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Internal Orientalism and the Nation-State Order: Turkey, Armenians, and the Writing of History

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Abstract: This essay reads Edward Said's *Orientalism* not only as a history of the idea of the Orient in Europe but as a book of oppositional history that challenges institutions of power and reflects Said's critical project as a future-oriented practice. Said develops his critical theory of history by synthesizing Michel Foucault's determinism and Giambattista Vico's emphasis on human agency in order to argue that, despite great power imbalances, there are always spaces for human agency to remake history, oppose power, and create an alternative future to the status quo. The essay investigates the writing of history in post-Ottoman Turkey by addressing two aspects in *Orientalism*: the first is that the representation of otherness is not only spatial but also temporal, and the second highlights that while otherness is often represented in binary opposites such as West/East, Said speaks of "intra-Oriental spheres" that constitute "internal Orientalism" as a discourse of representation within regions and nation-states. This essay examines how Turkey constructed an internal Orient and the effects this had on the writing of historical accounts of the republic's treatment of Ottoman Armenians, and the ways in which the Armenian genocide denial is framed within an Orientalist discourse..

Keywords: internal Orientalism, temporality, Edward Said, nationalist historiography, Turkey, Armenians, Bernard Lewis

> [T]he very act of doing criticism entails a commitment to the future[.]
>
> Edward W. Said, "The Future of Criticism" 952

I. Orientalism's Beginnings

Edward W. Said reflects on the years preceding 1967 in an interview with Tariq Ali, in which he says that those years for him were "essentially apolitical" ("Conversation"). As both an American and an Arab, Said saw himself on the margins of both affiliations while living in the United States. Even though he took part in the Vietnam protests, he was put off by how the protestors avoided confronting the politics of the Middle East. To many in the US, he says, the Middle East was "an inconvenient" topic that the public did not want to engage with. The year 1967—when Israel invaded and occupied the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip from Palestine, the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt—was a turning point for Said. He recalls: "I was completely shattered. The world as I have understood it and knew it, completely ended at that moment." By the time the student protests started in 1968, Said had begun affiliating with the Palestinian resistance movement. He had thought of himself as an American with a "WASP education" and remarks that he had been in the US for fifteen years, and only after 1967 had he started to encounter other Arabs in America. Said did not see Arabs in English literary circles for the simple reason, Said recalls, that "all of them studied Middle Eastern things, and I had to do very little with them" ("Conversation").

Said used the musical metaphor of counterpoint to read literary texts as well as to understand political causes. When he tried to locate the Middle East in the anti-Vietnam War campaigns and Palestinian resistance in the midst of the student protests, he was moving "beyond insularity and provincialism . . . to see several cultures and literatures together, *contrapuntally*" (Said, *Culture* 43; emphasis added). It was the absence and misrepresentation of the Arab and the Palestinian that initiated his beginnings in politics and were the precursors for *Orientalism*. When Ali asked Said if *Orientalism* came out of his post-1967 political commitment, Said replied affirmatively and laid down his methodology centred on the question of history:

> So that is what I did in the first few years of my political engagement, was to write, to expose, and to contrast what I took

> to be the reality, or the greater reality, of the lived experience of the Arabs and the Palestinians . . . with what was being written about them and move back into history. . . . At the time when I wrote *The Question of Palestine*, there were no histories of Palestine! I had to reconstruct the history, partly. . . . Well, I had to deconstruct the official history that one saw in the Western press and Western scholarship and somehow try to advance the notion of what our history was, and I did it largely through the optic of what Zionism did to us. That is to say that we were the effect of Zionism, which was not the correct way of doing it but this is all what was available to me at the time. It was at that time that I became much more convinced that the study of literature for example was essentially [a] historical enterprise, not just an aesthetic one. I still believe in the independent role of the aesthetic, but that it could be just aesthetic is simply wrong. And "literature for its own sake," "the kingdom of literature," "the republic of literature" all of that I think is complete nonsense. I think that the historical is what really dominated my thought at that time. ("Conversation")

In this passage Said outlines his own political beginnings with the methodology that dominated much of his writing and activism in the aftermath of 1967.[1] Starting with his early political essays "The Palestinian Experience" and "The Arab Portrayed" and later in *Orientalism*, Said aimed to challenge the misrepresentations of people's realities by situating the colonized in a history that is not defined by colonizers. This concern also grew out of his personal experience; as an Arab-American, he noticed the discrepancy between what he knew and experienced about the Middle East and the way it was represented in mainstream American political, academic, and cultural milieus. Such a realization pushed his critique to move on two parallel tracks: the first moving back into history, by deconstructing one history before reconstructing another; the second rejecting the independence of the aesthetic from its historical and political contexts. This methodology was the guiding approach in *Orientalism* and its sequel, *The Question of Palestine*. While in the former

Said critiques representation by deconstructing the idea of the Orient and brings the political and historical into the aesthetic, in the latter he attempts to construct a history of Palestine—counter to the dominant narrative in Euro-American media and political culture—from the standpoint of the silenced victims of Zionism: the Palestinians.

As Abdirahman Hussein notes, the motif of "beginnings" that Said develops in *Beginnings, Intention, and Method* is an important theoretical and practical problem to understand Said's oeuvre (73). In analyzing and critiquing authors and their work, Said presents us with the question: "What *are* the [author's] privileged terms and the principal aspects of critical awareness today?" (*Beginnings* xii; emphasis in original). I zero in on Said's motif of beginnings to better understand Said's privileged terms in *Orientalism*. I highlight two of Said's choices for the context of this essay. The first is his point of departure in *Orientalism*: he speaks of his critical awareness at the time as what compelled him to embark on writing the text. He does not begin with a chronological history of Orientalism, for example, but rather with an event in his present, the Lebanese Civil War and the massive destruction that was taking place in Beirut. He cites a French journalist who commented on downtown Beirut, saying "it had once seemed to belong to . . . the Orient of Chateaubriand and Nerval" (Thierry Desjardins qtd. in Said, *Orientalism* 1; ellipsis in original). Said then follows with a commentary that summarizes his entire project: "The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences" (Said, *Orientalism* 1). It was Said's present—and the representation of the Arab and Muslim Orients in the aftermath of the 1967 War and in the violent context of the Lebanese Civil War—that led him to trace the history of the idea and invention of the Orient. Said wrote this history with a deep political commitment to the present, and I cannot help drawing the analogy between Said's theory of history and that of Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of History." Said, like Benjamin, rejects history as a practice about the past, seeing it rather in terms of how the present moment invokes the past. A Benjaminian historian

makes a detour through the past, uncovering layers of hegemony and exposing power in accountability to an alternative future.

The second choice I highlight is Said's reference to two authors who are central to understanding *Orientalism*'s main argument that the "Orient was a European invention." First, Said uses Michel Foucault's concept of "discourse" throughout *Orientalism* to frame the systematic way that Europeans "manage[d]—and even produce[d]—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period" (Said, *Orientalism* 3). The second author is Giambattista Vico, whose view of history is centred on human agency: "men make their own history," he writes, thus rejecting a divinely deterministic view of history (5). For Vico, whatever is human-made is also knowable and changeable by humans. Thinking through this Vichian principle, Said understands geographical, cultural, and historical entities, such as the Orient and Occident, as human-made, implying that the process of their making is knowable and their un-making possible (4–5).

Despite their divergence, both Foucault's and Vico's ideas are complementary for Said's theory of history. While Foucault's view of history is deterministic, Vico sees human agency as the ability to challenge power. For Said, Vico imagines a "utopian moment beyond Foucault" (Hussein 129–30).[2] While Foucault explains the severity of the deterministic power of discourse, Vico enables the critic to imagine a different future that might overturn such hegemony. For example, if abstract ideas such as the "West" and the "Orient" are human-made, then their manufacture has a "history and a tradition of thought" that one can probe and trace, as Said demonstrates in *Orientalism* (Said 5). In light of this, I read Said's project in *Orientalism* not as merely writing a history of the idea of the Orient; rather, he carries out the Vichian principle that, just as history is made, it can also be "unmade and re-written" (Said, *Orientalism* xiv). Hussein describes Said's critical methods as "oppositional" in the way they seek to "reverse, subvert, and up-end received wisdom; they are counter-histories written against the grain of self-contained traditions" (296). Said's critical practice is then writing

an oppositional history—narrating the past not only to question power in the present but as a project for an alternative future.

II. The Temporality of *Orientalism*

In *Orientalism*, Said portrays how dichotomous oppositions between unequal parties have produced hegemonic knowledge. Orientalism, Said says, is "a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinctions between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'" (*Orientalism* 2). Yet such a distinction has an important temporal and historical dimension that, I argue, is key to understanding Said's method in *Orientalism*. In reading *Orientalism* as an oppositional history, I utilize Johannes Fabian's work to highlight the temporal dimension in representing difference (Fabian 11–12). "There is no knowledge of the Other which is not also a temporal, historical and political act," argues Fabian in *Time and the Other* (1). Accordingly, I highlight two corresponding central points in *Orientalism* in order to argue that the representation of otherness for Said has a temporal component and not only a spatial one.

First, the construction of the other is one that "vacillates between the West's contempt for the *familiar* and its shivers of delight in—or fear of—*novelty*" (Said, *Orientalism* 59; emphasis added). In this sense, the depiction of the Orient as an "other" has elements of new, unfamiliar, and distanced geographies, temporalities, and peoples, as well as the known, recognizable, and familiar. In other words, Orientalist discourses oscillate between the "novel" and the "original," both of which have a temporal dimension wherein the original is prior to the novel. The "other," according to Said, is an inferior and corrupt version of the self, and not ontologically foreign. This renders the Orientalist discourse a set of repetitive or even recycled practices, and therefore not entirely new (59). The Orient emerges in this deviance rather than in the strange or distant. Islam, for example, Said argues, was imagined by Orientalists as a "fraudulent new version of some previous experience" known to Europeans through Christianity (59). Orientalists therefore access Muslim history along the temporal timeline of Western European history, which is already narrativized as a history of progress. The Orient,

as deviant, becomes a place that must be "corrected, even penalized, for lying outside the boundaries of European society" (67). It must be "corrected," in other words, for being deviant by remaining confined to an inferior past and unable to change, and therefore incapable of graduating to the superior contemporary self.

Second, Orientalist discourse is a complex and multilayered power structure that "separates races, regions, nations, and minds" as a tool of domination. Such separations, as I will demonstrate, are created both between as well as within categories and attempt to construct the superiority of the hegemon over its subordinate (Said, *Orientalism* 57). Yet again such construction is possible only through the creation of a difference in temporality: the "other" is always lagging and lacking in relation to Western Europe's timeline of progress. Fabian understands the production of otherness through temporal concepts:

> Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, modernization (and their cousins, industrialization, urbanization) are all terms whose conceptual content derives, in ways that can be specified, from evolutionary Time. They all have an epistemological dimension apart from whatever ethical, or unethical, intentions they may express. A discourse employing terms such as primitive, savage (but also tribal, traditional, Third World, or whatever euphemism is current) does not think, or observe, or critically study, the "primitive"; it thinks, observes, studies *in terms* of the primitive. *Primitive* being essentially a temporal concept, is a category, not an object, of Western thought. (Fabian 17–18; emphasis in original)

Similar to the "primitive," the "native," and the "savage," the Orient also expanded "further east geographically and further back temporally" (Said, *Orientalism* 120), always as a corrupted version of the linear European timeline. The centrality of temporality in *Orientalism* is evident in Said's discussion of the "dogmas of Orientalism," which he summarizes in four points (300–01). First, Orientalism constructs an "absolute and systematic difference" between a superior West that is rational and developed and an inferior Orient that is temporally

lagging and "underdeveloped" (300–01). Second, it restricts knowledge sources about the Orient to "classical" texts and avoids the Middle East's contemporary realities. Resorting to classical texts to understand contemporary issues assumes that the Orient does not change and that authorized knowledge about it stems from ancient structures that are perpetually replicated, independent of time, place, and current actualities. Third, Orientalism considers the Orient to be eternal and uniform, thereby enabling sweeping and generalized knowledge about it that is subsequently considered to be objective. Authorizing generalized knowledge renders detailed, specific, and contextual examples irrelevant. Fourth, Orientalism considers the Orient as something to be feared or controlled through pacification or domination (300–01). As Said states on the first page of *Orientalism*, the "Orient was almost a European invention" (1)—an invention made possible by trapping it in temporal stasis.

Said's critique of Orientalism looks at not only representations of the Orient but also how Europeans fashioned Europe by creating the Orient as an archetype for deviancy from the European model. Said cites Neys Hay's "idea of Europe," which identifies Europeans ("us") against all non-Europeans ("them") in a way that views Europeans as superior to their inferior Oriental-other (*Orientalism* 7). Said asserts that representation is dynamic—changing according to the West's evolving needs and self-representation—and, more importantly, is created through the hegemonic imagination. The Orient therefore was created for the purpose of self-definition and the domination of "others." Orientalism is "the European idea of the Orient" (16) and "has less to do with the Orient than it does with 'our' world" (12). I take "our" here to mean the hegemonic status quo, be it political, intellectual, cultural, "racial," and/or moral. Yet such demarcations of otherness are flexible and contextual in a way that does not persistently follow national, ethnic, sectarian, or even racial or "civilizational" lines that are defined negatively and in contrast to an assumed hegemonic and superior self (54). Orientalism therefore is the practice of domination and exploitation that uses a lens of representation. It is a dynamic discourse as it does not retain a stable category, a fixed geography, or a monolith that is juxtaposed with

another opposite. As the next section discusses, this discourse of power extends beyond Western European colonialism and the West/Orient binary to include the production of multiple forms of otherness within regions and nation-states, that is, "internal Orientalism."[3]

III. Internal Orientalism

Making a "civilized" self requires the invention of a savage other, yet Said argues that "one big division, as between West and Orient, leads to other smaller ones" within each entity and category (*Orientalism* 57). Given that the invention of otherness is arbitrary (54), and that the division between categories such as West/Orient is destined to produce smaller sub-divisions, it is imperative to examine the shifting borders of the lands of the "barbarians" (54) by looking at internal Orientalism—Orientalisms within Orientalist spaces. Recent scholarship demonstrates that Orientalism does not only occur between geographically distant and large civilizational entities such as the West and the Orient; rather, it also operates within and between categories, nation-states, and regions, such as Western Europe,[4] Eastern Europe, and the Balkans,[5] and within intra-Oriental spaces, such as in China, Israel, and Turkey.[6] In *Orientalism* Said recognizes the multiplicity of Orients, or what he calls the "intra-Oriental spheres," wherein Orients can be "Near," "Far," "familiar," "novel," etc. (58). Within each sphere, internal hierarchies manifest in a "gradation of 'Orients'" (Bakić-Hayden 918). Milica Bakić-Hayden calls this "nesting orientalisms," which she defines as "a pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised" (918). Such gradation positions Asia as more Oriental than Eastern Europe, for instance, but within Eastern Europe, the Balkans represent the Oriental component. The locale of the Orient is also constantly shifting as spaces are Orientalized differently and circumstantially, often through a temporal language. For example, in the construction of the self-image of the West, Eastern Europe was made "backward" (Bakić-Hayden 918). The Balkans, accordingly, were associated in this process with "violence" (attributed mostly to alleged ethnic, racial, and religious attachments), and India was linked with "idealism" or "mysticism," particularly at moments of colonial conquest when the

West was imagining itself as "progressive," "civil" (and secular), and "rational," respectively (917–18).

Colonial conquest invents the "land of the barbarians" through its employment of an Orientalist discourse. This is also the case with nation-states, who like empires employ civilizing missions on the state's hinterland, hence the term internal Orientalism. The invention of otherness is discursive and does not assume a stable designation in reproducing difference, so both external and internal savages may exist, depending on how and where the self demarcates its borders. External and internal could be located predominantly within imperial dominions, between regions (such as West/Orient), between sub-regions (such as Western Europe/Balkans), or within the borders of nation-states, as I discuss in relation to Turkey below.

While the production of an Orientalist discourse is circumstantial and flexible, two persistent tenets of Orientalism are relevant for my discussion in this article. The first relates to how the "Westerner" is put "in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand" (Said, *Orientalism* 7). The second involves the temporality of Orientalism, in which Orientalism as a system of discursive representation denies the complex realities of human societies and the dynamism of human histories. Denying change leads to objectifying and ultimately dehumanizing the "other/s." For example, Said objects to Bernard Lewis' scholarship (which he calls "polemical not scholarly") because Lewis' underlying ideology is that Islam does not change or develop and must be merely studied, watched, and controlled (317).[7]

In this essay I emphasize that Said's approach in *Orientalism* not only critiques representation through sharp distinctions between two opposed geographies and temporalities, the Orient versus the West, but also highlights the complex internal subtleties within categories that Said introduces in his text—subtleties that nation-states overlook due their nationalist ideologies that homogenize populations and deny them a dynamic history. To this end, I turn to a discussion of internal Orientalism by using post-Ottoman Turkey as a privileged example to focus on populations that were made invisible by nationalist projects.

IV. Temporality and Internal Orientalism: The Case of Post-Ottoman Turkey

The Ottoman context of the nineteenth century is an interesting case that demonstrates the operation of Orientalism between as well as within political boundaries because it entails the creation of an internal Orient in an already Orientalized space. In "Ottoman Orientalism," Ussama Makdisi takes up Said's critical methodology by examining the Ottoman rulers' negative representation of the ruled. "In an age of Western-dominated modernity," Makdisi asserts, "every nation creates its own Orient" (768). The Orient in Said's critique is the target of conquest, domination, or even annihilation, and Ottoman Armenians suffered the same predicament in the final years of the Ottoman Empire and later in Turkey. While Said identifies the European representation of the Orient as Orientalism, Makdisi labels the employment of an Orientalist discourse by the Ottoman elites "Ottoman Orientalism," which he defines as "a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by the nineteenth-century age of Ottoman reform that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theatre of backwardness" (769). He details how the Ottomans created their own Orient in the geography and cultures of the Arab Ottoman provinces, similar to how Europeans created the Orient out of non-Western/European colonies. Ottoman Orientalism was a perplexing process since the elites of the empire engaged with European Orientalism by both resisting it and accepting its premise.

Ottomans had mixed and often contradictory attitudes toward the West, oscillating between admiration and resentment. Admiration was a motivation behind the Ottomans' modernization/Westernization policies that started in the first half of the nineteenth century. Their resentment, however, stemmed from adopting Western European models and institutions as an "implicit recognition of European superiority and a corresponding admission of Ottoman failure to maintain its former status on the international arena" (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 218). The European powers' imperial expansion and economic advancement against the shrinking Ottoman Empire with the rise of Christian nationalisms in the Balkan provinces accentuated this resentment. As

I state above, Westernization required the Ottomans to Orientalize their own culture, as long as Orientalism provided a way to depict the "other/s" within the empire and not the Ottoman elites themselves. Edhem Eldem explains that the Ottoman elites used the Arab and the Bedouin to deflect European Orientalism, providing an opportunity for the Ottoman elites to project the Oriental-image on these populations within the empire as a form of internal colonialism, racism, and classism ("Turkish Case" 219).

The Ottoman Empire was imagined within the geography of the Orient (Egypt and the Levant are the obvious examples), yet as Eldem argues, Ottomans or Turks nevertheless held an ambiguous position in Orientalist discourse: they were treated as Orientals yet were separated (or separated themselves) from Semitic and Arab Orientals ("Turkish Case" 219). The Ottoman relationship to Islam is also complex given that the empire was predominantly Muslim, and the notion of a "Muslim threat" (Said, *Orientalism* 75) is a key element in Orientalist discourse. This raises the following question: How did the Ottomans react, internalize, and resist European Orientalism—especially regarding Islam, which was a cultural and political source of state legitimacy at the time? U. Makdisi argues that although Islam distinguished modern Ottomans from Western Europeans, Islam was also part of the Ottoman elite's process of modernization (769). In this sense, Islam signaled the Ottoman Empire's difference from Europe and its commonality with its Muslim subjects. Just as Europe represented the empire's state, populations, and elites as inferior, Makdisi shows how Ottoman elites reflected the same attitudes toward the eastern provinces.

Given this complex relationship to Islam, Ottoman Orientalism did not base its terms of otherness on religion. This is the case because Europeans considered non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire to be similar to them, while predominantly Muslim populations such as Arabs and Kurds (living in the empire's hinterland) were co-religionists in relation to the Ottoman elites. Ottoman Orientalism was articulated not through the otherness of Islam but rather through alternative forms of otherness: as Eldem illustrates, these forms of otherness took hold in the figures of the timeless nomadic Bedouin (*bedevi*) and the time-lagging

savage (*vahşet*); in the ethnic difference of the Arabs and Kurds; in the geographical otherness of the provinces (versus Istanbul); or simply in variations in the way people practiced Islam (Eldem, "Turkish Case").

Following Fabian's formula that knowledge of the "other/s" is always "temporal, historical and political" (1), internal Orientalism in the Republic of Turkey was expressed both temporally and geographically. The republic's founders sought legitimacy for the new state by rendering the Ottoman past a temporal other. Such a process of othering, Eldem explains, took place through reinventing the Ottoman Empire as the *ancien régime* of the republic ("Turkish Case" 221), mirroring the Orientalist grid of representation.[8] While Ottoman Orientalism "was a discourse of empire," Kemalist Orientalism, in its first two decades of the Republic of Turkey, "was a nationalist, historicist discourse" (Szurek, "'Go West'" 112). For Emmanuel Szurek, the Kemalist elites demarcated a chronological dichotomy between East and West within the state.[9] By associating the Ottoman Empire with the past and the Republic of Turkey with the present, Kemalist Orientalism gave primacy to the temporal over the spatial, in which the division, Szurek explains, was constructed between the "old" backward empire versus the "new" civilized Turkey (112). The early republic systematically condemned the Ottoman Empire as belonging to a past that is religious, "corrupt, cosmopolitan, [and] despotic" (Szurek, "'Go West'" 112) in favour of the new, modern, young, and secular Turkish present.

Turkish nationalists' relationship to Islam was different from their Ottoman Orientalist counterparts. The Kemalist republican project of modernity was boldly secular and included religious reformism and criticism of Islam, even going so far as to circulate an atheistic view of society (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 220). Eldem argues that Kemalist Orientalism, as the early form of Turkish republican Orientalism, was more convincing as a discourse than Ottoman Orientalism, because Kemalist Orientalism pursued a bold rupture from the Ottoman past altogether, moving the nation-state of Turkey into modernity (221). The Kemalist reforms therefore were less tolerant than its Ottoman predecessor when it came to accommodating a bridge between the East and West. Furthermore, Kemalist Orientalism was temporally grounded, for it turned every aspect

of Ottoman, Oriental, Muslim, or Arab societies into "the major cause of backwardness and . . . something that had to be eradicated through Turkishness cum Westernization/modernization in order to reach 'the level of contemporary civilization'" (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 221). Islam was a double signifier: on the one hand it was seen as a source of decadence and backwardness (a view adopted from Western Orientalist discourse as part of its othering of the Ottoman past) (Zeydanlioğlu 159), and on the other hand, affiliation with Islam was a racial and ethnic marker to Turkish national identity vis-à-vis the Christian Balkans, as long as one does not confuse the modern and secular Turks with Arabs. The latter signifier—Islam as an ethnic/racial marker—emerged in the context of the rise of nationalisms in the Balkans, in which language, affiliation with the local Orthodox church, and ethnicity were the stock and trade of ethno-sectarian state projects in the region.[10]

While Kemalist Orientalism adopted this negative view of Islam from Western Europe, the geographical distinctions it promoted were an extension of Ottoman Orientalism. It represented Eastern Anatolia, its Kurdish and Arab populations, and what seemed to be Islamic and traditional practices in those areas, as backward and underdeveloped. These regions therefore stood as challenges to the project of modernization—a Westernization process the Kemalists aspired to (Eldem, "Ottoman Empire" 102). Looking at the rise of Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, multiple Ottoman Orientalisms were at play, with their peripheries being not only the Arab provinces but also Anatolia and its populations. However, unlike the majority of the Arab Ottoman periphery, Anatolia was to be reinvented as the heartland in the Turkish nationalist imagination. Anatolia was viewed as the source of authentic Turkish "civilization," but it also became the target for a civilizing, Westernizing mission. Eventually, Anatolia transformed into the Republic of Turkey.

The image of Turks as copies of Westerners did not match the existing reality of the early republic, as many regions and their inhabitants were still in the "'Oriental' stage" of their development, awaiting their "promotion" to modern Turks (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 224). As Anatolia was both an Orient within Turkey and a source of what was

perceived to be authentic Turkish culture, the Kemalist regime confined the Anatolian, Turkish-speaking villagers to the realm of folklore—to an "aesthetic ideal" (Bilsel, "'Our Anatolia'" 245). For example, the Kemalist republic applied to Anatolian women a "mild dose of orientalism" that maintained their distinction from "the abhorred images" of Oriental women in Western European imagery yet marked their difference from Westernized women in urban centres (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 224). Negative Orientalism therefore was reserved for non-Turkish-speakers, such as Bedouins, Arabs, and Kurds, as well as groups such as the uneducated and the religious with whom the Kemalists did not want to be confused in the eyes of Europeans (Eldem, "Turkish Case" 220). Sharing Europe's negative view on the Orient and reflecting it on Turkey's internal "other/s" was to assert Turkey's belonging in the West despite being predominantly Muslim.

So far, my discussion of Kemalist Orientalism assumes a somewhat clear division between the modern and the Oriental within—temporally within Ottoman and Turkish histories and geographically inside the borders of the Republic of Turkey. As I mention above, Orientalist discourses swing between what is novel and what is familiar. In the Kemalist case, representations of the West and the Orient were reproduced in a "binary east-west axiology" (Szurek, "'Go West'" 103). Kemalists mobilized opposites—such as the backwardness of Islam and the enlightenment of the West or the despotism of the Ottoman Empire and the emancipation of the modern Turkish republic—to produce an Orientalist discourse. In this sense, Szurek argues that Kemalist Orientalism was neither a reaction to Western Orientalism nor its internalization, but rather

> [a] flexible set of discursive and representational tropes that helped the elites of the "New Turkey" to define, justify and implement their own domestic agenda according to a process of social refinement through which the progressive, secularist, nationalist camp (the West within) needed to be separated from the reactionary, clerical, Kurdish or backward camp (the Orient within). ("'Go West'" 105)

Such a distinction is not only conceptual and cultural but also geographical and predates the republic. Eldem argues that Ottoman elites envisioned the empire in the second half of the nineteenth century with a "new division" whereby the West within was confined to urban centres, especially Istanbul, and the Orient relegated to the "'wild' East," comprised of the provinces of Anatolia (literally "the east" in Greek) and the Arab provinces (*Ottoman en Orient* 66).

In this sense, Kemalist Orientalism is an example of internal Orientalism, and contrasting the treatment of Armenians and Kurds in Turkey opens up yet another internal Orientalist process. With respect to the space between the Western-within and the Orient-within in the Kemalist self-image, where do Armenians (as Anatolian non-Muslims) and Kurds (as Anatolian Muslims) fit in this divide given their ethno-religious affiliations within the Turkish nationalist matrix? Answering this question would allow a more nuanced understanding of internal Orientalism in Turkey, because the Anatolian "other/s" in Turkey is not only the folkloric Turk but also the Arab, the Kurd, and—usually overlooked—the Armenian Christian. When the Ottoman Empire lost all its European provinces—with the exception of eastern Thrace—after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and following World War I (1914–1918), Anatolia increasingly became the focus for the empire's survival. Erik Zürcher suggests that if European powers had supported an Armenian national independence in Anatolia following the example of the Balkan nation-states, it would have threatened the integrity of the empire and the Muslim majority that live in Anatolia. Zürcher also explains that the majority of Turkish nationalists came from the displaced Muslim populations who emigrated from their Balkan homelands in the wake of Christian nationalism in the region (388). For the Turkish nationalist elites, Anatolia—although a foreign land to the majority of them—became a substitute for their lost homelands in the Balkans and the last remaining bastion of empire (388).[11]

Given that most of the founders of the Republic of Turkey, including Mustafa Kemal himself, were born in the European Ottoman provinces and received a European education with a secular outlook, they aimed to establish a nation-state modeled on the Enlightenment

notions of modernity, rationality, secularity, and progress (Zürcher 389; Mann 111). In an effort to bring Anatolia from the Ottoman past to the Turkish present, these founders carried out multiple civilizing missions in the form of erasure: the Europeanization of Anatolian Turks, the annihilation of Armenians and the effacement of their past from the landscape, as well as the removal of Kurds through heavy-handed assimilation and displacement policies to recreate the demographic landscape in the image of Turkey's nationalist founding fathers. These exploits were meant to create a nation-state that is in line with European (primarily French) state-building projects, thus producing a homogeneous population, centralized education system, standardized national language, and unified self-identification.

Kemalist Orientalism, like any other hegemonic ideology of representation, is prescriptive in the very act of seeming descriptive. That is, its process of representation is reproductive in how it both invents the "other/s" in the present and paves the way for them. The representation of Anatolia and its populations as inferior was therefore prescriptive because the Kemalists sought to bring Anatolia up to date, from the ruins of the Ottoman past, through the processes of Europeanization I describe above. Welat Zeydanlioğlu calls this civilizing mission "the white Turkish man's burden," invoking the Anglo-American colonial attitude of the late nineteenth century that depicts the perceived benevolence of white colonial conquest. The Turkish nationalists attempted to civilize Anatolia by Europeanizing state institutions, the education system, and daily cultural practices such as adopting surnames and the Latin alphabet as well as banning head coverings. More importantly, as Zeydanlioğlu notes, "the white Turkish man's burden" was primarily to homogenize, through re-education, Turkey's "other/s"—those marked as rural, tribal, Islamic, ethnic, or otherwise outside the notion of Western European modernity to which the new Turkey aspired (159).

Since 1908, Anatolian populations had faced both systematic and unintended changes to their demographic constitution following a sequence of events: the Armenian massacres in Adana (1909); the loss of the Christian-majority Ottoman provinces of the Balkans and the resulting influx of Balkan Muslim refugees to Anatolia (1912–1913);

the mass annihilation of Armenians during the genocide (1915–1918); the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, whereby 1.3 million Orthodox Christians were forced out of Turkey into Greece and 350,000 Muslims were forced from Greece to Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty (1923) leading to the establishment of the republic; and the forced displacement of the Kurdish populations in the first two decades of the republic, in addition to the many Balkan Muslims who continued to flee to Anatolia after the rise of Christian nationalisms in the Balkans in the early nineteenth century up until the second half of the twentieth century. The demographic effects of such population displacements contributed to the creation of Anatolia as a predominantly Muslim place while the Balkans became increasingly Christian.[12] This demographic shift was in line with the way Mustafa Kemal envisioned the nation-to-be. In many of his speeches preceding the foundation of the republic, he emphasized that being Muslim was the unifying characteristic of the population, rather than being Ottoman or Turkish: "the people whom this Assembly represents, are not only Turks, are not only Çerkes [Circassians], are not only Kurds, and are not only Laz. But it is an intimate collective of all these Muslim elements. . . . *The nation* that we are here to preserve and defend is . . . composed of *various Muslim elements*" (Kemal qtd. in Altınay 19; emphasis added).[13] However, with the establishment of the republic, Kemal and the state elites moved away from the focus on Islam as a unifying factor of the citizenry's diverse populations to an aggressive mono-ethnic Turkification project.[14] After the annihilation of the majority of the Armenians, the Kurdish population was the main challenge facing Kemal's desired population homogeneity in Anatolia, particularly given the Kurdish movement's nationalist aspirations. This makes Armenians and Kurds in the Anatolian east an interesting juxtaposition, especially in the context of internal Orientalism in Turkey. Armenians were denied a place in the new Turkey because, paradoxically, as non-Muslims they could not be Turks. In this way their exclusion was both physical and temporal, from the past as well as the future of Turkey. Kurds, on the other hand, as Muslims, could not be anything but Turks, so they were targeted by violent policies of assimilation and absorbed into the Turkish temporality of progress, conditional

on their assimilation to Turkish modernity. As I outline in my essay "Between Anatolia and the Balkans," the Kemalist elites sought the erasure of both populations but in different ways, based on the supposed *inability* of the Armenians and *unwillingness* of the Kurds to graduate to modern, Europeanized, and secular Turkishness (170).

V. Said and the Work of the Historian-Intellectual

Throughout his writings and activism, Said was concerned about the intellectual's relationship to power, particularly the experts who "validate the government's general line" (*Orientalism* xix). In *Orientalism*, he takes to task historians such as Lewis, whose writing is consistent with the Orientalist formula whereby Islam and Muslims "merely are" (Said, *Orientalism* 317)—that they are without a history that interacts, influences, and is influenced by others. Lewis was a supporter of the Turkish nation-state project, particularly its modernization as Europeanization. He regards Turkey as a success story emerging from Ottoman demise and denies the Armenian genocide in his effort to preserve the image of the Kemalist project as one of progress standing for modernity and secularity. It is noteworthy that Lewis coined the term "clash of civilizations" in a 1990 article titled, in an Orientalist fashion, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." In the article Lewis argues in sweeping generalized terms that "Muslims" are enraged at Western modernity and secularism and explains the presumed conflict in abstract and civilizational binaries: "This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both." Lewis positions Islam—as an abstract concept—in a fourteen-century-long rivalry with another ahistorical and abstract entity, the "Judeo-Christian" West, and the point of contention between the two is secularism. The same modernist and Eurocentric tropes are all too present in Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*: in the preface to the third edition he writes that a major theme of the book is "the emergence of a secular, democratic republic from the Islamic empire" (viii). For Lewis, Turkey was an anomaly in the Muslim world, and this perhaps explains his commitment to reaffirming Turkish nationalist historiography that

excuses Armenian suffering and even makes the genocide a necessity. Let's now look at how Lewis reproduces the Turkish denialist narrative in *The Emergence*. In the first edition of the book, Lewis describes the Armenian massacres as a "holocaust":

> For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, however reluctantly, withdraw, abandoning distant provinces and bringing the Imperial frontier nearer home. But the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia [Anatolia] from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland—and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state. Turkish and Armenian villages, inextricably mixed, had for centuries lived in neighbourly association. Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible holocaust of 1916, when a million and a half Armenians perished. (350)

However, Lewis' position changed with subsequent editions of the book. In the second edition, for instance, Lewis revises the last sentence of the same paragraph by retaining "holocaust" but casting doubt on the numbers and equating the Armenian predicament to that of the Turks: "Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the *terrible holocaust of 1915, when according to some estimates, up to a million and half Armenians perished, as well as an unknown number of Turks*" (356; emphasis added). Finally, the French translation of his book was published with an altered title, *Islam et Laïcité: la naissance de la Turquie moderne* ("Islam and Secularism: The Birth of Modern Turkey") in 1988—a title that reflects Lewis' obsession with secularity within Muslim-majority polities.[15] In the French edition the same paragraph presents yet a third diversion without the word holocaust. He writes that the "struggle . . . ended with the terrible slaughters of 1915, when a million and a half

Armenians perished, according to certain evaluations, as well as an unknown number of Turks" (qtd. in Ternon 242–43).[16]

The second edition of 1965, "reprinted with corrections" (as the copyrights page indicates), presents a revisionist departure from the 1961 edition. In the later edition, the number of Armenian victims gets diluted, presented vaguely and with doubt—the numbers are merely "according to some estimates," and Lewis does not indicate who estimates these numbers, seemingly less interested in sources or accuracy than in polemics and "serv[ing] political interests" (Ternon 243). He changes his narrative without informing his readers of any historical evidence he uses to construct this revision. Additionally, and most importantly, his narrative positions Armenians as a threat to Turks (Ternon 242) and compares Armenian victimhood to Turkish victimhood. Lewis therefore downplays Turkey's power over the largely annihilated Armenians, painting a picture of both Armenians and Turkish civilians dying in the midst of a chaotic military battle. After all, according to Lewis' story, the Armenian movement was "the deadliest of all threats" to the Turks and not the other way around (*The Emergence*, 3rd edition 356).

The ideological assumption that underlies Lewis' strong Kemalist Orientalism makes such a narrative possible. Lewis' history of Anatolia reduces it to a "Turkish homeland" and thus undermines the inconvenient fact that Anatolia has also been a homeland to Armenians, Kurds, and others whose existence in Anatolia predates both the Ottoman state and the arrival of Turkic tribes; in doing so he legitimizes Turkish nationalism (Suny xiv). But more importantly, Lewis' ideological history sees Armenians as a hindrance to Turkish modernity and nation-statehood, rendering their past annihilation inevitable when he writes that the Armenians "stretch[ed] across" the Turkish homeland, and that "to renounce these lands," insinuating that to leave Armenians on it, would have led to the "dissolution of the Turkish [Ottoman] state." Not only is he a genocide denier by rendering its occurrence natural, but he also pronounces a genocidal logic as he positions the survival of the Ottoman state (which he calls anachronistically "Turkish") as pending on the annihilation of Armenians. Perhaps the only thing that Lewis gets right is his claim that the Kemalist regime is a continuation of the

Young Turks movement, the de facto rulers of the empire during the Armenian genocide.

One might think that given Lewis' Orientalist depiction of Islam and Muslims, he would have acknowledged the crimes committed against Ottoman Armenians outright to reinforce the Orientalist European image of the Ottoman Empire that includes descriptions of a "despotic state," the "Terrible Turk," and "backward Islam" (Yavuz 112), or to point the finger at yet another instance of Islamic violence against non-Muslims. However, Lewis' Orientalism is far from simple. For him it is the "fundamentalists" who reject secularism and modernism and use violence to attack the West for these values ("The Roots"). Consequently, modernists, like the founders of Turkey, are secular and rational, and even though they committed atrocities against Armenians—which Lewis calls a "holocaust"—his narrative denies the crime by rendering it inevitable. Had he acknowledged the genocide, he would have had to condemn Turkey, which for him represents the only "secular, democratic republic from an Islamic empire" (*The Emergence*, 3rd edition viii). Lewis' assumption is consistent with classical Orientalist discourse in the way that it is only when a society creates a rupture with Islam that it can separate religion from politics and thus become modern. What Lewis, and those committed to modernity as projects of progress, tend to sideline is that "[m]urderous cleansing is modern," as Michael Mann demonstrates in *The Dark Side of Democracy* (2). What is worth noting here is that while many condemn the Armenian genocide using Orientalist language consistent with the European Orientalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Yavuz 112–13; Laycock 99–143), Lewis' denial is systematic with the Kemalist version of Orientalism analyzed above.

In response to his critics on signing a paid-for petition in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in 1985 against the inclusion of the Armenian genocide in a House of Representatives bill on the National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man (Cheterian 86),[17] Lewis was not concerned with historical accuracy. Rather, Lewis wrote about his worry in a letter to Gérard Chaliand (a French-Armenian political commentator) that the adoption of the resolution would cause

"the disruption of U.S.-Turkish relations" given that Turkey was (and still is) a NATO ally (qtd. in Ternon 241–42).

Lewis' *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* holds same view of history: in it he does not critique or contextualize the hierarchy that the Turkish state created within its citizenry, nor does he mention Turkey's policies of erasure, ranging from annihilation and expulsion to assimilation, in its efforts to modernize and homogenize. Rather, Lewis largely reproduces Turkey's official narratives, echoing its victory over the populations that Turkish nationalists subjugated and erased. Even though he acknowledges some discriminatory practices against non-Muslim Turkish citizens, Lewis' historiography is teleological in that it takes the endpoint as a given to weave a neat narrative that eventually leads to the establishment of a secular republic. His essay "The Roots of Muslim Rage" is symptomatic of the same method, since he presents centuries of Muslim history to explain the inevitable end point of a clash between Islam and the West in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Reading Said's *Orientalism* as "counter-histories" (Hussein 296) allows us to consider nationalist and colonial Orientalist discourses as two sides of the same coin, sharing similar assumptions in historiography: they are founded on ahistorical representation, the silence of selective people and events, and the production of historical amnesia by assuming objective categories that exist outside of human history, from time immemorial.[18] Objectification in Orientalist discourse denies change and thus also history. It occurs in both directions, on the self and the other; however, while the self represents timeless civilizational greatness, destined to triumph, the "other/s" are lagging in time, confined to savagery, and destined to be dominated. On objectification, Said writes:

> there emerged a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe, for instances of economic and sociological theories of development, revolution, cultural personality, national or religious character. (*Orientalism* 7–8)

Reading Said's words above by replacing the word "Orient" with "Europe," or with a nation-state such as Turkey, one sees how the authors of a discourse, be they European or Turkish nationalists, objectify themselves in the same manner as they do their "other/s." In their effort to create a homogeneous population, nationalists and nationalisms reduce the diversity within their populations and deprive the nation-state of its complex and often contradictory histories.

In *Time and the Other*, Fabian connects his analysis of the temporality of othering to Said's project in *Orientalism*. He sees in his and Said's work a common historical dimension in representing the marginal: "we both struggle to restore past experiences, which were buried under layers of 'enculturation' in other societies and languages, to a kind of presence that makes them critically fruitful" (xiii). Examining internal Orientalism invites us to question such layers and frame them within their contextual history in the hope of changing the future experiences of marginal populations. If the critique of Orientalism questions the representation of the colonized by the colonizer, internal Orientalism opens up venues to question "intra-Oriental spheres" (Said, *Orientalism* 58) within nation-states that are assumed or made to be homogeneous, thus complicating the operation of power that manipulates historical and contemporary actualities as we have seen in the case of Turkey. This critical approach becomes important within a nation-state setting because it challenges the presumed equality and "horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 7) that nationalists claim to be foundational to the nation-state.

Given the on-going denial of the genocide by apologetic historians to the Turkish state's position raises the wider question about the responsibilities of historians and public intellectuals: Are we to serve a political agenda of our nation, sect, or tribe at any cost even if it means excusing genocidal regimes and reinforcing structures of racism or should we provide the public with ideas and analysis that would contribute to a critical understanding of the world's complex realities, holding power accountable through critical historical inquiry? Regardless of the intellectual's affiliation, historians should be committed to writing with the principle of "never solidarity before criticism" (Said, *Representations* 32), seeing

the intellectual's position as perpetually oppositional and questioning the assumptions upon which power rests. Said explains:

> This does not mean opposition for opposition's sake. But it does mean asking questions, making distinctions, restoring to memory all those things that tend to be overlooked or walked past in the rush to collective judgment and action. With regard to the consensus on group or national identity it is the intellectual's task to show how the group is not a natural or god-given entity but is a constructed, manufactured, even in some cases invented object, with a history of struggle and conquest behind it, that it is sometimes important to represent. (33)

VI. Conclusion

This essay has traced the beginnings of *Orientalism* as well as its afterlives, demonstrating how the text and its methods of counter-histories help us read other political contexts by detailing the example of post-Ottoman Turkey. I have made a case for reading *Orientalism* as a text of oppositional history that challenges institutions of power, reflecting Said's commitment to criticism as a future-oriented practice. Said's theory of history is twofold. One model of history Said uses is the Foucauldian genealogy that traces the idea of the Orient to expose hegemonic constructions of knowledge that authorized domination over time. The other model, which unfolds in Said's *Beginnings*, is history as a method of critique and an indispensable tool for the intellectual's aspirations for a different future.

Yet the key to understanding *Orientalism* lies also in Said's later work. In the 1993 BBC Reith Lectures (published as *Representations of the Intellectual*), Said expands on his approach to history in *Beginnings*. The second lecture in the series, "Holding Nations and Traditions at Bay," scrutinizes the relationship between the intellectual and national belonging. While acknowledging that "every intellectual today has some certificate of a nationality, a native language and a tradition" ("Holding Nations"), he argues that such affiliation should not commit the intellectual to unconditional loyalty or national patriotism. The intellectual

is always presented with a choice: "either to side with the weaker, the less well represented, the forgotten or ignored, or to side with the more powerful" (Said, *Representations* 32–33). In light of this choice, Said takes to task the cult of expert intellectuals and apologists for state power and colonial enterprises for making sweeping generalizations about people, producing categories that speak for "not only a whole culture but a specific mind-set" (Said, *Representations* 31), and acting upon such opinions in foreign policies, as was the case with the "clash of civilizations" thesis that Lewis and Samuel Huntington propagated in the aftermath of the Cold War (Said, "Clash").

Writing in opposition to the generalizations and misrepresentation of "other/s" is to write "against the grain of self-contained traditions" (Hussein 296) that both colonial and nation-state power authorizes on their "other/s." Said's critical practice entices us to narrate the past not only to hold power accountable in the present but as a commitment for an alternative future. In our introduction to *Edward Said: A Legacy of Emancipation and Representation*, Adel Iskandar and I argue that Said's intellectual and political commitments stand on two concepts, emancipation and representation, where "[a]ll representation affects the ability to achieve emancipation, and every emancipatory project must engage and problematize representation" (16). This is the case because Orientalism is an ideology of power and a practice of exploitation that uses the lens of representation. Since there are always communities, individuals, events, and historical episodes that states render invisible and "minor" to history,[19] the urgency of reading *Orientalism* today as a text of oppositional history is that future critique will be oppositional to today's enshrined power.

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Notes

1 I am here echoing Said's approach to understanding Vico's work by discussing Vico's own beginnings as a writer by looking at his earlier work. See Said's "Vico: Autodidact and Humanist," p. 340.

2 In his intellectual biography of Said, Hussein sees both Foucault and Vico as central to understanding Said's method in *Beginnings*. Given that *Beginnings* is a prelude for *Orientalism*, it is notable that Said also invokes both authors at the outset of *Orientalism*.

3 For a critical assessment of the term "internal Orientalism," see Szurek's "Trans-, méta- et post-."

4 Here I am thinking of S. Makdisi's *Making England Western*, in which he argues that the civilizing mission in British colonies was paralleled by a similar mission in the English hinterlands, and the "other" was a fellow European.

5 On Eastern Europe, see Nowicka's "*Travelling Theory*," and on the Balkans, see Bakić-Hayden's "Nesting Orientalism."

6 On China, see Schein and Allès. On the representation of "Oriental" Jews in Zionist historiography, see Piterberg. The term "internal orientalism" in relation to Turkey has been employed by Szurek in "'Go West,'" p. 102 and Bakić-Hayden, p. 918.

7 For examples, see Said's discussion on Lewis' scholarship in *Orientalism*, pp. 314–21.

8 See pages 228–61 in Eldem's "The Turkish Case" for visual references of Orientalist depictions of the Ottoman past in early republican Turkey.

9 "Kemalist Orientalism" refers to the practices of internal Orientalism in the early years of the Republic of Turkey when Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) became president of the republic he founded in 1923.

10 See my article "Between Anatolia and the Balkans" for a discussion of how religious belonging became an ethnic marker in Turkey.

11 See also my essay "Between the Balkans and Anatolia," pp. 159–60.

12 For a discussion on the interconnectedness between the predicaments of Muslims in the Balkans and Armenians in Anatolia, and between Kurds and Armenians in Turkey, see my "Between the Balkans and Anatolia."

13 See also Zeydanlioğlu, "'The White Turkish Man's Burden,'" p. 162 for a discussion on the way the Turkish nationalist movement excluded the Kurds after the foundation of the republic. For a discussion on the way affiliation to Islam was the basis for population homogenization in Turkey, see my "Between Anatolia and the Balkans."

14 For Mustafa Kemal, Islam does not mean religion, faith, or dogma. It is rather a unifying factor—an ethnic or racial marker for the population in opposition to the Balkan nationalisms which were Christian based. Simply put, a non-Arab Ottoman Muslim was racialized as a "Turk."

15 Ternon says that Lewis took full responsibility for the translation of the book into French (243–44). In the preface to the 3rd edition of *The Emergence*, Lewis writes that the French publisher changed the title of the book to "Islam and Secularism" and modified "the emergence of modern Turkey" into a subtitle because—the publisher told Lewis—"Islam sells; Turkey doesn't." Lewis comments on the title change, saying that the focus on Islam and secularism "is not inaccurate, since one of the major themes of the book is indeed *the emergence of a secular, democratic republic from an Islamic empire*" (viii; emphasis added).

16 Regarding removing the word "holocaust" and not using genocide in the French edition, according to Ternon, Lewis remarked that it was due to the change in the meaning of both words over thirty years. Ternon comments that while the meaning of "holocaust" changed, "genocide" did not (245–46).

17 The petition was published on 19 May 1985 in both newspapers and signed by academics—mostly historians of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East, and Turkey—but paid for by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. On the home page of its website, this organization identifies its mission as supporting "strong US-Turkey relations through education and advocacy." According to its website, the Armenian question is a cornerstone of its "advocacy" work. A main tab encompassing a large number of genocide denialist literature is accessible through the home page (see *Assembly of Turkish American Associations*).

18 Even when nation-states imagine themselves as modern and progressive, they attribute their superiority and distinction as intrinsic to their long histories.

19 In saying "minor to history" I am invoking the critique of history as a linear sequence of progress that Walter Benjamin articulates in "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (Thesis III), in which he opposes distinguishing between major and minor events of history.

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