In(ter)secting the Animal in
David Malouf’s *Remembering Babylon*
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By nature I mean that problematical thing called human nature, which I find difficult to dissociate from animal nature.
—David Malouf, interview with Paul Kavanagh (249)

There is a symbolic moment early in David Malouf’s *Remembering Babylon* (1993) when the nearly-naked Gemmy Fairley, the prodigal ‘whitefella’ who has grown up amidst mid-nineteenth century Australian Aborigines, tries to bridge a communication gap with the white villagers of a Queensland settlement and strips off the meagre strip of cloth tied at his waist. Gemmy can offer no more than a generally incoherent babble, and that strip of cloth, itself the remains of a jacket, is the only “proof of what he claimed” (Malouf 3) in his wild biographical gesticulations. It is a key moment because it draws attention to a cultural anxiety that is no secret in the novel: the villagers are all uneasy about Aborigines, “those presences they are unable or unwilling to acknowledge” (Brady 95), and Gemmy is a fundamental problem because “the settlers see themselves as a different species from the Aborigines” (Brady 96). Gemmy’s appearance reveals an uncomfortable truth: colonial subjects can slip into that Aboriginal realm designated by Western imperial-colonialism as the degenerated Other.

Veronica Brady’s reference to *species* highlights another fundamental way of understanding *Remembering Babylon*: this novel is also interrogating the function of ‘animal’ and how a discourse of species institutes a *speciesism* integral to the villagers’ response to Gemmy and aboriginality. As animal studies has effectively shown, there exists a complex and multiplicitous relationship between Western philosophy and what Jacques Derrida calls “the question of the animal” (“Eating Well” 105).¹ This question of the animal is an interrogation of the very boundary that
cordons humans off from “all living things” that man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers” (“Animal” 402; emphasis in original), a separation that has been (and continues to be) particularly effective for denying ‘human’ status to groups subjugated under imperial-colonial-economic power. Alice Brittain, for example, writes of Captain James Cook’s mistaken conclusion in 1852 “that the people of Australia had ‘no idea of traffic’, no acquaintance with or interest in the principles of trade, and that they were by extension without culture or coherent social structure” (qtd. in Brittain, “Australasia” 72–73). Brittain continues by highlighting a devastating assessment whereby Cook “demoted all the aboriginal peoples of Australia to the status of ‘animals’” (Brittain, “Australasia” 72–73). The reduction of aboriginal populations, in Australia and across the globe, to animal status has ensured that “both human genocide and human slavery have been, and in some cases, continue to be, predicated on the categorisation of other peoples as animals” (Tiffin 32), thereby enabling ready exploitation of resources, bodies reduced to animal husbandry and labour.

Gemmy’s nakedness is only one of many instances wherein the question of the animal is raised, a question pertinent to not only Gemmy’s depiction but also the transformations of key villagers who undergo metamorphosis under the aegis of insect swarms. Remembering Babylon’s use of animal in the form of insects enables the “prophetic, half-glimpsed images and opening up of new possibilities” (Brady 94) of becoming—becoming-animal; becoming-insect—that engender alternate ways of thinking through liberal humanist subjectivity, species designation and critical race studies, and our general proximity with the animal.

Gemmy’s nakedness reinforces his aboriginal and animal status while simultaneously violating taxonomic boundaries. Brittain notes the precedent among nakedness, the animal, and aboriginality when she again writes of Captain Cook’s interactions with Australia’s Aborigines: “For Cook, nakedness and a ‘scattered,’ nomadic social structure suggest animality” (“Possession” 1160). Furthermore, the “property unique to animals and what in the final analysis distinguishes them from man,” Derrida writes, “is their being naked without knowing it. Not being naked therefore, not having knowledge of their nudity, in short with-
out consciousness of good and evil.” Derrida explains that “[i]n principle, with the exception of man, no animal has ever thought to dress itself. Clothing would be proper to man, one of the ‘properties’ of man” (“Animal” 373). Having only a tenuous grasp upon English, Gemmy has now apparently discarded a key property of (Western) man: he lacks any self-consciousness about his nakedness and even after he re-wraps the cloth around his waist, chiefly in response to the anxious exhortations of Jim Sweetman, he does so “in an ineffectual manner” (Malouf 14).

It is not only Gemmy’s nakedness that solidifies animal in his earliest introduction: scent also complicates Gemmy’s signification and enhances the settlers’ deep-seated anxiety, chiefly because Gemmy keeps deferring to this animal sense early in the novel. When Gemmy first runs out of the darkness, the “no-man’s land of the swamp” (3) that is the mythical land of wild Aborigines and wild animals, there is a confusion of species boundaries: he is a “wounded waterbird, a brolga, or a human that in the manner of the tales they told one another, all spells and curses, had been changed into a bird, but only halfway, and now, neither one thing nor the other” (2). He perches on a fence to offer his longest English utterance (“Do not shoot … I am a B-b-british object!” (3)) and tumbles onto the settler’s side to “crawl about with his nose in the dust” (Malouf 4). Unable to walk upright effectively because his “joints were swollen and one leg was shorter than the other and a little twisted” (Malouf 8), Gemmy dropped forward and “raised himself on all fours” (Malouf 24) and is then led “about like a dog” (Malouf 34). When he first encounters horse droppings, Gemmy gets “down on all fours and sniffed” (Malouf 29). After his biography is (inaccurately) transcribed by the minister Mr. Frazer and schoolteacher George Abbott, Gemmy “raised the sheets to his nose and sniffed them” (Malouf 20). Gemmy’s actions distress the villagers as they struggle with “the knowledge of something (they would not name it) that could hardly be conceived of in a white man’s thinking, which when the dark recollection of it flickered over his brow, brought it right into the room with you, as a thing you could smell” (Malouf 41). All of these instances echo Gemmy’s earliest encounter with Aborigines when, after being cast ashore onto
the strange Australian continent, the child-Gemmy is struck by the “the smell [Aborigines] gave off … [a]nimal, unfamiliar” (23).

What is profoundly unsettling for the villagers is the conflation of aboriginal with animal in the body of the formerly-civilized colonial subject, a sign of the complex relationships (and denials) intimately connecting federation to feral. In an oft-quoted passage, the villagers look at Gemmy and then at their children and are forced to tackle the difficult question: “Could you lose it? Not just language, but it. It” (Malouf 40). A parallel question is also implied: In losing It, could (or would) you become aboriginal? become animal? In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari pay particular attention to the intimacy and centrality of the animal in cultural history: they write that “the relationships between animals are bound up with the relations between man and animal, man and woman, man and child, man and the elements, man and the physical and microphysical universe” (235). Becoming-animal is then a manifestation of these complex relationships, a shedding of the ‘properties of man’ wherein the point is not “to imitate or identify with something or someone” so much as to “extract particles between which one establishes the relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is becoming, and through which one becomes” (272). Rosi Braidotti contextualizes becoming as the “affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant process of transformation, a flux of multiple becomings” (“Bugs” 113). Becoming-animal is then not literally becoming an animal; it is to be swept up by “a proximity, an indiscernibility that extracts a shared element from the animal” (Deleuze and Guattari 279).

Gemmy is becoming-animal in the sense of a “heterogeneous multiplicity of the living” (Derrida, “Animal” 399) that threatens the integrity of Western liberal humanist subjectivity, something Mr. Frazer alludes to in his personal journals: “Gemmy is a forerunner. He is no longer a white man, or a European, whatever his birth, but a true child of the place as it will one day be, a crude one certainly, unaware of what he has achieved” (Malouf 132). Mr. Frazer intuitions becoming-animal in his mapping of Gemmy’s ontology. It is this epiphany that makes his eventual meeting with the Governor, Sir George, particularly heartbreaking: Sir George
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cares very little for Mr. Frazer’s keen observations. He instead sees “in
grandiloquent terms, all classical allusion and analogy, the names he
has bestowed on a nameless part of empire, the towns he has founded,
the laws laid down” (Malouf 168). Mr. Frazer’s journal entries become
utterly unimportant: “Sir George lost interest in it [and It], and in
Gemmy too. ‘Yes, yes,’ he muttered, ‘an interesting case—they are in-
teresting people’—but a moment later they had leaped to Hesiod and
arrived, before Mr Frazer had quite caught up, at Homer” (168).

Gemmy’s becoming-animal is borne of a molecular identity that
crosses the species boundary, molecular identity chiefly understood as
“weblike interaction and interconnectedness” (Braidotti, “Bugs” 114)
that is made of “capacities and tendencies [that] offer the possibility
for transforming identity and society precisely because they refuse to
follow fixed channels” (Vint 287). Back in the village, the molecular-
ity of becoming-animal means that the villagers see Gemmy as one who
“never became wholly Aboriginal. But neither does Gemmy’s return to
the white settlement ever amount to a real return” (Mikkonen 208).

Gemmy’s becoming-animal, with the apparent loss of It, also “suggests
that the foundation of the white culture has no foundation; it hints
at a certain pre-individual experience in which no foundation is yet
sought or is possible” (Mikkonen 213). This is surely an uncomfort-
able episteme for a community twelve miles distant from Bowen, twelve
miles that “meant that they were only lightly connected to it, and even
more lightly to what it was connected to: the figure in an official uni-
form who had given it his name and the Crown he represented, which
held them all, a whole continent, in its grip” (Malouf 5). Empire, after
all, rested on “drawing lines and making boundaries and on the dis-
 crimination that allowed the colonizers to define themselves as superior”
(Brady 95). But Gemmy’s aboriginal-animal ontology demonstrates that
these demarcations are ripe for violation as the hybrid signals “the end
of clear delineations, a chaotic mixing and miscegenation of categories
that in the process of confusion indicated that their ordering is far from
inevitable” (Graham 54).

Species miscegenation triggers violent attacks upon Gemmy and the
McIvor family. Jock McIvor, the patriarch bearing the responsibility of
housing Gemmy, begins to notice things that “go wrong around the place. None of them was unusual, but that they should happen just now, and that there should be a string of them, was unsettling. Accidents, Jock told himself. Coincidence. He was trying hard to hold on to the normality of things, to resist in himself the wave of panic and suspicion that was running uncontrolled through the settlement” (Malouf 113). Jock becomes upset after “three of Ellen’s geese were found with their throats cut, and the stones of their little yard all alive with greenflies and sticky with blood” (Malouf 113). Three days later, Jock sees Gemmy fleeing from the shed he has been mending: “And there, smeared across, was a stain, a gathering of greenflies that heaped and bubbled, and the air that came to the nostrils rich with its stink. Someone had plastered the place with shit. Someone else—Gemmy he guessed—had tried to clean it off with a handful of grass but had only succeeded in spreading the filth” (115).

Jock is mortified by this abomination and is later furious after he saves Gemmy from a midnight drowning at the hands of a lynch mob, enraged that “in the middle of the night his wife and daughter should be standing out … watching him drag a helpless creature, half out of his wits, back from a moment of senseless bullying, while the men who had done it —neighbors! —were creeping home to crawl in beside their own wives, safe in bed” (Malouf 126).

Although Gemmy eventually retreats to the sanctuary of Mrs. Hutchence, an enigmatic woman whose house is not uncoincidentally located outside town, the McIvors are profoundly altered and Malouf stages key metamorphoses by classifying the question of the animal as a question of the insect. Insects often prove a special challenge; after all, they “are all wrong,” Charlotte Sleigh ironically remarks. “We humans have skeletons; they keep their hard parts on the outside and their squishy bits in the middle. We humans celebrate intelligence as our defining features; they form almost equally complex societies by instinct” (“Inside” 281). Insects typically “preponderate as vectors for disease and psychosis (not to mention straightforward pestiferousness)” (Brown x), vectors tied to the intimate connections between insect ontology and colonialism. In her cogent analysis on this subject, Sleigh writes that in the nineteenth century insects generally hindered “the process of
colonization. At the time of the scramble for Africa there were direct conflicts between the would-be colonists and the insect world” (“Wells” 37), particularly conflicts wrought by mosquitoes and malaria, flies and typhoid fever, and the tsetse fly and sleeping sickness. Insects became the biting embodiment of the challenges facing the imperial-colonial project, whether in the literal transmission of disease or as a metaphor for the indigenous populations who might want to upend and swarm the projects of imperial progress. Since “insects threatened to destroy the empire’s work-force … even more surely than the native’s ‘congenital laziness’” it then necessitated the treatment of “all the native inhabitants of the colonies—insects and humans—as part of the same problem” (Sleigh, “Wells” 38–39). Overall, Europeans “tried to rule colonies where insects and savages joined forces to overrun them; to overtake them by size or numbers” (Sleigh, “Wells” 54).

Insect pestiferousness is readily apparent in those swarming green flies greedily consuming the blood of Ellen’s dead geese, the human excrement smeared across Jock’s shed, or the mosquitoes that invade Sir George’s dinner party to greedily consume the partygoers’ blood. On the other hand, insects in Remembering Babylon do rise above pestiferousness to emerge as gatekeepers to becoming-animal or, more appropriately, the multiplicity of becoming-insect, clearly going against the grain of a culturally inherited insect ontology. Insects are, after all, “zoology’s Other, the definitive organisms of différence” (Sleigh, “Inside” 281) and radical becomings “take place routinely in their own lives … [I]nsect life cycles continually affirm the possibilities of radical difference” (Shaviro 48). It is insects’ “transformative speed as well as an immense power of adaptation [that] is the force that makes [them] the entity most closely related to becoming-molecular” (Braidotti, “Meta(l)morphoses 74). Everything about insects calls forth multiplicity and metamorphosis; thus, if Derrida is correct that “[b]eyond the edge of the so-called human … there is already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living” (“Animal” 399), what can be more multiplicitous than the molecularity of insects and their swarms?

Jock is the first to experience a transformative molecular epiphany mediated by an insect swarm when “[w]ading through waist-high grass,
he was surprised to see all the tips beaded with green, as if some new growth had come into the world that till now he had never seen or heard of” (107). He experiences a communion of multiplicity, a becoming, a non-verbal language borne of the body: he “uses his bodily senses (sight, hearing, touch) to see the reality of the Australian landscape anew … [and] he cannot express it in rational, discursive language, experiencing it instead through his senses” (Doty and Hiltunen 103). Although this becoming initially disturbs him, the new “knowledge he had broken through to … was also exhilarating; for a moment he was entirely happy” (Malouf 107). When he looks closer at this molecular growth in the countryside, he realizes “it was hundreds of wee bright insects, each the size of his little fingernail, metallic, iridescent, and the discovery of them, the new light they brought to the scene, was a lightness in him” (107). He is left standing “dreamily stilled, extending his hand, palm downwards, over the backs of insects, all suspended in their tiny lives in a jewel-like glittering” (107). In that moment of Jock’s becoming, he gleans the heterogeneous potentiality of becoming-insect: “The things he had begun to be aware of, however fresh and innocent, lay outside what was common, or so he thought; certainly, since he could have found no form in which to communicate them, outside words” (108). This becoming-insect then fosters a deeper intimacy with Ellen: he “wanted to know now what her life was beyond what he saw and had taken for granted…. There were times now when the intensity of his looking made her blush” (108–09). Jock later takes Ellen for a walk on the ridge and draws her attention to a flower he had been intently studying. She is struck by “the way he held it, the grace of the bit of a thing in his rough hand, and the attention he gave it, that touched her and made its whiteness come alive. When she looked round the whole slope was shining with it” (109–10), a shining reminiscent of the earlier glittering of insects.

Becoming-insect is particularly useful in unpacking the central metamorphosis of the novel, only this time it is another McIvor: Janet, the young woman, perhaps seeing with the eyes of a child, constantly struggling with the sense that she can become someone new, someone different, someone becoming.⁵ When she picks a scab off her knee, for example, she is amazed
when the hard crust lifted, to discover a colour she had never seen before, and another skin, lustrous as pearl. A delicate pink, it might have belonged to some other creature altogether, and the thought came to her that if all the rough skin of her present self crusted and came off, what would be revealed, shining in sunlight, was this finer being that had somehow been covered up in her. (Malouf 59)

Moments after picking the scab, she walks out into the paddock and feels “the brighter being in her was very gently stirring and shifting its wings” (59). She sees in “a particular vibrancy of light” a world that “shimmered” and “was changed” while “[g]rasshoppers…seemed made of the finest glass, and she too felt fine-spun, toughly transparent” (59). Janet’s becoming-insect reaches its apotheosis while she tends Mrs. Hutchence’s beehives, a colony made of “swarms of the little stingless native bees she [Mrs. Hutchence] kept along with her imported ones” (139). Janet finds contentment with the hive because something “in you slept while you were at it and you woke refreshed, which was just why Janet loved it and why the bees, now, were a necessity to her, as if without them she could never enter into her own thoughts” (Malouf 138).

The importance of bees cannot be understated because “[o]ne bee is no bee, so almost none of the standard western ideas of individuality and autonomy of self have any purchase in the study of bees” (Preston 15). The bees herald “another life, quite independent of their human one, but organised, purposeful, and involving so many complex rituals. She loved the way, while you were dealing with them, you had to submit yourself to their side of things” (Malouf 140). Consequently, Janet transitions towards becoming-insect when a bee swarm is attracted to her menstrual blood, her becoming a woman, becoming-woman: “She just had time to see her hands covered with plushy, alive fur gloves before her whole body crusted over and she was blazingly gathered into the single sound they made, the single mind” (Malouf 142). Much like the earlier scab that had also crusted over, Janet’s body is crusted over with a living multiplicity: “Her own mind closed in on her. She lost all sense of where her feet might be, or her dreamy wrists, or whether she was still
standing, as she had been a moment before, in the shadowy grove, or had been lifted from the face of the earth…. You are our bride, her new and separate mind told her as it drummed and swayed above the earth” (142). Janet tunes her ears to the bees and, in this moment, her mind becomes “their unbodied one and she had been drawn into the process and mystery of things” (143). Species taxonomy collapses amidst the swarming multiplicity of bees and *becoming-insect* as “sensory capabilities [are joined] with an animal communication system to symbolize Janet’s transformation” and metamorphosis (Doty and Hiltunen 103).

Janet’s epiphany is unfortunately interrupted when Mrs. Hutchence coaxes the bees off her, thereby reinstituting a species boundary; yet, just as peeling away the crust on her knee revealed that shiny pink skin underneath, so too is this swarming revelatory: Janet’s body “seemed new to her … she remained a little out of herself” (Malouf 143). She maintains a *becoming-insect* homology when she can see herself not as a “gawky child in pigtails and a faded frock, but a charred stump, all crusted black and bubbling; and she saw it—this, when she met his astounded look, was what convinced her—through Gemmy’s eyes” (144).

It is a moment of multiplicity: in seeing herself through Gemmy’s eyes, she achieves an intimacy with “what is ‘before’ the self, before culture, before even language, to what is unknown and inarticulate” (Brady 100). This metamorphosis, this *becoming-insect*, is resilient: Janet pledges her apian devotion and even as an adult fifty years later she continues the commitment: her mind still drifts “dreamily attendant, beyond tinted glass, to the life of the hive, moving closer now to the spirit of it, to the language they were using, those angelic creatures in their world of pure geometry” (199).

*Remembering Babylon* has been repeatedly (and justifiably) read as a novel pertinent to critical race studies. Penelope Ingram, for example, explains that Gemmy’s importance is not so much his hybridity but his effect upon the *whiteness* of other characters, an effect tied to *becoming-animal*/*becoming-insect* and metamorphosis. The question of the animal or, more specifically, the question of the insect in *Remembering Babylon* enables a broader interrogation of Western liberal humanism, a vital interrogation in our contemporary cultural moment when “that which
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was banished by the Enlightenment in order to constitute the human and human civility—the animal and animalistic—is now being returned as its essence” (Tiffin 32). What Remembering Babylon demonstrates is the web of rhizomatic in(ter)sects that thread imperialism-colonialism, critical race studies, and animal studies. The novel probes the power dynamics behind how human is identified, labelled, earned, and/or bestowed upon others while simultaneously helping “us to reimagine the social categories to which [we] belong or that [we] previously saw as the only possible ones” (Mikkonen 214). Remembering Babylon offers a vision of our intimacy with the animal wherein becoming-animal/becoming–insect multiplicities gleam forth to question the limitations of Western liberal humanism and suggest new ways of thinking about human and the kinships among human and nonhuman animals.

Notes

1 Joan Gordon provides a handy historical overview of animal taxonomies dominating Western thought, touching on Aristotle (“animals lack reason and therefore do not have the same moral status as humans”), René Descartes (“animals [are] organic machines”), Martin Heidegger (“animals [are] ‘poor in the world’ and as clearly separate from human beings”), and “Western monotheistic religion, from Judaism to Islam, [that] emphasizes the superior moral worth of human beings over animals” (332–33). In all these cases, animal is banished, insistently repressed and expelled by Western liberal humanism “in order to constitute the human and human civility” (Tiffin 32). This banished realm of animal, however, is simultaneously constitutive, a living multiplicity lying “at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called ‘the human’” (Wolfe 6).

2 This emphasis on smell hearkens to Wolfe’s analysis of the importance of animal in Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (1929). In Wolfe’s reading of Freud, there exists a fundamental act of “organic repression” whereby [humans] begin to walk upright and rise above life on the ground among blood and feces. These formerly exercised a sexually exciting effect but now, with “the diminuation of the olfactory stimuli,” they seem disgusting, leading in turn to what Freud calls a “cultural trend toward cleanliness” and creating the “sexual repression” that results in “the founding of the family and so to the threshold of human civilization.” (2)

One might read the repeated instances of Gemmy dropping down to the ground to smell the world around him as perhaps a denial of the original Freudian or-
ganic repression that has come to define human, thereby reinforcing Gemmy’s problematic relationship to the ‘properties of man.’

3 Sir George’s collective visions of a Homerian Australia is a molar approach to (national) identity, one “fixed in being, able to be grasped as a whole, recognized within the current social formation” (Vint 287) contra the molecularity of becoming-animal Mr. Frazer unsuccessfully imparts.

4 This scene is also reminiscent of Julia Kristeva’s theories on the abject, notably the function of human excrement as a symbolic communiqué: “[E]xcrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) stand for the danger to identity that comes from without: the ego threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by its outside, life by death” (71). In this instance, the smearing of the shed articulates the threat felt by the molar being of Empire from Gemmy’s molecular/abject becoming-animal. Thus, the community uses the abject faeces as a way both to send a message and to try and symbolically purge the contagion—through Gemmy’s expulsion or death—from their colonial body, a ritual Malouf clearly dismisses since the anxieties reside within the villagers themselves, not Gemmy or the surrounding Aboriginal world.

5 Two other characters are worth noting. Lachlan Beattie is denied any profound epiphany, chiefly because he gradually moves towards a molar identity borne of Empire and colonial mateship. He slowly distances himself from Gemmy in spite of his submerged guilt and when he later visits Mrs. Hutchence, he is profoundly discomforted by the other visitors: Gemmy, Janet, Meg, and even George Abbott. While Mrs. Hutchence’s house serves as a haven for some, it reminds Lachlan of a community that could have been but never can be. It is left to a much older Lachlan to reflect on Gemmy’s influence in his life and the profound effect the man has had upon him, albeit much too late to change his course in life. George Abbott, on the other hand, is afforded a place at Mrs. Hutchence’s table and has a momentary insight into becoming-insect: While he struggles with Australia’s interminable heat and humidity in his one-room schoolhouse, Abbott can feel the “thrumming of his blood was curiously at one with the shimmering, out there, of the landscape and the shrilling of insects, a sound so continuous, so dimly insistent in these late-summer days that it stilled the senses and drew you irresistibly into its own drawn out—” (Malouf 18). This moment is interrupted and there is no further evidence George has another epiphany, but he too demonstrates the potentiality of becoming-insect metamorphosis.

6 The charred stump imagery returns towards the end of the novel. Just before Gemmy leaves the colonial village (and the novel), Malouf writes that “[t]he seasons here were fire, ash, then the explosion out of the blackened earth and charred, unkillable stumps, of springy shoots and loose-folded, sticky little leaves” (183). The unkillable charred stump signals both endurance and new life springing forth, perhaps a new becoming mirrored in Malouf’s descriptions of Janet as a charred stump.
Bees’ angelic quality, a quality mirrored in Janet’s decision to live in an abbey as Sister Monica by the novel’s end, is well-established: Claire Preston explains that “a number of the church fathers—Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Basil and Tertullian—compared Christ’s life to that of the bee” (80) while “belief in apian resurrection … is probably one root of the whole range of theological traditions which associated bees with godliness, immortality, innocence and spirituality” (81).

The stakes in animal studies’ interrogations of the question of the animal are perhaps no more clearly articulated than Cary Wolfe’s summation that so long as a “humanist and speciesist structure of subjectivization remains intact, and as long as it is institutionally taken for granted that it is all right to systematically exploit and kill nonhuman animals simply because of their species, then the humanist discourse of species will always be available for use by some humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social order of whatever species—or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference” (8).

Works Cited


