Always Indigenize!
The Radical Humanities in the Postcolonial Canadian University

LEN FINDLAY

The word itself, "research," is probably one of the dirtiest words in the indigenous world's vocabulary.

LINDA SMITH

Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples

I'm not human. I'm an Indian.

ALPHONSINE, three-year-old daughter of Judge Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, as told by her mother.

This essay is in four parts. The first part deals with the form and force of the exhortation, "always Indigenize!" The second part offers no single solution to the struggle for justice inside and outside universities but instead suggests the doublet, "vision and conspiracy," as a way of taking advantage of millennial dependencies in governments and elite institutions while recognizing that such dependencies exist within neopaternalistic structures designed to be perceived as ethical and inclusive while practising an oppressive and contradictory politics of difference. The third part argues for the radical humanities as a crucial piece of the decolonizing puzzle and offers an example of the kind of critique that non-Indigenous scholars should undertake as one element in their contribution to the Indigenization process. And finally, I turn more particularly to the discipline of English within the grand narrative of English as a world language, a narrative constantly and uncontrollably interrupted and abducted by both native and non-native speak-
ers in familiar as well as exotic settings. Here I argue for a more concertedly activist disciplinarity which will have at its centre new alliances between English literary studies and Indigenous studies. This argument, like the exhortation always to Indigenize, gestures towards rather than guarantees a particular future. In transforming each other through new rapprochements and articulations that both express and connect in strategically contingent ways (Hall 141), academic English and Indigenous studies can help transform the institutions that house them and the publics which fund them, but only if “we” work together to make that happen.

I. Always Indigenize!

In the (human) beginning was the Indigene. This hypothesis is a necessary but inscrutable pretext for the historical and current distribution of our species in diverse groupings across the globe. With oral and written histories of a recoverable past have come difference and conflict, competing versions of residency, conquest, settlement, entitlement, and the limited circulation and decidedly mixed benefits of Indigenous status. It seems fair to say that all communities live as, or in relation to, Indigenes. And so there seems a general warrant for supplementing Fredric Jameson’s famous exhortation, “Always historicize” (9), with always Indigenize. In so Indigenizing, however, we should bear in mind James Chandler’s recent demonstration of how unclear and general Jameson’s urging to historicize is and how divergently it has been interpreted by literary scholars (Chandler 51ff.). And we should also clarify at the outset who the “we” in question are and how they stand in relation to Indigenousness and its increasingly explicit protocols of self-determination and self-representation.

The employment of the English language to express a sentiment like “always Indigenize!” that may have important consequences for Indigenous peoples, in Canada and elsewhere, is neither innocent nor “merely” practical. But the dangers of Anglocentric presumption are perhaps offset somewhat by the form this exhortation takes, specifying no particular addressee, definition, or outcome, but instead promoting participation in
an activity whose nature and consequences will depend on who is listening and how they understand and act upon what they hear or read. It can be understood as an allusive command to include Indigenous issues within the broader and more "developed" project of Western marxism. It can be understood as academic vanguardism playing variations on its own dearest illusions about what it can make happen. Or it can be heard, as I intend it to be heard, as a strategically indeterminate provocation to thought and action on the grounds that there is no hors-Indigène, no geopolitical or psychic setting, no real or imagined terra nullius free from the satisfactions and unsettlements of Indigenous (pre)occupation. The necessity and difficulty of Indigenizing is therefore no global shell game involving entities and essences that come and go according to sleight of hand or mind or cartographic ruse but an overdetermined play of forces and processes that produce particular determinate moments subjected in their turn to contestation and change. Indigenizing today is undertaken in face of the realities and dangers of "aggravated inequality" (Martin), the fact that development's twin continues to be underdevelopment, and the reality that the emergence of a so-called new economy has so far altered little the only too predictable global distribution of poison and prosperity.

Having drawn in a general way on deconstruction for some of my comments so far on Indigenizing, let me now turn to an Indigenous authority to frame what follows more firmly and prescriptively. The Maori educational theorist, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, has just published a powerful book, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, which provides what Terry Goldie, for example, lacked (and mourned) in his analysis of the reified and commodified Indigene within white-settler semiotic economies (4, 13, 19). Smith's work deserves to inspire other Indigenous scholars and to direct the efforts of non-Indigenous colleagues. She defines Indigenization variously as demystification (16), recentring (10, 39), "researching back" (7), "rewriting and rrighting" (149), as multilevel and counter-hegemonic (20, 189), and as "inevitably political" and connected to "broader politics and strategic goals" (178, 189).
Smith identifies Indigenizing with the processes of “decolonization, healing, transformation, and mobilization” (116) and with “Twenty-Five Indigenous Projects” (142ff.). There is clearly much work to be done, and to be done according to an Indigenous division of labour which simultaneously employs and critiques the division of labour’s Euro-imperial and now transnational corporate agenda. This double strategy of working with and against, defining by connection and by difference, suggests that, despite Linda Smith’s approving citation (19) of Audre Lorde, some of the master’s most important tools—like the domestic and international division of labour — can be used “to dismantle the master’s house,” though not if they are the only tools used and if they remain within dominant patterns of ownership of the means of production.

II. Vision and Conspiracy

Canadian universities have made some progress in the last two decades in moderating their traditional Eurocentrism. That Eurocentrism has for more than a century been underpinned by two related fictions which, in their most extreme forms, are captured in the doctrines of terra nullius (empty land) and scientific objectivity (Smith 53). The legal, religious, political, and cultural armatures of colonization constantly circulated the notion that Canada was an empty land — empty, that is to say, in the sense of being largely uninhabited, or empty of any social organization capable of meeting European standards for the fully “human” (Henderson et al.; Smith 26). At the same time, European colonization came to depend on an ever more ascendant science and technology to ensure the profitability of its civilizing mission. Commercial society extended its domains and enhanced its profit margins in part by using science and technology to reinforce stereotypes of Canada’s First Nations as hostile to or incapable of participating in modernity and hence ripe for assimilation or elimination. This stark picture of greed and genocide needs to be modified in light of the treaties signed between (often competing) colonizing powers and the First Nations, but much of the modification to date has attempted to reconceal, minimize, sanitize, or even justify colo-
nial practices radically at variance with Canada's professed sense of itself, domestically and internationally.

The consequence of academic complicity with colonialism has been a massive and persistent deficit in the national understanding of the rights of Indigenous peoples and the value and potential relevance of Indigenous knowledge to economic prosperity and social justice in Canada. The Canadian academy continues to face a formidable challenge in self-education and public education in this area. The academy must therefore begin anew to decolonize its traditional presumptions, curricula, faculty complement and student body, and research and teaching practices, and do so more radically and more rapidly than hitherto.

But where do we begin (again)? How do we proceed? Who are the "we" in question, and why? And how can scholars best record and most effectively share the most successful decolonizing practices across disciplines, institutions, regions? One might decide to start where one might presume progress most likely, "enlightenment" most assured — namely, in the humanities. And such a presumption could find support in the massive outpouring across the world recently of creative and scholarly work dealing with or claiming to exemplify one or another version of the postcolonial (see, for example, Spivak; Prakash; Ahmad; Williams and Chrisman; Rahnema and Bawtree; and Willinsky). Yet Canadian universities, despite (or because of) their crucial role in producing and responding to social change, have not themselves featured very prominently as an object of anticolonial or actively decolonizing inquiry (compared, for instance, with the case of India in, say, Symonds, Viswanathan, and Majeed). Alas, more often than not Canadian universities have been seen (and seen themselves to be) sites of feuding about so-called political correctness (Keefer), feuding which coexists as a distraction or embarrassment beside a wide range of traditional disciplinary activities which are assumed or asserted to be "objective." Canadian universities remain complicitous with residually colonial and defiantly neocolonial policies and practices that continue to produce Indigenous academic "homelessness" (Monture-
and that define what counts as knowledge and who will benefit from its acquisition and exercise, while the beneficiaries and casualties of colonialism stay much the same as they have always been.

Of course, colonialism has a particular history within and across all disciplines, old and new, and it is not only theology and law and genetics that need to hang their heads when invited to return the increasingly emboldened gaze of Canada’s First Nations, and Inuit and Metis peoples who are currently “looking white people in the eye” (Razack). Professedly objective methods have brought many benefits to Canada, but only at a price — a price that has been paid disproportionately by so-called surplus populations standing inconveniently in the way of “progress” and “development.” The claim to objectivity, whether made in published form or from a podium, habitually depends on formulations and explorations of research questions that play down or attempt to suspend sociopolitical determinants without ever fully or permanently erasing evidence of their agency. Elite institutions are still much too implicated in inappropriate presumptions and practices which in effect replay colonial encounters in the names of excellence, integration, modernity, and so on (as part of a more general threat to difference posed by the “University of Excellence” [Readings 21ff.; Findlay “Runes”]). The persistence of this reality, despite abundant good will and public commitments by universities to Indigenous issues, recalls a similar discrepancy between the institutions’ professed enthusiasm for interdisciplinarity and the zealously and narrowly disciplinary nature of most of their teaching and research. These related discrepancies suggest an analogous solution in Indigenously led, strategic interdisciplinarity, which draws on the fluid, permeable, holistic features of Indigenous knowledge to suspend or renegotiate academic territoriality (and the property regimes that underpin it [Battiste and Henderson Protecting]). We may still in general be far short of a post-paternalistic research and teaching agenda centred in and productively addressing the concerns of Indigenous peoples and the conceptual and practical deficits and disfigurements in the residually colonial or aggressively
biotechnologizing, neocolonial Canadian academy. However, Linda Smith offers very constructive as well as sobering advice for the development of new academic and more broadly social formations involving “non-indigenous activists and intellectuals” while “centr[ing] a politics of indigenous identity and indigenous cultural action” (39).

Following Smith’s advice, we may be able to produce and reproduce the conditions of possibility of innovative, non-appropriative, ethical cross-cultural research, postcolonial institutional ethnographies, and a more just understanding and achievement of the strategic as such. But what counts as strategy here, as strategic research and teaching in particular, and how does it connect to postcolonial notions like “strategic essentialism” as understood and practised by Gayatri Spivak, Sherene Razack, and others? What might strategic interdisciplinarity look like in the future? Such questions seem to me straightforward in the context of Indigenization, because essentialism is “the galvanizing idiom of insurgency but the lethal accomplice of hegemony” (Findlay, “Retailing” 503), and not fully allowable when the Indigenizing is being undertaken by the non-Indigenous academic collaborator rather than the insurgent Indigene. Outsider essentializing of Indigenous history and cultural practices must be respectfully strategic rather than presumptuously exotic, and driven by the need to benefit Indigenous people according to their rights, needs, and aspirations. Non-Indigenous learning which crosses disciplines and cultures but remains unidirectional cannot avoid reinscribing diffusionist colonialism and the only too predictable classification of polymaths and primitives, masters and servants.

There is no single remedy for the problems of colonialism, neocolonialism, and the prematurely postcolonial. The (re)doubling remedies I propose deliberately eschew singularity by attempting to be always constructive as well as deconstructive, addressing both a deficiency and an oppressive reality. By invoking vision as the first term in my doublet here, I point to the fact that millennial federalism in Canada is conceptually challenged, woefully lacking in vision (as well as literal and metaphorical millennial fireworks!), the proliferation of
institutional and official “vision statements” notwithstanding. Indigenizing vision can be of enormous benefit to all people, as will be more evident once Marie Battiste’s new collection of essays is published. Whether one is thinking of new pedagogies or sustainability, or institutional internationalization, or other topical issues, Indigenous knowledge can be an invaluable resource, if only in the first instance on its own terms. As we seek new national imaginaries in the new millennium, while federal budgetary surpluses melt away in the reactive restitution of things as they (arguably) were, publicly funded institutions will be looked to for inspiration, guidance — in sum for content for new information networks and a freshly skeletal cyber-state. Universities, meanwhile, will be doomed to recycle the neo-imperialist platitudes of Star Trek as their vision, unless they act on their obscured dependency on Indigenous vision and knowledge. Such vision honours the Other of Eurocentric, instrumental reason while exposing the latter’s arbitrariness and connections to injustice. Such vision is available in the traditional teachings of Indigenous peoples, though no longer as part of the larcenous practice of “trading the Other” (Smith 89); it is available also in colonial forms of hybridization and resistance such as the ledger drawings readable by non-Indigenous scholars (Findlay, “Interdisciplining”); and it is perhaps most compellingly available as mobilization and critique in such strategic Indigenizing of Canadian identity as Sharilyn Calliou’s “Peacekeeping Actions at Home: A Medicine Wheel Model for a Peacekeeping Pedagogy” or the strategic traditionalism of J. Y. Henderson’s “Postcolonial Ghost Dancing.”

In contrast to vision, conspiracy may seem to pose problems associated with aversion rather than narrowly instrumental understanding. Conspiracy may seem like the wrong term for facilitating new solidarities and coalitions across the Indigenous/non-Indigenous line. Indeed, it may seem to concede too much in a self-incriminating way. However, I prefer it to a more positive term like concert from which Victor J. Ramraj elicits such power in his recent collection of World Writing in English. Ramraj convenes and skilfully plays up commonality while respecting difference and promoting imagination as one
of politics’ invaluable Others. In contrast to Ramraj’s emphases in what is an evenhanded but not at all a wishy-washy introductory anthology, I am more concertedly political in aiming to mobilize difference as dissonance and dissent against the dominant ideology which so often presents itself as social and other forms of harmony—whether in readings of Ulysses’ great speech on social degree in Troilus and Cressida (Findlay “Valuing,” 7ff.) or Sir William Jones’s export to Bengal of the idea of “the great orchestra of the nation” (qtd. in Findlay, “Liberty” 10).

Another reason for preferring conspiracy to concert may lie in the latter’s source in Ramraj’s epigraph from Geoffrey Hartman, whom I will take to task in the next section of this essay. More important, however, I wish to rehabilitate conspiracy as a valuable term for articulating resistance by aligning its Indigenization with the so-called “Pontiac Conspiracy” of which Francis Parkman wrote so revealingly and influentially in 1851, a conspiracy explicitly and prominently linked to the deeply problematic notion of “the Conquest of Canada.” In the Preface to the sixth (1870) edition of this his first historical work, Parkman reaffirms its value as a portrait of “forest life and the Indian character” within which the use of smallpox and rum as official means of pacifying Indigenous peoples is thought “sufficiently startling” (345). From the outset, however, Parkman worked from the conviction that he was writing of “the American forest and the American Indian at the period when both received their final doom” (347; emphasis added). And he was writing in a tradition that had already firmly racialized conspiracy in the so-called “New York Conspiracy” or “Negro Plot” of 1741-42 (Horsmanden), a tradition that has received a “fresh lease on life” in the US today in the prejudging and demonizing of marginal groups thought to threaten dominant American interests at home and abroad (see Jameson, Geopolitical xvii, gff.).

In endeavouring to rehabilitate conspiracy as a necessary strategic step on the way from the Indigenous margin toward the academic centre, I wish to invoke especially the history of Pontiac even while running the risk of new, conspiratorial knowledge-coalitions being mistaken for the work of the
Michigan Militia and their ilk. What I am proposing is not conspiracy marked by silence, secrecy, violence, and hate, but linked instead to vigorous self-representation and to a very public process of envisioning, and then achieving, a thoroughly Indigenized future for all citizens. Indigenous insurgency may be driven to, but not necessarily driven by, conspiracy. Official academic channels remain inadequate and zealously self-sustaining in the name of tradition, academic freedom, and institutional autonomy (see essays by Battiste and Findlay in Bidwell). How otherwise can one account for the meagre and overwhelmingly cultural rather than scientific presence of Indigenous scholars and Indigenous knowledge in Canadian universities, still, today (MacIvor)? But a self-identified conspiracy might remind Indigenizers and others of a rhetoric and politics of dismissal which both deplored and denied the possibility of Indigenous leadership and solidarity in Parkman's version of Pontiac's case — there was little to be expected yet much to be feared from the "radical peculiarity of Indigenous language[s]" and the paradoxically fierce individualism of "an all-believing race" (359, 371). Parkman's contradictions proliferate as Pontiac's power is attributed to the "hero-worship" recently popularized by Thomas Carlyle but also to the essentially uncontrollable members of "one of these savage democracies" (360-61). The latter description of Indigenous polities was intended as a self-destructive oxymoron giving way to spasmodic forms of social cohesion: positively cast as "alliances" when connected to the colonial French or English, but negatively cast as plot and political seizure among "the great mass of Indians"(489) when a modestly legitimating European connection was absent. Parkman aggravates the ambivalence of the Harvard scholar towards his less educated fellow Euro-Americans while projecting it into political analysis of "savage democracies." There, instead of revolution by virtue of the general will, he could find only conspiracy in the course of which "the Indians concealed their designs within the dissimulations of their race" (487).

Such "dissimulation" is part of a larger problematic of representation which elicits from Parkman an imperious intervention
concentrating in one place many of the terms and tactics still used in some quarters of the academy and society today:

Of the Indian character, much has been written foolishly, and credulously believed. By the rhapsodies of poets, the cant of sentimentalists, and the extravagance of some who should have known better, a counterfeit image has been tricked out, which might seek in vain for its likeness through every corner of the habitable earth; an image bearing no more resemblance to its original, than the monarch of the tragedy and the hero of the epic poem bear to their living prototypes in the palace and the camp. The shadows of his wilderness home, and the darker mantle of his own inscrutable reserve, have made the Indian warrior a wonder and a mystery. Yet to the eye of rational observation there is nothing unintelligible in him. He is full, it is true, of contradiction. He deems himself the centre of greatness and renown; his pride is proof against the fiercest torments of fire and steel; and yet the same man would beg for a dram of whiskey, or pick up a crust of bread thrown to him like a dog, from the tent door of the traveller. At one moment, he is wary and cautious to the verge of cowardice; at the next, he abandons himself to a very insanity of recklessness; and the habitual self-restraint which throws an impenetrable veil over emotion is joined to the unbridled passions of a madman or a beast. (386)

AMERICAN HISTORY is self-consciously speaking here. The Conspiracy of Pontiac was dedicated to Parkman’s teacher and the first Harvard professor of modern history “Jared Sparks, LL.D, President of Harvard University . . . as a testimonial of high personal regard, and a tribute of respect for his distinguished services to American history.” The modern and the American converge to execute narrative interruption of chilling confidence and evil omen. The passage moves from the “counterfeit” as emotional, imaginative, and irresponsible to “rational observation” and complete intelligibility. Parkman proceeds according to a visual schema that panoptically commands “every corner of the habitable earth” and arterioscopically invades the innermost recesses of the living Indigene. Tragic and epic mimesis are no longer up to the task, especially in a new republic where any actual monarch will always turn out by definition to be worse than his or her dramatic image, and where only the historical fiction of Fenimore Cooper comes close to sharing
history’s epic vocation to define the heroic anew. Human inconsistency is read harshly so as to distract the reader from the displacement onto the Indigene of precisely those contradictions on which colonialism depends in order to function. Educated reason offers the Indigene a “home” in insanity, animality, or inferiority, while the attribution to him of “inscrutable reserve” ironically anticipates the only too scrutable reserves to which native Americans would soon be confined and also the impending treatment of the inscrutable oriental immigrant. It is in face of just such selective reading and monodisciplinary imperiousness as Parkman exemplifies that we urgently need a transdisciplinary, oppositional politics of reading which embraces conspiracy in order to redefine it, while looking to Indigenous vision to help meet Canada’s substantial discursive, ethical, and social deficits.

III. The Radical Humanities

In conjunction with an emergent, counter-hegemonic Indigenous humanities which alone will be able fully to expose injustice while remaining partially, deliberately unreadable to the dominant Other (Menchu ctd. by Spivak 245), there needs to be a radicalizing of the Eurocentric humanities from within. What this requires is not an abandonment of traditional humanist competencies (and Parkmanian deficiencies), but their Indigenizing employment otherwise to redefine the human (see Smith 26; Findlay, “Valuing”), as may become clearer from the following, only too recent example.

In 1998-99, Emory University inaugurated a lecture series with a talk by the distinguished comparativist and deconstructionist, Geoffrey Hartman of Yale University. Hartman’s theme was AESTHETICIDE: or, Has Literary Study Grown Old? Multiple copies of the published version of this talk have been widely disseminated at no charge to Humanities Centres and Institutes across North America and across the world. Emory clearly thinks its new series has got off to a good start, and there is institutional pride as well as generosity behind the free dissemination of Hartman’s lecture and in the covering letter. One of the many remarkable features of this lecture is how it
combines radical textualism and cultural conservatism. This combination is used to convey concerns about a decline in academic standards in the shift from Comparative Literature to Cultural Studies and about the "politicization" that the latter apparently brings with it. According to Hartman these developments are two of the "many reasons for the recession of literary criticism and a diminishment in its standards and quality" (2). He attempts to discredit this recession further by connecting it to the early-modern relocation of liberty in western Europe, and its subsequent "translation" to the "universities of the New (now not so new) World [which now may be] weakening in their will to teach and transmit the Western heritage" (3).

Hartman deals with diversity as academically unmanageable excess and "demographic upheaval" in three main moves: reaffirming deep rather than superficial learning, returning to sacred hermeneutics and the canons it authorizes, and rediscovering the Western tradition as sufficiently rich and complex to warrant continued educational concentration in a world where no one can or should seek to know all that qualifies as art and culture. Hartman's argument turns on a reading of the following passage from Tacitus's *Agricola* which he cites selectively and paraphrases tendentiously:

The winter which followed was spent in the prosecution of sound measures. In order that a population scattered and uncivilized (*dispersi ac rudes*), and proportionately ready for war, might be habituated by comfort (*voluptates*) to peace and quiet, *Agricola* would exhort individuals, assist communities, to erect temples, market-places, houses: he praised the energetic, rebuked the indolent, and the rivalry for his compliments took the place of coercion. Moreover, he began to train the sons of the chieftains in a liberal education (*liberalibus artibus erudire*), and to give a preference to the native talents (*ingenia*) of the Briton as against the trained abilities (*studii*) of the Gaul. As a result, the nation which used to reject the Latin language began to aspire to rhetoric (*eloquentia concupiscerent*): further, the wearing of our dress became a distinction, and the toga came into fashion, and little by little (*paulatimque*) the Britons went astray into alluring vices (*delenimenta vitiorum*): to the promenade, the bath, the well-appointed dinner table. The simple natives (*apud imperitos*) gave the name of "culture" (*humanitas*) to this factor of their slavery (*servitutis*). (Tacitus 21)
Hartman sees this passage as “anticipat[ing Cultural Studies’] skepticism” about “the link between liberty and the art of the past” and “remind[ing] us of what postcolonial literary and political critics have been saying: the colonizers use culture to weaken the resolve of the colonized, to prevent them finding their own genius and resources” (2-3). This is in every sense a powerfully partial reading, a telling example of patronizingly weak Indigenizing and depoliticizing deconstruction.

Hartman uses humanist learning to imply that the Western canon already knows what its critics (in this case he cites Fanon) are eager to tell it. But that prior knowledge exists within a commitment originating in the ancient world to the “idea of a sacred succession, or of a canonical order of works, guiding both scholarly and artistic tradition” (3). While sloppily renaming Agricola Agrippa in his discussion of Tacitus’s account of his father-in-law, Hartman seizes on the Loeb translation of humanitas as “culture” to underscore the prescience of an ancient text and to confirm his personal awareness that particular translations of “humanity” have been exposed at the racist heart of modern colonialism and boldly brandished by postcolonial culturalism. But it is not enough simply to register the fact of “humanity’s” portentousness; it has to be read as rigorously as Hartman reads Wordsworth or Nietzsche. And such a reading might be introduced as a reflection on the lesson that Agricola learned from his predecessors, namely, that “little was accomplished by force if injustice followed” (Tacitus 19). The problematic of pacification (see also Findlay, “Liberty” 15) and the unhealthy undertow of “sound measures” (saluberrimus consiliis) begin to disclose desire, stress, contradictions, circularities. The presence or absence of “civilization” turns unhelpfully on the same root in rudes/erudire, but is clarified by connection to urbanization, education, and language acquisition. Agricola’s civilizing mission depends (as does my countercivilizing mission) on an exhortation (hortari privatim) and is confirmed by an act of naming (vocabatur), that is to say, by rhetorical details which ought to have been grist to Hartman’s deconstructionist mill. However, he passes them over in favour of the lexical reduction of humanitas to “culture,” and his later preference of studium to ingenia (5).
Hartman recognizes the loaded nature of a liberal arts education in the context of colonization, but he fails to comment on the irony of translating *erudire* as "training" when later in the same sentence training is associated with the Gauls rather than the Britons. This irony points to the substantial biases of the English translation, biases evident also in the interpolated description of the Britons as a "nation." The contribution of cultural presumption and projection to hegemony are scarcely acknowledged, never mind adequately translated. The process here is composite, involving contamination as well as education, going "astray" as well as going straight, while Indigenous deficiency and error keep pace with civilizing activities and policies. Eloquence seems possible only in Latin, and only as an object of desire for Britons who are learning Latin as a second language. The Roman vices that some subject Britons do readily master leads them to a humiliating sociolinguistic catachresis — taking as emblems of *humanitas* sartorial self-display, sensual hygiene, and gluttony in a proto-decadent care of the self. Tacitus keeps them in their inferior place, yet the enslaved Britons are both right and wrong in naming a set of overdetermined practices *humanitas*. These signifiers of "distinction" (*honour*) draw on political and material surpluses unjustifiable and unsustainable over time. They represent Roman superiority and also the empire's "final doom." What Tacitus both welcomes and worries about as acculturation will both perpetuate the empire and create the conditions for its dissolution from within. Motivated and partial appropriation of the past in the present, as is done by Tacitus the historian, his Loeb translators, by Hartman, and by me, is ideological as well as intellectual work, and it is unnecessary and dangerously "human" to pretend otherwise in the name of scholarly standards that too often appeal to the best and the brightest in order to privilege the best-off and the whitest.

Such humanistic resistance to Hartman's reinscription of Eurocentric privileges — and problematic outcomes like an apolitical academy, reluctantly inclusive canon and curriculum, and self-renewing but exclusive civil society — needs to be effective and influential. Otherwise, Tacitus and his heirs (like
Parkman who admiringly cites the *Germania* ([495]) will never be made to yield an adequate measure of anti-colonial truth, nor will scholarship fully demonstrate “the power to transform history into justice” (Smith 34). So, the capacity for careful reading and the knowledge of dead languages must coexist alongside anticolonial resolve, if “real” rigour and scholarly distinction are not to confine themselves even more obsessively to “the” Western tradition. The new, radical (and hence Indigenizing) humanities need to retain as well as supplement and redeploy the benefits of a “classical” education.

IV. Englishes and Others

I want to conclude by arguing against “English” as imperious singularity and academic accomplice of the current hegemony, and by urging a new beginning for Englishes as the redrawing of the academic map and redistribution of cultural legitimacy and territoriality under Indigenous educational leadership. This I take to be an explicitly interested as well as interesting endeavour, an energizing departure from the colonial practice of Kantian and Arnoldian disinterestedness. Englishes ought to be a source of good instrumentality, by which I mean in part traditional disciplinarity but also a set of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary connections that define more by (politicized) commonality than by difference, and that defetishize expertise and writing, at least so far as to re-empower generalists and the work of going public and “going native” alongside publishing in academic journals and with academic presses. I mean also a set of activities self-defined and widely recognized as forms of useful knowledge — useful today and tomorrow as enhanced communicative and interpretative skills, and invaluable over a lifetime of engaged and critical citizenship and development of new solidarities.

Engaged and critical citizenship should start inside universities but not stop there or prove separable from the rest of life. The critical citizenry that looks to the political and cultural history of English as a world language and “family” of literatures must see or be taught to see in this living archive, and in its old and new technological modalities and mediations, the
endlessly artful masking of "the violence of production" (Caygill 389), the endlessly adroit yet oppressive management of the meanings of class, race, and gender, the endless silencing and mockery imposed or undertaken in the name of humane ideals and moral universals. The meaning of literary knowledge resides primarily not in the elitist interactions of guardians with their own underclass and with student consumers under the aegis of excellence and standards; it resides in the social relations of production and reproduction of the linguistic and the literary. Focus on the latter version of productivity can lead, and quickly, to the transformation of pedagogy, curriculum, merit, status, that bourgeois individualism that claims originality for itself, and that capitalist value forms at the heart of everything we currently do, or fail to do, or are prevented or prohibited from doing. It can and should also involve the radical, Indigenizing redefinition of what is meant by "culture" from all quarters of the Canadian academy, and perhaps especially from the radical humanities.

The nature and value of academic disciplines are determined by economic and social forces. (The President of sshrcc, for example, identifies three such current, powerfully determinative forces: the "revolution" in communications, the processes known as globalization, and the turn to a knowledge-based economy. Dr. Renaud recommends to his constituents that they busy themselves adapting creatively to this reality. This may well result in bad creativity.) The precise effects of such determination of the academic agenda can and should be demonstrated, and the task of doing so is important scholarly as well as administrative work, but such demonstration can never be complete or unequivocal. Disciplinarity remains a site for the staging of invidious, oppressive, or productive difference, but also, alas, disciplinarity remains a set of determinations and symptoms of unexamined privilege or indifference or fear. The humanities are in particular danger, perhaps (as Marc Renaud suggests) most of all in English-speaking countries. Certainly they are in danger all across Canada. The current beleaguerment of the humanities is in part the consequence of "external" misunderstanding and hostility elsewhere in the university and in society
at large. Much of this misunderstanding and hostility can be captured by the expression, *bad instrumentality*. However, the current beleaguerment is also the result of what happens — or fails to happen — “inside” the humanities. Many of the problems internal to the humanities can be captured in the notion of *anti-instrumentality* or *knowledge-for-its-own-sake*.

The past, present, and future of English literary studies in particular is intimately connected to the legacy of nineteenth-century philology as a Euro-imperial tool (Olender), and to the related fate of “the” English language: English as a world language but not necessarily as a compliently technocratic, multinational corporate instrument and/or conduit for cultural dumping or defoliation. Any quasi-imperial formation, including cultural formations like a *lingua franca* and the canon it sustains and is sustained by, acquires “impurity” while extending its authority or penetration across differences of class, race, gender, nationality. Such “impurity” *will be* the locus of intensified oppression, but also the focus of resistance and critique such as that offered by the Terra Lingua group of scholar-activists who work for the preservation and promotion of Indigenous languages across the world. The end of English-in-the-singular — understood as a project for the extension of hegemony combined with the ever more zealous policing of purity and maintaining of “proper standards” — is long overdue and too long delayed by the passing of the Anglo-imperial torch from Britain to the US. A new goal for Englishes is an enhanced capacity for analytical and imaginative critique of the current (Amerocentric, neocolonial, capitalist) hegemony. In making this end explicit and effective, English(es) will not be politicizing the university but simply endeavouring to change its tacit but well established politics. And in taking their lead from a new generation of Indigenous theorists and activists, Englishes and their critical promoters can contribute in highly practical ways to economic and social justice for all — for as long as the sun shines, the curriculum flows, and the text of treaties between the Crown and Canada’s First Nations is not reduced to the rhetoric of entreaty.
WORKS CITED


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