Cover: The Mobile Striking Force, an airportable and airborne brigade group designed as a quick reaction force for northern operations, was an inexpensive solution to the question of how Canada could deal with an enemy lodgement in the Arctic. During training exercises, army personnel from southern Canada learned how to survive and operate in the north. In this image, taken during Exercise Bulldog II in 1954, Inuk Ranger TooToo from Churchill, Manitoba relays information to army personnel in a Penguin. DND photo PC-7066.
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Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security
Historical Perspectives

Edited by P. Whitney Lackenbauer

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Conclusions: “Use It or Lose It,” History, and the Fourth Surge

P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Canada’s Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our future.

-- Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2007

In July 2009 the Conservative government of Stephen Harper released its long awaited northern strategy. It reaffirms the broad array of military measures promised by the prime minister since he took office in January 2006 and assigns a robust role to the Canadian forces in the Arctic. “The Government of Canada is firmly asserting its presence in the North, ensuring we have the capability and capacity to protect and patrol the land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory,” the strategy asserts. “We are putting more boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water and a better eye-in-the-sky.” To justify this increase in Canada’s military presence in the region, politicians, journalists and scholars have identified a multitude of issues as potential threats to the Arctic, including climate change, boundary disputes, commercial exploitation and even terrorism.

As the chapters in this volume reveal, sovereignty and security threats to Canada’s North have changed, evolved, and resurfaced over the last seventy years, forcing successive governments to respond. During the Second World War and the early years of the Cold War, the advances of the Axis forces and the more tangible danger posed by the Soviet Union and its massive arsenal finally led strategists to portray the northern approaches not as a natural defensive barrier, but as an undefended roof of the continent. In the 1970s and 1980s Canada’s defence planners still acknowledged the Soviet menace in the Arctic, but tended to emphasize new environmental and sovereignty threats after the Northwest Passage transits of the oil tanker S.S. Manhattan in 1969 and the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Polar Sea in 1985. The interrelationship between sovereignty and security continues to evolve as the Arctic and circumpolar geopolitics change, but the distinction between the two concepts – and the precise nature of their interaction – is seldom explained in a systematic way that is attentive to historical experience and decision-making.
“USE IT OR LOSE IT,” HISTORY, AND THE FOURTH SURGE

Although most of the current debate over Arctic sovereignty and security revolves around what the future will hold, history continues to inform perceptions of Canada’s legal position, relationships, and priorities. Political statements are embedded with assumptions about what Canada should have done, and therefore must do, to protect its sovereignty. After all, the current “crisis” is predicated on the notion that previous governments have failed to protect Canadian interests. Since coming to office in early 2006, Prime Minister Harper’s “use it or lose it” refrain has become the dominant political message. Tapping into primordial national anxieties about sovereignty, this phrase resonates with southern Canadians who have taken little interest in their Arctic but have been led to believe that military capabilities will shield Canada from “the perfect storm” brewing in the circumpolar north. The logic of “defending sovereignty” from foreign challenges has also brought a shift from past governments that favoured recognition – persuading others to accept our claims without demonstrating a capacity to enforce them – to a Harper government that favours enactment.

If popular ignorance about the Arctic facilitates a message of alarmism – as some commentators alleged – so too does a lack of knowledge about past promises, practices, and relationships. Various authors in this volume point to the dynamics that generated perceived crises historically. By calling something a sovereignty or security crisis, an actor elevates an issue from the realm of low politics (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures) to the realm of high politics (characterized by urgency, priority and a matter of life and death). The line between risk management – concern that potential risks are prevented from developing into concrete, acute threats to Canada – and the perception of actual threats to sovereignty and security becomes blurred. Is anxiety about “using or losing” our Arctic inheritance more revealing of the Canadian psyche (particularly our chronic lack of confidence) than of objective realities? Who are the alleged “enemies” to Canada’s national interests, and what is the nature of their challenge? Does the discourse of “crisis” encourage a disproportionate emphasis on national defence at the expense of a broader suite of social, economic and diplomatic initiatives?

The media plays a pivotal role in generating and framing sovereignty crises demanding political attention. Several chapters in this volume reveal how press coverage influences political perceptions, priorities, and messaging about Arctic issues. At various intervals during the Cold War, for example, Canadian journalists and politicians panicked about Canada becoming too dependent on the United States and thus abdicating our de facto sovereignty.
Since 1968, the media has frequently reminded Canadians that the United States opposes our legal positions on the status of the Northwest Passage, and has served as the primary vehicle for commentators and politicians to disseminate their views – either alarmist or reassuring – to the public.

This has certainly played out again in recent years. While Huebert and Griffiths offered differing assessments early in the twenty-first century on the risks that climate change might pose to Canada’s sovereignty and security in the Arctic, media interest in the issue grew sharply in the middle of the decade. First came the fanfare over Hans Island. Denmark and Canada quietly disagreed over ownership of the tiny, uninhabited island for more than three decades before political theatre and hyperbolic rhetoric created a “crisis” that some media commentators portrayed as the opening salvo in a coming boundary war. The Danes sent naval vessels to the island in 2002 and 2003. Canada responded in 2005 with an inukshuk raising and flag-planting visit by a small group of Canadian Rangers and other land force personnel, followed by a highly publicized visit by Minister of National Defence Bill Graham. The media frenzy soon spiraled out of hand, alluding to Canada’s 1995 “Turbot War” with the Spanish and even a “domino theory” effect suggesting that if Canada lost Hans Island its other Arctic islands might succumb to a similar fate. This distorted the simple reality that Canada’s title to the archipelago itself had been explicitly recognized for more than half a century, but history was easily overlooked to create a sense of alarm. Although Canada and Denmark soon restored the dispute to a well-managed diplomatic track, Hans Island remains a touchstone for the outstanding sovereignty issues that Canada faces in the north.

The whole idea of “use it or lose it” has become intertwined with a broader swath of unresolved maritime boundaries in the Arctic. Although the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the rights and responsibilities of states in using the oceans and lays out a process for determining maritime boundaries [see Figure 17], pessimists began to forecast that Canada might fail to submit its extended continental shelf claim by its 2013 deadline, or stronger states might use their military might to disabuse Canada of its sovereign rights. Media coverage held up the Russian submarine expedition that planted a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007, coupled with renewed Russian military overflights and warship deployments into Arctic waters the following year, as evidence of Russia’s nefarious intentions. Were these deliberate messages to Canada and the other Arctic coastal states? Did this signal a trend towards militarization of the region? Canada soon engaged in “muscle-flexing,” former Foreign Affairs minister
Figure 17. Maritime Limits and the Continental Shift in UNCLOS. Diagram by the Association of Canadian Land Surveyors.
Lloyd Axworthy observed – even though he believed that “this is a contest we cannot win.”

Canada’s defence capabilities in the Arctic had atrophied in the 1990s, which played into growing concerns that Canada had not demonstrated significant resolve to defend its sovereignty. The 2000 Arctic Capabilities Study admitted that the CF would have been “hard pressed to conduct operations in the Arctic” at the dawn of the new millennium. At the same time, it recognized that northern security had evolved to include environmental, social and economic aspects, but argued that the coming decades would make the North even more vulnerable to “asymmetric” security and sovereignty threats. The Canadian Forces had to be prepared to respond to challenges related to environmental protection, increased shipping as Arctic sea lanes opened due to climate change, heightened commercial airline activity and “trans-national criminal activity” that would accompany resource development such as diamond mining. This required improved capabilities to monitor and respond to emergencies. As Huebert noted in chapter 14, the Department of National Defence decided at that time that, given its limited budget, the equipment and programs proposed to address anything more than surveillance issues would be extremely expensive. Scarce military resources would, instead, be devoted to more pressing priorities. Although the Liberals modestly increased the tempo of military operations in the Arctic in the early twenty-first century and promised to augment capabilities in their 2005 Defence Policy Statement, Paul Martin’s government fell before it could deliver on its promises.

Since coming into office in 2006, Stephen Harper’s Conservatives have made the CF the centerpiece of their “use it or lose it” approach to Canadian sovereignty. In short, the government’s sovereignty strategy has become a security strategy. This fits within their Canada First Defence Strategy (2008) vision that pledges to defend “our vast territory and three ocean areas” through increased defence spending and more Regular and Reserve forces. Naval patrols, overflights, effective surveillance capabilities and boots on the ground are portrayed as the tools with which Canada will defend its claims. Accordingly, the Harper government has announced a spate of “new” military measures to respond to the anticipated sovereignty challenges:

- 3 heavy, armed naval icebreakers (2006 campaign) – this was later changed to one polar-class Coast Guard icebreaker (August 2008)
- implementing an arctic national sensor system to monitor submarines and ships (2006 campaign)
“USE IT OR LOSE IT,” HISTORY, AND THE FOURTH SURGE

- six to eight Arctic Offshore Patrol ships (May 2007)
- establishing a Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut (2006 campaign, announced August 2007)
- expanding the size and capabilities of the Canadian Rangers (August 2007)
- building a deep water Arctic docking and refuelling facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut (2006 campaign, announced August 2007)
- conducting annual military exercises in the Arctic (Operations Nanook, Nunalivut, and Nunakput)
- creating an Arctic Response Company Group (introduced in May 2009)
- establishing a new CF Reserve unit in Yellowknife (announced September 2008, stood up in August 2009)

Critics suggested that this was more of a “shopping list” of military initiatives rather than a coherent Northern policy vision, and that this emphasis on “hard security” seems to reverse the direction charted by the Liberal government in the 1990s. This should not be surprising for partisan political reasons, as well as past trends. The chapters in this volume show how, over the last four decades, governments have frequently turned to the Canadian Forces when faced with northern sovereignty “crises.” Indeed, previous governments had promised several of the initiatives announced by Harper – such as the polar-class icebreaker, subsurface detection systems, and a high arctic base – and then abandoned them when the immediate sovereignty crisis passed.

The belief that an improved military presence can bolster Canada’s sovereignty has been prevalent during past sovereignty crises in the Arctic. In recent years, the Harper government again has made frequent reference to the “critical role” that the CF plays in asserting sovereignty. “We believe that Canadians are excited about the government asserting Canada’s control and sovereignty in the Arctic,” Harper told a Toronto Sun reporter on 23 February 2007:

We believe that’s one of the big reasons why Canadians are excited and support our plan to rebuild the Canadian Forces. I think it’s practically and symbolically hugely important, much more important than the dollars spent. And I’m hoping that years
from now, Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, military and otherwise, will be, frankly, a major legacy of this government.\textsuperscript{13}

The justification for these claims seems to be rooted in the notion that, if a country does not demonstrate its occupation and effective control over its territory, then it can lose its sovereignty “by dereliction.”\textsuperscript{14} Harper told an audience in Winnipeg in December 2005 that “you don’t defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric or advertising campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea, and proper surveillance.” In a speech delivered in Whitehorse on 11 March 2009, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon re-affirmed that military exercises are required to “demonstrate a visible Canadian presence in the Arctic.”

Should the burden of enforcing Canada’s Arctic sovereignty really be placed on the CF? Where is the justification to validate this accepted wisdom? A country must be able to control activities in its territory, but does a military presence actually contribute to our Arctic sovereignty? Critics suggest that this emphasis on presence is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of sovereignty, which international lawyers insist is a legal concept entailing ownership and the right to control over a specific area (as regulated by a clearly defined set of international laws). As Lackenbauer and Kikkert reveal in chapter 11, officials in the Department of External Affairs were sceptical in the late 1960s and early 1970s that increased military capabilities and activities strengthen our sovereignty. The context has changed since then: Canada has extended its territorial waters to 12 miles, clarified its position on the internal waters of the Arctic Archipelago by declaring straight baselines effective 1 January 1986, and is now mapping its extended continental shelf. Nevertheless, many of the underlying issues that they raised remain pertinent today. Erik Wang’s questions “how much is enough to ensure adequate Canadian influence and control,” and how much is “feasible” given finite military resources and competing defence priorities, are seldom posed directly in the current debate. They should be. Furthermore, Wang’s attentiveness to the public relations and political value of “presence” and “visibility,” which generate “Canadian self-esteem” but do little to strengthen Canada’s legal case, should be better acknowledged today. Legal officers at External Affairs warned that continuous talk about the need for a stronger Canadian Forces presence could actually undermine Canada’s sovereignty, by suggesting that Canada thought its claim was weak. Does current rhetoric have the same unintentional, but unfortunate, effect – even though Canada has developed a solid sovereignty position over the last century?
The meaning of core concepts remains important. How one interprets “sovereignty” and “security” influences expectations of military, federal, territorial/provincial, and municipal government stakeholders. Expanded definitions of security are helpful to understand the interconnections between environmental, socio-economic, and military variables, but are problematic when this inclusive definition of security is simplistically translated into the need for military action. If sovereignty is accepted as a legal issue solved through legal processes, it becomes inappropriate to frame military presence in the Arctic as essential in the defence of sovereignty. Furthermore, does accepting “an integrated concept of security – one in which military requirements are combined with an awareness of the need to act for ecological, economic, cultural, and social security” – allow northerners to play a more direct role in setting agendas and fostering cooperation and dialogue, as Franklyn Griffiths anticipated? Northern indigenous leaders believe that their voices have been pushed to the margins in light of the recent emphasis on purported legal and military threats to Arctic sovereignty. This is problematic, given that these citizens represent the clearest case of sustained Canadian presence. By extension, a coherent, integrated, “whole of government” Arctic strategy – with the CF playing an important but supporting role – is preferable to “erecting ‘Fortress Igloo,’ operated and staffed by the Canadian Forces personnel.”

The historical insights in this volume also suggest that commitments to invest in new or improved military capabilities must be rationalized and coordinated with other government objectives, or else they might be built upon “shifting political sands” (to borrow Erik Wang’s phrase). Several authors criticized Canada’s past policy approach to the Arctic – or lack thereof – for being cautious, ad hoc, and reactive to external developments. Others suggest that it was reactive and pragmatic, gradually entrenching Canada’s sovereignty as international law evolved – a remarkable success given the country’s parsimonious and half-hearted commitment to investing in the region. These interpretations point to a central dilemma facing policy-makers today. Do changing Arctic conditions internationally warrant a radical departure from the gradualist approach of the past?

The chapters in this volume reinforce that Canada’s dominant international relationship in the Arctic is with the United States. In the early Cold War, the US was a provider of security, but in so doing posed a perceived sovereignty threat to Canada. Bilateral agreements guaranteed Canadian security at relatively little expense to the federal government, and “defending against help” meant that Canada needed only modest defence capabilities
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

to ensure that the Americans did not take unilateral action to defend the northern approaches to North America. Canada could instead focus on being “providers” of security abroad rather than at home.20 Given that our closest military and economic ally was also our main challenger, symbolic shows of control sufficed. Canada knew that, in the end, the US could be relied upon for continental security21 and this spared Canada the expense of trying to defend its remote regions alone. The Manhattan and Polar Sea controversies revealed that, when the federal government perceived Canadian sovereignty to be threatened, it adopted unilateral legal measures to assert jurisdiction. When the short term crises faded, the government’s willingness to deliver on its promised investments in Arctic security also melted away. Instead, Canada sought multilateral or bilateral agreements to lessen the likelihood that its claims would be challenged in the future.

How policy-makers conceptualize US intentions and Canadian responses informs expectations for the future. The chapters in this volume, which pay careful attention to process, produce “lessons learned” that (re)shape our understanding of Cold War relations. Like the historiography more generally, they yield two main interpretations. Which side of the debate one chooses to accept influences the lessons that might guide future scenario-setting and policy-making. On the one hand, contributors like Bernd Horn and Adam Lajeunesse pick up on themes first raised by Donald Creighton and Shelagh Grant, which intimate that the US had little regard for Canadian sensitivities and interests. By extension, this interpretation suggests that Canada must be more activist to entrench and protect its Arctic interests against American challenges. Incompatible interests demand that Canada consolidate and defend its sovereignty outside of cooperative frameworks unless the US is willing to concede its legal arguments in favour of Canada’s.

On the other hand, contributors like Peter Kikkert and Dan Heidt join other historians who promote a narrative of mutual understanding and cooperation over one of conflict.22 By seeing Canadian and American interests as generally compatible (and friction as inevitable but manageable), these authors suggest that a history of diplomacy and successful working relationships helps to explain how and why Canada’s security and sovereignty interests have been enhanced since the Second World War. Quiet diplomacy and practical, bilateral solutions have allayed most of the acute “crises” concerns that arose. Accordingly, decision-makers today might seek to perpetuate a long tradition of cooperation with the United States that respects legal differences and seeks practical agreements without prejudicing either country’s national or international interests.
These specific themes converge most directly over the Northwest Passage. While Canada sees its archipelagic waters as internal, the US insists that they constitute an international strait with an accompanying right to transit passage. Some Canadian commentators suggest that if Canada demonstrates it has the rules, regulations and capabilities to better control activities and thus increase continental security in the Passage, then the United States will not contest, and may even support, Canada’s claims. This would be a dramatic departure from its longstanding legal position which emphasizes that the NWP-as-internal-waters and would set a dangerous precedent elsewhere. Such hypothetical scenarios involving US acquiescence to Canada’s position, then, might be read as presentist and unrealistic. While the United States sees the NWP in global terms, Canada views it in narrow national terms as a coastal state. If one reads Canadian and American interests as inherently incompatible and opposed, then Canadian nationalists will read the two countries’ disagreement over the NWP as an untenable basis for future cooperation. If one reads the historical record as a series of precedents in which Canada has “agreed to disagree” with the United States and has managed to safeguard its essential interests, then this situation seems less precarious. This volume is a reminder that we have a long history of working with the Americans in defending the North, that balancing sovereignty and security interests requires creativity and dialogue, and that differences of opinion on difficult legal issues are nothing new.

More generally, the authors remind us to situate Canadian decision-making in an international context. Does Canada face a conventional military threat to (or through) the Canadian Arctic? Recent commentators are divided in their assessments. Huebert suggests that there is an “arms race” in the region that requires a Canadian response. Foreign affairs and defence officials suggest that there is no conventional military threat to our Far North. Yet the prime minister, foreign affairs minister, and defence minister repeatedly assert that they will “stand up for Canada” in the face of foreign aggression, and Canada will “not be bullied” by countries like Russia. Does this speak to contradictory threat assessments, or is this simply political messaging designed to appeal to a domestic audience? If Canada does face military threats, should it work through alliances and bilateral partnerships to meet them, or invest in unilateral solutions? Although alliances and partnerships are expressions of sovereignty, history reveals that an over-dependence on Canada’s allies (particularly the Americans) raises perennial concerns about de facto (practical) sovereignty and perpetuates cycles of crisis-reaction.
Canada’s responses have implications beyond the national and international level. Several chapters in this volume point to the impacts of Arctic defence initiatives “on the ground.” Most existing scholarship supports policy scholar Frances Abele’s observation that “sovereignty and security policy decisions, in their immediate impact, have been and continue to be disproportionately costly to northern indigenous peoples.” \(^{25}\) In their chapter on the Northwest defence projects, Coates and Morrison point to the downside of militarization, such as prostitution, disease, alcohol, and environmental degradation. \(^{26}\) This reminds defence planners that sovereignty and security projects, conceived from afar and implemented locally, can have unintended consequences. Ken Eyre and Whitney Lackenbauer also suggest positive contributions that the military has made to Northern life, such as improved communications, transportation, training, and community-development. They introduce the social or nation-building role of the Canadian Forces in the region, and the expectation that military activities contribute to the government’s broader nation-building objectives.

To this end, how much should National Defence and the Canadian Forces focus on national rather than departmental goals? *Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future* (2009) identifies four pillars:

- exercising our Arctic sovereignty;
- promoting social and economic development;
- protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and
- improving and devolving northern governance, so that Northerners have a greater say in their own destiny.

This multi-faceted strategy requires a whole-of-government approach. In addition to exercising sovereignty, the CF will contribute to other pillars (even if only in terms of secondary effects such as capacity-building, local infrastructure, and support to local governance).

This resurrects difficult questions about how the CF can play a leadership role in the evolving Arctic. Northern indigenous leaders have lamented what they see as an over-emphasis on defence at the expense of the broader suite of human security issues. Mary Simon of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami noted in 2008:

The Arctic has the country’s worst housing, health and education indicators. This cannot be allowed to continue.... [A] quick review of the recent federal budget shows where the federal government
priorities rest at the moment: sizeable new funding for mineral development alongside earlier big ticket commitments to military facilities and hardware, with a “hold-the-line” approach to endemic social problems…. In this backwards-looking focus, the aboriginal realities of the Arctic – our demographic majority, our aboriginal and treaty rights, our distinct languages and cultures – are effectively pushed out of sight.27

If the government has shifted to a whole-of-government approach, why should it invest money and resources in the CF rather than the Coast Guard, the RCMP, or other departments more involved in human security efforts? If it is unlikely that Canada will find itself unilaterally engaged in kinetic operations in the Arctic, what roles should the CF play beyond surveillance? The obvious answer is that the military’s training makes it an ideal responder to probable emergency scenarios, and it is funded and equipped to do contingency operations beyond the capabilities of any other department.28 But is this the political message that Canadians are receiving? Does it have sufficient appeal to sustain the Harper government’s bold agenda for investments in Arctic defence? History suggests that promised investments in military capabilities, announced in a “crisis environment” with little explicit justification beyond their contributions to sovereignty, do not fare well over the long-term. Implementation is difficult once political and popular perceptions of an immediate sovereignty threat pass, the lack of an obvious military threat becomes apparent, and budget pressures force cuts to “non-priority” areas. The challenge today is to learn from history and implement a Northern Strategy that balances domestic and international interests, justifies appropriate and sustainable roles for the Canadian Forces, and reflects the priorities of Canadians – particularly Northerners, the primary stewards of our Arctic homeland.

Notes


7 Rens van Munster, “The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror” (Syddansk Universitet Political Science Publications, 2005), 6-7, available online at http://www.sdu.dk/~media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Statskundskab/Skriftserie/05RVM10.ashx

8 See, for example: “The Arctic contest heats up,” The Economist, 9 October 2008.


10 Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), Arctic Capabilities Study (2000), 8-1, 8-3.


12 David Bercuson, “Comedy of Errors: First, a defence strategy, then a shopping list,” Globe and Mail, 21 May 2008, A17.

13 Kathleen Harris, “Laying claim to Canada’s internal waters,” Toronto Sun, 23 February 2007.


17 At an October 2009 workshop on Arctic sovereignty and security, participants proposed a working definition of a “whole of government” approach as “the ability to apply applicable elements of national power to implement desired goals.” The report observed that the Canadian Forces/Department of National Defence was only one of those elements, and it could support other government departments if necessary but not at the expense of its primary Defence of Canada mission. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Peter Archambault and Yvan Gauthier, “Towards an Arctic Campaign Plan: Syndicate Results and Recommendations from the Arctic Sovereignty and Security Symposium” (Defence Research and Development Canada letter report, 1 December 2009).

18 Captain (Navy) Jamie Cotter, “Developing a Coherent Plan to deal with Canada’s Conundrum in the Northwest Passage,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 11/3 (Spring 2009): 1-51. Collaboration does exist. The Arctic Security Working Group, co-chaired by the Commander, Joint Task Force North (JTFN) and the Regional Director of Public Safety’s Arctic Regional Office, was formed in 1999 as a forum for federal/territorial departments and agencies to discuss Arctic issues and exchange information. Furthermore, Operation Nanook exercises test what capabilities various federal, territorial and municipal government stakeholders could bring to emergency scenarios. While press releases emphasize that these operations are important
assertions of “sovereignty,” they are more important as opportunities for government departments and agencies to critically analyze their policies and procedures and to refine their relationships.

19 Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga.


24 See, for example, Griffiths, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty,” 14, 22, and John Noble, “Arctic solution already in place,” Toronto Star, 8 February 2006.


26 Recently, Lackenbauer and Ryan Shackleton drew similar conclusions about the postwar period. “The federal government’s approach to Arctic defence was paradoxical,” they observed. “Although the military … was not at the forefront of intentional social engineering nor did its practices represent a well orchestrated scheme to ‘civilize’ the Inuit, its activities created or exacerbated dependencies on wage employment and Western goods, encouraged the sedentarization of the Inuit, and set up unsustainable expectations given the ‘boom and bust’ cycles associated with defence work.” Lackenbauer and Shackleton, “Inuit-Air Force Relations in the Qikiqtani Region during the Early Cold War,” The Canadian Air Force’s Experience in the Arctic ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Major W.A. March (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, Canadian Aerospace Power Studies Series, forthcoming 2011).


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ABSTRACT: Climate change is transforming the Arctic. Questions abound about what this will mean for the Canadian Forces, for Canada’s sovereignty position, for northern peoples, and for stability and security in the circumpolar world. Fortunately, Canadians have encountered and debated similar issues in the past. This volume, featuring chapters by established and emerging scholars, offers essential historical analysis on Canadian Arctic security and sovereignty policies and practices since the Second World War. The “lessons learned” lay a solid foundation for future research and historiographical debate in this dynamic field, and should inform Canadian thinking on what is necessary to protect national interests in the twenty-first-century Arctic.