Cover: The Mobile Striking Force, an airportable and airborne brigade group designed as a quick reaction force for northern operations, was an inexpensive solution to the question of how Canada could deal with an enemy lodgement in the Arctic. During training exercises, army personnel from southern Canada learned how to survive and operate in the north. In this image, taken during Exercise Bulldog II in 1954, Inuk Ranger TooToo from Churchill, Manitoba relays information to army personnel in a Penguin. DND photo PC-7066.
Calgary Papers
in Military and Strategic Studies

Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security
Historical Perspectives

Edited by P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Contents

Introduction
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER ................................................................. 1

Gateway to Invasion or the Curse of Geography?
The Canadian Arctic and the Question of Security, 1939-1999
BERND HORN .......................................................................................... 23

“The Army of Occupation”: Americans in the
Canadian Northwest during World War II
KEN COATES AND BILL MORRISON ................................................... 55

1946: The Year Canada Chose Its Path in the Arctic
PETER KIKKERT ........................................................................... 69

“Advertising for Prestige”: Publicity in Canada-US
Arctic Defence Cooperation, 1946-48
DAVID J. BERCUSON ......................................................................... 111

Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic
Waters, 1946-1949
ELIZABETH B. ELLIOT-MEISEL .............................................................. 121

Clenched in the JAWS of America? Canadian Sovereignty
and the Joint Arctic Weather Stations, 1946-1972
DANIEL HEIDT .................................................................................... 145

A Practicable Project: Canada, the United States,
and the Construction of the DEW Line
ALEXANDER HERD ............................................................................. 171
The Military and Nation Building in the Arctic, 1945-1964
K.C. EYRE..................................................................................................................201

Claiming the Frozen Seas: The Evolution of Canadian Policy in Arctic Waters
ADAM LAJEUNESSE......................................................................................................233

The Manhattan Incident Forty Years On: Re-assessing the Canadian Response
MATTHEW WILLIS ......................................................................................................259

Building on “Shifting Sands”: The Canadian Armed Forces, Sovereignty, and the Arctic, 1968-1972
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER AND PETER KIKKERT..................................................283

Polar Vision or Tunnel Vision: The Making of Canadian Arctic Waters Policy
ROB HUEBERT ............................................................................................................309

Canada’s Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER.......................................................................................345

Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage
ROB HUEBERT ............................................................................................................383

Pathetic Fallacy: That Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is on Thinning Ice
FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS ...............................................................................................401

Conclusions: “Use It or Lose It,” History, and the Fourth Surge
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER .......................................................................................423

Further Reading..........................................................................................................437
What is important to Canadians is not what we think the Russians will do; it is what we think the Americans think the Russians will do.¹

The Arctic has a very special hold on the Canadian psyche despite the fact that very few Canadians have actually ever seen the North. Strategist Kenneth Eyre observed that the “North to Canadians is more of an idea than a place.”² Nevertheless, it was not until the Second World War that Canadian apathy towards its Arctic was actually broken. The war led to a continental alliance which dictated the close cooperation between Canada and the United States in the defence of North America. It was also the catalyst that sparked a new surge of interest in the North.

The looming Japanese threat to Alaska and the fear of a Nazi occupied Siberia, only a short distance away across the Bering Strait, raised American anxiety in regard to its security to an unprecedented high. The subsequent American mobilization to meet the perceived peril quickly spilled into Canada and transformed its North into a hive of activity. Unfortunately, the Americans placed little weight on the formalities of ownership and executed their tasks with a single-mindedness that raised the concern that the long neglected Canadian North was actually under the control of the United States.

The growing American presence, coupled with their dominating attitude, worried Canadian politicians. This fear soon led to action to safeguard Canadian sovereignty. Canada had always been defensive of its claim to ownership of the Arctic archipelago and the growing occupation of the North, by the United States, was seen as a direct threat to Canadian proprietorship. The American presence, argued Canadian governmental officials, could be seen as de facto control. As a result, a policy was implemented to reimburse the Americans for their wartime developments in the North, regardless of whether the Canadian government had originally supported or
wanted the subject projects. It was not lost on the politicians that sovereignty has a price. Equally clear were the consequences of not paying that price.

Canada’s new wartime defence partnership underscored another inescapable reality. It became evident that any threat to the security of the United States perceived by the Americans, whether realistic or not, represented a genuine danger to Canada. The national political and military leadership promptly realized that it was critical that Canada be seen by its southern neighbour to be taking adequate steps to secure Canadian borders from any intrusion that could subsequently threaten the United States. This geographical reality was exacerbated at the end of the Second World War. New technology, weapons of immense potency and the emergence of two diametrically opposed superpowers – with Canada sandwiched between them – fuelled what would become a continuing challenge to Canada’s efforts to maintain the security and sovereignty of its Arctic regions.

It is this balance between security and sovereignty that begs examination. Was Canada’s defence policy and northern focus oriented toward a real menace in the Arctic as a result of a belief that its security was jeopardized by the threat of invasion by belligerent powers? Or, was it geared to thwarting the perceived peril to its sovereignty by an ally? Careful scrutiny uncovers a Canadian defence policy that was focused more on frustrating erosion to its sovereignty and minimizing American expansion into the Canadian Arctic, than it was on meeting any real danger to its territory from hostile invasion. Although a degree of potential threat was always recognized, more so by the military than the political leadership, decisions taken on defence of the North were primarily geared to countering American encroachment. This theme, which was initiated by Prime Minister King in the Second World War, continues to the present.

Before 1939, Canadian politicians, as well as their military commanders, placed very little emphasis on the Arctic. The primary stimulus of the limited northern development conducted by the government during this period was the result of a select few individuals. Patrons such as J.A. Wilson, the Controller of Civil Aviation, and Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), sponsored initiatives that included the survey of suitable landing fields in the Arctic archipelago; a program of aerial photography for mapping purposes; and the establishment of a series of northern radio stations. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of growth in the North was primarily civilian in nature. Canadian Airways and Mackenzie Air Service, two commercial airlines that commenced operations in the Arctic in the late 1920s were instrumental in opening up the North. Nonetheless, eventually,
a series of civilian airfields and emergency landing strips, supported by the Departments of Defence and Transport, were established across the entire Dominion. These fields were primarily used by Trans-Canada Airlines but also yielded a network that could be used to concentrate military air strength in time of crisis.5

Much of this development was due to depression-era relief projects. However, continuing interest in an air route to Alaska and Europe over the Arctic was always prevalent and by 1935, technological and economic conditions merited a closer examination of its viability.6 Consequently, the government-sponsored survey of northern airfields was conducted to determine whether expansion of existing sites was required and what additional landing fields were necessary.7 Construction on this network of airfields was undertaken in 1939 and continued well into the war. It eventually became known as the Northwest Staging Route and it proved instrumental in the defence of Alaska and in the supply of aircraft and equipment to the beleaguered Soviet Union.8

Despite the remarkable strides in aviation and the limited but growing commercial development of the North, both the military and political leadership shared the belief that the Canadian Arctic represented a negligible security threat to the “fire-proof house” of Canada. In 1938, Prime Minister Mackenzie King asserted, “May I point out that undoubtedly Canada is the most secure of all countries.” He dismissed “the launching of fantastic expeditions across half the world [by belligerents intending to attack Canada]” and stated that “at present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and second-hand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves.”10

The Minister of National Defence (MND), Ian Mackenzie, agreed. “There is danger,” he acknowledged, “but so far as Canada is concerned, it is, as I have already pointed out, an incidental contingency.”11 He asserted that the direct defence of Canada entailed the defence of “our coastal areas, our ports, our shipping terminals, our territorial waters, the focal areas of our trade routes adjacent to our harbour mouths.”12 Specifically, he felt that the threat consisted largely of raids by submarine, aircraft or other craft for the purpose of creating diversion and panic.13

The military perception was little different. “The idea of our having to fight a major war on our own soil,” wrote Lieutenant-General Maurice Pope, “was absurd...As the forms and scales of attack to which it was judged Canada might be exposed in the event of even a major war comprised only limited naval and air bombardment and minor raids against our defended
ports.” This judgement changed little even with the commencement of hostilities. An Army appreciation in February 1941 stated that “Canada’s front line lies in and around the British Isles.”

The apparent lack of concern of any menace to Canada’s security emanated from the nation’s geographic endowment. A military analysis of Canadian defence problems noted that “The direct defence of the national territory ... owing to our fortunate geographical position ... has not been given a high degree of priority.” General Charles Foulkes reinforced this theme. “Prior to 1939,” he explained, “Canada was able to derive a considerable amount of security from her geographical position. The then available weapons precluded a direct attack on Canada.”

Geography and history provided Canada with another important element in its defence, namely, a powerful neighbour to the south. The close proximity to the United States prompted Colonel E.L.M. Burns in 1936 to write that “we believe, reasonably or unreasonably, that our Southern neighbour would go to war before she would allow a foreign nation to establish itself on our territory.” The renowned Canadian historian C.P. Stacey repeated this thesis in his examination of Canadian defence policy in 1940. “It has long been generally recognized in Canada,” he insisted, “that the most elementary regard for the security of the United States itself would render it impossible for that country to permit any aggressive power to gain a foothold on Canadian soil.”

These conclusions were not entirely visionary. In 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt raised the image of a benevolent neighbour when he stated: “We can defend ourselves, and we can defend our neighbourhood.” Two years later he erased any doubt with his famous declaration at Queen’s University in Kingston. “The Dominion of Canada,” he announced, “is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire. We as good neighbours are true friends.”

Two days later King responded. “We, too,” he declared, “have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.” These courageous words were uttered at a time when there were no perceived threats to Canada because of its geographical location and the naval might of both Britain and the United States. As a result, King’s pledge to guard the flanks
of his neighbour seemed effortless and easily enforced. However, his words would return to haunt him and take on the essence of a curse. World events and technological developments soon changed Canada’s outlook on security forever, particularly with respect to its Arctic regions. The Second World War dramatically altered Canada’s perception of its security and fuelled an unprecedented concern for its North. Paradoxically, the emphasis on northern security became focused primarily on protecting national sovereignty from the perceived encroachment of an ally rather than guarding an unprotected flank from hostile invasion.

The catalyst was the renewed American focus on Alaska. Originally, American politicians and military leaders shared a common apathy with their Canadian counterparts in regard to their northern territory. “In the halls of Congress, Alaska was described as a ‘frozen waste,’ much as strategic Guam was passed off by some Representatives as a ‘grain of sand.’” The military leadership shared a similar view. An official report tabled just prior to the American entry into the war argued that “there appears at present to be no necessity, from the viewpoint of national defense, of increasing the military garrison of Alaska.” Few acknowledged Brigadier-General Mitchell’s observation that Alaska, “as the most central place in the world of aircraft,” was subsequently the most strategic location on earth. He reasoned that “whoever holds Alaska will hold the world.”

It took the Axis juggernaut to galvanize American action in the North. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 “muddied the already seething situation in the Far East and seemed to bring closer to Alaska the danger that Alaskans had been advertising for years.” The realization that “in the possession of the enemy Alaska will furnish a jumping-off point for invasion by air of the United States” soon resulted in the restoration of money to expand Alaskan defence. The Permanent Joint Board for Defence (PJBD) concluded on February 26, 1942, “that the effective defence of Alaska is of paramount importance to the defence of the continent against attack from the West, since Alaska is the area most exposed to an attempt by the enemy to establish a foothold in North America.”

Canadians quickly absorbed the idea of a northern threat via Alaska. “It was easy to believe,” wrote Canadian military historian Desmond Morton, “as Japanese power spread irresistibly across Southeast Asia ... that it could also reach out easily to seize a foothold in North America. If the threat was far-fetched militarily, it was politically all too real.” Even Mitch Hepburn, the Premier of Ontario at the time, “predicted a Japanese assault on Alaska, and [he] visualized the enemy infiltrating down the western coast of
Prime Minister King also believed that the Japanese represented a real danger. He warned his military officials that it would be foolish to discount their strength. Moreover, King cautioned his generals not to rule out the possibility of operations of a larger or more serious nature.

Despite the dire admonitions, the military was not overly alarmed. Even the Japanese seizure of the islands of Attu, Agatu, and Kiska in the Aleutians in the early summer of 1942 failed to change their outlook. Their analysis reaffirmed that “the forms and scales of attack envisioned on the entry of Japan into the war remained unchanged.” The confidence of the military commanders rested on the premise that there were no military objectives of sufficient importance to justify other than small hit-and-run raids, the effect of which would have little military significance. In addition, the generals emphasized that the Japanese were already over-committed. The Chiefs of Staff Committee clearly stated that an invasion of Canada’s West Coast by Japanese forces was considered highly remote.

Nonetheless, the military chain of command took into account the anxiety of the public. “The question of increasing protection in British Columbia,” asserted an Army appreciation, “is one of vocal and increasing concern on the part of the civilian population. In view of the immense length of the coast line, greater mobility of Army personnel would seem a matter of urgent consideration and might do much to allay the present feeling of apprehension.” As a result, the West Coast was reinforced with artillery and manpower. Lieutenant-General Pope, however, noted the nature of the real threat. “It was clear that if ... Canada should attempt to remain neutral and aloof,” he explained, “our American neighbours would ride roughshod over us and make use of our territory and facilities as it pleased them.”

Pope’s observation was the more accurate. The response of the United States to the new northern menace was representative of the energy and seemingly unlimited resources of a great power. The American reaction was swift and all encompassing. It created an intricate web that eventually entangled Canada. The expeditious American mobilization resulted in a massive influx of personnel to reinforce the Alaskan garrison, as well as to establish the logistical infrastructure required to support the new defensive effort in the North. By June 1943, more than 33,000 American soldiers and civilian workers had poured into northwestern Canada.

The American “invasion” was driven by their perception of defensive steps required to protect the North. These included the expansion and upgrading of the Northwestern Staging Route, the construction of a land route to Alaska, and the assurance of petroleum for military forces in the North.
These projects all encompassed development on Canadian territory and were, theoretically, subject to consultation and agreement between the two nations in accordance with the Ogdensburg Agreement. The Ogdensburg Agreement was signed in haste – almost in panic – as a contingency for the imminent collapse of Britain. As the tide of war began to shift, the consequences of the agreement soon became clear. Nonetheless, although the projects signed under the auspices of the agreement were grounded in the noble pursuit of mutual defence, they quickly highlighted the dangers of a relationship between two unequal partners.

What were trumpeted as “projects of vital importance” to the security of North America very quickly captured Canadian attention. One such project, the construction of the Alaska Highway, was representative of the difficulties facing Canada. As early as 1928, both Americans and Canadians had thought about a land route to Alaska; however, the exorbitant cost and “negligible military value” precluded any official support. American military planners viewed a road link to Alaska as of little strategic importance and primarily of economic benefit to civilians. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour abruptly changed the American perspective. Overnight, the construction of an all-weather road was seen as “one of the most important steps toward making Alaska defensible.” Once the Americans decided what was necessary, they took prompt action with little regard for Canadian sensitivities.

On February 12, 1942, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs informed the Cabinet War Committee that the Americans had concluded that construction of a land route to Alaska on Canadian soil was necessary for continental defence, but they had not yet submitted a formal request to do so. It was not until February 26, 1942, that the PJBD, as its twenty-fourth recommendation, advised that the construction of the Alaska Highway should be undertaken. The Canadian dilemma was evident. The government was reluctant to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, a secret External Affairs memorandum conceded that “the United States Government is now so insistent that the Canadian Government cannot possibly allow itself to be put in the position of barring the United States from land access to Alaska.” It commented that the Canadian government would be in a completely untenable position if it prevented the construction of land communications to Alaska and subsequently, as unlikely as it may be, the Japanese were able to deny the United States access by sea.

The alternative, however, was daunting. It required Canada “to expend some $80,000,000.00 on the construction, and about $1,000,000.00 per annum
on the maintenance of a road that would be a monument to our friendship for the U.S. but would otherwise be pretty much of a ‘White Elephant.’” Cabinet concluded that Canada had little choice but to agree. War Cabinet Committee approval was subsequently given on March 5, 1942.

But the Cabinet’s approval was irrelevant. The actual decision to proceed had already been made in the United States. President Roosevelt considered the matter a fait accompli. Consequently, he had allocated $10 million for the project from his emergency fund as early as February 11. As a result, American engineers arrived in Dawson Creek to begin construction on the road two days before Cabinet approved the request. The highway eventually proved insignificant. By the autumn of 1943, only 54 tons of supplies had been delivered to the Alaska Defense Command by road.

Nonetheless, the American presence quickly struck a chord with Canadians, particularly Prime Minister King. Alarming reports emanating from the North painted a grim picture for a country that laboured at maintaining a decorum of autonomy and independence. One account acknowledged that “the Americans in Edmonton are openly describing themselves as an ‘Army of Occupation.’” To King the spectre of American encroachment was very real. “I said,” he wrote in his diary, “I was not altogether without feeling that the Alaska Highway was less intended for protection against Japan than as one of the dangers of the hand which America is placing more or less over the whole of the Western Hemisphere.”

The Alaska Highway was not the only source of concern. The CANOL project provided similar hazards to the Canadian hosts. Its aim was to provide a guaranteed supply of fuel to Alaska and military traffic en route by means of a pipeline from Norman Wells, in the North West Territories, to a refinery in Whitehorse, Yukon, from where subsequent distribution would be made. By the time the project had been completed it had expanded to include a series of airfields, numerous construction camps, pumping stations, supplementary pipelines and additional roads. Its utility, as well as efficiency, was questioned from the beginning and it has since been labelled a “junk-yard of military stupidity.” Lieutenant-General Pope, who was a Canadian member of the PJBD, later commented that “the CANOL project as a defence measure has always seemed to me so far-fetched as to be absurd.”

Of greater concern was the fact that the decision to proceed with the project was once again taken before receiving the requisite approval from the Canadian government. Canadian historian Donald Creighton observed that “the United States army authorized the pipeline and signed a contract with
Imperial Oil more than a fortnight before the Canadian government signified its approval.”57 Furthermore, additional airfields were built in support of the project without consulting the Canadian government.58

The American insensitivity to Canadian control prompted Vincent Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in England, to comment that the Americans “have apparently walked in and taken possession in many cases as if Canada were unclaimed territory inhabited by a docile race of aborigines.”59 His diary entries noted further disquieting observations. “The Americans,” Massey recorded, “who unfortunately under cover of the needs of the war effort are acting in the North-West as if they owned the country ...We have for too long been far too supine vis-à-vis Washington and the only threat to our independence comes from that quarter.”60

As the war progressed, all perceived threats to the North American land mass, particularly in the Arctic, diminished dramatically,61 suspicions of American intentions, however, did not. Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner in Canada, visited the northern projects and reported to the Canadian Cabinet War Committee that “it was quite evident that these vast undertakings were being planned and carried out with a view to the post war situation. Canadian representatives in the area were few and quite unable to keep control or even in touch with day to day developments.”62 Civilian entrepreneurs also questioned the long-term motives of the Americans. J.K. Cornwall, an Edmonton businessman, said “I visualize the U.S.A. controlling to a large extent the development of Canada’s north land, due to their financial power and experience.”63

But no-one was more suspicious than the Prime Minister. “Despite his close friendship with Roosevelt,” disclosed the Prime Minister’s secretary, J.W. Pickersgill, “Mackenzie King was never without suspicions of the ultimate designs of the Americans ... He referred to ‘the efforts that would be made by the Americans to control developments in our country after the war.’”64 King’s own diaries offer testimony to these misgivings. “I viewed the Alaskan Highway,” he wrote, “and some other things growing out of the war, which was clear to my mind that America had had as her policy, a western hemisphere control which would mean hemispheric immunity, if possible, from future war but increasing political control by United States Forces greater than those of any one country working to this end.”65 Moreover, he confided in Vincent Massey that “he had grave doubts whether international agreements [on U.S. withdrawal from bases and installations on Canadian soil] on this which Canada had secured from the United States [would] provide any practical guarantee against the United States’ claims
and pretensions.” King went on to say that “Canadians were looked upon by Americans as a lot of Eskimos.”

This fear of “possible domination of post-war Canada by the Americans” led King to believe that it was necessary to displace the Americans from further development in the North and “keep control in our own hands.” The prevailing perception of American encroachment into Canada’s North led directly to new initiatives to regain control and assert ownership. The Canadian government “now embarked on a vigorous programme intended to ‘re-Canadianize’ the Arctic.” Clearly, the new focus on the Arctic was not inspired by security concerns but rather for fear of losing jurisdiction over its territory. A military appreciation asserted that “it is of great importance that Canada should carefully safeguard her sovereignty in the Arctic at all points and at all times, lest the acceptance of an initial infringement of her sovereignty invalidate her entire claim and open the way to the intrusion of foreign interests of a nature which might create an ultimate threat to national security.”

Specific action to reclaim the North began with the appointment of a Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in Northwest Canada. His task was to supervise and coordinate the activities of the government and “to maintain close and continuous cooperation with all agencies of the United States government in the area.” The government’s most influential initiative, however, was the policy of reimbursing the Americans for the cost of construction and development that was undertaken in the North.

The tight-fisted King government realized that retention of clear ownership and title to its North required payment for those bases and facilities of a permanent nature that were built by the Americans. What made this decision more painful was the fact that most of the projects were never supported as necessary by the Government, and almost all were constructed to standards far in excess of Canadian requirements. Despite these realities, the need to buy back control was seen as primordial and a new financial agreement was reached between the two nations in June of 1944. It resulted in the acceptance of a further war debt of $123.5 million to reimburse the Americans for work that had been done. The principle in question was simple. King himself, prior to the outbreak of war, pronounced that “domestic ownership, maintenance and control of all military stations and personnel is one of the really indispensable hall marks of national sovereign self government.”

This fundamental belief led the government, in the interest of sovereignty, to buy back the North and ensure clear title of Canadian ownership. The Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities reported
in January 1945: “As time went on, it became increasingly apparent that the existence of major military installations in Canada built, paid for and operated by the United States might impair Canada’s freedom of action. This difficulty has been mitigated, if not eliminated, by the Canadian Government’s decision, agreed to by all the United States, to reimburse the United States for construction costs of all airfields and certain other facilities of continuing value erected in Canada by the United States.”

The lessons learned through painful experience during the war were not lost. “The war,” wrote Desmond Morton, “had taught Canadians how swiftly the Americans could move when their minds were made up and how little weight Ottawa’s appeals really carried in Washington.” A government report frankly stated that “if Canada had refused or failed to undertake projects which formed part of United States plans or measures in Canadian territory for the special protection of the United States, the United States was willing and even anxious to proceed alone.”

Clearly, the realization that American security concerns represented a genuine threat to Canadian sovereignty was entrenched by the end of the Second World War. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Canadian North. “We had to discharge our obligations to make sure that nobody attacked the U.S. over our territory,” explained General McNaughton. “If we had not done so there was the danger that the U.S. might have taken over the Canadian North in the interest of their own security.” This fear led to a new focus on the North and the acceptance of an enormous debt for unwanted infrastructure. The motive was primarily to preserve control and sovereignty of Canadian territory and not the result of a concern for security. The new geo-political reality was that Canada and the United States formed a strategic unit. As a result, American security was of vital interest to Canada. “Because of the gateway which Canada opens to an enemy,” King noted, “the defence of this continent is bound to be increasingly that of the United States itself.”

This awareness, combined with the dramatic improvements in technology and the growing antagonism between the newly emerged superpowers, cast Prime Minister King’s pre-war pledge in a new light. It now took on the likeness of a curse. Sandwiched geographically between the two rivals, Canadians quickly deduced the hazards and the potential penalty of attempting to remain aloof. A Canadian diplomat underscored the danger by pointing out that “the United States military men refer, whether nervously or menacingly, to the ‘undefended roof of North America’ and claim the right to return en masse to the Canadian Northland which they left so recently.”
the Second World War forced the nation’s political and military leadership to take a direct interest in the North because of a fear of losing Canadian control and ownership, then the post-war era burned the issue of Arctic sovereignty into their very soul.

Any respite from American encroachment in the North that the Canadian politicians had hoped to gain at the cessation of hostilities in 1945 quickly disappeared. The geographical reality was also highlighted in a 1946 classified American military appreciation on the problems of joint defence in the Arctic. It concluded that “the physical facts of geographical juxtaposition and joint occupation of the North American continent have at all times carried the implication that the defence of Canada and the defence of the United States cannot be artificially divorced. Recent technological developments rendering Canada’s Arctic vulnerable to attack and thereby exposing both Canada and the United States to the threat of invasion and aerial assault across the northern most reaches of the continent have greatly heightened the compulsion to regard the defence of the two countries as a single problem.”

The Canadian assessment, although similar, was blunter. Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote: “To the Americans the defence of the United States is continental defence, which includes us, and nothing that I can think of will ever drive that idea out of their heads. Should then, the United States go to war with Russia they would look to us to make common cause with them, and, as I judge their public opinion, they would brook no delay.” Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent quipped that “Canada could not stay out of a third World War if 11,999,999 of her 12,000,000 citizens wanted to remain neutral.”

Once again Canada was caught in the vortex of American security concerns. The North was perceived as an unprotected gateway to invasion that required immediate and costly measures to minimize its vulnerability. Canadian politicians and their military commanders quickly supported the new emphasis on the defence of the North, but they did so to minimize American encroachment in the Arctic. The motive behind Canadian defence policy in the North remained one of countering perceived American penetration in the interest of sovereignty – not security.

Although an element of menace was recognized, Canadians consistently questioned their ally’s assessments of risk. This difference in the threat perception is an important indicator that reinforces the true motive behind the government’s focus in the North. By 1946, joint military planning committees warned of a serious threat, within a few years, to the security of Canada and
the United States by means of attacks on North America by manned bombers equipped with atomic weapons. The updated Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan (revised ABC-22) more accurately reported that “up to 1950, the Soviets could use subversion and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.” By 1952, military planners projected “the use of the atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland, Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces.” The Americans therefore maintained a worrisome interest in the Canadian Arctic.

It was this American interest in the North, more than the threat posed by possible invasion, that concerned Canadian politicians. Their view of the risk of Soviet invasion was somewhat different. Scholars have pointed out that Canadian defence analysts were “less alarmist” than their American counterparts about Soviet intentions and the pace of technological advancements. A Canadian intelligence report assessed that “the USSR is not considered capable at the present time of endangering, by direct action, the security of Canada and the United States.” It bluntly stated that the present American outlook gave an impression of a greater threat to the security of Canada and the United States than actually existed. It specifically disagreed with the American claim of increased enemy capability that ascribed to the Soviets the potential to seize objectives in Alaska, Canada, or Labrador, from which they could strike strategic targets in North America. The report commented that the Americans “credit a potential enemy with greater capabilities than we consider reasonable.” The British Foreign Office concurred. They affirmed that “Russia, so far as we can judge, is neither prepared for nor in the mood for war, and Stalin is a sober realist.”

Canadian diplomats supported this viewpoint. Norman Robertson acknowledged “the scales of attack, to which it could reasonably be held we were exposed, were, are, and will be, almost insignificant.” The nation’s military commanders agreed. “I feel,” conceded the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, “[that] there is often a tendency for the Americans to place the worst picture before us in our discussions, with the result that our thinking is often along the lines of 100% protection and does not take into account a more realistic policy of calculated risk.”

Significantly, Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, shared the same belief. He felt strongly that Canada faced no imminent threat. “On the information as is available to the Canadian government,” he wrote, “it
appears most unlikely that the Soviet Union would be in a position to wage another war in the near future, and for this reason it is highly improbable that the Soviet Government would run the risk of deliberately provoking such a war.”

Claxton postulated that the Soviet Union required a period of 15 years before it would be physically capable of war.

The scepticism of the actual risk was not a function of blind ignorance. The politicians maintained a belief that there was no peril to Canada even at a time when the bogey of communism reached its zenith in the early 1950s. They recognized an international threat but not one to Canada itself. Gordon Graydon, the Parliamentary Advisor to the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, speaking on Soviet intentions warned of the “undisguised steps towards [Soviet] world domination.”

Prime Minister St. Laurent and Lester Pearson both went on record as stating “the international situation was never more serious.” Other Parliamentarians were representative of the prevailing climate, viewing communism as “a diabolical dynamic thing ... aiming at the destruction of all the freedoms and the inherent hard-won rights of man” and describing it as “the darkest and direst shadow that has ever fallen upon this earth.”

The international threat was such that Canada expanded its armed forces and dramatically increased its defence expenditures. But this was done to facilitate the dispatch of an expeditionary force to fight the evils of communism in Korea, as well as to raise a special brigade for service in Europe.

Despite these concrete actions to combat the growing international menace, the actual danger to the Canadian Arctic was seen as minimal. “The danger of direct attack upon Canadian territory,” declared Claxton, “was extremely remote ... any attack on North America would be diversionary, designed to panic the people of this continent into putting a disproportionate amount of effort into passive local defence.”

This confidence was based on an assessment of practicality, probability and risk. Claxton explained the factors that were important in determining Canada’s defensive posture. He insisted that consideration must be given to “the geographical position of Canada; the capacity of any possible aggressor to make an attack; the disposition of friendly nations; and what may be called the international climate.”

Based on these criteria, the northern threat was quickly discounted. The government asserted: “We have to discard from any realistic thinking any possibility of an attack by ground forces on the area of Canada either by air or by sea. Anyone who has any knowledge of the terrain of the outlying parts of this country will realize that such an attempt would be worthless and useless and is not likely to be part of any aggressive
plans which may be launched against Canada.” Furthermore, the government emphasized that invading the North “would in no way destroy our war-making potential nor would it have any decisive effect on winning a war on this continent by invasion ... you have only to look at this vast continent to see how formidable such a task is.” R.J. Sutherland likened Canada’s Arctic region to a strategic desert separating the two bastions of polar defence, Alaska and Northern Greenland. He concluded that there was no particular strategic value in the Canadian Arctic itself.

The military assessment was similar. Army appreciations considered the likelihood of enemy airborne attacks as extremely slight because of the difficulties of re-supply and re-embarkation of the attacking force. The official assessment regarding the direct defence of Canada, contained in Defence Scheme No. 3, concluded that as a result of the extremely limited base facilities in Eastern Siberia, the Soviets were not capable of more than isolated airborne operations, none totalling more than a few hundred men. Furthermore, it explained that the lack of fighter escort would make sustained operations impossible. More importantly, the official defence plan identified only Western Alaska and the Aleutian Islands as targets of potential enemy airborne forces. Joint Intelligence Committee assessments clearly remarked that the data available “implies that the Soviet Union cannot land any airborne forces on Canadian territory.”

The marginalization of the North as a potential ‘gateway to invasion’ was further advanced by the Cabinet Defence Committee. It rationalized that “if the Soviets attempted to use a Canadian Arctic station as a bomber base, warning would be received and it was expected that such a base, which would have immense supply problems, could be immobilized rapidly.”

The double-edged nature of establishing facilities in the North was now exploited. Prime Minister King carefully weighed the Governor General’s observation that bases in the Arctic “may become bases from which the enemy himself may operate were they not there.” He subsequently formulated the strategy that “our best defence in the Arctic is the Arctic itself.” Claxton reiterated the belief when he stated: “In working out the doctrine of defence of our north, the fewer airfields we have the fewer airfields we have to defend against the possibility of the enemy using them as stepping stones from which to leapfrog toward our settled areas. Indeed, were it possible the greatest single defence throughout our northland would be the rough nature of the ground and the extent of the territory itself.” General McNaughton agreed with the concept that “ice is something of a defence in itself,” and Lester Pearson quickly dubbed the government’s position the “scorched ice policy.”
In spite of the government’s position on the actual threat to its North, or lack thereof, it still continued to funnel resources into the Arctic. During the period 1945-1956, it increased the number of weather stations in the Arctic; increased arctic research and developed a permanent research facility in Fort Churchill; escalated the number of northern exercises; based the army permanent force establishment on an air portable / air transportable brigade (Mobile Strike Force) with a specific task of countering enemy lodgements in the North; formed the Canadian Rangers to increase northern patrols; and cooperated in the construction, financing and manning of a series of early warning radar networks.\textsuperscript{114}

These actions were not based primarily on security concerns, but were rather part of the government’s active “re-Canadianization” program which was aimed at “keeping the Canadian Arctic Canadian.”\textsuperscript{115} Government reports highlighted the necessity of ensuring effective protection of Canadian sovereignty because of the fear of American penetration. One note from the Privy Council Office remarked that “our experiences since 1943 have indicated the extreme care which we must exercise to preserve Canadian sovereignty in remote areas where Canadians are outnumbered and outranked …. Of much greater concern is the sort of de facto U.S. sovereignty which caused so much trouble in the last war and which might be exercised again.”\textsuperscript{116}

Canadian concern for the North was aptly described by an editorial in \textit{The Canadian Forum}. “We must be certain,” it wrote, “that we defend it [Canada] as much from our ‘friends’ as from our ‘enemies.’”\textsuperscript{117} Action was taken, despite the absence of a legitimate concern for security, because “what we have to fear,” explained Norman Robertson, “is more a lack of confidence in United States as to our security, rather than enemy action …. If we do enough to assure the United States we shall have done a good deal more than a cold assessment of the risk would indicate to be necessary.”\textsuperscript{118} This was the reason for the continuing Canadian focus on its Arctic region.

The immediate post-war concern for the perceived northern Achilles heel eventually began to wane and by the mid 1950s the menace from the Arctic was seen almost exclusively as an air threat. Political and military leaders generally agreed that “the only probable method of attack is by air,”\textsuperscript{119} and “that in the final analysis the task of Canadian defence is defence against aerial attack over the north pole.”\textsuperscript{120} The new assessment provided Canadian politicians with a welcome respite. The emphasis of military activity in the North shifted from a focus on active “defence” to one of simply “surveillance.” Department of National Defence annual reports documented the subtle switch. The stated threat no longer postulated potential surprise
attacks in coordination with a campaign of aerial bombardment of North America. The yearly summaries now narrowly defined the danger as an air threat based on the manned bomber.\textsuperscript{121}

The air threat itself evolved, due to technological advancements, and the manned bomber was seen as being largely replaced by the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). By 1963, Paul Hellyer, the MND, believed “the air threat to North America consists of long range ICBMs, submarine or ship launched intermediate range ballistic missiles and manned bombers.”\textsuperscript{122} The new ICBM threat relegated the Arctic’s importance simply to one of strategic depth. General Charles Foulkes explained this new reality meant that “we will have to rely on the deterrent and retaliatory effect of the U.S. strategic [nuclear] force. So that with the passing of the bomber, the Canadian contribution to the defence of North America will be greatly diminished and the importance of Canadian air space and territory ... will be seriously reduced.”\textsuperscript{123}

As prophesied, the American interest in the Canadian North declined dramatically during this period. Not surprisingly, as the threat of American encroachment in the Arctic disappeared, so did the Canadian interest. The navy gradually stopped its northern cruises in the summer. Surveillance flights were pared down. Army exercises ceased. Furthermore, the radio system, as well as the Alaska Highway, was turned over to civil departments of the government. Finally, the Canadian Rangers were allowed to languish.\textsuperscript{124}

The lack of concern was further evidenced in the 1964 White Paper. It did not include a single reference to the Arctic. This is not surprising and would seem logical in accordance with strategist Colin Gray’s observation that “since the mid-1960s there has been no military incentive to urge the Canadian Forces to be active in the North. Reference to ‘foreign incursions,’ let alone ‘lodgements,’ should be treated with the contempt they merit.”\textsuperscript{125} But Gray missed the point. “Military incentive” was never the motive.

Another perceived American challenge underlined this. In 1969, the Americans announced that the supertanker Manhattan, belonging to the Humble Oil Company, intended to conduct a voyage through the Northwest Passage as part of an experiment to study the feasibility of transporting Alaskan crude oil through the northern waters year-round. The Americans did not seek Canadian permission. They considered the Northwest Passage international waters. The Canadians, however, fervently asserted that the Passage was strictly territorial waters. As a result, the Manhattan incident sparked another frenzy of politically directed military activity in the North.
Maxwell Cohen captured the essence of the challenge. “Manhattan’s two voyages,” he wrote, “made Canadians feel that they were on the edge of another American steal of Canadian resources and rights which had to be dealt with at once by firm governmental action.”

This action included increased activity in the North. The military was once again given the principal role of protecting Canadian authority in the Arctic. “Our first priority in our defence policy,” asserted Prime Minister Trudeau, “is the protection of Canadian sovereignty.” This affirmation was later followed by the External Affairs Minister’s admission that the future role of Canadian forces would be “in the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines in the interests of protecting our sovereignty.”

Changes were rapidly implemented. Year-round training of soldiers in the North was re-introduced in March 1970. The following month a new permanent northern headquarters, to coordinate military activities in the North, was established in Yellowknife. Furthermore, a new defence White Paper, tabled in 1971, emphasized sovereignty protection as the prime commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces. The government cleverly used the requirement to bolster its ability to defend its territory and sovereignty in the North to help explain the withdrawal of half of its forces from NATO Europe.

Critics viewed the “whole emphasis on the North” as a sham and one editoralist wrote that “while Pierre Trudeau didn’t invent the Arctic, he
certainly seems determined to re-discover and exploit it for political purposes." The crux of the accusation was appropriate. The White Paper emphasized the perennial distress over American encroachment instead of any concern over security. Military threat was never a serious issue. The NDHQ Directorate of Strategic Planning insisted that “apart from the threat of aerospace attack on North America, which can be discounted as an act of rational policy, Canada's geographic isolation effectively defends her against attack with conventional land or maritime forces.” Predictably, once the storm over the Manhattan incident died away, and the cuts to the Canadian Forces in Europe had been implemented, the emphasis on Arctic sovereignty was allowed to dissipate.

Concern for the Arctic ebbed with the tide and generated little interest until the Americans triggered hypersensitive nationalist sentiments once again in 1985. The announcement, with no accompanying request, of the impending voyage through the Northwest Passage of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Polar Sea incited a shrill cry for protection of Canadian sovereignty. The military was once again mobilized to meet the non-military threat to its North. The Canadian Strategic Review 1985-1986 noted that the government’s decision “to underscore Canadian sovereignty in the north with an increased air and naval presence was reminiscent of the steps taken by the Trudeau government during the late 1960s and early 1970s.” Melvin Conant linked the Polar Sea moving through Canadian waters to the “political receptivity of an increased defense effort.”

The magnified emphasis on defence was subsequently highlighted in the 1987 White Paper, Challenge and Commitment. Like its predecessor, the White Paper established as “its first priority the protection and furtherance of Canada’s sovereignty as a nation.” It stated: “After the defence of the country itself, there is no issue more important to any nation than the protection of its sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is the very essence of nationhood.”

The government initiatives included the North American Air Defence Modernization Program, a proposed new Northern (Army) Training Centre, the designation of five northern airfields as Forward Operating Locations, the construction of the Polar 8 icebreaker, and a new fleet of nuclear submarines. These programs were rooted in a response to a perceived challenge to sovereignty and not as a result of a concern for security. The White Paper commented that technology had nullified the Arctic Ocean as an historic buffer between the superpowers and had made the Arctic more accessible. “Canadians cannot ignore,” it stated, “that what was once a buffer
could become a battleground.” But the underlying motive was explained by Perrin Beatty, the Minister of National Defence. “Our sovereignty in the Arctic,” he admitted, “cannot be complete if we remain dependent on allies for knowledge of possible hostile activities in our waters, under our ice and for preventing such activities.” This concern was used to justify the cost of a fleet of submarines. It was not in response to the belief in a potential Arctic battleground. This point of view is shared by Canadian military strategists who “have privately mused that ... it seems safe to assume the threat of attack on or through the ice of the Arctic Ocean against Canada is indeed negligible.” Joseph Jockel asserted that “it is important not to overrate the importance of Canadian Arctic waters .... To the north, there are very substantial limitations to the firing positions SLCM-carrying submarines could take up.” Jockel underscored the true stimulus behind the government programs when he remarked that “the Canadian emphasis on sovereignty protection places a premium on the presence of Canadians, rather than on the fulfilment of a defence mission.”

Fiscal realities and the end of the Cold War quickly dampened the latest surge of interest in the Arctic. Many of the programs proposed, such as the fleet of nuclear submarines, the northern training centre and the Polar 8 icebreaker, were never implemented. However, the emphasis on sovereignty did not wane. The 1994 Defence White Paper echoed the sentiments of its predecessors and emphasized sovereignty as a vital attribute of a nation-state. This was reinforced in DND’s Defence Planning Guidance documents which reiterated that although Canada faces no direct military threat, it must have the ability to protect its sovereignty.

The Arctic was never seen as a gateway to invasion. Prior to the Second World War there was little focus on the North. With the exception of a few far-sighted individuals who envisioned the importance of a transpolar air route to Asia and Europe, as well as the national value of a network of northern airfields and communications sites, most considered the Arctic nothing more than a frozen wasteland. The question of the North being a security risk was never considered.

The war changed the Canadian apathy toward its Arctic region. The spectre of a Japanese or Nazi-occupied Siberia, from which attacks could be launched against North America, stimulated a new American focus on Alaska. The American mobilization to protect its northern-most frontier spilled into Canada and shocked Canadian politicians. American energy and resources quickly transformed the Canadian North into a hive of activity. Unfortunately, the Americans placed little weight on the formalities of
ownership and executed their tasks with a single-mindedness that raised the concern that the long neglected North was under de facto United States control. For Prime Minister King the apparent loss of autonomy and independence was intolerable and action was quickly taken to “re-Canadianize the Canadian Arctic.”

Canadians quickly realized that when it came to the defence of North America, the technological advancements of aircraft and weapon systems, as well as the reality of geography, made Canada and the United States a single strategic unit. Furthermore, it was evident that any American concern for security became a real danger for Canada. It was well understood that if Canada failed to take the appropriate action to ensure its frontiers were safe from any hostile action that could endanger the United States, the Americans would do so unilaterally. As a result, in an effort to maintain control and sovereignty over the North, the Canadian government undertook an energetic and costly program to halt American penetration. The motive was strictly one of sovereignty. Security was never the over-riding issue.

The theme of sovereignty over security, as the catalyst of government concern for the Canadian Arctic, was replayed consistently during the post-war era. A decline in activity and interest in the North by the Americans was always paralleled by a reduction in the Canadian effort. However, the Canadian focus was always quickly energized by the appearance of any American challenges, such as the voyages of the Manhattan in 1969 and the Polar Sea in 1985. In both cases, shrill cries lamenting the loss of sovereignty in the North triggered visceral public debate. Equally, in both cases the government quickly reverted to its default setting and responded by increasing military activity in the North. The use of the military was a symbolic and very effective tool to reinforce its sovereignty. But the Canadian Forces were used to provide a presence, as an exhibition of control and ownership of the North, rather than to perform any real military mission.

The North was never seen by Canadian authorities as a gateway to invasion. Instead, Canada’s location was often viewed as a curse. Canada was sandwiched between two rival superpowers and as the weaker ally of a more powerful, and at times paranoid, neighbour, it had little option but to ensure it took the necessary action to placate the security concerns of the United States, regardless of its own best interests. In the process Canadians became more concerned with defending their North from their close ally than they were from any perceived threat of invasion. To the Canadian government it has always been a question of sovereignty, not security.
Notes


1 Canada, Canada’s Territorial Air Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1985), 35.

2 Kenneth Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North, 1947-87," Arctic 40/4 (December 1987), 293.

3 Trevor Lloyd, “Aviation in Arctic North America and Greenland,” The Polar Record 5/35-36 (January-July 1948), 164; and John Swettenham, McNaughton vol. 1 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), 210-214. In 1941, this established network of radio stations and air fields proved invaluable to provide communications for the many defence projects which were quickly undertaken. See also Shelagh D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security? (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988), 15. The cost of the radio stations was shared between the Department of the Interior and Defence.


5 C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and Positions Past and Present (Toronto: Ryerson, 1940), 247. It was quickly noted that “On the maps of tomorrow’s air age Canada holds a strategic position that can shape our future as a world power...In practise every plane from Europe or Asia reaching the United States by great circle courses will cross the Dominion.” Trevor Lloyd, “Canada: Mainstreet of the Air,” Maclean’s, 3 April 1943, 34.


8 Stacey, Arms Men and Governments, 380. See also Debates, 15 October 1937-30 July 1938, 135.


10 Debates, 16 May 1938, 3179.

11 Debates, 24 March 1938, 1644.


13 Debates, 24 March 1938, 1650, and 26 April 1938, 3236-3237.


15 “CGS Appreciation of Military Situation, February 1941,” Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), file 112.3M2 (D496).

16 Joint Staff Committee, DND, 5 September 1936 (Army Records), as quoted

17 Charles Foulkes, “Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age,” *Behind the Headlines* 21/1 (May 1961), 1. Stacey supported this claim. He noted, “All Canada’s pre-war defence planning was implicitly conditioned by the knowledge that Canadian territory was protected by geography and the naval power of the United Kingdom and the United States. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 130.


21 Monica Curtis, ed., *Documents on International Affairs 1938 – Vol. 1* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 416. See also Canadian Annual Review of Politics & Public Affairs, 1937-1938, 141; and Debates, 12 February 1947, 346. FDR’s speech was made in Kingston, Ontario on 18 August 1938. There was a degree of pragmatism involved. It has been well established that “the American Army has always taken the position that an attack on Canada is equivalent to an attack on the United States. For it is axiomatic that such an invasion... would merely be the prelude to an assault on the industrial heart of this country.” Edgar P. Dean, “Canada’s New Defence Program,” *Foreign Affairs* 19/1 (October 1940), 236.

22 Debates, 12 February 1947, 346. The reliance on American protection led King to retort in Parliament, “The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada...is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours...” *Debates*, 24 May 1938, 3179. This is not to say that some alarmists did not raise the issue. The advances in aircraft technology and the development of transpolar routes raised the concern of aerial bombardment. It was postulated that industrial centres in Canada could conceivably be attacked from Europe by aircraft using the Arctic routes. These concerns; however, were largely ignored. See Debates, 13 February 1939, 861-871; Flight Lt. A. Carter, “It Can be Done,” *CDQ* 16 (October 1938-July 1939), 54-58; and E.L. H-W, “The Trend of Air Power,” *The Royal Air Force Journal* 10/1 (January 1939), 1-6.


26 Conn, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, 392. Alaska was described as, “Not exactly a soft under belly but rather the big toe an enemy can stand on while he slugs you.” M. Young, “Defence Dilemma on North Frontier,” *Saturday Night*, 13 October 1951, 28.

27 Potter, *Alaska Under Arms*, 35-36. On 13, Potter noted that it took less than four hours to fly, in a bomber, from the southern Alaskan bases to Seattle.


30 E.R. Yarham, “The Alaska Highway,” *Royal United Services Institute 87/547* (August 1942), 227. This was reflected by the concern shown by the Minister of Parliament for Cariboo in Question Period following the initial announce-
ments of Japanese occupation of some islands in the Aleutians. He stated, “there will be much uneasiness in British Columbia, Alberta and other parts of Canada....” Debates, 11 June 1942, 3257.


32 “An Appreciation of the Military World Situation with Particular Regard to its Effect on Canada,” (as of 31 July 1942), completed by the General Staff (GS), 4 August 1942, 7, National Archives of Canada (hereafter NA), Ralston Papers, MG 27, III B11 37.


34 “Appreciation Re Air Landing Troops,” 24 January 1942, 2. DH112.3M2 (D232).

35 Stacey, Six Years of War, 174-175. At its peak in June 1943, the Army attained a strength of 34,316 men on the West Coast. See also Perras, “Aleutian Interlude,” 3-4.

36 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 91.

37 Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, The U.S. Army in World War II. Special Studies. Military Relationships Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959), 199. The United States military strength in Northwest Canada in late 1942 exceeded 15,000, and in the next year, when some of the troops had been replaced by civilian workers, U.S. civilians alone exceeded that figure.

38 The Ogdenburg agreement (18 August 1940) was a result of discussions, relating to the mutual problems of defence, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King. King stated, “The common approach of the govern-ments of Canada and the United States to the problems of North American defence was formally recognized in the Ogdenburg agreement.” Debates, 10 May 1943, 2504. The PJBD consisted of “four or five members from each country, most of them from the services.” See J.W. Pickersgill, and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1960), 137-142; and Dziuban, Military Relationships, 22-30. See also “Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence – Twenty-Fifth Anniversary,” External Affairs 17/9, September 1965, 384-388; and H.L. Keenleyside, “The Canadian-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of Defence, 1940-1945,” Behind the Scenes 16/1 (Winter 1960-61), 51-75. In regard to the North-West Staging Route, Howe described it as, “One of Canada’s most important airways...composed of a chain of main aerodromes, with intermediary fields, extending form Edmonton to Alaska.” Debates, 28 February 1944. A northeastern staging route, code named Crimson, was also developed which was used to ferry aircraft and supplies to Europe via northern Canada (The Pas, Churchill, Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay, Northern Quebec), Labrador and Greenland. See Conn, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, 399-403; and Dziuban, Military Relationships, 130-133.

well as a perceived lack of faith and loyalty) caused Prime Minister Winston Churchill to initially look upon the Ogdensburg Agreement in an unfavourable light. This was reflected in an uncomplimentary telegram to King. See Pickersgill, Record vol. 1, 139-143; and Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 312.

40 Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 46.


43 Stefansson, “Routes to Alaska,” 868.

44 DCER 9, 1942-1943, 1175.

45 DCER 9, 1942-43, 1183. The author, H.L. Keenleyside noted, “I do not like the idea of Canada allowing the U.S. to construct a highway on Canadian territory (thereby acquiring a moral if not a legal right to its continued use, at will, in peace or war).

46 DCER 9, 1942-43, 1183. See also Keenleyside, “Canadian-U.S. Permanent Joint Board of Defence,” 54-55.

47 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 383.

48 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 348; and Dziuban, Military Relationships, 220-221.

49 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 348; Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 74-78; and Dziuban, Military Relationships, 41.

50 Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 76.

51 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 383.

52 Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 123.

53 Mackenzie King Diaries, Queen’s University Archives (QA), File (Microfiche) T172 (21 March 1942).

54 Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 82-86; O.B. Hopkins, “The ‘CANOL’ Project,” Canadian Geographical Journal 27/5 (November 1943), 241; Cohen, Forgotten War vol. 1, 34-38; and W.O. Kupech, “The Wells and CANOL: A Visit after 25 Years,” Canadian Geographical Journal (1968), 137-139. The eventual price tag for the project was $134,000,000.00.

55 Coates and Morrison, Alaska Highway, 36. See also Dziuban, Military Relationships, 229; and Cohen, Forgotten War vol. 2, 30.

56 Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 219.

57 Donald Creighton, The Forked Road (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976), 73. See also D. Grant, “CANOL – A Ghost From the Past,” Alternatives 9/2 (Spring 1980), 23.


60 Massey, What’s Past is Prologue, 372. Creighton commented, “All too often they behaved as if they were on their own soil, or on a separate but tributary and submissive part of the Empire of the United States...” Creighton, 73. Stacey noted, “Canadian officials were often troubled by a tendency on the part of Americans to disregard Canadian sovereignty. American officers and officials...were sometimes as little disposed to worry about respecting Canadian national rights...and acted as if they were on their own soil.” Arms, Men and Governments, 385.

61 Stacey, Six Years of War, 145-183. Lieutenant-General Pope stated, “The threat to Canada was less than minor, and insignificant as it was, it was creat-
ed almost entirely by the overwrought imagination of too many of our otherwise sane and sensible people." *Soldiers and Politicians*, 180, 219. See also Nils Orvik, *Canada’s Northern Security: The Eastern Dimension* (Kingston: Queen’s University, 1982), 2.

62 Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict* vol. 2, 362. Trevor Lloyd, assigned to the Wartime Information Board, reported that it was apparent that the Americans were far advanced in their study of the Canadian Arctic. He noted that the American Army “was deeply entrenched in the north and that they have first class research facilities and an Arctic information centre.” He added, “We have nothing.” Grant, *Sovereignty or Security?*, 122. Norman Robertson exclaimed, “The American presence had been allowed to grow in a fit of absence of mind” and he recommended that “a good, competent Canadian staff would have to be sent to the area, capable of collaborating with and controlling American development activities.” J.L. Granatstein, *Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 322.


64 Pickersgill, *Record* vol 1, 396.

65 Mackenzie King Diaries, QA, file T172 (18 March 1942).

66 Massey, *What’s Past is Prologue*, 396. Minutes from the Cabinet War Committee meeting on 7 April 1943 record, “It was feared that despite these agreements the United States, after the war, might seek to base an equitable claim to special concessions upon these large expenditures in Canada. *DCER* 9, 1942-43, 1259. King also noted a similar conversation with Malcolm MacDonald in his diary. He wrote, “I said we’re going to have a hard time after the war to prevent the U.S. attempting control of some situations. He [MacDonald] said already they speak jokingly of their men as an army of occupation.” Mackenzie King Diaries, 29 March 1943.

67 Massey, *What’s Past is Prologue*, 396.

68 Pickersgill, *Record* vol 1, 644.

69 *DCER* 18, 1952, 1201.

70 “Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic in Relation to Joint Defence Undertakings,” 29 May 1946, DHH 112.3M2 (D213).

71 *Debates*, 10 May 1943, 2504. The commissioner, Brigadier W.W. Foster, reported directly to the War Cabinet Committee. See also Grant, “CANOL,” 24.

72 Prime Minister King stated, “To carry out joint plans for the defence of this continent, and to facilitate the transportation of war materials to fighting fronts, the Canadian government has agreed to the stationing of United States military units at certain places on Canadian territory...It is not contemplated that the contributions which the United States is thus making to the common defence will give that country any continuing rights in Canada after the conclusion of war.” *Debates*, 29 January 1943, 20-21.

73 Grant, *Sovereignty or Security?*, 132; Conn, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, 403-404; and Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 381.

74 *Debates*, 1 July 1938, 4527.

75 *DCER* 11, 1944-45, 1570. See also L.B. Pearson, “Canada Looks ‘Down North,’” *Foreign Affairs* 24/4 (July 1946), 641-643. In 1969, SCEAND reiterated the importance of “paying your own way” and denounced the “free ride theory.” The committee was convinced that Canada must be prepared to incur reasonable expenditures for its own defence in order to maintain its independence and freedom of action as a nation, and to ensure that Canadian interests are taken into account when continental defence measures are being taken. Cited in E.J. Dosman, ed.,
The Arctic in Question (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 90.

76 Morton, Canada and War, 156.

77 DCER 11, 1944-45, 1570. Defence analyst R.J. Sutherland echoed those same observations seventeen years later when he observed, “Canada must not become through military weakness or otherwise a direct threat to American security. If this were to happen, Canada’s right to existence as an independent nation would be placed in jeopardy.” “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal 17/3 (Summer 1962), 202. A group of twenty influential Canadians (politicians, scholars, bureaucrats) reached this same conclusion in July 1940. They wrote A Program of Immediate Canadian Action, which stated in part, “A United States bent on large-scale preparations for its own defence and that of the hemisphere would be determined to take adequate measures wherever they might be needed. If concerned about the inadequacy of the meagre Canadian defences, it might and probably would insist on acting to augment them. Canada would have to co-operate voluntarily or involuntarily.” Cited in Dziuban, Military Relationships, 18.

78 Swettenham, McNaughton vol.1, 176.


80 Pickersgill, Record vol. 1, 203.

81 Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 156.

82 USAAF Study on Problems of Joint Defence in the Arctic, 29 October 1946, quoted in Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 302-311.

83 DCER 11, 1944-45, 1535.


85 The new perceived vulnerability was the result of “the principal advancements in the science of war,” namely, “The increased range of application of destructive power and armed forces resulting from the development of modern aircraft, amphibious technique, guided missiles, and advancement in technique of submarine warfare, as well as the increased destructive capacity of weapons such as the atomic bomb, rockets, and instruments of biological warfare.” DCER 12, 1946, 1617-1618.

86 During the 1947 May Day flyover of Red Square, the Russians revealed that they now had bombers (copied from an American B-29 that made an emergency landing in the U.S.S.R. during the war) capable of striking the United States. J.T. Jockel, “The Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee and Continental Air Defence, 1946,” Canadian Historical Review 64 (1983), 352, 355. See also House of Commons Debates Official Report – The Defence Programme, 5 February 1951, 1.

GATEWAY TO INVASION

Canadian Military History 2/2 (Autumn 1993), 76.

88 Maloney, “Mobile Striking Force,” 76. See also “If the Russians Attack Canada,” Maclean’s, 15 June 1951, 8-9, 68.

89 See Ron Purver, “The Arctic in Canadian Security Policy,” in Canada’s International Security Policy 82. Colin Gray also stated, “There is no doubt that in the late 1940’s Canadian-United States differences over the scale of ‘the threat’ were quite considerable.” Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1972), 71. Stacey observed, “Canadian ministers, officials and officers were probably somewhat less disposed than their American opposite numbers to believe that the USSR intended to attack the West...” Canada and the Age of Conflict vol. 2, 406.

90 DCER 14, 1948, 1581.

91 DCER 14, 1948, 1581-1582. A memorandum from the MND to PM, in 1947, reiterated this belief. He wrote, “... war is improbable in the next five or even ten years...” DCER 13 (1947), 1482. Furthermore, Ernest Ropes of the U.S. Department of Commerce stated that Russia’s industrial production would be “insufficient to support a war against the U.S.A. for at least 25 years.” J.W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth (Toronto: New Press, 1970), 50.


93 DCER 11 (1944-45), 1534.


96 “Political Appreciation,” 30 November 1946.

97 Debates, 5 February 1951, 77.

98 Debates, 12 February 1951, 267.

99 Debates, 8 May 1951, 2833. The shrill screams of fear included such manifestations as claims that “We also have no reason to believe that the Russians have not at this time, somewhere in the north, set up camouflaged rocket installations. It is not entirely beyond the realm of possibility;” and “We have no reason to believe they could not send suicide bombing missions, and if they did central Canada would make a beautiful target.” Debates, 8 May 1951, 2834.


101 Eayrs, Peacemaking and Deterrence, 100, 107, 401. See also D.J. Bercuson, True Patriot: The life of Brooke Claxton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 195; and DCER 11, 1944-45, 1583.

102 Debates, 9 July 1947, 5270; and Canada, Canada’s Defence (Ottawa: DND, 1947), 7.

103 Debates, 17 June 1955, 4925. One military officer stated, “In Canada’s northern regions there was no place to go from a military point of view and nothing to do when you got there.” Dosman, Arctic in Question, 23.

104 Debates, 8 May 1951, 2834-2835.

105 Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 209.

106 “Composition of Mobile Striking Force for Defence of Canada,” 3 December 1948; and “Appreciation on the Mobile Striking Force,” 13 May 1949, DHH 112.3M2 (D369).

107 Defence Scheme No. 3 – Major War, Chapter V, “The Direct Defence of
Canada,” 16 September 1948, Appendix A, 2 & 4, DHH 112.3M2 (D10).

“The Employment of the MSF for Reduction of Enemy Lodgements in Canada,” 2 May 1950, DHH 112.3M2 (D400)

DCER 174, 1951, 1249.

Pickersgill, Record vol. 3, 370.

Eayrs, Peacekeeping and Deterrence, 344.

Debates, 15 April 1953, 3920.


The emphasis on air was obvious.

BERND HORN

DCER 10, 1949, 1471.

DCER 18, 1952, 1197-1198. It was noted that “U.S. activities now far surpass those of Canada, and there have been numerous incidents of U.S. military personnel throwing their weight about.” DCER 18 (1952), 1117, 1195-1196. G.W. Smith noted, “a massive and quasi-permanent American presence in the Canadian North such as we have seen during and since World War II could in due course lead, gradually and almost imperceptibly, to such an erosion or disintegration of Canadian sovereignty that the real authority in the region, in fact if not in law would be American.” In R.St.J. Macdonald, ed., The Arctic Frontier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 213. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, during a briefing to Cabinet reiterated the danger of de facto American control as a result of increased American activities in the Arctic which would “present greater risks of misunderstandings, incidents and infringements of Canadian sovereignty.” DCER 19, 1953, 1048.

The Canadian Forum 27/318 (July 1947), 75. Colin Gray claimed that “the only plausible challenger to the writ of Canadian law in the Arctic is Canada’s principal ally, the United States.” Canadian Defence Priorities, 128.

DCER 11, 1944-45, 1535.

Debates, 21 May 1954, 4951. See also Canada, The Defence of Canada (Ottawa: DND, 1955), 2; and Canada, Defence 1959 (Ottawa: DND, 1959), 10. The emphasis on air was obvious.
Proportion of monies, for the different services was broken down as follows: navy – 15.7%; army – 15.7%; air force – 41.4% (remainder spent on mutual aid, research, and other), 6. House of Commons Debates Official Report – The Defence Programme, 20 May 1954.

120 Debates, 17 June 1955, 4925. It was also stated, “we have to discard from any realistic thinking any possibility of an attack by ground forces on the area of Canada either by air or by sea.” The belief was that “any attack on Canada will be in essence part of an attack on the United States,” and it would be part of “a world war, a total war.” Debates, 17 June 1955, 4925, and 24 June 1948, 5783. See also Canada’s Defence Programme 1949-50; Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 271; and A. Brewin, Stand on Guard. The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), 53-54.

121 The change was reflected in the Canadian Defence Programme annual reports. Reports from 1949-1955 spoke of the need to repel “surprise attacks.” In 1956, the wording was changed and reflected the down graded danger. It now stated that forces were required to an ambiguous “deal with possible enemy lodgements.” Another subtle change was the change in focus of the aim of Canada’s defence programme. Wordage changed from “defence of Canada from direct attack” to “provide for the security of Canada.”

122 Statement by the Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, MND, to the Special Committee on Defence, June 27, 1963, 1. See also Canada, Territorial Defence, 5-7; Macdonald, 271-272.

123 Special Committee on Defence – Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 22 October 1963 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1963), 503.

124 Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity,” 296.

125 Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities, 185.

126 Maxwell Cohen, “The Arctic and National Interest,” International Journal 26/1 (Winter 1970-1971), 72. The government tried to place a favourable spin on the event. Both Prime Minister Pierre Eliot Trudeau and External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp stated publicly that they “concurred with the project.” Nevertheless, their approval was never sought and the research information was never shared. See Debates, 15 May 1969, 8721; and Globe and Mail, 18 September 1969, A7. Sharp explained that a large part of the problem lay in Canada’s fear that its claims to the Arctic archipelago and adjacent waters, specifically the Northwest Passage which was disputed by the Americans, may be defeated in an international tribunal. Sharp stated, “the government continued to feel that a blunt declaration of sovereignty would invite a challenge from the United States, a challenge for which Canada, equipped only with legal and historical arguments of less than conclusive force, might be ill-prepared.” Canadian Annual Review for 1970, 350. External Affairs had always candidly noted, “Due to the desolate nature of the areas in question, these claims have little support on the grounds of effective occupation, settlement or development. Thus while Canada’s claims to sovereignty to these regions have not heretofore been seriously challenged, they are at best somewhat tenuous and weak.” DCER 12 (1946), 1556. See also Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 178 & 307; L.C. Green, “Canada and Arctic Sovereignty,” Canadian Bar Review 68/4 (December 1970), 740-775; Globe and Mail, 12 March 1970, A1; and Dosman, Arctic in Question, 34-57.

127 External Affairs 21/6 (June 1969), 253.


130 Canada, *Defence in the 70s*. See also Canada, *Canada's Territorial Air Defence*, 31; and Nils Orvik, *Canadian Defence Policy: Choices and Directions* (Kingston: Queen's University, 1980), 1-2. He felt that the “so-called ‘northern orientation’ in Canadian defence policy was never well defined in terms of defence objective and deployments.” Joel Sokolsky commented, “the general thrust of the Trudeau policies was to de-emphasize collective defence in favour of national sovereignty protection.” *Defending Canada* (New York: Priority Press Publications, 1989), 5.


132 “A Draft Study of the Future International Scene,” 5 April 1968, 4 & 8. DHH 112.11.003 (D3), Box 3.


136 Canada, *Challenge and Commitment – A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: DND, June 1987), II.

137 *Challenge and Commitment*, 23.

138 *Challenge and Commitment*, 55-56. Erik Nielsen (MND 1985) stated, “I want to emphasize the importance of fully exercising sovereignty in our north. The DEW Line has served Canada well, but Canadians do not control it...The North Warning System will be a Canadian-controlled system-operated, maintained and manned by Canadians. Sovereignty in our north will be strengthened and assured for the future.” Debates, 13 March 1985.


140 *Challenge and Commitment*, 6.


142 Honderich, *Arctic Imperative*, 90.


144 Jockel, *Security to the North*, 193. He also stated that “the emphasis on sovereignty protection can pose two long term future problems for the United States. First, Canada can devote its very scarce military resources to presence rather than military mission, knowing that the United States can be counted on, in the final analysis, for defence.”


Calgary Papers

Volume 1 (2007): Canada in Kandahar
Volume 2 (2007): Canadian Defence Policy
Volume 1 (2008): Strategic Studies
Volume 2 (2008): Military Studies and History
Volume 3 (2008): Civil Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan

Occasional Papers

Adam Lajeunesse

Number 2 (2008) Equipment Procurement in Canada and the Civil Military Relationship: Past and Present
Dr. Aaron Plamondon

Number 3 (2009) Censorship, the Canadian News Media and Afghanistan: A Historical Comparison with Case Studies
Dr. Robert Bergen

Forthcoming Occasional Paper

Number 5 (2011) Inuit Art and the Quest for Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty
Dr. Patrick Lennox
ABSTRACT: Climate change is transforming the Arctic. Questions abound about what this will mean for the Canadian Forces, for Canada’s sovereignty position, for northern peoples, and for stability and security in the circumpolar world. Fortunately, Canadians have encountered and debated similar issues in the past. This volume, featuring chapters by established and emerging scholars, offers essential historical analysis on Canadian Arctic security and sovereignty policies and practices since the Second World War. The “lessons learned” lay a solid foundation for future research and historiographical debate in this dynamic field, and should inform Canadian thinking on what is necessary to protect national interests in the twenty-first-century Arctic.