English-speaking North American milieu, have shaped our military history as much as the invention of the machine gun.

The Canadian Forces cannot hope to achieve true military effectiveness in the twenty-first century without the development of an intellectual general officer corps. That development cannot take place until there is a strategic change in planning and in delivering military education in the CF. Military education must be an integral part of CF military training. The CF must recognize that a semester-long course in, say, Canadian military history, is as necessary for the development of a young officer as four weeks at Gagetown at the Combat Training Centre, and that much more is required of men and women at the general officer level. Education must not be an "add-on" to a list of qualifications that the CF demands before a member becomes an officer or a general. Canadian Forces members should never have to choose between education and training, between education and taskings, between education and six months in Bosnia. Career advancement in the CF officer corps should be dependent on education.
as much as any other factor. The CF must understand in its collective heart that education is a process, that education is not training, that education is not about learning "stuff," but about "learning about stuff." When those conditions are fulfilled, the CF will have undergone a true revolution in military education, and when that happens, all CF general officers will take their places at the front rank and alongside the best, most professional, and most effective military leaders in the world. Only then will the Canadian public’s high expectations of Canadian Forces general officers be met.

NOTES


2. The most prominent recent representative of the genre is Martin Seymour Lipset’s Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).

3. One recent example is the emergence of a small, family-owned, snowmobile company – Bombardier – as one of the largest manufacturers of civil aircraft in the world. In part, its success was built upon an expertise in building aircraft for northern bush flying that extends back more than half a century.


5. In Simonds’ case, he showed great flexibility in Sicily until he recovered his artillery and motor transport and reverted to “bite and hold,” or “firepower over movement.”


**REFERENCES**


What the Public Expects from Canadian General Officers


Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September

David Bercuson

If William Lyon Mackenzie King were to magically reappear in the nation's capital today, he would no doubt be shocked at the extent to which the armed forces of Canada and the United States operate together and the extent to which Canada's defence has been so thoroughly integrated into the larger context of American defence concerns. King would be staggered by the range and number of treaty-level agreements and memoranda of understanding that tie the Canadian Forces to the United States military structure. He would disapprove of the now standard practice of integrating a Canadian navy warship into every United States carrier battle group that goes to the Arabian Gulf to enforce United Nations sanctions against Iraq. He would be mortified by Canada's 29 August 2002 announcement of a pending agreement with the United States to allow American troops onto Canadian soil in response to a terrorist attack. He would undoubtedly reject the notion that in matters of security and defence, the already close working relationship between Canada and the United States ought to be tightened even further, or that a Canadian government ought to think seriously of a significant expansion of its defence budget in order to soothe rising American concerns about Canadian defence "freeloading."

In general, it still remains the case that the Canada–U.S. defence relationship is one of the closest of any two sovereign countries on the face of the earth. As of January 2002, there were almost ninety bilateral, treaty-level agreements governing the Canada–U.S. defence relationship, some dating as far back as the early nineteenth century. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, more such

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arrangements have been entered into, including the establishment of the Canada-United States Bi-National Planning Group. The group will prepare “contingency plans to ensure a co-operative and well co-ordinated response to national requests for military assistance” on land and at sea, essentially in order to supplement NORAD (DND 2002). Outside the purview of strictly defence matters, the two nations have moved closer with regard to sharing cross-border intelligence, providing for border security, smoothing the flow of cross-border traffic, and in general, starting to shore up the continental perimeters to ward off attack.

Offshore, active Canadian military co-operation with the United States, as well as with Canada’s other NATO allies, predated the events of 9/11, with the Canadian air force contributing to the bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, and a Canadian ground contingent being sent to Kosovo for two rotations in 1999 and 2000 to help KFOR pacify that nominally Yugoslavian province. Most notably, Canada sent a large naval contingent to aid the U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban and Al Qa’ida in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, followed by a Canadian ground contingent sent to participate in a shooting war in the early spring of 2002. Close operational co-operation continues between the Canadian and American navies and air forces, while Canadian defence contractors supply a myriad of military equipment to the American armed forces.

At one level, then, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship continues much as it has evolved since the first post-World War II affirmation in February 1947 (Permanent Joint Board on Defence Resolution No. 36), namely that the close wartime continental defence relationship, initiated at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940, would continue into peacetime. And yet the post-9/11 period saw an immediate upswing in American pressure on Canada – in public by the American Ambassador to Canada and in private by a wide range of government officials, political leaders, and influential private citizens – to beef up the Canadian military for both continental defence and offshore operations. Dwight Mason’s essay in Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus accurately reflects the growing frustration that the United States feels over Canada’s shoddy treatment of its own armed forces because of the hard reality that the United States’ longest, and perhaps its most vulnerable, border is with Canada.

It is still too early to know whether all the forecasts that the terrorist attacks would “change the world” were correct. As with all such sweeping generalizations, no one will really know until many
years have passed. But one thing is certain: those attacks revealed just how vulnerable the United States is to acts of planned, mass mayhem. Thus, the defence of the continental United States is now, once again, at the top of the American priority list, ahead of virtually every other American foreign policy concern. This has not been the case since the end of the Cold War, not even since the era of the massive buildup of ICBMs in the USSR and the United States, which began in earnest in the early 1960s. In many respects, then, Canada today is in virtually the same position it was during the ten years immediately following World War II; owing to geography alone, Canada is once again a vital component of the defence of the United States itself, whether Canadians are aware of that reality, whether they like it, or even whether they are prepared to pay for it. In that sense, 9/11 returned Canada to a past that should not be forgotten.

Canadians remained wary neighbours of the United States for more than six decades after the country’s establishment in 1867. It is a continuing source of amusement to Canadian military historians that the first interwar defence plan put together by Canada’s tiny interwar military had at its heart a Canadian cavalry attack into the United States’ midwest. It was not until 1938, when Hitler was well on the road to launching World War II, that the first very tentative but tangible steps towards Canada–U.S. defence co-operation began when Franklin D. Roosevelt told a Queen’s University audience that year that the United States would not stand idly by if Canada were threatened by a hostile power. King responded in kind a few days later (Thompson and Randall 1994, 147). Two years later, as France lay in defeat, Canada initiated the first military-to-military talks ever between the two countries—but in secret, of course. Canadian officers soon began to pay clandestine visits to Washington, always going in mufﬁ, to begin exploring concrete steps that the two countries might take in view of the growing overseas threats (Eayrs 1965, 203).

Thus the fundamental pattern of the Canada–U.S. defence relationship was set from the very beginning of that relationship: the United States initiates, Canada responds (because it usually must), though generally reluctantly and often with great hesitation. The dynamic—as true today as in 1938—is rooted in the reality that the United States has harboured global interests and ambitions since the late nineteenth century, and Canada has not. Thus, with the exception of the twenty years between 1919 and 1939, the United States has generally understood that global interests must be protected by global power, manifest in many forms but especially as military power, and that at a minimum, America’s real security borders must be established far from its shores and its land boundaries with Canada and Mexico.
Almost none of that is true for Canada. "When Canada’s mandarins first awoke in the 1930s to the importance of reaching out for international markets – particularly but not exclusively in the United States – their strategy rested primarily on the power of reason and the pull of economic self-interest to tie Canada to the United States and eventually the rest of the trading world" (Granatstein 1981, 66). Canada had economic interests in the Caribbean, for example, but no military capacity to force the peoples of that region to do its bidding. Besides, the United States was perfectly capable of policing that area and shouldering the full costs of maintaining marines and naval units at the ready there.

The pattern of Canada–U.S. defence relationships has almost always involved Canada responding to American initiatives; the pattern of Canadian-American trade relationships is almost exactly the opposite. From the first days of Confederation, Canada initiated contacts aimed at easing the cross-border trade flow, with the United States responding. On three occasions – in 1910, 1947, and 1985 – Canada initiated free trade discussions with the United States, only to back away on the first two occasions and almost retreating on the third.

The explanation for this peculiar train of events is simple. In matters of defence, Canadians have long believed that the United States needs strong Canadian defences far more than Canada does, while no one has to convince Canadians that in matters of trade, Canada badly needs American markets. In other words, when Canadians look south, they see jobs; when Americans look north, they see defence. This Canadian view of things is quite wrong, but most Canadians still seem to believe, as Senator Raoul Dandurand proclaimed at the League of Nations in 1924, that Canada lives in "a fireproof house far from inflammable materials," and is thus unaffected by the onset of world crises with no need to maintain a credible military between wars (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991, 76).

The historical evolution of the Canada–U.S. defence partnership in the post-World War II era was established early. In 1946, the Military Co-operation Committee (MCC) attempted to convince both governments that the air/atomic threat from the USSR was so grave and so imminent that both countries ought to move quickly to establish vast networks of radar stations and fighter fields to counter the threat (Jockel 1987, 6–29). In fact, the MCC’s view reflected the worst-case scenario held by some high-ranking generals in the United States Air Force far more than it did official thinking in either American military or diplomatic circles. The Canadian government was not at first aware
of that and feared that the MCC report was but the opening stage of a new campaign to pressure Canada to fortify its north. William Lyon Mackenzie King's misgivings were fed by news leaks emanating from Washington relating that Canada was being pressed to establish some sort of aerial "Maginot Line" in the far north. Some historians took Canadian reticence as a sign that Canada's view of the Soviet threat in that period was more moderate than could be found in Washington (Page and Munton 1977). In fact, as closer examination of Department of External Affairs and Department of National Defence documents have since revealed, Canadian policy-makers were generally of the same mindset as those in the United States. The difference in outlook between the two countries was that the Canadian defence budget was so much smaller that Canada's policy-makers were forced to subordinate their mistrust of the USSR to the spending priorities of the Department of Finance. That department, under Douglas Abbott, took its cue directly from the Prime Minister, who was determined to shrink the military budget and shift financial priorities to paying down Canada's massive war debt and initiating the welfare state measures the government had promised in the June 1945 federal election. Not for the first time, Canada's defence planning was cut to fit the Finance Department's cloth (Bercuson 1993a).

Although the United States also made massive cuts to its defence budget after 1945, those cuts still left enough money for their military to be more expansive in its planning than was the case in Canada. Besides, the United States was forging ahead with the expansion of its nuclear attack capabilities, the design and building of new intercontinental bombers such as the B-47, and the development of air-to-air refueling, which they believed would provide the ultimate protection for the United States and would be its ultimate guarantor against attack from the USSR (Conant 1962, 16).

In almost every case in the late 1940s, Canadian ties to the U.S. defence establishment developed out of American requests to Canada to map the Canadian North by air, or establish LORAN and weather stations, or allow cold-weather testing, or give access to United States naval vessels and military personnel to practice joint land/sea exercises in the Arctic Archipelago. The United States wanted the transcontinental radar station chains, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) lease of Goose Bay, the possible use of an emergency landing strip at Resolute, permission for its fighters to cross into Canadian airspace in hot pursuit of unknown radar contacts, the ability to overfly Canada - with bombers armed with nuclear weapons - and the right to use Goose Bay to launch atomic attacks by air against the USSR
without Canadian permission. Being the larger power with a greater military and a far more sweeping list of potential threats, it was natural that the United States would be the perpetual supplicant, Canada the perpetual respondent. It was also natural for American defence requirements to often distort Canadian budget priorities.

In the first fifteen years or so of the Cold War, Canadian policy vis-a-vis defence relations with the Americans evolved from initial great reluctance, to a realistic appraisal of what measures would have to be taken to accommodate American requirements, to a renewed reluctance to be perceived as a mere cockboat following in the wake of the United States man-of-war. From roughly 1945 through late 1949, the Canadian government's main strategy for dealing with American requests for defence co-operation was deceit of the Canadian people and delay in agreeing to the Americans' requirements. When Canada agreed to the construction of LORAN and weather stations in the far north, for example, the public never learned the military nature of the building program, and American aircraft and ships detailed to carry construction supplies north were instructed to avoid Canadian population centres (Bercuson 1993b, 158). To some extent, the government's effort to mislead Canadians over the American presence in the far north was rooted in the fear that the anglophile Tory official opposition in Parliament would raise embarrassing questions regarding why Canada was connecting itself ever more closely to the United States in defence matters. The other main factor was King's reluctance to be seen as too activist in the Cold War and too close to the American line on the USSR. King officially retired from office in late 1948, and his successor, Louis St. Laurent, was far less reticent to throw Canada's lot in with the United States.

In these early years of the Cold War, Canada evolved a policy that amounted to defending its own sovereignty against possible American incursions by ensuring that it be seen by Washington to be doing as much as time and Canada's financial resources would allow in regard to defending the continent (Bercuson 1990). The greatest fear among Canadian policy-makers was that failure to act at all, or to act sufficiently to give the Americans comfort, would prompt the United States to shove Canadian sovereignty concerns aside and act in its own self-defence. There was an almost irrational fear, for example, that the United States might challenge Canadian claims to sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago, especially since Canada had no tangible presence on many of the Arctic islands and claimed sovereignty on the "sector principle," which the United States did not recognize (Smith 1966, 214).
Even if the United States was not interested in formally challenging Canadian sovereignty over any Canadian soil, the danger persisted that heavy American presence in any concentrated area of Canada would have the practical result of the United States assuming de facto control over parts of Canada, even if de jure control was not sought. That had appeared to happen in large areas of British Columbia and the Yukon in the lands contiguous to the Alaska Highway and the North West Staging Route during the war, and it could not be allowed to happen again.

Thus a set of principles was worked out in Ottawa that was subsequently applied to almost all the Canada–U.S. defence projects on Canadian soil, with the notable exception of the Goose Bay SAC base, which was governed by a special lease negotiated by both countries. Included in that set of principles were provision for at least a symbolic Canadian presence on all joint bases and projects, ultimate Canadian ownership of any facility built, and applicability of Canadian law to American personnel (Bercuson 1993b, 158).

Canada's reluctance to spend money on defence projects that appeared to be short-sighted and more beneficial to the United States than to Canada melted away in the twelve to fourteen months between the explosion by the USSR of its first nuclear weapon in late 1949 and the initial spectacular successes of the Chinese 'volunteers' in Korea beginning in November 1950. By the first months of 1951, Canada was as ready as the other Western powers (all affiliated to NATO) to spend massively on defence. An atmosphere of panic pervaded Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, and even Ottawa as the United Nations forces in Korea were pushed back from near the Korean border with China to south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Deep fear gripped these capitals that a Communist victory over the United Nations forces in Korea would prompt the Communists to launch World War III with either an atomic attack on North America or an attack into West Germany, or both.

Canada's defence budget ballooned in early 1951 and kept climbing for the next half-decade; suddenly, Canada's hesitation over matters of continental defence faded away. From the early winter of 1951, Canada-U.S. military co-operation grew apace as the Cold War deepened. Agreements were concluded that solved a host of minor issues arising out of the American presence at the leased bases in Newfoundland, a renewable twenty-year lease was signed for a SAC base at Goose Bay, and provision was made for backup SAC facilities elsewhere. Canada undertook to build the Mid-Canada Line (or McGill Fence) and gave the United States permission to build the DEW line. Canadian air defence resources expanded rapidly—with major
increases in fighter forces deployed, bases maintained, and radar and ground control stations operated. A series of agreements deepened interoperability in air defence and led to the signing of NORAD in 1957 (Jockel 1987, 91–117). At the same time, a North American defence production agreement was concluded in October 1956, while cooperation in research on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons increased. By the time John Diefenbaker received his massive 208-seat majority in the 1958 election, Canada had become a willing partner not only in Canada-U.S. continental defence matters but also in NATO, where the previous St. Laurent government had been a leader in the nuclearization of the alliance.

Both the Canadian defence effort and Canada’s commitment to an enthusiastic defence partnership with the United States began to slip during Diefenbaker’s five years in office. There were four main factors underlying this renewed lack of Canadian enthusiasm for defence in general and defence of North America in particular.

The first was the rapid slowing of the Canadian economy in the first years of Diefenbaker’s administration as the nation slid into its first serious post-war recession. Rising unemployment alongside Canada’s first post-war devaluation of the Canadian dollar ushered in a period of severe federal restraint marked, for example, by the cancellation of the Avro CF-105, which was emerging as one of the most expensive defence undertakings in Canadian history.

The second factor was Diefenbaker’s own mindset and his view that the Liberals had allowed Canada to slip much too far down the road of Americanization. “Dief the Chief” was determined to swim against the inexorable tide of continental economic history by thrusting Canada back into British markets and ensuring that Canada reemphasize its ties with Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations (Robinson 1989, 10). Diefenbaker gave his almost automatic approval to the NORAD agreement not long after he was first elected with a minority government in 1957, but this lack of any resistance was almost certainly due to the wiles of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Charles Folukes, who presented it to the Prime Minister as a done deal and one that only capped a series of agreements that were already in place—which was partly true. As Diefenbaker grew more comfortable in his unexpected interregnum, he questioned Canada-U.S. defence relations more closely until eventually he balked completely over the matter of nuclear warheads for the newly acquired BOMARC-SAGE ground-to-air, anti-aircraft defence systems. Diefenbaker also refused to fulfill commitments made to NATO about acquiring tactical nuclear warheads for the Honest John, short-range missiles that the
Canadian army was operating in Europe or for the CF-104 Starfighters that had been acquired to replace the aging RCAF Sabres.

Diefenbaker was not only suspicious of the "Americanization" of the Canadian defence effort, he was also suspicious of the new President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. The poor personal relations between Diefenbaker and Kennedy are well known and need not be detailed here, but there can be little doubt that the two men were as intense in their dislike of each other as Lyndon Johnson and Lester Pearson or George W. Bush and Jean Chrétien. In part, that dislike was based on sheer age and personality differences. But Kennedy was also determined to conduct an active, vigourous, and, where necessary, armed United States foreign policy where his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had seemed to rely more on diplomacy. Whenever there is great activity in defence and foreign affairs in Washington, Canadian governments find themselves challenged to help lead, to follow, or to get out of the way – a source of perpetual discomfort for most Canadian governments which are, by their nature, hesitant and cautious, either for reasons of conviction or owing to sheer politics. Thus "when Kennedy announced the presence of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba in October 1962 and brought United States military forces to the second highest state of readiness in anticipation of an invasion of Cuba and a war with the USSR, Diefenbaker refused to go along. As a consequence, the Canadian military itself took the unprecedented step of following the American lead in the absence of a lawful order from the Prime Minister, a clear violation of the principle of civilian control of the military" (Granatstein 1986, 114–16).

The final factor leading the Canadian government to distance itself from the Americans in matters of continental defence was the growing realization that the threat of the manned bomber was passing as the USSR and the United States deployed increasing numbers of ICBMs and the age of the SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) dawned. Since there was no effective defence against either of these two weapons systems, there was less need for Canada to continue devoting resources to anti-aircraft defence systems. American reliance on detection for purposes of defence shifted to detection for purposes of warning, with the first steps being towards the establishment of the BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) in 1959. By 1964, much of the continental radar warning system put in place after 1950 was destined to be closed and dismantled. Canada would henceforth have a much smaller part to play in continental defence than it had had during the manned bomber era; in the age of MAD (mutually assured destruction), the United States would defend itself by deterrence, a role in which Canada could play only a peripheral and unimportant part.
In 1963 John Diefenbaker lost power in the first election since 1911 that had an important defence issue to be decided. His refusal to agree to acquire the nuclear warheads that were vital for the effective operation of the BOMARC missiles (and the rocket warheads and tactical nukes designed for the Starfighters) gave Lester B. Pearson a winning election issue. Previously, while Leader of the Opposition, Pearson had opposed Canada’s nuclearization. But that had been mere politics; he had been a willing proponent of NATO acquiring tactical nukes when he was still Secretary of State for External Affairs. In a calculated move to distance themselves from the Tories, the Liberals switched sides and won the 1963 election by campaigning that Canada had made commitments to the United States and NATO and must now fulfill those commitments.

Once the Liberals were elected, the nukes were acquired, but the government made it clear that it would abandon Canada’s nuclear role as soon as possible. Pearson’s main occupation in his five years as a minority Prime Minister was the completion of the welfare state and the laying of the foundations for national bilingualism. The war in Vietnam reached fever pitch as Canadians welcomed American draft dodgers and demonstrated in increasing numbers against the “war on Vietnam.” Pearson’s attempt to give Lyndon Johnson advice about that war stoked Johnson’s anger and the Canada-U.S. defence relationship cooled considerably, at least at official levels (Martin 1982, 223-30). Pearson’s successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, publicly distanced himself from closer defence ties with the United States. He courted the Third World, was a leader in the start of the so-called North-South dialogue, and even tried to cultivate Canada-USSR ties in a vain attempt to make multilateralism actually work for Canada. He also cut Canada’s military presence in NATO. And although he eventually gave his blessing to the acquisition of new Leopard tanks and the CF-18 fighter jets, he left the navy and much of the rest of the military in a dilapidated state. He trod a fine line when he gave the United States permission to test cruise missiles in the Canadian Arctic while launching his round-the-world peace mission in the last year of his prime ministership (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990, 377–83).

If Trudeau’s pirouette around traditional Canada-U.S. defence ties and long-standing Canadian defence commitments to NATO left the Americans unimpressed, Brian Mulroney tried to restore Canadian credibility in Washington by pulling Canada closer to the United States in trade and on major foreign policy questions. Mulroney was determined to restore the credibility that Canada had once had in NATO and with the Americans, participating in the Gulf War of 1990-91 and slightly increasing the defence budget. His government set the
Halifax-class frigate construction program in motion, began to plan for the acquisition of maritime helicopters to replace the already-aging Sea Kings, and at one point even proposed that Canada acquire nuclear submarines and a Polar 8 icebreaker to guard Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. The subs died when Canada's growing budget deficit and debt crisis dictated new cuts in defence expenditures. There can be no doubt, however, that Canada-U.S. defence relations reached a new high point during his administration (Davis 1989, 215–38).

Canada-U.S. relations began to slide once again under Jean Chrétien, and more particularly, his longest-serving Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy was determined to show the world that Canada was not simply a pale reflection of the United States and used the greater freedom that the end of the Cold War seemed to allow Canada to encourage ties with Communist Cuba, to use the United Nations, multilateralism, and "soft power" to achieve Canadian goals and to pursue goals such as the anti-landmines treaty that the United States found diplomatically embarrassing. For the most part, the Clinton administration more than tolerated Axworthy's ingenuous spin on Canadian foreign relations, possibly because it projected the image that it was itself more likely to act "within a multilateral framework than its Republican predecessors were." But when George W. Bush was elected in 2000, the tone of the American administration quickly changed.

The new president made it very clear that the United States would rebuild its military, that it would unilaterally withdraw from the Kyoto Accord, and that it did not trust international inspection regimes covering chemical and biological weapons. Ottawa was immediately challenged to either get on side with the new administration or keep its distance and await developments. The choice was complicated by the knowledge that President Bush had a long history of involvement with Mexico and was close to the new Mexican President, reformer Vicente Fox. One way to forestall a United States shift towards Mexico, several experts suggested, was to rebuild the Canadian military and strengthen the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair was strengthening UK-U.S. defence ties. The Chrétien government, as was its wont, chose caution, and even appeared to make a practice of denouncing alleged United States unilateralism, becoming once again the "stern daughter of the voice of God," as Dean Acheson had once described Canadian foreign policy (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991, 183).

Almost immediately after the terror attacks of 9/11, Canada was once again in the Washington spotlight as a country that was suddenly
very important for continental defence and the security of the United States. The closing of cross-border trade and the grounding of all air traffic in North America after the attacks grabbed the attention of the Canadian government almost immediately. The direct impact on the economy was devastating in its own right, but the ripples were felt right across the country. One burgeoning young airline closed its doors permanently; the rest required bailouts. In companies large and small, retail, wholesale, and manufacturing, plants shut down – or nearly did – for lack of parts or lack of access to American markets. Border security leapt to the top of the Canadian government agenda.

From the very beginning of the war on terror, the Canadian government was an active and willing partner with the United States in tightening border controls and increasing border security. Tough new internal security measures were adopted, and billions in new resources were directed to perimeter and national security in the December 2001 budget. With $1.7 billion in daily cross-border trade at issue, it mattered a great deal to Canada that the United States was once again very concerned about its northern border.

That firmness was missing, however, when it came to beefing up the only Canadian agency capable of patrolling the littoral waters and the air over Canada, or of making any significant contribution not only to the war on terrorism at home but to the attack on terrorism abroad. Canada’s Operation Apollo (heavy on naval forces, extremely light on air assets, with a battle group insertion only in late February 2002, and incapable of a tour longer than six months) was the best Ottawa could do with the nation’s badly depleted military. No matter what pressure was placed on the government by various domestic agencies – private and public, including the Senate Security and Defence Committee, the federal Auditor General, and the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs – the Prime Minister dug in his heels and refused to consider any significant increases in the national defence budget. It was then that the United States Ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci, began to openly disparage Canada’s defence readiness and urge that Canada’s military be bolstered (Gatehouse 2002). Celluci’s entreaties merely widened the rift that Trudeau, Chrétien, and Axworthy had already worked hard to create. One poll taken in mid-December 2002 showed that an astonishing 38 per cent of Canadians thought George Bush was more of a threat to world peace than Saddam Hussein.¹

It is ironic that a nation so dependent on international trade and so securely tied to the American economy should have emerged early in
the twenty-first century as so cool to the United States, so isolationist in its foreign policy outlook, and so self-deluded as to believe that it mattered much in world councils any longer. Tepid government leadership in foreign affairs, the gutting of the military, and the felt need of some liberal ministers to cater to the illusions of the otherwise tattered Canadian Left have produced a growing impasse with the United States. As in the early days of the Cold War, the United States is looking to Canada for help; unlike those days, Ottawa is spurning Canada’s only true neighbour and friend. If this policy trend is not reversed, the long-term implications for Canada will be devastating.

**Note**

1. See [http://www.ekos.com> – 56% thought Saddam Hussein was more of a threat than Bush; 6% could not make up their minds.

**References**


Renaissance in
Canadian Arctic Security?

Rob Huebert

In the summer of 2002, the Canadian Forces (CF) held their first joint exercise in the Canadian Arctic in over twenty years. Three years later, in August 2005, two Canadian warships entered Hudson Bay for the first time in over thirty years. The CF are eagerly awaiting the launch of RadarSat II in 2006, as it will give Canada the ability to know when surface vessels enter Canadian northern waters for the first time ever. Additionally, the Canadian government has acknowledged the need for better Arctic security in its recently released International Policy Statement for Defence and Foreign Affairs. Further fuelling this renaissance in Canadian Arctic security is interest generated by the national media over several related issues, such as the dispute with Denmark over Hans Island. All of this suggests that Canada is rediscovering the need to improve its ability to defend the north.

The security of the Canadian north has been a perpetual problem for Canadian policy-makers and for the Canadian military. The challenges of operating over its vast distances combined with the complex nature of security threats in the face of extreme weather conditions create a strategic requirement that often appears insurmountable. As such, it frequently seems that Canadian political leaders and defence planners prefer to ignore these challenges in the hope that nothing will happen. When decisions are made, they have usually been in response to the specific actions of one of Canada's northern neighbours, such as the United States or the former Soviet

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Union. Furthermore, even when the Government of Canada has decided to act, it has generally proven unwilling to commit the resources that those decisions entail.

Despite its weak past record, however, there are indications that the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces are now beginning to take the security of the Arctic seriously. In order to understand what the Canadian government is doing, the following questions need to be answered: What is the history of Canadian Arctic security? How well has Canada met its need to protect its Arctic region? Is Canada improving the manner in which it provides for Arctic security? If so, why, and is this effort likely to be sustained?

Historical Background

There is little known about Arctic security issues before the arrival of the Europeans, although there are some suggestions that there may have been some low level conflict between the Inuit and Dene peoples. Likewise, there are limited observations of some conflict between the Inuit and early European explorers, such as Martin Frobisher and Henry Hudson (Delgado 1999, 19; 40).

The modern record of Canadian Arctic security began with the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Following their failure to catch and sink the American aircraft carriers stationed there, the Japanese tried again to engage the American fleet during the early summer of 1942. Their strategy at the Battle of Midway was to capture that American island, thereby forcing the Americans to respond with their numerically smaller carrier force. The Japanese hoped to then overwhelm and sink the American carrier fleet in battle. In order to confuse the Americans, they also launched a diversionary attack on the Aleutian Islands of Attu, Agattu, and Kiska. While the Japanese were decisively defeated at Midway, their attacks on the Aleutian Islands were successful. They held these islands until they were defeated by a joint American–Canadian invasion of the Archipelago during the summer of 1943. At the time of the Japanese occupation, both the American and Canadian governments feared the Japanese might use the islands as a staging point for further advances into North America. The decision was then made to construct a highway connecting the existing North American road system with Alaska to facilitate the transfer of personnel, ammunition, and other goods needed to defend against further Japanese advances. The highway was to begin at Dawson Creek,
British Columbia, and stretch all the way to Fairbanks, Alaska, a
distance of 2,288 kilometres (Bell 2001). Begun in March 1942, it was
duly completed eight months later (Milepost 1998).

In many ways, construction of the Alaska Highway set the stage
for future Canadian security operations in the region. Canada
contributed the bulk of the territory over which the road was
constructed (1,964 kilometres in Canada, versus 324 kilometres in
Alaska), but the majority of the personnel building the highway were
American, and it was also primarily paid for by the Americans. No
surprise, then, that it was named the Alaska Highway, and not the
Yukon or Northern Canadian Highway.

When the Second World War ended, the Soviet threat quickly
replaced the Japanese one in the Canadian north. As the Soviets
acquired nuclear weapons, then long-range bombers, and then ballistic
missiles, the Canadian Arctic became one of the Cold War’s main areas
of interest. While there was little fear of a Soviet ground invasion, the
polar route became the direct means of attack on North American cities
for the Soviet bomber and strategic missile forces. In order to defend
against a bomber attack or to deter a missile attack, the governments of
Canada and the United States entered into a number of agreements
providing for the surveillance and protection of North America’s
aerospace. These included the construction of the Distant Early Warning
(DEW) Line of radar sites and the establishment of North American Air
Defence Command (NORAD), later to become the North American
Aerospace Defence Command. The DEW Line was erected across the
entire northernmost land boundary of North America, commencing in
western Alaska and stretching completely across northern Canada,
ending at Greenland. It was augmented by other radar warning tiers in
the ensuing years and modernized in Canada in 1985. It is now known
as the North Warning System. In May 1958, Canada and the United
States agreed to the establishment of NORAD. This bilateral union
established the joint command that provides for the surveillance and
binational control of North American airspace. It remains in force as one
of the key security arrangements between our two nations.

Canada and the United States acted as political equals with
respect to both the DEW Line and NORAD, but the United States
provided the bulk of the financing and technology required for their
construction and maintenance. Nevertheless, the general consensus is
that both entities served Canada’s northern security requirements well.
There were inevitably some minor disputes during their development,
but no significant difficulties arose regarding their ultimate impact
upon Canadian–American security requirements. The fact that a state of deterrence was maintained between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO throughout the entire Cold War period can be attributed partly to the success of both these initiatives.

However, when examining Canada’s actions in defending its northern security without American assistance, it becomes immediately apparent that the Canadian government has historically preferred to minimize its presence. The largest force maintained in this region is the Rangers, a volunteer militia force whose purpose is to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty through its presence, as well as provide surveillance. These units are made up primarily of northern Canadian Aboriginal peoples, who contribute their outstanding skills in navigating and surviving in the north. The Rangers are not heavily armed, however, and they have not been employed on patrols very far from their home communities until recently. Further, the permanent deployment of members of the regular forces in the north has been historically small, and from the 1970s onward, has not normally exceeded 500 personnel stationed there at any given time. This includes both the electronic listening post in Alert and the Northern Area Command Headquarters in Yellowknife. The Canadian Forces did engage in large-scale northern exercises throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but these declined in importance and size towards the end of the 1980s with the end of the Cold War.

Likewise, the roles of both the air force and the navy generally decreased as the Cold War progressed; the navy did not even possess an icebreaker until 1954, and it quickly decided to transfer the craft to the Coast Guard. The navy was then reduced to sending an occasional warship into the Arctic during the short open water period in the summer, but even these deployments ceased in 1989. When the USSR developed its nuclear-powered submarine force and began to deploy these vessels into Arctic waters, there was no tangible effort by the Canadian government to meet this threat. Periodically, the government toyed with the idea of purchasing nuclear-powered submarines. In 1965, the possibility of buying a small number of American Skipjack-class submarines was raised, but the initiative was soon abandoned (Milner 1999). The most serious consideration was generated in the mid-1980s, when the government stated in its 1987 White Paper its intention to buy/build as many as twelve nuclear-powered submarines (DND 1987). This would have given our navy the ability to go anywhere in Canadian Arctic waters, with the concomitant ability to deter Soviet submarines from entering those waters. Canadian nuclear-powered submarines also would have forced Allied navies to establish
an underwater management scheme when operating in Canadian waters in order to avoid collision. Thus, Canada would have gained an excellent picture of all submarine activity in its Arctic waters. However, due to the ending of the Cold War and the associated costs, the nuclear submarine acquisition program was abandoned, just as a design decision was about to be made.

The air force's presence and its concomitant ability to operate in the north was also continually pared back throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At present, 440 (Transport) Squadron, comprised of four de Havilland CC-138 Twin Otters, is the only permanently based air asset. These aircraft were built in the 1960s and 1970s, and only now is their replacement being given serious consideration. There are also four designated Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), constructed at Inuvik, Iqaluit, Yellowknife, and Rankin Inlet to accommodate Canadian and NORAD fighters, but they are seldom operational. With the exception of the Twin Otters, there are no other Search and Rescue (SAR) aircraft or helicopters permanently stationed in the north. The northern sovereignty overflights of the region by long-range patrol aircraft (first the Canadair Argus, later the CP-140 Aurora) reached a high of twenty-two flights per year in 1990. However, in keeping with the perceived threat reduction, they were then decreased drastically in frequency, such that by 1995, only one or two flights a year were being conducted (Huebert 1993).

The ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to respond to security threats in the north has never been very significant. At its zenith, the Canadian military co-operated with that of the United States to counter first the Japanese, then the Soviet threat. However, there was little effort to develop a Canadian ability to act on its own. There are several reasons for this. First, the costs associated with any independent effort have always been formidable. During the 1950s, Canada might have had the resources to build up its northern military capabilities, but that would have come at a cost to its other defence capabilities. Since the Americans were willing to pay for the vast majority of the costs, there seemed little reason to spend more Canadian funds on defence of the region. Second, the threats posed by the Japanese, then the Soviets to the north, were always overshadowed by other elements of the overall security threat at the time. Thus, the war in Europe completely dominated the focus of Canadian decision-makers as the Japanese moved into Alaska. The strategic assessment (a correct one) was that the German military threat was the most dangerous to Canada. Likewise, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets' actions in Europe and Asia
tended to divert attention from the growing Soviet aerospace and maritime threats to the Canadian Arctic. Third, the threat perception of the time was shared by the United States. With their much more significant military capabilities, they were in a better position to provide the necessary resources to ensure that North America's northern security needs were met. Thus, Canada was willing to entrust the North American undersea Arctic security entirely to the United States Navy. Fourth, once the Alaska Highway, the DEW Line, and NORAD were established, Canadian decision-makers tended to believe that there was little more that needed to be done, and they felt free to focus on other concerns. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Canadian security needs in the Arctic since the 1970s have become increasingly dominated by a false dilemma generated by sovereignty and security issues.

THE ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY/SECURITY FALSE DICHOTOMY

Much of the debate with respect to Canadian Arctic security tended to conceptualize the issues surrounding sovereignty and security as an "either/or" proposition, suggesting that policies designed to protect Canada's security came at a cost to its sovereignty, and vice versa. This is predicated upon the assumption, first articulated during the Cold War era, that the security threat was posed by the USSR, while a sovereignty threat existed from the United States. Thus, the implication was that to work with the United States towards protecting Canadian Arctic security meant that some sovereignty over the north would have to be surrendered to the United States. Conversely, if Canada made efforts to protect its Arctic sovereignty against the Americans, it would come at the cost of co-operating with them in preparation of a defence against possible Soviet aggression.

The reality is that the two are not mutually exclusive concepts, but are different terms for the same requirement – regional control. While there have been extensive discussions regarding the meaning of sovereignty, it is effectively all about the ability of a state to make and enforce laws and regulations within a given geographic area. A state makes and enforces these laws and regulations for the well-being, prosperity, and security of its citizens. In the case of the Arctic, Canada has historically wanted this right for all its Arctic regions – land, water and ice – in order to offer its citizens security from outside threats. However, to do so is expensive. Owing to the willingness of the United States to provide the bulk of the funding required to defend the security of North America's Arctic region against threats from Japan and then the USSR in the past, Canadian policy-makers have not been
forced to deal unilaterally with the security threat in the north. At the same time, the very public disputes with the United States regarding Canadian Arctic sovereignty in 1969–70 (the Manhattan crisis) and 1985 (the Polar Sea crisis) created the illusion that, somehow, there is a fundamental difference between Canadian sovereignty requirements and security requirements. This has been true only because Canada has not been willing to provide adequate resources to establish control.

**THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

With the end of the Cold War, almost all activities the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) conducted in the north were either stopped or substantially reduced. The predominant view was that the danger to the north was now over; nothing more needed to be done.

The Canadian navy ceased its northern deployments (NORPLOYS) in 1989. It had been sending anywhere from one to three vessels into the eastern Arctic since 1971. Initially, Canadian destroyers and replenishment vessels were deployed, but by 1986, only smaller support or ancillary vessels were used.

The Canadian Forces also had the opportunity to purchase underwater listening devices for Arctic use from the United States. Consideration was given to buying three units, a number that would allow complete coverage of the choke points leading into the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. While agreement regarding the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was reached to allow Canada access to this very advanced technology, the Canadian government ultimately decided that the expected cost of C$100 million was too expensive. Declassified documents suggest that the decision not to proceed was made during the early 1990s. Had the system been deployed, Canada would have had its first independent means of knowing if/when foreign submarines were entering Canadian Arctic waters.

The Canadian air force also cut back on its northern commitments. Throughout the 1990s, 440 Squadron continued to use the Twin Otter light transports in-theatre, with no replacement decision for these aging aircraft on the horizon. The CP-140 Auroras and the three CP-140A Arcturus aircraft had their northern sovereignty overflights (NORPATS) reduced from a high of twenty-two sorties in 1990 to just one in 1995. After 1995, seldom were more than one or two northern sovereignty flights per year generated. Likewise, Canadian CF-18 Hornets were rarely exercised at the four Forward Operating Locations.
Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?

The DEW Line was modernized into the North Warning System starting in the mid-1980s. This included updating some of the radar systems, but a large-scale reduction of personnel manning the systems was made possible through the automation of many of the smaller sites. However, as the 1990s progressed, less attention was paid to maintaining these systems. Concurrently, the Canadian post at Alert was modernized, allowing for a decrease in all ranks personnel from over 200 to about 75 (Urosevic 2004).

The only aspect of Arctic security increased in the immediate post-Cold War period was that pertaining to the Rangers. The overall number of Ranger patrols was increased from 25 in the 1980s to 58 by 2000. However, funding limitations allowed for only 30 of the 58 Ranger units to actually perform sovereignty patrols in 2000.

It is clear that the Arctic simply ceased to be an area of significant concern for Canadian security during the 1990s. Indeed, when the government did give any consideration to the role of the Canadian north in the new emerging international system, it was in the context of innovative, multi-lateral institutions, the most important of which was the Arctic Council. While this Council has done important work in determining the nature and force of environmental and social threats facing the Arctic, its founding document specifically forbids it from addressing security related issues. This clause was inserted at the insistence of American officials, who still considered their Arctic security a high priority and did not want an international organization limiting their freedom of action in the region (Huebert 1998).

The 1990s were a period of substantial cuts for the Canadian Forces, with both personnel and budgets being substantially reduced as a result of the end of the Cold War. Difficult decisions that ultimately reflected the forces’ core priorities had to be made. It became clear that Arctic security was not a high priority. However, during the last decade of the twentieth century, interest was renewed in a limited fashion.

The Beginning of a Canadian Arctic Security Renaissance?

It was not until the end of the 1990s that the Canadian government began to reconsider its neglect of the Canadian Arctic’s security. A new policy framework addressing Canada’s needs originated from a relatively small number of officials who became alarmed by Canada’s inaction. To a large degree, this was the result of initiatives taken by select government officials, particularly members of the Canadian
Forces. Much of the initial recasting of Canadian Arctic security commenced within an organization known as the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group.

**Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group (ASIWG)**

Created in the spring of 1999, the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group is a bi-annual forum where Canadian federal and territorial government officials meet to discuss and coordinate activities. Its membership includes academics and representatives of various northern Aboriginal groups in meetings that are held on a rotating basis among the three territorial governments. The ASIWG allows each department to educate the other members about security issues they have experienced. In this manner, it has proven very beneficial in coordinating policy and planning activities, and has thus become one of the most important instruments available to the Canadian government to examine and coordinate policy regarding Canadian Arctic security.

A first-time meeting at Yellowknife in May 1999 was attended by officials from the Canadian Forces, the RCMP, the Coast Guard, Revenue Canada, Citizenship and Immigration, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. In his opening comments, Colonel Pierre Leblanc, then the Commander of the Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), explained his rationale for hosting the symposium.

As you may have realized, the geo-strategic situation of the Arctic has changed significantly over the last five to ten years, and it appears that the pace of change is on the increase.

As many of us here will know, most departments, and airlines judging from the seat sales, think of Canada in a very linear way from St. John's to Victoria. Too often the north is forgotten or not given the prominence that it should have.

The North is a vast and beautiful part of our country. It contains enormous natural resources, but it is also a very fragile ecosystem. It behooves all of us to look after it properly. Ultimately that is the aim of this symposium: to provide better coverage of northern Canada from a security point of view. (CFNA 1999)
Following a series of presentations on potential threats and challenges to Canadian Arctic security – including issues surrounding sovereignty, the impacts of global warming, and control of natural resources – it was decided that these meetings had tremendous utility, and that they should be held on an ongoing basis. By the time of the third meeting in Iqaluit in October 2000, membership had expanded to include federal officials from Natural Resources Canada, Environment Canada, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Transport Canada, and Health Canada. Officials from the territorial governments of the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut were also attending regularly at that point. By 2005, ASIWG membership has become so large that organizers began to think about curtailing its expansion.

The strength of ASIWG has also been demonstrated by the continued strong support that the three succeeding commanders of Canadian Forces Northern Area have given the working group. While space does not allow for a comprehensive examination of the issues that have been covered by this body, they have included problems associated with organized crime and the diamond industry, the security of oil and gas pipelines, security issues associated with the receding of the Arctic’s ice cover, and the spread of pandemic diseases.

This series of meetings have had three major impacts on the renaissance of Canadian Arctic security policy. First, they provided a means to develop relationships among the group’s membership. Many of the officials were previously unaware of their colleagues’ activities and concerns. Secondly, the meetings provided a way to improve coordination between these same officials. CFNA has used ASIWG to coordinate exercises with other departments; for example, when DND re-introduced joint northern exercises (such as the Operation Narwhal series), it was able to include the RCMP, the Coast Guard, and the Canadian Space Agency. While such coordination might have occurred in the absence of ASIWG, it was at the regular meetings that the invitation for the other departments to join was made. The ASIWG model of interdepartmental co-operation at multiple levels of government pre-dated the Canadian government’s current efforts to coordinate its security policy. The events of 9/11 caused a major re-thinking regarding how North American governments provide for the security of their citizens. One major “new” initiative was the creation of numerous interdepartmental security working groups. However, since ASIWG was created in the fall of 1999, preceding them all, it is not surprising that many of the officials involved with ASIWG in its early days now find themselves playing important roles within these new
security bodies. Even the territorial governments have used ASIWG as a means of coordinating their own security and sovereignty policies. Territorial officials attending ASIWG sessions soon began working together to develop their own joint territorial policy paper on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security (Govt. of Yukon, NWT, Nunavut 2005).

The meetings also gave departments opportunities to discuss and debate policy differences amongst themselves. Even though ASIWG meetings are not classified, officials tend to be frank and open in the defence and criticism of their own policies. For example, a recurring debate surrounds the northern vessel reporting system (NORDREG). Currently, foreign vessels operating in Canadian Arctic waters are not required to report their presence. There are some departments that have defended this policy, while others have pushed for NORDREG to be made a mandatory system. This debate forced the departments involved to consider their positions carefully.

A third benefit of the meetings is that they provide an open forum for member education. Presentations by experts from academia, business, foreign countries, NGOs, and other government departments dealing with new and emerging threats, as well as security challenges in the north, are frequent. In this manner, all members have an opportunity to discuss and debate the issues as they are put forward, and the membership is becoming increasingly sophisticated about the threats posed by climate change, the resource industry, and so on.

Beyond its direct benefits, ASIWG also provided the successive CFNA commanders a forum from which to advance their case to the senior leadership of DND regarding the need to improve Canadian Arctic security. Their efforts resulted in several important initiatives; first, the Arctic Capabilities Study (ACS) (DND 2000), and secondly, the re-commencement of joint Canadian Forces exercises in the north.

**Arctic Capabilities Study**

The aim of the ACS was “to provide information, analysis and recommendations with regard to the need for, and the feasibility of, an increased CF presence in and surveillance of the Arctic region” (DND 2000, 3) The downstream ACS Report stated that it was undertaken on the assumption that the strategic situation in the Arctic was changing. It went on to acknowledge the role played by Colonel Leblanc, as the Commander of CFNA, in making the argument with respect to the changing Arctic security environment:
With the passing of the Cold War, the nature of security issues is evolving, with an increasing focus on environmental, social, and economic aspects. In the Arctic region, these issues are assuming growing importance. In the coming decades, environmental protection, climate change leading to potential increases in shipping, increases of air transport activities, as well as concerns regarding trans-national criminal activity are but a few of the new challenges the CF may be called upon to assist in confronting in Canada's Arctic regions.

Commander CFNA argued that these evolving issues rendered the North increasingly vulnerable to asymmetric challenges at a time when the CF is reducing its activities in the region. Consequently, the Deputy Minister requested a study to determine whether increased CF efforts in the North are warranted and to assess achievability in the near term. (DND 2000, 2)

The ACS Report was divided into four sections. Part 1 provided an overview of DND Arctic policy, the second part reviewed the activities of other departments with respect to Arctic security, the third, general DND activities in the Arctic, while the last examined options for increasing DND/CF capabilities in the Arctic.

The first part posited that there was only limited mention of the Canadian north in the main federal security policy documents. The 1994 White Paper makes only one direct reference to Arctic security, stating that the Canadian Forces will be capable of "mounting effective responses to emerging situations in our maritime areas of jurisdiction, our airspace, or within our territory, including the North. [italics added]" (DND 2000, 3). Furthermore, Part 3 – the review of DND actions and capabilities in the north – found that "CF activities in the North have decreased over the years, and our ability to monitor activity and to respond in an appropriate manner remains limited. This shortcoming is likely to become more significant as activity in the Arctic increases" (DND 2000, 11). Thus, the ACS acknowledges the weakened capability of the Department of National Defence to provide for Canadian Arctic security.

The report then went on to make the following short-/medium- and long-term recommendations.
Short-/Medium-Term Recommendations:
1) Strengthen inter-departmental co-operation through:
   i) continued DND participation in ASIWG;
   ii) participation in the inter-departmental group in the Privy Council/Intelligence Assessment Secretariat with the view to producing an Arctic intelligence assessment;5
   iii) continued participation of DND in the northern science and technology committee; and
   iv) continued exchange of information with other government departments.
2) Enhance the connectivity of CFNA to relevant DND/CF operations and intelligence systems.
3) Enhance the analysis and planning capabilities of CFNA.
4) Increase Ranger capabilities and activity levels.
5) Exercise the northern reaction capabilities of the land forces.
6) Assess options for providing CFNA with necessary levels of air support.

Long-Term Recommendations:
1) Include the Arctic dimension in the development of future Canadian Forces planning frameworks.
2) Include the northern requirement in development of an enhanced global deployability for the Canadian Forces (DND 2000, 16–17).

The report also provided a review of options to improve the ability to provide better surveillance of the north. These included the use of space-based sensors; high altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles; high frequency, surface-wave radar; and the establishment of a joint maritime intelligence system based upon networked surface surveillance capability, as well as a remotely deployable, undersea detection capability (DND 2000, 14).
In total, the report represents an excellent summary of Canadian efforts to provide for Arctic security up to the year 2000. It also found that while there were signs of developing threats, those threats remained vague.

While the report called for improved utilization of the Canadian land and air forces in the north, the commanders of CFNA have actually successfully initiated Operation Narwhal, a new series of large-scale, joint exercises involving the land (including Rangers), maritime, and air forces. There were two such exercises, in 2002 and 2004, and planning is now underway for the third iteration. There was also an additional exercise, entitled Operation Hudson Sentinel, centred upon a Canadian Forces return to Hudson Bay.

**OPERATIONS NARWHAL AND HUDSON SENTINEL**

In August 2002, Narwhal 1 focused upon the deployment of two Canadian Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs) sent to the eastern Arctic to engage in exercises with land and air units of the Canadian Forces. This was the first time the navy had deployed a warship of any size or class to the region since 1989, and the first time such a large joint exercise had been held in the north since the latter part of the 1970s. Two years later, in August 2004, an even larger exercise (Narwhal II) was held in the Pangnirtung region. A Canadian frigate, *HMCS Montreal*, was utilized this time, along with other land and air elements, including the Rangers. It was the first time since the 1982 deployment of *HMCS Saguenay* that a Canadian destroyer or frigate had sailed into Canadian Arctic waters. The Canadian Coast Guard and the RCMP also participated in the exercise. In 2007, Narwhal III will be held in the Tuktoyaktuk/McKenzie Delta area, marking the first time that Canadian Forces have jointly exercised in the western Arctic region.

In the summer of 2005, two Canadian MCDVs, *HMCS Glace Bay*, and *HMCS Shawinigan*, circumnavigated Hudson Bay in an operation entitled Hudson Sentinel (Jansen 2005). The last time any Canadian warship sailed these waters was in 1975, when *HMCS Protecteur* deployed there. At the same time that the MCDV vessels were in Hudson Bay, the frigate *HMCS Fredericton* was engaged in a northern fishery patrol off the east coast of Baffin Island. Thus, there was a renewed effort on the part of the Canadian Forces to re-acquire the skills necessary to operate in the north. However, as significant as these new efforts are, they are occurring only in the most benign environmental conditions. There has not yet been any effort to conduct large-scale
exercises during the winter months, with the exception of several expanded Ranger patrols. The Canadian Forces are re-discovering that operating in the Canadian north is just as challenging as deployments to regions like Afghanistan or East Timor, possibly even more so.

**Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS)**

Perhaps the clearest indication that Canada's senior political and military leaders have come to accept the need for a re-examination of Canadian Arctic security can be found in the *International Policy Statement (IPS)*. Released in the spring of 2005, this document brought together Canadian foreign affairs, defence, international aid, and international trade policy into one package. In the overview document and in the Defence and Diplomacy sub-documents, the government acknowledged that it had neglected Canadian Arctic security and that it now needed to focus on it, owing to the prediction of a number of emerging changes to Canada's North during the next two decades.

In addition to growing economic activity in the Arctic region, the effects of climate change are expected to open up our Arctic waters to commercial traffic by as early as 2015. These developments reinforce the need for Canada to monitor and control events in its sovereign territory using new funding and tools. (DND 2005a, 7)

This theme is brought out even more clearly in the Diplomacy and Defence sub-documents, where the need for Arctic security figures prominently in the sections dealing with the protection of North America. The Defence IPS states: "The demands of sovereignty and security for the Government could become even more pressing as activity in the North continues to rise" (DND 2005b, 17). Echoing the findings of the *ACS Report*, the policy acknowledges that these new challenges will not follow the pattern of traditional security threats, but the government will need to respond to these new challenges with the capabilities only DND can provide.

Although the primary responsibility for dealing with issues such as sovereignty and environmental protection, organized crime, and people and drug smuggling rests with other departments, the Canadian Forces will be affected in a number of ways. There will be, for example, a greater requirement for surveillance and control, as well as for search and rescue. Adversaries could be tempted to take advantage of new opportunities unless we are prepared to deal with asymmetric threats staged through the North. (DND 2005b)
The DND paper then makes it clear that there is a need to move beyond mere words, and it lists specific improvements that must be carried out by Canada’s maritime, air, and land forces. The maritime forces are to “enhance their surveillance of and presence in Canadian areas of maritime jurisdiction, including the near-ice and ice-free waters of the Arctic” (DND 2005b, 19). The air force is to “increase the surveillance and control of Canadian waters and the Arctic with modernized Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and satellites” (DND 2005b, 19–20). Additionally, the air force will need a replacement for the Twin Otters, and consideration will be given to basing search and rescue aircraft in a northern location. Land forces have been instructed to improve the communication capabilities of the Rangers, and to increase the commitment to regular forces sovereignty patrols (DND 2005b, 20).

The government commitment to improving its Arctic sovereignty and security can also be found in domestic policy initiatives. The most important of these, entitled Arctic Strategy, is currently being led by officials from the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs. It includes various members of the federal government and three territorial governments, most of whom have some association with the ASIWG (DND 2005c). While it is still being developed, it will have six main goals and objectives. One of these is “Reinforcing Sovereignty, National Security and Circumpolar Co-operation.” While it is too soon to know definitively what this policy will contain, it is indicative that the International Policy Statement and Arctic Strategy have both acknowledged the need to re-examine Canadian Arctic security.

**Implementation of the New Arctic Security Capabilities**

Is the government talk regarding the need to improve Canada’s ability to protect its Arctic security serious? Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate whether this is just rhetoric, or if the government is serious enough to allocate resources to meet these newly stated needs. Owing to the very recent release of the main documents, there has not been enough time to witness new spending on the part of the government. Nevertheless, there are programs that pre-date both the IPS and ACS documents, and they support the seriousness of the government’s intentions with respect to improving Canadian Northern security capabilities.

RadarSat II is a Canadian designed and built satellite that uses radar for earth’s surveillance. Its Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) allows it to “see” through cloud and darkness, making it an ideal
technology for use over the Arctic (Huebert 2004a, 193–206). Along with other duties, it will be used to monitor surface vessels in Arctic waters. The utilization of RadarSat II for this specific endeavour is called Project Epsilon. Assuming the satellite can be launched successfully, this will be the first time Canada will be able to maintain surveillance of vessels in its Arctic waters twenty-four-hours-a-day/seven-days-a-week in almost-real-time terms.6

Another area where there is intent to improve Canada’s northern capabilities is being demonstrated in the specifications being established for new maritime forces ship construction. Both the proposed Joint Support Vessels (designated to replace the current Auxiliary Oil and Replenishment [AOR] vessels) and the intended replacements for our present destroyers and frigates are being designed with the ability to operate in limited ice conditions. Though these ships will not be considered actual icebreakers, they will give the Canadian navy the ability to patrol Arctic waters earlier and later in the season than is currently the case. However, it must be clearly noted that the decision on the design of either class vessel has not yet been finalized, thus, it is not confirmed that they will actually be given this limited ice capability.

The process of deciding what type of aircraft will replace the Twin Otters is now underway. Likewise, the modernization of the CP-140 Aurora fleet is continuing, but the three CP-140A Arcturus aircraft are currently being removed from service. Thus, while the individually remaining long-range aircraft will be more capable, the overall fleet size will be smaller, suggesting that it will become problematic for the government to increase the number of sovereignty overflights that now occur.

While there are optimistic notes within DND, other key departments are not doing as well. Most notable is the continued inability of the Coast Guard to have its ice-breaking fleet revitalized. It has one heavy ice-breaker, the *Louis St. Laurent* – commissioned in 1969 – and five medium vessels, *Pierre Radisson* (1978), *Sir John Franklin*/*Amundsen* (1979), *Des Groseilliers* (1982), *Henry Larsen* (1987) and *Terry Fox* (1983) (Maginley and Colin 2001, 152–58). Almost all range in age from twenty-two to thirty-six years, with the exception of the seventeen-year-old *Larsen*. While the Coast Guard has tried to gain Cabinet approval to begin examining a new shipbuilding program, there are no indications that any such decision will actually be made in the near future. It is difficult to fathom how the government can be
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serious about improving northern security unless it begins to take this particular shortfall much more seriously.

Nevertheless, the government indicated that it was willing to increase its symbolic actions during the summer of 2005. Minister of Defence Bill Graham's decision to send a Ranger patrol to Hans Island, followed by his own visit there, was one of the clearest indications of the government's willingness to engage in strong, possibly provocative, action to protect and promote Canadian northern interests. The visit was meant to send a message to Canadians and to the international community that the Canadian government is willing to take Arctic security and sovereignty seriously.7

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE NEW ARCTIC SECURITY

It is thus clear that the government has become increasingly aware of its past neglect of Arctic security. The final question to be addressed concerns the government's willingness to maintain its resolve and to assign the funds necessary to provide for the surveillance and protection of the region. This ultimately depends upon those factors that have driven the government to recognize the need to act, and whether there is the political will to provide the resources required over the long term.

Four factors led to this renaissance in Canadian Arctic security:

1. The attacks of 9/11 drew attention to North America's vulnerability to terrorism.

2. Increasingly it is believed that the impact of climate change will lead to melting of the Arctic, thereby making it more accessible to foreigners.

3. The demand for natural resources, particularly energy sources, points to increased exploration and exploitation of the assets found in the Canadian north.

4. A series of widely publicized international incidents revived the interest of both the Canadian political elite and the general public in defending Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security.

The attacks of 9/11 drastically changed the way North Americans viewed security. They drove home the existence of new threats,
replacing the perceived danger posed by the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. While debate continues regarding the nature of the new threats and the best means to counter them, the attacks made it clear that new, dangerous, and unexpected security threats do exist. They also drove home the fact that in order for North Americans to remain adequately protected, all its borders must be secured. While no one is expecting an immediate attack from Inuvik by al-Qa‘ida, potential dangers do exist in the long term. If southern borders are made more secure while those in the north are not, it stands to reason that the latter constitute a vulnerability. Terrorists could be willing to exploit such shortcomings. For example, it is unsettling to know that there is still no security screening of passengers boarding aircraft in many of Canada’s northern airports outside the territorial capitals. Terrorist attacks demonstrated that it is necessary to be on guard for these new threats.

The ongoing debate on the impact of climate change is enormous and cannot be fully assessed here. However, the most comprehensive review of the literature generated by leading international experts delineates the fact that the Arctic is already being transformed. Furthermore, the Arctic will continue to experience the most pronounced changes in the entire world related to climate change. The Arctic Council commissioned a multi-year study that reached an extremely high degree of consensus. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) clearly states that the Arctic is warming, and that it will continue to warm at an alarming rate (Symon, Arris, and Heal 2005). For Canada and the other Arctic nations, this means that their Arctic regions will become more accessible as the extreme environmental conditions moderate. The specific local effects are not yet clear, however. While considerable concern has been raised regarding the prospects of international shipping in an increasingly ice-free Northwest Passage, the issue of whether international shipping companies may find it more attractive to sail through the Northern Sea Route on the Russian side, even perhaps over the North Pole itself, rather than sail through the Northwest Passage remains unclear. All of this depends on how the ice melts as climate change warms the region. However, what is certain is that the Arctic is physically changing.

The Canadian north has tremendous resource potential. The discovery of diamonds in the Northwest Territories moved Canada from being a non-producer of these gems, to the third largest source aside from Botswana and Russia. However, the greatest resource interest remains the potential developments for exploiting Canada’s
northern gas and oil. There is renewed interest in Canada in developing such exploration in the region around the Mackenzie River delta (Canadian Business Association 2002). This area underwent extensive exploration in the 1970s, but the collapse of oil and gas prices at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, combined with the decision not to build a pipeline along the Mackenzie River valley, postponed most of these projects. The continuous rise in energy prices since the 1990s along with a renewed interest in building a gas pipeline along the Mackenzie River, have created growing expectations that substantial oil and gas resources will be developed around the Mackenzie River delta and into the Beaufort Sea. While the timing is uncertain with respect to when these oil and gas resources will be developed and brought to southern markets, given skyrocketing global energy prices, it appears this will happen sooner rather than later.

Finally, the national media are increasingly developing an interest in providing coverage of the issues of Arctic sovereignty and security. Specifically, there has been tremendous interest in issues relating to climate change, sovereignty, and the Northwest Passage. However, as demonstrated by the coverage provided by the National Post and the Globe and Mail on the Hans Island issue, there is also a growing willingness to present detailed examinations on issues concerning Arctic security. It seems likely that future issues featuring northern security and sovereignty will continue to be given significant coverage.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Summarizing, then, the factors that pushed Canadian policy-makers to re-examine Arctic security will not soon dissipate: terrorism will remain a threat to North American security; climate change will not reverse itself; at some point, oil and gas development will occur in the Canadian north; the security threats Canada faces in its Arctic regions, as cited in the Arctic Capability Study and the International Policy Statement, will remain relevant; and the attention accorded Arctic sovereignty and security issues by the national media will not soon disappear.

Canada is now experiencing a renaissance in how it addresses the issues of Arctic security. It has acknowledged the cost of its previous neglect, and it appears poised to develop the tools needed to meet the challenges that are already re-shaping the Arctic region. Of course, nothing is assured with respect to governmental action, but it appears likely that the government will— and should—remain committed to improving Canada’s ability to genuinely be the “True North Strong and Free.”
NOTES

1. Operation Sandcrab recaptured the island of Attu. This was a costly battle, and on the Allied side, it was fought only by American forces. The battle to take back Kiska (Operation Cottage) was a joint U.S.–Canadian operation comprising approximately 30,000 American ground troops and 5,500 Canadians. However, unknown to the Allies, the Japanese evacuated their troops three weeks before the invasion.


5. This was done, but the report remains classified.

6. There will be a delay in the download of the imagery, but depending upon the urgency for the specific imagery, this can be very short, possibly less than an hour from when the imagery was recorded by the satellite.

7. For an examination of the Hans Island issue, including the circumstances of a Danish Minister’s visit to the island, see Rob Huebert, Return of the “Viking.” The Canadian-Danish Dispute Over Hans Island—New Challenges for the Control of the Canadian North, in Breaking Ice: Renewable Resource and Ocean Management in the Canadian North, ed. F. Berkes, R. Huebert, H. Fast, M. Manseau, and A. Diduck, eds. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 337–62.

8. For details of the debate, see Franklyn Griffiths, The Shipping News: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice, International Journal 58, no. 2 (Spring 2003); Rob Huebert, The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is on Thinning Ice, International Journal 58, No. 3 (Summer 2003); Franklyn Griffiths, Is Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Threatened?
RENAISSANCE IN CANADIAN ARCTIC SECURITY?

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The Battle for Control of Canadian Arctic Waters: Icebreakers or Patrol Vessels?

Rob Huebert

A battle is currently going on within the Ottawa bureaucracy that may well determine the future of Canada's ability to protect and enforce its sovereignty in the Arctic. The Canadian government is now deciding what tools it needs to protect Arctic waters. This stems in part from a commitment made by Stephen Harper in December 2005, but it also reflects the general recognition that the Canadian North is about to get much busier. The battle is over the type and ownership of the vessel that will used for the next forty to fifty years to patrol Canadian Arctic waters. The Canadian navy, which has not operated icebreakers since the mid-1950s, has been tasked to acquire vessels, while the Canadian Coast Guard, which has been operating icebreakers for a much longer time, is being left out of the process. The Navy is not enthusiastic about its new role, yet no one seems to have even bothered to ask the Coast Guard's opinion. As a result, the Navy is proposing to acquire vessels that meet requirements beyond those needed for use in the Arctic, but the suggested vessels are not icebreakers, and they cannot be used in thick ice. At the same time, the Coast Guard will soon be facing the rust-out of most of its current icebreakers, with no replacements in sight.

The Harper government’s intention to give the role of defending northern Canadian waters to the Navy, combined with its continuing long-term neglect of the Coast Guard, has us headed in the wrong direction regarding the protection of our territory. We need icebreakers, not ships that can only operate in limited ice conditions.

Particulars of First Publication:
One of the paradoxes of climate change in the Arctic is that some sections of the Canadian North will see heavier ice conditions rather than less for the foreseeable future. As the Arctic ice cap melts and breaks up, the specifics of the region's ocean currents and wind patterns will increasingly bring the breaking ice into the north-west tip of the Northwest Passage. Thus, a melting Arctic actually means more ice for Canada. No one has a sound estimate of how long this process will take, nor should one think that it will occur in a linear fashion. As the Arctic ice melts, there will be some years when the ice will be thicker in the Northwest Passage, while in others, it may be non-existent. Ultimately, the passage will be clear in the summer and fall months; we just do not know when. Given that state of affairs, one might wonder why we should worry about any new vessels at all?

The problem is that the Russian side, and possibly the polar cap itself, will be clearing much sooner than the Canadian areas. This means that others will be building their Arctic shipping capabilities to go there. When the ice conditions improve on the Canadian side, those capabilities could be quickly transferred into Canadian waters. Other countries are interested in the Arctic because of its value; the North is a treasure trove of both living and non-living resources. Canada’s problem is that we have disputes with all of our neighbours regarding what is Canadian territory and what is not.

Canada’s Arctic boundaries generate a number of disputes. The first, between Canada and the United States, concerns the location of the dividing line in the Beaufort Sea. Extensive oil and gas resources may lie within this contentious zone. The second boundary issue is in the Lincoln Sea off the northern tip of Greenland and Ellesmere Island, but this time, the Danes are involved. Canada also disagrees with the United States and the European Union over control of shipping in the Northwest Passage, and will also probably argue with the Russians, Americans, and Danes regarding the division of the northern continental shelf.

All four Arctic nations are now preparing their claims, but there are already indications that the Russian claim will extend into the region Canada wants. Thus, it really does not matter if the Canadian northern waters are the last to open; we must be able to demonstrate that we are capable of being in the region we claim as ours, and that we can respond to anyone conducting business there without our permission. Otherwise, our position in all of these disputes will be weakened significantly.
ICEBREAKERS OR PATROL VESSELS IN THE CANADIAN ARCTIC?

Given the clear need to have and maintain a presence in the Canadian North, why is the Navy reluctant to assume this role? The main reasons are cost and expertise. They know that if they acquire new icebreakers, they will have to surrender other capabilities. The Navy also knows that it is very unlikely that they will be given the funds for both icebreakers and the number of new replacement vessels it needs and that it currently does not have the necessary expertise to operate in the Arctic; northern waters, even with the effect of climate change, are harsh, dangerous, and merciless to novices. The Navy can learn how to sail in these waters, but it will take time and resources – both of which are in short supply today. Why, then, isn’t the solution to recapitalize the Coast Guard’s existing icebreaker fleet? Part of the answer may be that the Auditor General recently found substantial organizational problems within the Coast Guard. More importantly, however, has been the ongoing and continual government neglect of the agency. For reasons that are not clear, successive governments have seen fit to either ignore or cut the core capabilities of the Coast Guard, including its ice-breaking fleet.

What, then, is the solution? First, it is necessary to recognize that Canada tends to demand a lot of our ships. Whatever ship is built for service in the Arctic, it will probably be in service for up to forty years. When one factors in the fact that it will probably take up to ten years to decide upon, design, and build these ships, our decision will be in service until 2057! Secondly, we must recognize that the defence of the Canadian North should not be held hostage to the funding requirements of one department. The Prime Minister’s office should work together with Finance and the Treasury Board to allocate the funds necessary to build the tools to defend and protect our North in a special, trans-government budget. Thirdly, we need icebreakers. If there are challenges within the various departments to acquiring and operating these vessels on their own, perhaps now is the time to truly apply a "whole of Canadian Government" approach and have both the Navy and the Coast Guard operate them. The Navy has the numbers, while the Coast Guard has the expertise. It seems a logical solution.
Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage

Rob Huebert

Abstract
Climate change in the Arctic provides important challenges to Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security. Climate change has already led to thinning of the ice cover in the Northwest Passage. If this continues, commercial international shipping and other forms of activity in the area will become more viable. If this happens, Canadian control of its Arctic will face two significant challenges. First, current efforts by the Canadian government to maintain Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage are unlikely to succeed. Second, Canada will need to substantially rethink its enforcement and surveillance capabilities in the Arctic, which will require significant new expenditures in these areas.

The Problem: Climate Change and the Ice Cover

The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that the Arctic region is especially sensitive to the dynamics of warming temperatures (Intergovernmental Panel 2001, pp. 2.2.5–2.2.6). Recent scientific evidence strongly suggests that the Arctic is experiencing warming at a rate greater than almost any other region of the globe. This is evidenced by a number of factors: the thickness of the ice cover; the time of year when both the melting and freezing of the Arctic Ocean and its surrounding waterways occurs; and information garnered from ice core samples. 1 Numerous first-hand observations reported by northern Aboriginal peoples also support the contention that the Arctic

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is experiencing substantial global warming (McKibbon 2000). For example, insects have been reported much further north than is the norm. They have also noted changes in animal migration patterns (Bowkett 1997, 7; Nichols and Huffam 2000, 48). Northern Aboriginal peoples and scientists both report significant alterations in the hunting patterns of predators like the polar bear. Ian Sterling, one of the world’s leading experts on the North American polar bear, claims there are significant reductions in the size of the polar bear population inhabiting the Hudson Bay region (Stirling 2000, 92). He attributes this to the earlier melting of the ice cover on Hudson Bay, which makes it more difficult for the bears to hunt seals. Environment Canada’s Canadian Ice Services department notes that the ice cover has decreased steadily since the mid-1970s (Falkingham 2000), as does other satellite data.

Not all scientists agree that climate change is the cause of these changes in the Arctic. Some researchers suggest that the ice is thinning because of fluctuations in wind patterns and not as a result of increased temperatures (Webber 2001). However, those who suggest that climate change and the resulting impact of global warming has not occurred or has not affected ice levels in the Arctic are a distinct minority. The general consensus is that climate change increases average temperatures in the Arctic regions which, in turn, causes the ice cover to melt.

Increased Interest in the Canadian North

There are limited signs of renewed interest in shipping through the Northwest Passage. At the end of the Cold War, there were between five and ten partial or complete ecotourist voyages entering the passage each year. To date, only icebreakers or ice-strengthened vessels have been used. Every company that used these vessels to transit the passage has requested the Canadian government’s permission. Most such voyages have been without incident. However, in 1986, the Hansentic went aground on a sand bar near Cambridge Bay (McCague 1996, 15). Although a minor oil leak occurred, the grounding was severe enough to require the vessel’s complete evacuation as well as the removal of most of its stores in order to facilitate its removal from the sandbar.

In 1999, the first non-American passage for commercial shipping purposes took place when a Russian company sold a floating dry-dock based in Vladivostok. Its new owners decided to move the dock to Bermuda. With the aid of a Russian icebreaker and an ocean-going tug,
the dry-dock was successfully towed through the passage, thus avoiding storms in the open ocean. Preferable weather conditions is another important advantage benefitting international shipping when/if the ice is reduced. The fact that the dry-dock was then almost lost in a storm off Newfoundland seemed to confirm the benefits of the passage route’s sheltered waters.

Also in 1999, a Chinese research vessel visited Tuktoyaktuk. While the Canadian embassy in Beijing were informed of the Chinese plan to send a vessel to the western Arctic, local Canadian authorities were not. Consequently, local officials were considerably surprised when the Chinese arrived in Tuktoyaktuk, an incident that demonstrates the limitations of Canada’s surveillance capabilities. Canadian officials did not learn of the vessel’s entry into Canadian waters until it had actually arrived.

The United States Navy (USN) organized a symposium to examine the issue of conducting surface vessel operations in Arctic waters in April 2001. This strongly suggests that it perceives the possibility that it may be required to operate in an ice-free Arctic and has begun to give that subject serious consideration.

New multilateral efforts to prepare for increased Arctic maritime traffic in the 1990s have begun. There has been a widespread effort to develop international standards for the operation of commercial shipping in Arctic waters. A 1993 Canadian Coast Guard initiative led a group of Arctic coastal states and relevant international shipping companies to meet in order to develop what is now known as the Polar Code (Brigham 1997, 283). These meetings were intended to devise a common set of international standards governing the construction and operation of vessels that would operate in Arctic waters. To a large extent, these talks represented the Canadian Coast Guard’s effort to initiate discussions in anticipation of increased shipping in the region.

Unfortunately, the United States State Department attempted to derail the negotiations for reasons that are not clear. Their reluctance to engage in these talks has slowed discussions. Substantial progress was made when the discussions involved only officials from the various Coast Guards. However, as the talks began to lead to an agreement, the American State Department became involved. When this occurred, several elements of the American position were altered, including initial acceptance of developing a mandatory agreement and accepting the inclusion of Antarctic shipping. However, although the other participants accepted the changes in the American position, the Americans are still reluctant to advance the negotiations.
While each of these events by themselves can be dismissed as interesting but unimportant events, when considered as a whole they indicate an upward trend in the interest in Canadian Arctic waters. Furthermore, it is expected that there will be an increase in activity associated with the development of oil and gas deposits in this region. When all of these are considered, it is obvious that the Canadian Arctic waters are becoming busy. It is also evident that an increasingly ice free region will become even busier.

**The Canadian Claim**

The melting of the ice that covers the Northwest Passage gives rise to questions about the impact this would have on Canadian claims of sovereignty. It should be clear that there is no question about the status of the land territory that comprises the Canadian Arctic archipelago. All conflicting claims were settled in the 1930s (Franckx 1993, 71–74). The sole exception is ownership of a small island between Baffin Island and Greenland named Hans Island. The government of Denmark contests the Canadian claim of ownership. The only relevance of this claim is its impact on the determination of the maritime boundary line between Canada and Greenland in the Davis Strait. Canadian claims of sovereignty of its Arctic areas with respect to maritime boundaries have resulted in three disputes. Canada disagrees with both the United States and Denmark over the maritime boundaries that border Alaska and Greenland respectively. Neither dispute will be influenced by reduced ice conditions.

However, a third dispute regarding Canada’s claim over the international legal status of the Northwest Passage will be adversely affected by a reduction of ice cover in the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government’s official position is that the Northwest Passage’s internal waters are historically Canadian. This means that Canada assumes full sovereignty over the waters, thereby asserting complete control over all activity within them. The Canadian government’s most comprehensive statement with respect to this claim was made by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, in the House of Commons on 10 September 1985. In that declaration, he made the following statement:

Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea, and ice. It extends without interruption to the seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic Islands. These islands are joined and not divided by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of
the year by ice. From time immemorial, Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land. (External Affairs 1985)

The Department of Foreign Affairs has not issued any further official statements regarding the passage since that time. Following the end of the Cold War, the department’s main focus in the north is the development of new international institutions. These include the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and the Arctic Council. Both bodies are important new developments, but their focus has been based almost exclusively on sustainable development (Huebert 1998, 37–57). In June 2000, the department issued a “new” Arctic foreign policy statement listing four main objectives, the second of which was to “assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in the North” (Foreign Affairs 2000, 2). However, the document does not discuss exactly how Canada will enforce its sovereignty. The only statement on the topic is that “public concern about sovereignty issues has waned,” and that “globalization has also altered the exercise of state sovereignty, partly through the development of a web of legally binding multilateral agreements, informal agreements, and institutions.” (ibid., 5). There is no explanation or justification regarding how these assessments are reached.

The department has made few comments regarding the impact of climate change on Canadian claims, with the rare exception of a presentation made by an official from the Legal Affairs Bureau in Whitehorse on 19 March 2001 regarding Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. His predominant focus was the impact of climate change. Although his discussion is not official policy, it nevertheless provides the most current understanding of the position of the Foreign Affairs department. In that presentation, the official argued that Canadian sovereignty over the waterways of the Canadian Arctic did not depend on the ice-cover of the region. Instead, he offered the argument that Canada’s view, then and now, is that since the 1880 deed transfer [of the Arctic archipelago from the United Kingdom to Canada], the waters of the Arctic archipelago have been Canada’s internal waters by virtue of historical title. These waters have been used by Inuit, now of Canada, since time immemorial. Canada has unqualified and uninterrupted sovereignty over the waters.

The official also noted that Canada has not relied on the concept of “ice as land” to support its claim of sovereignty. This is due in part to the differences between pack ice and shelf ice. Pack ice is “dynamic
and ever-changing" and therefore “unsuitable for legal analysis as being dry land.” Shelf ice, while potentially more useful in determining boundaries, is not particularly useful to Canadian claims because the four main ice shelves of the Canadian Arctic are on the northern border of Baffin Island, and therefore, not pertinent to the Northwest Passage area. Thus, he affirmed that “even if the ice were to melt, Canada's legal sovereignty would be unaffected” (Gaillard 2001, 4). In conclusion, he argues “sovereignty over the marine areas is based on law, not on the fact that waters in question frequently are covered by ice. The waters between the lands and the islands are the waters of Canada by virtue of historical waters” (ibid., 5).

There are several problems with this argument that are unrelated to the issue of ice use. First, the claim that these waters are internal by virtue of historical title is suspect. A study by one of the leading Canadian legal jurists, Donat Pharand, demonstrated the weakness of the use of this line of argumentation. In his major study of the issue he concludes that “[t]he highly questionable that Canada could succeed in proving that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are historical internal waters over which it has complete sovereignty” (Pharand 1988, 251). Pharand supports this conclusion with two arguments. First, the use of the legal concept of historical waters has diminished in recent years. It is unlikely to be persuasive in an international court. Second, the requirements for proving historical waters are exacting and include “exclusive control and long usage by the claimant state, as well as acquiescence by foreign states, particularly those clearly affected by the claim” (ibid., 251). Pharand argues this has not been the case for Canadian Arctic waters. Canada has not dedicated the resources to demonstrate exclusive control. Neither have the foreign states with an interest, that is, the United States and the European Union, acquiesced. Although Canada may claim that Arctic waters are historical waters, Pharand convincingly argues that this assertion would probably not withstand an international challenge.

The Canadian foreign affairs official also argued that the Canadian government’s decision in 1986 to enclose the Canadian Arctic Archipelago by straight baselines ensures that the waters within the straight baselines are internal. The weakness of this approach lies in the timing of the Canadian declaration. Canada implemented straight baselines around the Arctic on 1 January 1986. However, in 1982, it signed the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Article 8(2) of that convention states that a
state cannot close an international strait by declaring straight baselines.\(^2\) Therefore, the Canadian government’s claim that drawing straight baselines gives it the international legal right to claim jurisdiction over international shipping in these waters is also unlikely to withstand an international challenge.

The foreign affairs official then forcefully asserted that the condition of the ice is not an important element of the Canadian claim. However, this is not entirely true. As stated earlier in this section, the 10 September 1985 statement on Canadian Arctic sovereignty clearly connects ice conditions to sovereignty. The statement provides that the islands of the Arctic are “joined and not divided by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice.” The statement continues with “[f]rom time immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land” (External Affairs 1985, 2). The government’s intent in issuing this statement is clear. The ice cover makes the Northwest Passage unique by virtue of the Inuit’s year-round inhabitation of the ice. Thus, it can be considered more as land than water. Following this logic, the government is obviously making the case that international law as it pertains to international straits does not apply. Since this statement remains as the definitive statement on Canadian Arctic sovereignty, it is clear that any new statement to the contrary cannot be accurate.

Canada’s legal position has been challenged. Both the United States and the European Union have indicated that they do not accept Canadian claims of sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. However, neither the United States nor the European Union pushed their challenge as long as ice conditions precluded any economically viable international shipping. This hesitation will likely diminish as the ice melts, and this is the crux of the problem facing Canada.

**The American and European Position**

The position of the European Union and the United States is that, contrary to Canadian claims, the Northwest Passage is an international strait. The United States in particular does not accept the argument that ice cover makes a difference to the international legal definition of what constitutes an international strait. They have always maintained that the International Court of Justice’s ruling in the Strait of Corfu case is applicable to the Northwest Passage. In that
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instance, the court ruled that an international strait is a body of water that joins two international bodies of water and has been used by international shipping (ICJ 1949). The United States argues that the Northwest Passage meets these criteria, albeit with very few transits.

Historically, the United States posed the greatest challenge to Canadian claims of sovereignty. In 1969 and in 1970, the Manhattan, on behalf of Humble Oil, transited the Northwest Passage without seeking Canada’s approval. The Manhattan was an ice-strengthened super tanker that could transit the Northwest Passage only with the assistance of icebreakers; even with them, the voyage was very difficult and very expensive (McRae 1987). In 1985, the American icebreaker, Polar Sea, was sent through the passage without the Canadian government’s permission. Though not designed to challenge Canadian claims of sovereignty, that voyage led to a significant diplomatic dispute (Huebert 1995). However, to maintain positive American-Canadian relations, an agreement was reached regarding future transits by American icebreakers. The 1988 agreement on Arctic co-operation between the two governments required the United States to request Canadian consent for any future transit of the passage by American icebreakers (Agreement 1988). However, both governments agreed to disagree on the actual status of the passage. When the agreement was reached, the United States had only two icebreakers capable of such a passage. Since then, the Americans have built one more icebreaker, which invoked the agreement in 2000 to transit the passage.

In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the European Community, issued a diplomatic protest against Canadian efforts in 1985 to enclose its Arctic waters as internal waters by using straight baselines (Huebert 1993, 331). The Europeans have kept their protests low key, preferring to allow the Americans to take the more active position. But by issuing a demarche against the Canadian claim, they have given notice that they have not acquiesced to Canadian claims of sovereignty.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISPUTE

The Canadian position diverges from that of the United States and the European Union over the issue of control. If the passage is Canadian internal waters, as Canada maintains, then Canada has sovereign control over any activity, foreign or domestic, that occurs in those waters. On the other hand, if the Northwest Passage is an international
strait, Canada cannot unilaterally control international shipping within it. Therefore, Canada would be unable to deny passage to any vessel that met international standards for environmental protection, crew training, and safety procedures. As these standards are set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Canada cannot set different standards, especially any which impose more demanding requirements.

However, Canada could invoke more exacting environmental standards through the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Article 234, the ice-covered waters clause, allows a state to pass legislation that exceeds international standards for any ice-covered waters within its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Canadian clause, as it is referred to because Canada was its main proponent, states that

Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the preservation, reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence. (UNCLOS 1983, 84)

It is important to note that the article does not give the coastal state the right to deny passage. Rather, it bestows the right to the coastal state to pass their own domestic legislation for environmental protection rather than being bound by international standards. Such legislation can be more demanding than that called for by existing international agreements.

It is interesting that despite the fact that Canada drafted the clause and was originally a strong supporter of the entire convention, it has not yet ratified it (United Nations 2001). The Canadian government has issued statements that it accepts most of the convention as customary international law. However, while it continued to issue vague statements that it someday intends to ratify the convention, there is no evidence regarding when, or even if, this will actually happen.

Although the issue of sovereignty invokes strong nationalistic feelings among Canadians, the reality is that after Canada and the
United States signed the Arctic Co-operation Agreement in 1988 controlling the passage of American icebreakers and continued to officially ignore the transit of American nuclear-powered submarines through Canadian northern waters, there was no reason to revisit the issue. As long as ice conditions remained hazardous to commercial shipping, there was little incentive for any country, the United States included, to challenge Canada’s position. However, if conditions become less hazardous, the situation will change drastically and quickly. The main attraction of the Northwest Passage is obvious. It substantially shortens the distance from Asia to the Eastern Coast of the United States and Europe. It is over 5,000 miles shorter than the current route through the Panama Canal. It would also significantly shorten the voyage for vessels too large to fit through the Canal that must now sail around the Cape Horn. The voyage of the Manhattan demonstrated that the passage can accommodate supertankers of at least 120,000 tonnes. The shorter distance means substantial savings for shipping companies, which translates to reduced costs for the products shipped. It is easy to see why an ice-free Northwest Passage, even for a limited time, would be of tremendous interest to major international shipping companies as well as to the states that use their services.

Canada’s position is clearly susceptible to challenge. The only reason it has not been seriously questioned since 1985 is due to the severe ice conditions. If they improve, there is every reason to expect that the Canadian position will be challenged. It is impossible to know who will make the first challenge. While it is reasonable to suspect that it might be either an American or a European vessel, it could also be another state. For example, Japan has shown considerable interest in Arctic navigation in the 1990s. It was a major partner in a multi-year, million-dollar study of navigation through the Russian Northern Sea Route (also known as the Northeast Passage) (INSROP 1993–1994). The Japanese were also interested in buying the ice-strengthened oil tanker, Arctic, when the Canadian government put it up for sale. Perhaps even more telling is the amount of money the Japanese put into polar research and development, which is now substantial and continues to increase (NSERC 2000, 12; Wuethrich 1999, 1827). While the Japanese have never issued a statement of their view of the status of the Northwest Passage, it is clear that they would gain if it became a functioning international strait. Oil from both Venezuela and the Gulf of Mexico would then be cheaper to ship to Japan.
CANADIAN EFFORTS TO ASSERT AND MAINTAIN SOVEREIGNTY

The discussion to this point suggests that Canada should seriously consider how best to respond to the prospects of any future challenges. Unfortunately there is little evidence of that. Instead, the government appears to be downgrading its already limited capabilities. The two main agencies with important roles in the protection and maintenance of Canadian international interests in the Arctic are the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Coast Guard. Both departments’ northern capabilities are continuously being reduced.

While the DND began to consider the impact of a diminished ice cover, budget cuts forced it to eliminate most of its plans regarding northern sovereignty. The previous Commander of Northern Area initiated a working group of relevant federal and territorial departments called the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group, which has been meeting twice a year since May 1999. The group shares both information and concerns and has raised the issue of climate change several times. However, it has almost no resources of its own and its only role is coordination and networking.

Also at the initiative of the former Commander of Northern Area, the DND recently assessed its capabilities in the north. The assessment indicated that Canada had limited resources that could be used in the northern area, and that the cost of any equipment and programs to remedy this shortcoming would be extremely expensive. The department concluded that, given its limited budget, resources would be allocated to more immediate priorities; it also noted that projects that would improve surveillance capabilities could be developed if funding was available (Mitrovica 2001, A3).

Financial cutbacks to the department resulted in the elimination of most programs that gave Canada a presence in the north. Northern deployments of naval assets to Canadian northern waters, termed NORPLOYS, ended in 1990. Northern sovereignty overflights by Canadian long-range patrol aircraft (CP-140/CP140A Aurora and Arcturus) were reduced in 1995 to one overflight per year and even that flight will soon be totally eliminated. The recently acquired Victoria class submarines cannot operate in Arctic waters. In fact, none of the Canadian naval units can operate in northern waters owing to their thin hulls and the resultant risk of ice damage.
The one exception to the cutbacks is the recent expansion of the number of ranger patrols. The Canadian government is in the process of increasing the number of serving rangers from 3,500 to 4,800 by 2008. However, although the rangers can assert a presence in the north, they are a militia unit comprised of northern inhabitants who can travel moderate distances through limited areas only with snowmobiles.

In short, the DND’s ability to demonstrate a presence in the north is severely limited. The recently concluded defence study suggests that it may be possible to improve surveillance with future technological developments. These would include the deployment of High Frequency Surface Wave Radar, rapidly deployable undersea surveillance systems, and the use of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones). While each system would prove useful for surveillance and indicate a northern presence, they are still in the research and development phase and thus are not currently being considered for deployment. Furthermore, this technology is unlikely to be purchased anytime soon.

The Canadian Coast Guard has the greatest responsibility for monitoring the Arctic region. Recently moved from the Department of Transport to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the CCG operates a fleet of icebreakers that represent Canada in its northern waters. The Arctic fleet consists of two heavy and three medium icebreakers. Though the most recent icebreaker, the Henry Larsen, was added in 1987, the fleet is both heavily tasked and aging. A prolonged refit between 1988–1993 resulted in the extension of the operating life of the largest icebreaker, Louis St. Laurent. However, this vessel, too, will soon reach the end of its operational life, and there are no immediate plans to build any new icebreakers.

The Coast Guard is also responsible for NORDREG. This is the voluntary, not mandatory, reporting system that all vessels (Canadian and otherwise) are requested to use when operating in Canadian Arctic waters. Following the 1969–70 voyage of the Manhattan, the Trudeau government enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA). This created a 100-mile environmental protection zone within Canadian Arctic waters. AWPPA regulations forbid the discharge of any fluids or solid wastes into the Arctic waters and sets design requirements for vessels. Upon entering Canadian Arctic waters, vessels are requested to register through NORDREG. While such a system works reasonably well when few vessels enter the
Northwest Passage, it is clear that it will not work should the number of voyages increase as the ice cover opens up. The idea of making NORDREG mandatory has been broached, but has not been developed any further.

The voluntary nature of NORDREG poses an obvious challenge to Canada's commitment to its claims. If Canada is serious about its claim to the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, there should be no question about its ability to enforce its rules and requirements. The message sent to the international community by making the system voluntary is that Canada questions its own ability to enforce its claim.

Currently, then, Canada is not able to demonstrate a meaningful presence in its Arctic waters. As long as ice conditions in the north do not change, this is not a significant problem. However, as the ice melts, it will become a serious issue.

**The Internationalization of the Northwest Passage**

Would it really matter if Canada lost an international challenge to its claim of sovereignty? The Canadian government is on record as stating that it supports international shipping through the passage as long as Canadian regulations are followed. The issue, then, is the type of regulations to be followed. Canada could claim that regardless of the status of the passage, it retains the right to pass environmental regulations based on Article 234 of UNCLOS. The problem with this argument is that the Canadian government has not yet ratified the convention. The question is whether Canada could claim the rights provided by the article if the convention has not yet been ratified.

The Canadian Coast Guard's efforts to formulate a Polar Code to govern the construction and operation of shipping in Arctic waters are designed to ensure that any international rules will have significant Canadian input. Canada, along with Russia, played a key role in developing the technical requirements contained in the code. (Brigham 1997, 283). On the other hand, these efforts may send the message that Canada expects to lose the ability to unilaterally develop regulations. Thus, there are signs that a new regime for regulating the international system is developing beyond Canada's control. Such a regime is likely to leave Canada facing tremendous challenges if and when shipping develops.
First, traditional security problems associated with international waterways will arise. An examination of waterways in southeast Asia indicates that increased shipping can result in increased smuggling and other associated crimes. The deserted coastlines of northern Canada could be used for a host of illegal activities such as smuggling drugs and people, as well as other goods like diamonds and fresh water. These potential problems will require substantial improvement in Canadian surveillance and policing capabilities.

The spread of new and exotic diseases is also a potential problem. The crew members of most vessels come from southern countries. They may carry strains of diseases to which northern Canadians have a low tolerance or to which they have not been exposed. Thus, the risk of an outbreak could increase as shipping increases.

Even if Canada implements strong environmental regulations, the probability of an accident will increase with the corresponding increase of maritime traffic. As the Exxon Valdez accident demonstrated, the grounding of a large vessel in northern waters will produce an ecological disaster. Currently, Canada is ill-equipped for even a moderate grounding. This was clearly demonstrated in 1996 when the Hansentic grounded off Cambridge Bay (McCague 1996, 15). The Hansentic was successfully evacuated only because there were favourable weather conditions and many local commercial pilots and planes availability to help. It is doubtful the grounding could have had as favourable a result had it occurred in a more isolated location with severe weather conditions.

The lifestyle of Canada's northern Aboriginal people will also be substantially affected by international shipping. Traditional hunting and trapping will be severely disrupted by the twin impact of global warming and the passage of more large vessels. The influx of large numbers of foreigners associated with the new shipping will also affect their traditional way of life. Opportunities for employment will expand, but only for northerners with the necessary skills.

Nevertheless, there are some advantages associated with the melting of the Northwest Passage's ice cover. Singapore has demonstrated that with the proper planning, geographical location on an international strait can bring substantial economic benefits. Vessels transiting the passage would require certain services that Canadian settlements could provide. Tuktoyaktuk and Iqaluit could conceivably become important ports of call for vessels using the
passage. However, the current state of its port facilities would need to be substantially improved before any such benefits could be realized.

CONCLUSIONS

Will climate change result in the melting of the Northwest Passage for some parts of the year? Will international shipping interests then attempt to take advantage of these more benign conditions? Will Canada’s authority regarding the passage be challenged? Will Canada be prepared for such a challenge? The evidence for the ice melting in the Northwest Passage is mounting. The remaining question is how fast these changes will occur and when the passage will become economically viable for shipping. International shipping companies will logically want to take advantage if and when this opportunity arises. Canada can expect to face a challenge at that point. It is becoming more readily apparent that Canada’s position will probably not be successful given the low current levels of Canadian activity in the region. But even if Canadian claims of sovereignty are upheld, pressure to allow the passage of international shipping will remain. Regardless of the nature of the international status, it is clear that Canada will face tremendous challenges in adapting to the opening of the passage. The challenge that now faces Canada is to become aware of these possibilities and to begin to take action to prepare for them.

NOTES


2. Canada remains one of only a handful of states that have not ratified the convention. Currently 135 states have ratified. The few that have not are either land-locked and/or are a developing state. The United States is the only other major state that has not yet ratified.

3. The most recent statement by the Canadian government on the issue of shipping in the Northwest Passage can be found in its response to the Special Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada’s International Relations (Hockin Simard
Climate Change and Sovereignty in the NW Passage


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Canadian Discourse on Peacekeeping

Barry Cooper

The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take wars more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms. — Carl von Clausewitz, On War

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it is a report on what those Canadians who have had a great deal of experience in peacekeeping operations have thought about what these activities have become. Second, it is a cautionary tale: Canadian armed forces have endeavoured to transform themselves from war-fighters to peacekeepers. The results, to say the least, have been ambiguous. The second purpose is served by a consideration of the relationship between what Hans Morgenthau called a “realist interpretation of international politics” and what might as well be called idealism. Canadian governments may not be alone in the world in pursuing an idealist agenda, but they have very few allies.

Realism, most observers agree, may be the norm in international affairs, but it is not considered noble. And nobility is what raises our efforts above the low but solid base of interests and gives those interests a meaning. Much of the discourse regarding intervention by peacekeepers, however, is not an expression of nobility but of sentimentality and of celestial intentions. The intentions of realists are usually simple: to maintain the existing regime and to secure prosperity. In contrast, the intentions of idealists, because they are based upon

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sentiments alone, are limited only by the imagination. This is why, almost without exception, realism provides the best retrospective accounts of peacekeeping activity and of politics more generally. Yet idealism cannot be ignored, and certainly not when Canadian foreign policy is considered, not least of all because that policy is expressed in the language of moral rectitude and seems to aspire to nobility.

We may begin, however, by recalling the words of Hans Morgenthau, first published as long ago as 1949. He wrote, he said, in explicit opposition to a view “that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now” (Morgenthau 1967, 3).¹ His interpretation was an empirical and pragmatic attempt to bring order to an otherwise disconnected array of phenomena. The view he criticized, the idealist interpretation, not only believed in a rational and moral political order based on abstract principles, but also held that human beings are both malleable and essentially good, that failure of the social or international order to measure up to the enunciated principles of morality and rationality can be attributed to ignorance, to the depravity of a few beneficiaries, or to the persistence of outmoded and unprogressive political and social institutions. To idealists, the solution is as clear as the problem: more education; increased reform; and if needed, a surgical application of force. Eventually the problem would be solved, because that was the meaning of progress, and idealists devoutly believed in progress.

By Morgenthau’s interpretation, in contrast, the world is filled with opposing interests, with conflicts, and with distinct moral and cultural principles. It will, accordingly, never conform to a single principle, no matter how rational, moral, and/or virtuous those who support it may take it to be. Instead, one may expect a temporary balancing of interests and a precarious and highly contingent series of settlements of conflicts. He went on to enunciate several principles of political realism of which the most important, for present purposes, are these: first, that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (ibid., 5), which is to say that motives and the personal or ideological preferences of statesmen are discounted. Lofty motives and ideologically inspired ideals may help prevent deliberately evil policies, but they do not guarantee good or even successful results. Second, interests that are advanced, defended, and balanced constitute the essential feature of all politics, though the actual content and manner by which interests become politically visible will vary enormously over time and space. Third, it follows that a political realist will apprehend a tension between moral imperatives and political success, the most immediate
consequence of which is that prudence, not commitment, is the chief political virtue. In short, the world is still the world, and progress is a fantasy and a conceit.

One of the corollaries that may be drawn from Morgenthau's realism is that peace results either from a balance of power and interest, or from the hegemonic imposition of the interests of a single power. For him, then, Wilsonian collective security, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United Nations Charter, the New World Order, the End of History, and similar doctrines, aspirations, and desiderata are distinctly secondary in importance. It is in the context of the debate between a realist and an idealist interpretation of international politics that I wish to consider some recent discussions and analyses of peacekeeping by Canadians. Many of the examples in this discourse are taken from Canadian peacekeeping experience, but the conclusions are more widely applicable.

Much of the discussion about Canadian peacekeeping consists in highly technical analyses in the pages of the Canadian Defence Quarterly or even more recondite places, of how one might improve the "peace process" or the "peace framework" in one or another specific operation. The more interesting and significant discussion, however, concerns the principles involved in peacekeeping, not the details of their application. By discussing principles, one inevitably raises questions regarding the assumptions that have guided Canadian thinking on the topic. In my opinion, this is a good thing, not because debate is by itself always helpful, but because the traditional assumptions are highly questionable. My perspective on the question of peacekeeping is akin to Morgenthau's realism; the position of the Canadian government and of many Canadians who support peacekeeping operations is akin to idealism.

There is, to begin with, considerable conceptual ambiguity surrounding peacekeeping, both as a term and as a reality. First, as Paul Diehl has observed, one finds a "conceptual muddle in the use of the term peacekeeping" among diplomats and statesmen, journalists and scholars (1993, 5). For example, the former Secretary General of the United Nations offered as (one presumes) his official definition:

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. (Boutros-Ghali 1993, 475)
Mr. Boutros-Ghali’s definition excludes non-United Nations operations, thereby removing from consideration, for example, the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers; worse, it combines a conceptual definition with hopes for the prospects for success of any given operation. In terms of Morgenthau’s realist interpretation, one would classify the former Secretary General’s expectation of expanding the possibilities of preventing conflict and making peace in the same category as Kellog-Briand.

Even if one limits the definition to what are now called “classic” peacekeeping operations (though including non-United Nations sponsored ones), there remains a major conceptual problem in assessing success, which is also an element in the Boutros-Ghali definition. The problem here is akin to a problem encountered in deterrence theory where, as Lebow and Stein have argued, successful deterrence cannot be observed because it is a non-event (1990, 336–69). Likewise, if one of the aims of peacekeeping operations is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between formerly warring powers or “actors,” measuring success is a bit similar to measuring successful deterrence. As with deterrence failure, so too is failure at peacekeeping easily identified. On the other hand, if the presence of peacekeeping forces results in the lowering or cessation of hostilities, as for example with IFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia, this does not mean that there has been any movement toward peace. Except in some minimalist sense – namely lowering the level of violence – it is difficult to consider IFOR a successful peacekeeping operation. One reason for this, to adopt the realist perspective of Morgenthau, is because the interests of no outsiders were really involved in Yugoslavia prior to UNPROFOR. All one could say is that the several peoples of the area were destroying their own country. This was, of course, a terrible thing for the participants, but only they had anything seriously at stake.

One may clarify some of these conceptual ambiguities as well as ambiguities surrounding the reality of peacekeeping operations by recalling the distinction between the deployment of troops under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter and their deployment under Chapter VII; it may also be useful to note that the term “peacekeeping” is not to be found in the Charter. A Chapter VI mission is “classic” peacekeeping. Both parties to a dispute have agreed to the presence of the United Nations, and the actual soldiers are usually equipped only with personal weapons or perhaps machine guns and light cannon. As Alan James has said, Chapter VI peacekeeping “is more like counseling than combat” (James 1995, 105).
In a Chapter VII operation, the consent of the belligerent parties is not required. Indeed, to commonsense observation, action taken under Chapter VII is not, properly speaking, peacekeeping but war-making under the banner of the United Nations. Chapter VII was originally intended to provide the Security Council with the teeth that the League of Nations lacked. It has an elaborate but largely inoperable set of military provisions that, as Anthony Parson observed, were "strangled at birth" by the Cold War (1995, 250). The absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council in 1950 allowed the United States to fight with its allies, including Canada, in the Korean War as a Chapter VII United Nations operation. So too was the Gulf War. In addition there are interventions – the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia for example – where consent is either highly conditional or non-existent. These operations, sometimes called "Chapter VI 1/2 operations," are described by a number of other terms: Peace Support Operations, Multifunctional Operations, Second Generation Peacekeeping, Extended Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping, and so on. The significance of this new style of intervention lies in an appreciation of the fact that sharp distinction between Chapter VI peacekeeping and Chapter VII peace enforcement, also known as war, was directly tied to the Cold War. This is a point to which I will return.²

Canadian discussions of peacekeeping may be classified without much distortion into the realist or idealist categories. The discourse of the idealist is well positioned to make use of the conceptual ambiguities just discussed. Accordingly, for those who favour enhancing Canada's role in the United Nations, the importance, the significance, and the virtue of peacekeeping is little short of self-evident. As a typical example, consider the words of Alex Morrison, currently the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and former Canadian representative at the United Nations:

As you are well aware from the historical record, from the speeches of Canadian officials and from the statements of various United Nations' Secretaries-General, Canada invented peacekeeping as it is now practiced. Canadians have been members of every United Nations peacekeeping mission in addition to many non-United Nations operations. No other country can claim such a record. More Canadians than citizens of any other country have worn the Blue Helmet and the Blue Beret in the interests of international peace, security, and stability. We need to ensure that the experience and expertise we have accumulated over the past decades is put to good use in the future. If we do not share it, there is the risk that future peacekeeping will be less effective. (Morrison 1993, 6)
Indeed, the numbers are impressive. Since 1947, nearly 100,000 Canadians have served in United Nations operations. However, deployment under United Nations auspices is not eo ipse upholding “the interests of international peace, security and stability,” or wearing “the blue beret and the blue helmet in the service of peace” (Morrison 1994, ix). Occasionally such deployment is simply war-making. Only a pedant would speak of the Korean or Gulf peacekeeping operations; they were quite obviously wars.

Practitioners of idealist discourse not only claim that peacekeeping simply means service in the cause of peace, which is unambiguously a good and just thing, but that the goodness and justice of the activity ensures, in Morrison’s words, that “Canadian participation in peacekeeping is immensely popular with the Canadian public.” Certainly it is popular with Canadian politicians and bureaucrats. It is “a traditional source of national pride for Canadians,” according to the Department of External (now Foreign) Affairs; likewise former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney expressed his personal satisfaction with the job that Canadian troops have done, and Prime Minister Chrétien was instrumental in the initiation of the subsequently cancelled operations to rescue and protect refugees in Zaire and Rwanda.³

The 1996 central African activity is illustrative of the power of idealist discourse in several respects. First, it appears to have been initiated by the Prime Minister following a phone conversation with his nephew, Raymond Chrétien, who was serving as a United Nations special envoy to the region to deal with the refugee problem. Raymond Chrétien had been in the area for about a week, mostly flying among capital cities talking with officials. The Government of Canada had no reliable information on the numbers and condition of the refugees or on their intentions. One reason for the dearth of intelligence is because Canada has no foreign intelligence service. What information the Prime Minister received was either from his nephew or from NGOs who were, of course, concerned about refugees but whose own first-hand information was either badly out of date or simply wrong. Canada had no aerial surveillance but, because the Canadian government wanted to “do something” and the Americans were skeptical that anything useful could be done, the Canadian government was convinced that American estimates of the size of the refugee problem, which were based on spy satellites, were too low. Canadian diplomats in Kigali were too busy taking care of their VIP guest, Raymond Chrétien, to get out into the bush to see for themselves.
Because of the alleged Canadian tradition of upholding "the interests of international peace, security and stability" and because of the alleged popularity of peacekeeping among the Canadian public, the Prime Minister felt confident in committing his country to a military expedition, the sole reliable element of which was its tremendous cost, estimated at over $100 million. It was not until a week after the Prime Minister made his commitment, that is, until 28 November 1996, that Canada had any first-hand information when Lt.-Gen. Maurice Baril spent five hours in the area. By then thousands of refugees had returned from Zaire to Rwanda, and even General Baril was allowed to see only what the rebel leaders wanted him to see. When forty Canadian soldiers arrived in Kigali, they were not able to monitor short-wave radio reports from journalists in the field and received their information the next day by faxed newspaper reports from Ottawa. The Rwandan government did not want the Canadian soldiers on their territory and never signed a Status-of-Forces Agreement so that Canadian troops were, in effect, under house arrest. The United States sent spies into the area, had reliable information, and deployed no troops. Canada relied on day-old and published journalists' reports, NGOs, and bureaucrats looking over the embassy wall, and their troops were arrested. An explanation for this odd state of affairs was provided by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Lloyd Axworthy: he was comfortable with "open sources." The fact that they provided useless information mattered not at all. It was, however, fully compatible with Canadian idealism.

For idealists, the cancellation of the expedition to central Africa was a failure. Hope springs eternal in the idealist's breast; the future always holds great promise. There one idealist foresees an extension of the "partnership" between the Canadian military, the humanitarian aid agencies, elected officials, and the RCMP.

They are now co-operating all around the world to ensure that the peacekeeping umbrella is as large as it can be, and to ensure that the resources of this great country of ours are mobilized in the service of peace. Indeed, in Canada I think we will soon see people from the Canadian Armed Forces actually being seconded to humanitarian aid agencies for short periods of time and also aid experts being attached to military organizations. This interchange will ensure a greater degree of effective advance planning and inter-operability. When future peacekeeping missions are mounted, people will know one another, they can work together at the beginning, and a truly coordinated plan can be drawn up and carried out. (Morrison 1993, 8)

Perhaps more importantly, this complex of future expectations is widely shared by officials in the Government of Canada.
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Other supporters of the deployment of Canadian troops on peacekeeping missions go even farther than Morrison. For Ernie Regehr, the National Director of Project Ploughshares, "the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-Cold War world has significant military elements to it, but much more significant, of course, and increasingly urgent, is the need to bolster the non-military foundations of global security" (1993, 27). Mr. Regehr's "of course" indicates great confidence that his views will command widespread, if not universal, assent.

Such arguments, which invoke noble motives and take aim at what advocates consider to be unimpeachable goals, are clearly idealistic. Even sympathetic observers of Canadian peacekeeping activity such as Joseph Jockel have raised questions:

Why did peacekeeping become so important to Canada? It is not at all starry-eyed to conclude that Canadians and their government have been motivated in substantial part by altruism or simple international voluntarism. In other words, they often are self-promoted to go out and do good in the world. To the extent that peacekeeping has helped alleviate suffering and has contributed to regional and international stability, it has afforded Canadians the opportunity to do just that. (1994, 13)

The desire to "do good" in the world may well be a motive for Canadian politicians, bureaucrats, and even members of the public. Keeping Morgenthau's perspective in mind, however, one would also like to consider the question in terms of "interest defined as power."

One emphatic alternative interpretation, strongly realist in its orientation, has been offered to the Canadian public through the pages of the glossy, mass circulation magazine, Saturday Night, under the title, "Peacekeeping is for Chumps." Charles Krauthammer argued that the victory in the Cold War, as the victories in the two other general wars of this century, was followed by a utopian illusion that the victors have discovered an alternative to balance of power or to great power hegemony as a way to order international politics. "Peacekeeping," he said, "is perhaps the most widely accepted illusion at work in today's utopianism" and is closely followed by the opinion that the United Nations can be a force for collective security.

It is a guarantor of nothing. The guarantor of security and peace today is, as it has been for five hundred years, the great powers, and, most specifically, given the unipolar structure of today's international system, the sole remaining superpower, the United States.
Again, that was demonstrated with stunning clarity in the Gulf War. The liberation of Kuwait was attended by all kinds of UN resolutions and declarations and proclamations. It has led to a lot of pious talk about the UN as the guarantor of collective security in some new post-Cold War order. But this is to confuse cause and effect, the US with the UN. The UN guaranteed nothing ... Indeed, the entire apparatus of UN resolutions and declarations was a conscious product of American diplomacy, a conscious effort to give the Gulf War the air of international legitimacy. The UN was to be the flag of convenience under which the US and its sundry friends would liberate Kuwait. (Krauthammer 1995, 72–)

For the United Nations to be able to do what its supporters hope, it would have to have its own army, a real army, recruited as individuals, a foreign legion that swore allegiance to the Secretary General and the blue flag. In short, the United Nations would have to become a hegemonic power.

That will not happen for the perhaps low, but certainly solid, reason that it is not in the interests of the constituent powers, especially the larger ones, to let it happen. Considered in terms of the interests of the great powers, which are, after all, great powers, the purposes served by peacekeeping are sensible enough, but also limited. During the Cold War, for example, Chapter VI peacekeeping centered on containing armed conflict by separating the combatants. Then observers could monitor the cease-fire lines, report violations, and facilitate negotiations towards a settlement. Awareness of the Cold War context, however, is important, because it indicates that an unobtrusive, but significant, purpose of peacekeeping was to insulate local conflicts from the larger conflict between East and West. Under such conditions, it was clear that the interests of the superpowers were being served; more to the point, they were being served within the context of a balance-of-power equilibrium. That is, in the international division of labour between great, medium-sized or “middle” powers, and small powers, one of the tasks of the latter two has been to keep great-power rivalry confined to great-power strategic interests and to do so, in part at least, by mounting peacekeeping operations – one of the consequences of which was precisely to keep the great powers out. And, to close the logical circle, the smaller powers were able to undertake such a task because it was in the interests of the great powers to let them.

By this argument, the role of peacekeeper is constrained as much by the interests of the great powers as it is by the belligerents who, presumably under Chapter VI, had consented to the United Nations’
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presence in the first place. Such consent, and its inherently temporary existence, indicates yet another limitation to “classic” peacekeeping. The implications were brought home to Canada in an unambiguous way with the first official Chapter VI operation, the deployment of the first United Nations Emergency Force, UNEF I, to the Middle East. This Chapter VI operation was put together or “invented” by Canada’s Minister of External Affairs (later Prime Minister) Lester B. Pearson, in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956. Many of those who support Canadian peacekeeping efforts today look to Pearson’s work as a model that deserves to be emulated whenever possible. A realist appraisal would, it seems to me, draw rather different conclusions from the events of 1956 and after.

The interests and the concerns of the British, French, and Israelis prior to the Suez “crisis” were different but compatible. The British saw a grave threat to their economic, and especially oil, security in Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal during the summer; the French, fighting in Algeria, sought to forestall President Nasser’s aspirations towards leadership of a pan-Arab nationalist movement; and Israel considered him to be the chief supporter of the Palestinian guerrillas. For their part, the Americans were in the final weeks of a presidential election campaign and the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the anti-Communist revolt in Hungary. The Israelis invaded the Sinai and, as previously planned, London and Paris issued a joint ultimatum to Cairo and Jerusalem calling for a cessation of hostilities. The Israelis, who had made major gains, agreed; the badly bloodied Egyptians refused, and Britain and France began their air and sea attack.

The United States was shocked. After having its Security Council motion vetoed by France and the United Kingdom, the Americans used the Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly to condemn the belligerents. Canada was also aghast at the action, and Pearson went to New York to take charge of the Canadian United Nations delegation. His first choice was to get the United Nations’ agreement to establish a police force for Suez, and he thought that the nearby French and British troops would be suitable for the job. It was clear soon enough that the General Assembly would not have agreed; Pearson then, on 4 November 1956, advanced the notion of a United Nations army made up of national contingents interposing itself between the belligerents. The next day, French and British airborne and amphibious troops landed in Egypt and took control of Port Said, which prompted a Soviet proposal that Washington and Moscow jointly deploy their own troops in defence of Egypt. Pearson and United Nations Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjöld then proposed that no troops belonging to
Security Council members should be sent, thus eliminating France, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States from
donning the blue beret. The General Assembly accepted the Pearson-
Hammarskjöld proposal, UNEF I came into being, and Pearson
eventually received the Nobel Peace Prize.

There is no doubt that Pearson’s diplomacy and his proposal of a
multinational emergency force contributed to the cessation of
hostilities. Accordingly, the pride with which Canadian supporters of
peacekeeping speak of Pearson’s “invention” is understandable –
though Pearson, in his Nobel acceptance speech, stressed the
contribution of Hammarskjöld.

For those adopting a realist perspective, it is even more
important to consider the configuration of interests understood as
power. The deployment of the United States and the USSR on one side
and of Britain, France, and Israel on the other was not just exceptional,
it was unique. As Parsons noted, “Britain and France achieved the
apparently impossible: They had united the two confrontational
superpowers in the United Nations at a moment when one of them
was hammering a small European country, Hungary” (1995, 13). In
addition, “the attack only served to demonstrate the weakness of the
invaders. Why had they needed a week to get troops from their staging
areas on Cyprus to Egypt? Clearly, Britain and France were no longer
military powers with a worldwide reach” (Granatstein and Bercuson
1991, 195). That is, the chief guarantors of the existing global balance
of power, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, each
considered it to be in their interests to support the UNEF I proposal.
France and Britain were compelled to agree.

In addition, the two minor powers whose interests were most
directly involved on the ground, namely Egypt and Israel, also
considered the UNEF I proposal to be in their interests. Israel would
gain UNEF assistance in curbing guerrilla action, and the Straits of
Tiran would remain open; Egypt would gain a much needed respite
from the Israelis. Even so, Egypt was able to oppose Canada’s initial
participation: Canadian uniforms looked at lot like the British ones;
the Canadian flag then contained the Union Jack; and Canada’s choice
of a troop contingent, the Queen’s Own Rifles, was unacceptable
because the name of the regiment sounded far too British for Egyptian
tastes. So far as President Nasser was concerned, UNEF was to be
tailored to his liking.
We may conclude that UNEF I served the interests of the two superpowers. It saved face for the British and French, who were able to claim, with the kind of hypocrisy that comes from long and illustrious diplomatic experience, that UNEF was just the outcome they had been hoping for; temporarily, at least, it served the interests of Egypt and Israel. But it did nothing to preserve peace. In May 1967, this was clearly illustrated when President Nasser ordered Egyptian troops into the Sinai and ordered UNEF to withdraw to Gaza. Secretary General Thant then offered to leave Egypt altogether if the United Nations could play no useful role and if President Nasser really wished this to happen. President Nasser did indeed so wish; on 18 May the United Nations was requested to vacate Egypt, and a few days later the Egyptians occupied UNEF positions overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel’s sole outlet to the Red Sea.

Prime Minister Pearson said he supported the right of access to, and innocent passage through, the Gulf of Aqaba; President Nasser responded by declaring Pearson an “idiot” and ordered Canadian troops out within forty-eight hours. On 5 June, the Six-Day War began; it ended with Israel as the strongest power in the region, its forces controlling the territory from the Suez Canal to the Jordan River and the Golan Heights. “In Canada,” wrote Granatstein and Bercuson, “the reaction against the humiliation of Canada’s representatives, and against the United Nations and peacekeeping in general, was very sharp – for a time” (1991, 200).

A realist appraisal of the first UNEF experience entails two things. First, UNEF did not initiate, impose, or keep the peace. It was initiated chiefly by the concerted power of the United States and the Soviet Union on the four belligerents, two of whom showed by their response that they were, in fact, no longer great powers. On the other hand, it was kept only so long as it was in the interests of Egypt and Israel to do so, and that time had passed by 1967. Second, when peace finally did come between Israel and Egypt it was following yet another war, in 1973. This, in turn, was accompanied by UNEF II as well as by the American-sponsored Multinational Force and Observers, the MFO. But neither the MFO nor UNEF II keeps the peace today. Israel and Egypt do.

One might have expected that the lessons of the previous generation would have been learned by the 1990s experience and the deployment of Canadian troops with the UNPROFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia. During the 1970s, for example, Canada developed a set of criteria to be used in determining how to respond to
peacekeeping requests from the United Nations. The first and most important criterion was that the mission have a "clear and enforceable mandate." Others included such commonsensical considerations as an understanding of the political context, the availability of Canadian forces in light of other commitments and in light of what the United Nations proposed, clear lines of authority, adequate financial and logistical support, acceptable risk to Canadian troops, clear and appropriate rules of engagement, and an appraisal that a proposed operation served Canadian interests.

In addition to this well established policy regarding Canada's troop contributions, there are a number of recent scholarly contributions. For example, James F. Keeley and Terry Terriff made a number of generalizations based on their analyses of several United Nations peacekeeping efforts. They concluded that United Nations intervention can be successful only under certain specific conditions:

Situations that have a strong potential to or actually do threaten national interests are the ones that are likely to call forth the effort and resources needed for a significant UN impact. Conflicts which do not cross this minimum threshold of threat or danger are likely not to elicit a UN response or at least not a strong and successful UN response. (Keeley and Terriff 1996, 9)

As an upper threshold, large scale hostilities such as that of 1967 or 1973 in the Middle East, to say nothing of those involving major powers, as, for example in Viet Nam or Afghanistan, also make United Nations intervention unlikely or impossible. The end of the Cold War, they argue, has not improved matters. Without the rivalry that prompts intervention, there is also no impetus to insulate local conflicts. Such rivalries as exist in the post-Cold War context are not particularly vital, being played out in the third world or in the southern periphery of the former Soviet bloc. Under such circumstances, the only reasons for involvement are the threat of spillover effects or humanitarianism. The result is that a higher threshold of violence is needed to prompt involvement; alternatively, fewer resources are committed so that less is accomplished.  

They also point out that most of the occasions for United Nations involvement will be related to intrastate wars. Typically, these are brutal and passionate affairs that employ force against civilian populations, involve ethnically and religiously mixed populations as well as armed forces with varying degrees of internal discipline. In contrast, interstate conflicts are usually between well organized
conventional armies subject to government direction in action along well-defined borders. These observations and arguments seem to imply more, not less, violence, but less, not more, United Nations peacekeeping, which raises the question of Bosnia, the experience of the Canadian peacekeepers, and what it meant.

To begin with few, if any, of the Canadian government’s own criteria for committing troops were met by UNPROFOR. Successive Canadian governments have been unable to explain how the presence of Canadian troops in the middle of a vicious civil war served Canadian interests, whether considered in terms of power or merely moral rectitude. There was no clear and enforceable mandate, “although the enabling resolution was peppered with ‘Chapter VII language,’ which was both offensive and empty” (Parsons 1995, 227).

There were no clear lines of authority and wholly inappropriate rules of engagement. As David Bercuson noted, “What this meant in practical terms is that Canada’s troops trained, equipped, and prepared themselves for a standard [Chapter VII] peacekeeping operation when Bosnia was anything but” (1996, 139). The rules of engagement issued to Canadian troops in Bosnia were very similar to those used in Cyprus, a “classic” Chapter VI operation, but in Bosnia, Canadians were often targets of the belligerents; moreover, their routine tasks, such as clearing mines or protecting convoys, were no different than what they might do in a regular conventional war. On several occasions Canadian troops found themselves in the middle of a firefight between two armies seriously intent on killing each other and with very little to defend themselves. In short, the Canadians, and other UNPROFOR troops, were in a Chapter VII situation but constrained to operate according to Chapter VI rules.

The results were sometimes nothing less than atrocious. In the summer of 1995, for example, Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica found themselves surrounded, out-numbered, and outgunned by Bosnian Serbs. They were told to surrender and to surrender the Moslem town as well or they, along with the civilians, would be killed. They surrendered; the inhabitants of Srebrenica were, in fact, massacred.

The most obvious lesson to be drawn from the UNPROFOR fiasco was pointed up with the replacement of UNPROFOR with NATO’s heavily armed Implementation Force, IFOR, which quickly ended the futility of United Nations neutrality and interposition. IFOR took sides, the side of the weaker, and deployed a war-making military operation. There was a unified command, heavy American armour,
and the United States Air Force to ensure that its directives were not ignored. The purpose was to establish a new equilibrium – a new and local balance of power – and the rules of engagement were very close to that of a conventional war.

If IFOR indicates what was needed from the start, UNPROFOR raised an important question nevertheless. In Bercuson's words, UNPROFOR was a scandal: "thousands of Canadian soldiers were sent into a place where their lives were recklessly risked by politicians who appear not to have cared for their welfare" (1996, 157).

The question I would like to ask is this. How did the Canadian government and its citizens come to support peacekeeping with such thoughtlessness that the criteria developed to guide decision-making in a sensible direction could be so completely ignored?

To answer it, one must examine two factors, one long-term and the other short. Over the long term, peacekeeping has proved to be supportive of a persistent myth of "Canadian identity." This myth is not, in fact, a pan-Canadian myth so much as one centered in the historical experience of Ontario, and to a lesser extent, Quebec. It expressed that experience thematically through literary and cultural symbols. To simplify greatly, this myth of identity claims that what makes us Canadian is a rejection of the United States. By this argument, Canada's "identity" began with the American Revolution and the defeat, exile, expulsion, and regeneration of the Loyalists. The historiography in support of this interpretation of Canadian life is voluminous and complex; in my opinion, it properly belongs only to Ontario, indeed, only to southern and southwestern Ontario. But even so, its natural home is a significant part of the country, and the myths and stories that express the particularity of political life in that region are widely diffused.

In the context of support for peacekeeping, the argument is often advanced that Canadians, unlike their southern neighbours, are "good international citizens." This self-description carries with it the clear implication, at least to Canadians, that Americans are excessively nationalist, are super-patriots and, unlike Canadians, are not good international citizens. Where Canadians keep the peace and are proud that a policeman is a national symbol, Americans are too quick to fight, too ready to use force and throw their weight around.

Jockel, who is American, put the matter this way with considerable delicacy:
Canada's reputation as a good international "citizen," a reputation acquired partially through extensive peacekeeping, may have strengthened its position in the UN across a wide range of issues on the world agenda. It would be hard to measure effectively the exact relationship between peacekeeping activism and overall Canadian influence. An evaluation team assembled by the Canadian Department of National Defence found, on the basis of interviews it conducted, "disagreement between foreign and Canadian sources on this point." On the one hand, "almost all foreign interviewees, and a few Canadians indicated that peacekeeping was not a strong factor in national influence." But "most Canadians disagreed, saying it was of importance." (Jockel 1994, 15–16)

In other words, Canadians fondly believe peacekeeping somehow contributes to whatever power and influence Canada can project. Non-Canadians do not share that belief.

One reason for this belief may be sought within the North American symbolic context. As Jockel notes,

Peacekeeping has become so very popular in Canada because it fulfills a longing for national distinctiveness, especially vis-à-vis the United States. There is a strong Canadian tradition of turning to external relations as a way to "balance" the United States, or form "counterweights" to "continentalism" (that is, increasing ties with the United States). Canada's attempts at economic diversification to reduce dependence on the United States, undertaken especially in the 1970s during the prime ministership of Pierre Trudeau, who sought to increase ties with the European Community and Japan, failed. But the quest for ways to "balance" the United States, and for a distinctiveness in Canadian foreign policy in which Canadians can take pride, remains. (1994, 18)

In its more explicitly anti-American form, the quest for distinctiveness with respect to the United States took the form of asserting that Canada is an "honest broker" between the superpowers, a "genuine peacemaker," and so on. The logic of this argument led to the view that Canada ought to have withdrawn from NATO sometime during the 1960s and declared its neutrality. Apart from the perniciousness of the doctrine of moral equality between the United States and Russia, the notion that Canada took part in so many peacekeeping operations because it was moving towards neutrality on something like the Swedish model had no basis in Canadian history. "Canadians," Granatstein argued,
were not asked to participate in any of the peacekeeping operations for their inherent neutralism or because our soldiers and airmen were the equivalent of a gendarmerie. Far from it. We were wanted in Cyprus because we were a NATO power; we were needed in the Suez because, as a NATO ally with a tradition of overseas service in two world wars, we had sophisticated technical capabilities, and we were a natural choice [in Indochina] because we were a Western democracy. Neutralism or military weakness, in other words, had nothing at all to do with our acceptability as a peacekeeper. And yet Canadians came to believe that they did ... (1992, 231)

In short, Canadians’ enthusiasm for peacekeeping, with or without anti-American overtones, has helped turn them into political idealists, especially where foreign policy questions are concerned.

From its inception, Canadians have viewed the United Nations as a forum where they could influence international affairs in a more direct fashion than was possible within organizations such as NATO or the OECD, where American military and economic strength was translated more directly into policy. Canada’s language within the United Nations was less the language of Canadian self-interest or power than of doing good, maintaining the virtues of international “citizenship,” and so on. The fact was, however, that if peacekeeping enhanced the role of the United Nations, even if it was merely symbolic, it would enhance Canada’s role as well, especially insofar as it would enhance Canadian distinctiveness vis-à-vis the United States.

This brings us to the short-term factor, the changes to the Canadian military that resulted, at least in part, from the pursuit of foreign policy ideals that are more or less remote from, or opposed to, the realities of power and interest. The initial response by the Canadian military to the peacekeeping initiatives of Lester Pearson was less than cordial. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Canada’s chief military missions were tied to the purpose of armies – to fight wars. In Europe, Canadian units were deployed as part of NATO preparations to battle Warsaw Pact forces across the plains of northern Germany. In North America, Canada would assist the United States in defending the continent against Soviet bomber threats across the pole and against threats from Soviet submarines. Peacekeeping was a distant third priority.

During the 1960s, under the presiding genius of Pierre Trudeau, things began to change. Numerous elements combined to alter existing defence priorities over the next several years, the most important of which were the integration of the three services and the blending of
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civil and military responsibilities at National Defence Headquarters. This latter more effectively meant that a civilian Deputy Minister (DM) shared authority with the military Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Because the DM would usually serve in his or her post longer than the CDS, the result was that military advice and policy planning is effectively controlled by civilian officials. This is not the same as ensuring the military is controlled by the civil power, which has never been questioned; rather, soldiers at NDHQ are constrained from giving the civil power their considered military advice because it requires the agreement of civilian bureaucratic officials as well. As a result, “many army officers today believe that the CDS now works for the DM” (Bercuson 1996, 72). There is, no doubt, room for argument about the importance of any particular change. There is no doubt that the changes all moved the Canadian Armed Forces in the same direction — away from the traditional purpose of armies, to fight wars and to train to fight wars.

Initially the Canadian Army was of the view that good peacekeepers are first of all good soldiers, well-trained in fieldcraft, weaponry, small-unit tactics, and especially, they are well-disciplined. Such people “can be taught the art of peacekeeping as an add-on. But troops who have been taught primarily to be peacekeepers will have neither the weapons skills, the discipline, nor the instinct for the battlefield that they will need if they become endangered” (Bercuson 1996, 60). This was amply demonstrated in 1990 when Canada was asked by Britain and then by the United States to contribute a mechanized brigade group to Operation Desert Shield, the prelude to the Gulf War. It was well known that Canada’s tanks and troop transport were too slow, too vulnerable, and simply too old to accompany the initial assault on Iraq, but it was thought they could be usefully employed in a follow-on and mopping-up operation. The government of Canada dithered for some months and then turned down the request. Early in 1996, the Chief of Defence Staff admitted the obvious: the Canadian Army was not battle-ready. By 1999, the United States Ambassador to Canada, Gordon Giffin, was unambiguously telling Canadians and their government that Ottawa had to increase military spending, that its defence posture was inadequate, and that it ought to have sufficient pride and self-respect not to continue to be a free-rider, particularly where North American defence is concerned.

At the same time, two of Canada’s best known soldiers, retired generals Lewis McKenzie and Clive Addy, praised the American Ambassador and indicated the obvious: “Canada is rated 133rd of the 185 countries of the United Nations with armed forces, and the second
last in NATO when comparing its (1.2%) share of GDP," said General Addy. "Anybody who thinks you can make things go with $9.2 billions means you will have Boy Scouts. You can’t have an armed forces, and you can’t have respect or influence." General McKenzie added, "I am honourary chief of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force and we’ve got 1,200 more cops in Toronto than we have infantry in the Canadian regular army, from private to general. If the Montreal and Toronto police forces went on strike at the same time we would have to ask Americans to come in and help us police our streets." The reason for this embarrassment, he said, was the idealist foreign policy led by Mr. Axworthy. He will have little success, General McKenzie said, with his "soft diplomacy" policy of shifting the focus of the United Nations to "human-security concerns" such as drug trafficking and terrorism. "You can’t just be a soft diplomat when push comes to shove as it is in Sierra Leone and the southern Sudan and Kosovo, and not be able to go there and do something about it." Such realist voices, however, are in a distinct minority in Canada, and they have had no influence on the country’s foreign policy.

The emphasis on peacekeeping in the context of budget cuts, force reduction, and the fusion of civilian bureaucrats and military officers at National Defence Headquarters led to additional disabilities, as well. A smaller, obsolete army meant that opportunities to command larger units declined; the closing of the Canadian base at Lahr, Germany, meant that Canadian troops would no longer even train in large multinational battle groups; the inability to take part in a real war, as in the Gulf, meant that senior officers would be deprived of combat experience. How, then, would one rise through the ranks? "With few exceptions," wrote Bercuson, "soldiers who want to get ahead had better learn how to fit in with the military bureaucracy or resign themselves to staying at the field-grade rank forever" (Bercuson 1996, 103). It is not to be wondered at, then, that if the personnel of high command of the Canadian Armed Forces got to their present position by being splendid career managers and outstanding administrative operators, the remaining warriors in the Canadian Armed Forces have little confidence in the integrity and the ability of their superiors.

Without going into the details of the shameful behaviour of the Canadian Airborne Regiment when it was deployed on the Somalia peacekeeping operation or considering the immediate cause of its disbanding early in 1995, it is clear that the end of the Airborne was part of a larger crisis in the Canadian military. That crisis is indicated by the observation that war-fighting today is probably the third priority of the Canadian military, after peacekeeping and a successful
managerial career. Obviously peacekeeping is not the sole cause of the disintegration of the Canadian military, but it is certainly a contributing cause. Moreover, the existing problems can only be made worse, much worse, by the demands of the foreign policy idealists to increase the size of the "peacekeeping umbrella" and require the armed forces to enter into "partnerships" and secondary agreements with humanitarian aid agencies, Elections Canada, or the RCMP. In this regard, if no other, the results of the abandonment of realism by a generation of Canadian policy makers, their misbegotten, mistaken, and idealist attempts to transform the primary mission of a once proud and effective army from war-making to peacekeeping can serve as a cautionary tale to our allies, our potential allies, and our friends elsewhere in the world.

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NOTES


3. See, Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities: 1991–92 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, Department of External Affairs, December 1991); Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Notes for a speech by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs (Toronto: 10 December 1991); Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the Centennial Anniversary Convocation, Stanford University, California, USA (29 September 1991).


6. "Precursor" operations included the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, deployed in 1949, and the UN Truce Supervision Organization sent to the former Palestine in 1954 (but organized in 1948).


9. Americans still, apparently, subscribe to this doctrine. As Col. Harry G. Summers observed with respect to the USMC in Somalia, "it was not their 'peacekeeping' skills that made the Marine Corps effective, otherwise they would have hunkered down behind the berm at the Mogadishu airport with the Pakistani 'peacekeepers' already there. What made them effective was their war-fighting skills." Summers, *The New World Strategy: A Military Policy for America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 163. See also Paul Koring, "US Officers Believe Peacekeeping Dulls Combat Skills," in *The Globe and Mail*, 13 January 1997.


11. The problem is hardly unique to Canada. One of the lessons the Americans learned from their experience in Viet Nam is that an army needs to be led by warriors, not administrators. That they had learned the lesson was proved beyond doubt by the successes of the Gulf War. Canada is still at the bottom of that learning curve.

12. The domestic career benefits of the aforementioned "idealistic" proposal to intervene in central Africa have been noticed by Canadian journalists. In an article entitled "The Zairian Mission Means Political Gold for the Canadian Players" in *The Globe and Mail* (16 November 1996), D8, William Thorsell pointed out that a
successful operation in central Africa would have raised the political profile of Maurice Strong, a Canadian who is currently a Special Deputy to the UN Secretary-General, but who also had an eye on his boss’s job; it would go a long way towards restoring the image of the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, who had appeared inept and indecisive in the previous eighteen months; it would do great things for his nephew, Raymond Chrétien, who may also be interested in a further career at the UN – or perhaps even a Nobel Peace Prize; the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister and the Defence Minister were also very keen on the mission, and force commander Lt. Gen. Maurice Baril was more than eager to redeem the tarnished reputation of the Canadian army and become the next Chief of Defence Staff. In any event, Canadian troops were not sent in significant numbers to Africa. This was a good thing because such troops would have been given something like a Bosnian mission all over again, namely to escort relief convoys through hostile territory, this time a jungle. Militarily, there are but two ways of doing this realistically. The first is to secure the whole area, which would mean defeating the armies and militias of the region; the second is to guard the roads, which is an invitation to prolonged guerrilla war, as General Giap pointed out and proved half a century ago against the French in Viet Nam. Either option would have involved Canadian troops in an untenable military position where they were obliged to implement a policy of high-sounding ideals about which next to no serious thought had been given, and no military hardware was available to carry out the mission.

REFERENCES


CANADIAN DISCOURSE ON PEACEKEEPING


Through Canadian Eyes: How Journalists Interpreted the Post-1945 World of Canadian Foreign Policy

Patrick H. Brennan

From the perspective of a war-weary nation in the summer of 1945, Canada's future looked promising – even if the outlines of that future were a bit vague. For ordinary citizens, there was at long last the prospect of some measure of "normalcy" in their lives, as well as real prospects of a more abundant and secure life. But internationally, profound change characterized the immediate postwar period as Canadians had to come to terms with the frightening prospects of a Cold War and the implications of British decline and American ascendancy. In responding to these new realities, Ottawa forged the key elements of Canadian foreign policy for the remainder of the twentieth century.

The responses were mostly pragmatic, rooted in a domestic consensus on what Canadian interests were and how the country could best achieve them. Critics might later argue that the consensus did not really extend much beyond the confines of Ottawa and sympathetic elites. Yet the fact that there was little overt disagreement with either the necessity or wisdom of Ottawa's central foreign policy initiatives in the immediate post-1945 period does suggest a larger consensus in the country about its place in the world and its options.

Newspapers, magazines, and radio were not public opinion. But in articulating a certain perspective on major world issues – a perspective which matched that of the leading bureaucrats and Liberal

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ministers – these media played a significant role in shaping the public agenda. The existence of a so-called “Liberal Press” establishment has become one of the supposed historical “certainties” around which our understanding of the 1945–57 period is fashioned. Yet it is more accurate to say that the leading English-Canadian journalists who enthusiastically explained Canada’s new international roles and the underlying factors which necessitated them were not co-opted by political allegiance, but had independently come to accept the world view of the “Ottawa Men.”

The small group of widely read commentators on Canadian foreign policy during this period all embraced significant elements of at least the internationalist mindset of that group of young English-Canadian intellectuals who constituted, to use historian Douglas Owram’s apt phrase, the “government generation.” The allegiance of these journalists was to a sovereign Canadian nation which they passionately believed must possess an independent voice in the world. Furthermore, they believed that their compatriots, as Arthur Irwin, the editor of Macleans, succinctly phrased it, must be made to think along “broad national [and international] lines.” As prominent journalists, they were able to utilize the enormous advantages offered by their positions to make their case. All were committed “liberal internationalists” whose intellectually formative experiences in world affairs were the rise of the dictators, appeasement, the failure of the League of Nations, world war, and of course, the shift in Canada’s orientation from Britain to the United States. All personally admired, and empathized intellectually with, the key civil servants in the departments of External Affairs and Finance and the Bank of Canada. The relationship was unquestionably closest with Lester Pearson, the rising star in the postwar Canadian diplomatic firmament who was a skillful handler of the press, sympathetic to their potential role, and openly respectful of the intellects of the top men. At a time when “adversarial journalism” was not in vogue, they were also the bureaucrats’ confidants, a factor which enormously enhanced their credibility as “authoritative voices.”

To a far greater extent than before the war, Canadians were interested in what was happening in the world after 1945. While they listened avidly to American radio and read American publications for information as well as entertainment, only the domestic media provided coverage of public affairs from a Canadian perspective. Building on its wartime popularity, radio – and particularly the CBC – was becoming a significant source of news and commentary for many Canadians. The public network drew on the expertise of print journalists to analyze developments on popular programs like Capital Report, News Round-Up, and Canadian Commentary. Consequently,
those with a knack for the new medium – like Blair Fraser or George Ferguson – obtained frequent national exposure. Indeed, Fraser’s radio work, combined with his writing for *Macleans*, quickly established him as the country’s first public affairs pundit with a national audience. Though radio was exciting and its reach growing rapidly, large-circulation daily newspapers and nationally distributed magazines and business and financial newspapers remained the chief source of international news and commentary during the immediate postwar period. Metropolitan dailies covered their markets like blankets and gave substantial coverage to world affairs, as did *Macleans* and the *Financial Post*.

Many of the most important foreign policy issues Ottawa faced in the aftermath of the war were rooted in economic factors: Britain’s endless financial woes, European recovery, trade liberalization, and Canada’s own dollar crisis during 1947–48. In these stories, the voice of Ken Wilson, “Ottawa Editor” of the *Financial Post*, the country’s most widely read business and financial paper, was clearly heard. Within the press gallery, Wilson had the keenest interest in, and most sophisticated grasp of, economic policy. It was not lost on the economic mandarins, a group who generally distrusted the press’s ability to “get the story right.” By war’s end, these bureaucrats were firmly committed to American initiatives to liberalize world trade and finance, views Wilson shared. Under his by-line, the *Financial Post* did much useful spadework to promote these ideas and help overcome opposition to their implementation within certain business circles.

Well in advance of the formal trade talks scheduled for Geneva in 1947, External Affairs gave drafts of Canadian proposals to “strategically placed individuals.” As the lone journalist among them, Wilson had readily “agreed to ... do what he can to stimulate interest by printing ... [summaries] ... and frequent comment in his paper.” He adopted a stance on the trade negotiations decidedly sympathetic to the American (and Canadian) position, and discussed at length the dangers to the country’s prosperity of siding too closely with the British. Blair Fraser, who was working closely with his Maclean-Hunter colleague on the trade story, made the same point. Americans were suspicious of Commonwealth trade meetings, he informed his listeners during one broadcast, and no matter how innocent Canada’s involvement, such talks did “more harm than good by unduly alarming the U.S. government.” Wilson was the only Canadian business reporter to attend the Geneva conference, and he also provided regular reports on the sessions for the CBC. Although the deliberations proved very heavy going, the tone of Wilson’s reports remained positive, a reflection of his own belief in the merits of a multilateral trading world, as well as his hunch that some sort of agreement must, and therefore would, be reached.
Wilson and the Financial Post also played a central role in informing the business community as the dollar crisis unfolded in 1947. Pearson, the undersecretary of state for External Affairs, had approached Wilson to run a series of "explanatory" articles in the Financial Post outlining the depleted state of the country's U.S. dollar reserves and discussing the remedies being proposed by government advisors. It was not just businessmen and the public who needed educating, Pearson had anxiously warned him, but many Liberal cabinet ministers, too. Fraser was also approached to write some articles informed by the bureaucracy's perspective, and these subsequently appeared under his byline in Macleans. 16 The Post did particularly yeoman-style work warning its business readers of the stark — and unpalatable — financial choices confronting Ottawa. Not the least, Wilson alerted them to the need to protect the country's finances even at the expense of further aid to Britain, a politically controversial position Ottawa was eager to legitimize. 17 The Post's "Ottawa editor" was clearly privy to the gist of the critical negotiations with the American government that unfolded during September and October, for he authored a series of articles outlining the situation in precise detail. In keeping with his sources' worries about politically-inspired inertia, the columns repeatedly urged the government to take the recommended action. 18 It was a similar line to the one Fraser pursued in his radio commentaries. 19 The Ottawa Journal, too, joined in the chorus, criticizing not the government, per se, but the Cabinet's procrastination 20 in editorials penned by Norman Smith like "A Menacing Policy of Wait and See."

At the end of the war, it was no longer a question of whether Canada would have an autonomous foreign policy but merely what form it would take, and even then there was relatively little debate. The days of timidity and knee-jerk imperialism were over — with a newfound confidence born of the war, Ottawa was actively prepared to pursue Canadian interests abroad.

The establishment of the United Nations in the spring of 1945 provided the first illustration of the top-ranked journalists' commitment to get Ottawa's perspective across to the public. In a post-conference note to Blair Fraser, who had covered the proceedings for both Macleans and the CBC, Pearson revealingly alluded to "our work together [there]." 21 By the time of the Paris peace conference in the summer of 1946, however, the international climate was clearly becoming very chilly. The tone of Fraser's CBC reports matched his glum private mood. From the conference's outset, he informed his listeners that "pretty deep divisions have appeared." By the end of the acrimonious and utterly unproductive talks, a disillusioned Fraser concluded that "it all added up to a picture of division [and] mutual
hostility ... and does make you wonder how much more co-operation we can hope for.”

For “true believers” like Winnipeg Free Press editor Grant Dexter, support for the UN was an article of faith. Not surprisingly, he was furious when a disillusioned Prime Minister, fresh from Paris, privately dismissed the United Nations as a façade for power politics and no better than the League of Nations. After calming down, however, Dexter admitted to Bruce Hutchison that there was no point in publicly exposing King’s lack of faith, for “we would be cut off with no hope whatsoever in influencing [him],” and on top of that, confuse Canadians in the process. Better to “nudge” and “discuss” and not “miss a single opportunity of sowing [the internationalist] seed.” Rather more pragmatic and less the idealist, Fraser wrote in a “Backstage at Ottawa” column that while “officially, Canadian public men are all supposed to believe in the United Nations – it’s an article of political piety, like belief in motherhood or full employment ... a good many of them are pretty pessimistic about it.” Hutchison, too, was beginning to voice his concerns about the UN more openly.

After his acrimonious split with the paper’s management and subsequent departure from the Winnipeg Free Press in 1946, George Ferguson was hired as editor of the Montreal Star. Bringing in Ferguson – thought by mandarin Norman Robertson to be the “ablest newspaperman in Canada” – was a coup for the paper’s owner, J.W. McConnell. The gruff, brilliant Ferguson provided instant credibility on international affairs at a time when, thanks to the emergence of the Cold War, McConnell was abandoning the Star’s long-standing, “Empire, right or wrong” editorial positions. Consequently, Ferguson was pretty much given a free hand to shape his foreign policy commentaries along more sophisticated, liberal-internationalist lines.

During the crucial months of 1947 and 1948, Pearson and Louis St. Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, confronted a world situation that was deteriorating alarmingly. Canada’s future security lay in increasing its international commitments by means of arrangements outside the now all-but-paralyzed UN collective security structure. The Department of External Affairs, appreciating the valuable work in “educating the public” which informed, committed journalists could do at this critical juncture, relied on these “authoritative voices” to get their message across to Canadians. That message, of course, was the necessity of embracing a North Atlantic security pact.

On 18 September 1947, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, St. Laurent made a forceful declaration of the Canadian interest in a defensive alliance to link the United States and
Canada to Western Europe and contain Communism. In the Minister of External Affairs’ words:

Nations, in their search for peace and co-operation, will not accept indefinitely and unaltered a [Security] Council which was set up to ensure their security and which, many feel, has become frozen in futility and divided by dissension. If forced, they may seek a greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for greater national security. 30

Unfortunately, a frustrated Canadian diplomat noted, “the significance of this statement was not appreciated ... by newspapermen who were covering the Assembly.” 31 It did not pass unnoticed by Grant Dexter, however. While his belief that the United Nations could still work as an effective collective security organization was not yet completely shaken, it would be his commitment to the principle of collective security, achieved by the most effective means possible, rather than to a specific institution, which would prevail. Both the Montreal Star and Macleans were already voicing support for something along the lines St. Laurent had outlined, 32 and in response to the speech, Ferguson noted pointedly that “our patience, the patience of the Western world, is exhausted – or nearly,” and that the need to provide collective security without the participation of the USSR simply reflected “sober realism.” 33 By year’s end, Hutchison, too, had concluded that Moscow had no intention of co-operating with the West, and the latter, Canada included, would have to explore collective security alternatives. 34

The Communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was Dexter’s epiphany. Within days, he penned an editorial acknowledging that Moscow had stymied the UN’s purpose, and that only a functioning, trans-Atlantic collective security pact would make the Russians more reasonable. 35 For Ferguson, the sad events in Prague aroused the strongest emotions. “Are we still appeasers?” he angrily asked, invoking the bitter memories of 1938. Thereafter, the Star’s editorial page argued loudly for the speedy conclusion of negotiations for a North Atlantic defensive alliance. 36 The rhetoric employed by Dexter and Ferguson closely matched that which St. Laurent, Pearson, and Pearson’s assistant Escott Reid were using to build support for just such a pact. It was no accident that Dexter and a few trusted journalists were aware that the government remained sharply divided over the St. Laurent/Pearson initiatives; the pact’s supporters had kept them informed in the obvious hope they would be able to rouse public opinion and thus bring pressure to bear on the doubting politicians. 37
On 29 April 1948, speaking in the House of Commons, St. Laurent made his most impassioned plea yet for a North Atlantic collective security pact, and this time his comments gained wide domestic press coverage. “Canada,” Ferguson concluded approvingly, “has declared a foreign policy which sweeps aside the isolationism, the half measures, [and] the weasel words [of appeasement].” 38 Norman Smith’s editorial in the Conservative-leaning (but strongly internationalist) Ottawa Journal concluded that “the question may be asked why we haven’t come to a mutual security pact long before this, a security pact unfettered by vetoes.” 39 Blair Fraser, who was averaging two appearances a month by this time on the weekly Capital Report broadcasts, by far the greatest frequency of any Ottawa-based journalist, made a similar case. 40 If the St. Laurents, Reids, and Pearsons had already become cold warriors or were well on their way, 41 the same was true for the Frasers, Fergusons, Hutchisons, Wilsons, Smiths, and Dexters. 42 All were deeply disturbed by developments in Europe and alive to the implications for Canadian security.

Through the summer and autumn, their editorials and commentaries favouring the proposals for a North Atlantic security pact became, if anything, more pressing. Ferguson’s defence was typical. Such an arrangement, he admonished his readers, would not be “charity” but “common sense,” “an effective form of fire insurance, and the only one available.” While “this revolutionary concept” had clearly already won “majority acceptance in this country,” he also warned darkly of the existence of an “obstinate hard core of people [a clear reference to the contrary voices in Cabinet] who delight to live exclusively in the past.” 43 With the Berlin blockade spurring everyone on, “defence-multilateralism” was now being promoted with the same conviction that its economic brother had been since the end of the war. Indeed, “the very highest sources” had assured Wilson that the Canadian government was determined the security pact would “contain definite obligations for ... economic co-operation.” 44 Indeed, this linkage between economic and military security—the European Recovery Program and the Atlantic Pact—became a major theme both at External Affairs and in the pages of the Financial Post.

The re-election of President Truman was also a relief for internationally minded Canadian journalists. They had been deeply concerned over the inevitable shake-up of personalities, and perhaps policies, too, which would have followed a Republican victory in the 1948 election. Several of the External mandarins had taken the precaution of having Ken Wilson invite John Foster Dulles, the likely Secretary of State in any Dewey administration, to give a speech to the members of the Ottawa branch of the Canadian Institute for
International Affairs, a visit that would have done double-duty by providing Canadian diplomats with an opportunity to privately take the measure of Dulles. In a revealingly titled, post-election editorial, "No Change, We Hope," Ferguson conveyed a widely held sentiment:

Among the consequences of Mr. Truman's victory ... is that there need be no change in the top-flight direction of American foreign policy ... American objectives are to keep the peace by maintaining our present position with steady firmness. As part of that plan, a North Atlantic Security Pact is now being discussed which will link directly the military fate of this continent with that of Europe. Surely the result of the election will not mean fatal delay in moving that great project ahead.  

By the spring of 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a fact, "the most reassuring demonstration that the United States has given yet," Ferguson noted approvingly, "of recognition of the responsibilities of leadership that rest on [its shoulders]." Parliament's approval of the treaty with only two dissenting votes was a clear indication of the degree to which fear of Communist aggression had forged a foreign policy consensus in Canada. Nonetheless, the combined (and often co-operative) efforts of diplomats, politicians, and journalists during the preceding two years had certainly played a useful role. Firstly, they had made Canadians aware of the United Nation's impotence in the face of this threat and that establishing collective security arrangements outside of the world body was a pressing necessity. Secondly, they had convinced them that such arrangements were not only permissible under the UN charter, but no long-term threat to the UN's existence. For a population deeply committed to the concept of the United Nations, such reassurances that the organization was not being abandoned were vital.

In the afterglow of NATO's establishment, many Canadians seemed seduced by the notion that the Cold War was manageable and perhaps even won. Again, the public's apparent unwillingness to "think internationally" was furrowing brows in Ottawa, while at the editorial offices of publications like Maclean's, where editor Arthur Irwin was trying to play up Canadian foreign policy developments, there was frustration with the same complacency. The outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 rudely shattered Canadians' illusions about a Cold War won. With the sanction of the Security Council in hand, Washington moved speedily to defend South Korea. Legitimizing Western military action through the United Nations mattered a great deal to the Canadian public, and so now did loyally supporting the United States in a time of crisis. During the first weeks
of the conflict, the St. Laurent government struggled to fashion an appropriate Canadian role – and to moderate American actions – and in the process ran afoul of both an alarmed public opinion and the journalists who were normally among its most committed supporters.

Both the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press immediately joined in the chorus clamouring for unconditional support of the UN military effort. As Ferguson put it, “there is more than a moral obligation involved ... the fact is that effective collective security remains the only safe way of protecting ourselves.” When Ottawa appeared to dally, the editorial tone of Ferguson and the others became even sterner. In early August, battered by the waves of criticism from the United States government as well as Canadian public opinion, Ottawa finally announced a formal commitment to provide ground forces. “There was a tone of injured innocence in [St. Laurent’s] argument,” the usually sympathetic Hutchison chided the Prime Minister in an editorial, “as if he was conscious of criticism but didn’t wish to admit that there might be grounds for it.” The “right thing,” as the Sun editor put it, had taken too long to do. Nevertheless, the more muted tenor of the criticism offered by Norman Smith was the norm. The well-informed were only too aware of the opposition in Cabinet which the committed internationalists – particularly St. Laurent, Pearson, and Defence Minister Brooke Claxton – had had to overcome, and seemed to make allowances.

Within three months, Chinese Communist “volunteers” were battling United Nations forces, and a new crisis loomed for External Affairs and the St. Laurent government. Behind the scenes, Pearson was attempting to prevent the United Nations’s formal labelling of Peking as an “aggressor,” a development much desired by Washington but which, from Ottawa’s perspective, guaranteed to harm the West’s long-term interests in Asia. Unfortunately for Pearson, his laudable goals in this exercise in “quiet diplomacy” were well hidden from the Canadian public, the majority of whom were disgusted with their government’s apparent appeasement of the “Chinese Reds” and its failure to support the American position. Even though the leading journalists had to some degree been briefed by their contacts at External, they nonetheless felt compelled to part with Pearson on the clear principle of defending collective security. Grant Dexter, who idolized Pearson and was rarely out-of-sync with his heroes in the East Block, was particularly outraged, and his denunciations were harsh, sustained, and certainly politically damaging. By January 1951, it was obvious to Pearson that his diplomatic initiative had failed, and he publicly backed down. While all was promptly forgiven by his press allies, the incident had clearly illustrated that their support for the Pearson/St.
Laurent foreign policy initiatives was neither automatic nor politically motivated, but rather based on a shared personal commitment to certain internationalist principles.

During the immediate postwar years, hard-edged criticisms of Canadian foreign policy in the country's media were the exception. More than anything else, this support reflected the absence of fundamental differences of opinion between the bureaucratic and ministerial architects of Canadian foreign policy and the leading journalists covering their efforts. The partnership rested on three pillars, with the first being a shared perspective on the fundamentals of Canada's postwar, international role. As John Holmes later recalled, “a new body of Canadian professionals – foreign service officers and students of foreign policy – were feeling their oats and aspiring to a place nearer the seats of power.” 58 The most informed and influential journalists deserve to be included in this group – certainly Pearson and the other diplomats thought so. 59 The second factor was the journalists' perception of their role – first and foremost, to “educate Canadians internationally.” This necessitated a working partnership with the diplomatic professionals, since being “informed” was essential if they were going to do their job effectively. Finally, both groups accepted that the media could play a useful role in translating their shared vision into reality. The diplomats wished to build a consensus in English-speaking Canada for an assertive internationalism – as for French Canadians, it was simply hoped in the Anglophone heights of External Affairs that St. Laurent could carry them along. In fact, it was developments abroad and the absence of credible policy alternatives that largely forged the domestic foreign policy consensus, with the media playing a distinctly secondary role. Nonetheless, as events unfolded and anxieties mounted, this was not so clear. The partnership between government and press, both of whom sincerely felt they were advancing the national interest, did much to ensure that the coverage of the international scene, and Canada's role in it, would be interpreted through Canadian journalistic eyes in ways that would create few “wrong impressions.” 60

Notes

1. In 1950, Arnold Heeney, one of the ablest mandarins and the External Affairs Department's under-secretary, rated Dexter, Ferguson, Fraser, Hutchison, and Wilson as the five best Canadian journalists with respect to getting a foreign policy story right and commenting intelligently on it. Grant Dexter Papers [Queen's University Archives], v. 5, file 37, Hutchison to Dexter, 31 Jan. 1950.
Both Arthur Irwin, the editor of *Macleans*, and Norman Smith, Jr. of the *Ottawa Journal* might well have been included in Heeney's list.


3. Maclean-Hunter Papers [Ontario Archives], Horace Hunter Correspondence [hereafter MH Papers, HHC], v. 80, Irwin file, memo, 6 Jan. 1950


5. Ibid., 128–32.


8. Indeed, during the decade 1947–1957, the total circulation of Canadian daily newspapers was greater than the national population. Rutherford, 84; *Macleans Magazine* had a circulation of 400,000 by 1950, making it by far the largest Canadian magazine covering public affairs. Ibid., 82.

9. The *Financial Post's* circulation reached 50,000 shortly after the end of the war and steadily increased thereafter, making it the most widely read business and financial publication in the country by a considerable margin. MH Papers, HHC, v. 64; "75th Anniversary Supplement" to *Newsweekly*, 26 Sept. 1962.


15. Unfortunately, none survive in audio or transcript form.


21. Lester Pearson Papers [NAC], N1 Series, v. 52, San Francisco Conference 1945 file, Pearson to Fraser, 19 May 1945; Interview with Escott Reid.


23. Hutchison was editor of the Vancouver Sun, as well as an editorial advisor to the Free Press and one of Dexter's closest confidants.

24. Bruce Hutchison Papers [University of Calgary Archives], 1.2.1, Dexter to Hutchison, 23 Oct. 1946.


27. It was the only Canadian daily to cover the UN full-time, for example. The understandable anti-communist sympathies among newspaper owners and publishers generally freed Canadian editors to cover the Cold War and all that followed from it for Canada – the embrace of the United States and collective security – with unusual independence.


31. Reid, 33.


42. Interviews with David Ferguson, Bruce Hutchison, and Norman Smith.


45. Wilson was the chapter president in 1948.


48. Interviews with John Holmes and Escott Reid.


50. Mackenzie King had stepped down as Liberal Party leader and prime minister in the autumn of 1948, and been replaced by St. Laurent. Pearson entered the Cabinet as External Affairs minister.


54. Interview with Norman Smith.


56. Thomas Crerar Papers [Queen's University Archives], Series II, v. 88, Correspondence 1951 file, Freedman to Dexter, 3 Feb. 1951; and Dexter Papers, v. 6, file 39, Freedman to Dexter, 3 Feb. 1951; Interview with John Holmes. Terrence MacDermot Papers [Bishop's University Archives], M371/1-131, Ferguson to MacDermot, 6 Dec. 1950.


59. Interviews with John Holmes, George Ignatieff, and Escott Reid.

60. Pearson Papers, N1 Series, v. 6, Hutchison file, Hutchison to Pearson, 21 Jan. 1953.
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