Max’s Colonial Fantasy: Rereading Sendak’s “Where the Wild Things Are”

JOHN CLEMENT BALL

Maurice Sendak’s most famous picture book, Where the Wild Things Are (1963), marks a radical break in the history of literature for young children. In its portrayal of childhood anxiety, aggression, and punishment, it shattered a hundred-year-old consensus that vulnerable preschoolers need protecting and that their books should portray a cozy world of “security, affection, and familial comfort” (Egoff 250). The book won the 1964 Caldecott Medal, and has since been called “probably the most suspenseful and satisfying nursery tale of our time” (Lanes 87). But Where the Wild Things Are provoked loud opposition in its day. Its hulking wild things were thought to look too “frightening,” and well-intentioned adults fretted over its power to confuse or disturb “sensitive” children (Hentoff 341-42). In the decades since its publication, children’s books have reflected a much more radical desacralizing and opening-up of childhood to adult worldliness; children are now exposed to social-realist and problem texts that confront all manner of threats, anxieties, and darknesses. Sendak’s book now looks rather tamer than it did, and a critical accord has emerged that celebrates its imaginative shoring up of the very identity and values it was once thought to undermine.

The book’s narrative of rage and aggression exorcised through an empowering dream-journey is typically now seen to offer a positive, reassuring message. Following Sendak’s own view that children use fantasy as “catharsis” in order to “cope” with frustration, fear, and anxiety (“Caldecott” 151), critics have stressed the beneficial aspects of Max’s decision to turn “violent emotion” and “destructive force into narrative energy” (Gilead...
Max "achieves a healthy identity" after dreaming himself into "an older state, a state of supposed maturity in which he will not be subject to an older person’s arbitrary power" (Jones 122-23). The "heroic" boy passes a "test of identity" (124), liberating himself as he "transforms his room (the scene of his punishment) into the land of the wild things (the scene of his power)” (Paul 151).

What critics have not discussed, however, is the overtly imperial-colonial model through which Max imagines and achieves this state of empowerment. If Max's fantastic journey abroad and eventual return to reality follows a classic children's story structure—think of *The Wizard of Oz*, *Peter Pan*, and the *Alice* books, just for starters—it also has precedents in adults' and children's fiction with colonial or quasi-colonial settings: *Robinson Crusoe*, *Gulliver's Travels*, *Heart of Darkness*, and *The Voyages of Doctor Doolittle*, for instance. Sarah Gilead, in a fascinating study of circular fantasy-and-return narratives, calls Max's dream "a salutary exposure of forbidden wishes and emotions" through which he achieves "psychic growth" (278). But while by one measure Sendak's representation of such taboo material was a leap forward, by another he had his sights set firmly back in time. Woven into the story and pictures that depict Max's adventure are numerous uncanny echoes of narrative patterns, events, psychologies, and structures that can be seen as typically—even archetypally—colonial. Through these echoes, Max's journey invokes a complex mesh of self-other relations that both enhances and qualifies the notion of his psychic progress.

The story begins with an aggressive and violent Max dressed in his wolf suit and making mischief. His mother, an absent presence outside the frame, calls him "WILD THING!”; he retorts "I'LL EAT YOU UP!” and is "sent to bed without eating anything.” But as with anti-social British convicts sent away from the motherland to Australian penal colonies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the confining space of Max's punishment turns out to be an opened-up, far-away tropical space. The walls fade away, bedposts turn into trees, and as the illustrations grow his room becomes "the world all around." Yet while the antipodean convicts had to wait many years before being liberated into a
colonizing role, Max achieves dominion over the wild things and their exotic land right away. The process by which he does this draws on several models of colonization besides the initial penal colony one.

He may be a 1960s boy, but Max does not just fly, channel-change, or otherwise instantly get to where the wild things are. Like the traditional colonizer, he takes a boat, a "private" sailing vessel with his name on it. His journey is described in an odd blend of spatial and temporal language: "he sailed off through night and day/and in and out of weeks and almost over a year to where the wild things are." Picture books, some have said, make meaning through the "counterpoint" of spatial image and temporal narrative, of pictures and text (Hunt 175; Townsend 302-03); perhaps Sendak is offering a witty nod towards this hermeneutic truth. Perhaps, too, the time-space conflation implies that Max's achievement of "physical distance from his mother" takes him ahead in time to a more mature state (Jones 123). But could Max's journey not also be back in time? Colonial and anthropological discourses are notoriously prone to locate geographic and racial others—"savages," " primitives," "wild things"—in an earlier historical or evolutionary time, or outside of time altogether. Marlow in Conrad's Heart of Darkness describes his spatial journey up the Congo as "like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world" (48). If "the socializing tendency" in children's fantasy can rub shoulders with an adult's "regressive yearnings" (Gilead 277), then Max can be seen to mature by enacting a historical regression to an anachronistic state of power. He moves forward and back in time; like many an imperialist before him, he becomes the "adult" leader of purportedly childlike or backward beings living in a "primitive" state of nature.

That he does this so easily and non-violently marks the degree to which Max's colonial fantasy is a fantasy. Imperial domination was rarely so smoothly achieved: after the wild things have tried to scare him away, Max simply commands them, with a kind of divine imperative, to "BE STILL!" He tames and frightens them by staring them down and is immediately proclaimed "king of all wild things." Certainly there were cases of colonial explorers
quickly elevated to such stature: Cook in Hawaii, for example, or Cortes and Columbus among the Aztecs, who Tzvetan Todorov says succeeded because they could only be accommodated to an Indian worldview as "gods," not "as equal and as different" humans (75-76). But if the elements of surprise and novelty favoured some colonizers initially, imperial power was usually imposed and always maintained by force. Colonial domination was violent and often bloodthirsty; Max, of course, needs none of that. As Bob Dixon (74-119) and others have argued, the image of lower-order "others" gratefully embracing their imperial master appears in numerous books read by children, reflecting the colonialist and racist ideologies of their times: Friday with Crusoe, Long Arrow with Doctor Doolittle, for example. As Abdul JanMohamed writes in an African context, the colonizer's projections of racial others as inferior and unable to govern themselves are merely "self-contained" and self-serving "fantasies" (Manichean 3). The fantasy that Max creates is also self-serving, and while it is not colonialist or racist, imperial myths and representational systems are crucial elements in its ways of meaning.

As most commentators recognize, the wild things are not really scary. They are actually quite cuddly, and even as they roar their terrible roars and gnash their terrible teeth they are smiling and waving at Max. (Sendak's work is full of such text-picture disjunctions, exemplifying what William Moebius calls the "plate tectonics" of the picture book [135].) Some readers perceive the wild things as comic. (My four-year-old daughter, Hilary, finds them "silly.") This too suggests a colonial lineage, for in combining the comic with the purportedly fearsome, Sendak creates his monsters much the way explorers of Africa represented natives: "as amusing or dangerous obstacles or as objects of curiosity," in Patrick Brantlinger's words (195). Moreover, the wild things remain unindividualized (in the textual narrative) and unnamed; known only as a collective, they have the "generic," interchangeable quality that JanMohamed identifies in colonialist discourses of alterity ("Economy" 83). Brantlinger (207-09) and Edward Said describe representations of imperial activity, at least from the supply side, as overwhelmingly male and com-
monly, as in Kipling's *Kim*, concerned with “boyish pleasures,” games, and adventures (Said 137). The creatures with whom Max revels may also be male: they all have beards (though Max’s Scottie-dog has a beard, and could still be female); most have horns (though some have long hair, and none have penises). But their generic hybridity undermines any clear-cut gendering. If the wild things are best described as “comic-grotesque beasts” (Gilead 280), the indeterminacy implied by the grotesque complicates any dualistic categories, including the Manichean self-other binary.

Medieval and early modern European cosmographies often imagined grotesque, “untamed” animal-human hybrids and “discrepant others” living beyond the edge of “civilization”; Sebastian Munster’s *Cosmographei* provides a well-known visual representation (Sibley 49-52). As those peripheral spaces “opened up” to European exploration, the actual people found there could be accommodated to this *a priori* model of imperfection as suited their “discoverers.” But colonial others were alternately denigrated and romanticized—sometimes simultaneously, as in the “noble savage” myth. The ambivalence of these attitudes parallels the feelings inspired by the grotesque. The influential but polarized theories of Wolfgang Kayser and Mikhail Bakhtin capture something of that ambivalence. For Kayser, grotesque fusions of human and animal are associated with dreams (25); they force us to confront a “horrible and ridiculous” chaos (53), a monstrous abyss that prompts feelings of fear and estrangement (182-85). Bakhtin, by contrast, celebrates the grotesque for breaking down self-other differences, inverting hierarchies, and blending normally separate realms; for him it is an expression of joyful integration, rebirth, and regeneration (303-436). Suggestive as these different views undoubtedly are to a reading of Max’s fantasy, they are usefully augmented by Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s mediating theory.

For Harpham, the grotesque is “a species of confusion” (xv) that challenges the “categories” by which we organize and know the world (3): “In any age—this one, for example—its widespread use indicates that significant portions of experience are eluding satisfactory verbal formulation” (4). Harpham connects
the grotesque with Edmund Leach's idea of the young child's developing ability to separate "things" into categories, and the consequent body of anomalous, ambiguous "non-things" that elude definition. Such non-things are typically suppressed as taboo, pushed into the interstices of consciousness where "supernatural monsters" and the like reside (4). Harpham's grotesque "occupies a gap" in "the middle of a narrative of emergent comprehension" (15). Grotesque images are often recognizable at the micro-level of body parts, but the parts are in a fanciful "state of anarchy" and resist definition as a whole. This leads to the "paralysis of language" that is the grotesque (6). Another way Harpham views the grotesque is as occupying a space "between two worlds" (14); in its refusal to respect established "proprieties of high and low" (human and animal), it signifies the margin impinging on the centre, the id threatening the ego, and the self mingling with the other (10, 35, 67). In fact, the grotesque is the enemy of all dualisms: reason-unreason, white-black, literal-metaphoric, and so on (67-68).

When Sendak's creatures are not being described generically as "wild things," they are objectified as so many body parts: teeth, eyes, claws. (Conrad's Marlow likewise glimpses Africans on the shoreline as "incomprehensible" flashes of limbs and eyes [51].) The wild things blend elements of disparate animals—bulls, ducks, reptiles, bears, dogs, roosters, goats—with friendly, somewhat human-looking faces. One of them also has human feet. They clearly belong to Harpham's category-defying category of the grotesque. But if they do, so on a rudimentary level does Max—the boy in the wolf suit. Max, who "creates" the fanciful beasts (in his dream, and in a picture he has previously drawn), is also a wild thing: his mother calls him one, and the creatures call him "the most wild thing of all" before naming him "king of all wild things." There is no unbridgeable difference between Max and the creatures: his role as king involves becoming one of them (playing on equal footing in the "wild rumpus") as much as dictating the rules (starting and stopping the rumpus). If Max "advances" to a position of adult-like control, he also regresses to a state of non-verbal, infantile, "primitive" play.

Drawn to this world of ambiguous resemblance yet difference, Max enjoys both the adult power and the "boyish pleasures" of
imperialism. In the ultimate fantasy, he gets to have it both ways. The joyful play depicted in the wordless "rumpus" section suggests that, for a while at least, he can comfortably inhabit a world in which he confronts and blends into a grotesque "other-self," even if (or because?) that relationship leads into a non-verbal state of linguistic paralysis. After all, these may on some level be "non-things," but he still knows them to be "things"—and not all that different from him. In this fantasy version of colonial rule, Max feels none of the destabilizing threat that Homi Bhabha perceives in colonialist authority ambivalently confronting the "unspeakable" and inscrutable hybridity of its objects (112). Max alternately is and is not "at a loss for words" (112) in the presence of wild things who, like Bhabha's colonial mimics, signify both "resemblance and menace" (86). Their "difference" may only be "partial"—"almost the same, but not quite" (86)—but Max can handle them.

Three specific features of the book reinforce and extend this self-other problematic. First is the cannibal motif. Stephen Slemon describes "the cannibal encounter" in colonialist discourse as "both paradigmatic and deferred" (164). So often potentially present, the eating of the colonizer usually remains an unfulfilled threat. Cannibalism, Slemon writes, fascinates us because of its ability, in "a discourse of othering," to mark "an unpassable boundary between communities"—"splitting the field of human relations by space and by time, and enabling the self/other tropics of European modernity to inhabit the comforting binary opposition of civilization versus savagery" (165). No such boundary exists for Max, wild thing that he is: the creatures' unfulfilled threat to "eat you up—we love you so" is an echo of his own retort to his mother. (Here it is worth noting the nineteenth-century writer Winwood Ruede's bizarre observation that "A cannibal is not necessarily ferocious. He eats his fellow-creatures, not because he hates them, but because he likes them" [qtd. in Brantlinger 203].)

A second feature with which the book disrupts boundaries of difference is the inclusion of one very distinctive wild thing. The first two panels after Max's arrival depict a white goat-dog hybrid among the wild things. Much smaller than its fellows, this being is
only slightly larger than Max, who both in and out of his wolf suit is also white. Moreover, the small thing is first pictured riding on the back of a large thing—just like the crowned and triumphant Max in the final “rumpus” panel. Could this small white thing, who appears only in the first two of the eight “land of wild things” panels, be a prior “king” (that is, colonizer) who absconds as soon as Max is crowned? Is this the Spanish displaced by the British in Trinidad? Or one colonizing generation taking over from another, the meek child inheriting the earth from yesterday’s man? Is the goat-dog a colonizer “gone native,” a Kurtz who needs ousting? Whatever the interpretation, the resemblance strengthens the equation of Max with the wild things, the colonizer with the colonized.

The third reinforcing feature is the book’s design. Many critics have praised Sendak’s exemplary use of picture-book form to echo narrative content (for example, Jones 126-29). As Max transforms powerlessness, anger, and confinement into fantasized power, pleasure, and freedom, the pictures grow: from a tightly-framed and constricted order through a gradual encroaching on the frame (or margin) to a panoramic openness in the land of wild things. This spreading-out reaches its peak in the full-bleed illustrations of the wild rumpus, during which, as one critic writes, “Max’s imaginative interaction with his creatures takes him beyond words—or before words—and the kinds of distinctions they insist upon making: friend-foe, joy-fear, self-other” (McGavran 173). Eventually “text . . . reestablishes a beachhead in the last pages” (173) as Max returns to “reality”; the whole effect is of narrative, pictures, and layout working in harmony to convey “the central theme of control” (Arakelian 126). But if Max can be seen as most in control when the pictures are biggest, the same rumpus section also shows matters closest to being out of control. Max temporarily merges with the wild things; binary distinctions and ordered containment break down through egalitarian, pre-linguistic play which shows that “Max has gone beyond logic and rationality” (Jones 126). The pictures reflect this ecstatic state. And viewing the wild things as colonial grotesques extends the idea: the tensions between reality and fantasy, reason and unreason, order and disorder, adult hier-
archy and egalitarian regression are conveyed through a page design in which the “centre” literally takes over the “margin.” This takeover can been seen in two distinct ways: either the centre obliterates the margin (wipes it out, dominates it), or the centre merges with the margin (and becomes indistinguishable from it). In the gap that divides these possibilities lies the ambivalence of the grotesque, and of colonial relations. How Max comes to terms with this ambivalence in the book’s final pages determines the book’s theme.

By placing Max so clearly among the wild things, the rumpus scenes break down the conventional spatial boundaries of colonialist iconography, in which “self” and “other” are clearly separated. Here is how Peter Mason describes some seventeenth-century Dutch paintings of Brazilian Indians:

Eckhout [the painter] orders the Indians in accordance with a scheme that is centred on European canons. The wild dance and the (ethnographically inaccurate) portrayal of the “Tapuya” as cannibals situate them on the outer ring of wildness. The more “civilised” Tupi Indians occupy an intermediary position, marked for example by the fact that the Tupi man bears a European knife, and that the landscape behind the Tupi woman contains rows of cultivated palms and a colonial house. The “civilised” Europeans come ... in the centre as the most attractive and refined people. (Qtd. in Sibley 51)

Sendak ignores such ordering principles, especially in the first two rumpus panels. But in the end Sendak and Max pull back from the perhaps unspeakable abyss of permanent wildness and play: Max orders an end to the rumpus and enacts the circular closure that will take him back home. Why? Raymond Jones astutely notes that “Quite literally, Max’s fantasy has no room for growth” (126). Like the pictures, one might say, it has been stretched to the “max.” Amy Sonheim says Max must now resolve “the opposing strains of wildness and discipline” (84). According to Sendak himself, “the fantasy has to be resolved”: “If Max had stayed on the island with the wild things, a child reading the book might well have been frightened” (qtd. in Hentoff 343). Max would have lost his “self”—the boy who lives with his mother in a “civilized” home—and this could indeed be disturbing. However, the book’s fulfillment of what are essentially generic requirements also owes much to its colonial origins.
Albert Memmi’s classic study of colonial psychologies, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, outlines the following paradigmatic narrative. The typical colonizer (a male) views his mission as “simply a voyage towards an easier life” (3); he finds that life seductive in its pleasures, and has difficulty leaving for home. He succeeds in the colony “by upsetting the established rules and substituting his own” (9). But he ultimately faces two choices: to “refuse” or to “accept” his role. To refuse is to become a “turncoat”: to betray the “civilized” self by embracing the colonized and hoping “to be loved by them” (37). When this “leftist” colonizer realizes the difficulties of ruling “by the divine right of love and renewed confidence” rather than by imposition, he “invokes the end of colonization” (40-41). The “best” colonizers go home; only the mediocre remain (48). Even “the colonizer who accepts” his role—who “basks in the privileges” and “abundant pleasures” afforded by his “anachronistic authority”—feels “guilty.” He knows the source of his grandeur is not intrinsic (57). Torn between such privilege and a “mother country,” where he would “cease to be a superior man,” he nevertheless becomes obsessed with an ideal image of his homeland. The mother country becomes valorized as a place of “positive values, good climate, harmonious landscape, social discipline and exquisite liberty, beauty, morality and logic.” This vision requires the distant homeland to be “immutable and sheltered from time” (60-61). Whether psychologically (by staying) or physically (by returning), the colonizer treats the motherland as a “refuge” (58). He “navigates” between it and “a present [colonial] society which he rejects” (68).

Memmi’s book, published in French in 1957 and in English in 1965, offers an uncanny set of parallels to Sendak’s narrative. Most of these are obvious and do not need rehearsing here. Max’s ambiguous relations with the wild things make him both an “accepting” and a “refusing” colonizer. He enjoys the superiority of difference and the mutuality of play; he simultaneously keeps control and “goes native.” The first post-rumpus panel, which inaugurates Max’s decision to return home, suggests that he has reached the limits of possibility here. Surrounded by sleeping wild things (are they now the mythical “lazy natives” of
colonialist discourse?), Max occupies a distinctively special space in the picture. The pavilion-like tent in which he sits looking so bored and lonely connotes both his kingly separateness from "them" and the temporary nature of his stay. Now, as a new day dawns, he begins to shore up that separateness. He abdicates his crown in favour of the newly idealized "motherland," which suddenly looks (and smells) much more appealing. Max wants his old "self" back, to be "where someone loved him best of all." He foregoes the wild things' cannibalistic love for his mother's nourishing love, and on returning home to his "still hot" dinner he finds, like Memmi's misty-eyed colonizer, that the motherland has indeed remained "immutable and sheltered from time."

Or does he? What are we to make of the full moon that seems to follow him home, replacing the crescent-shaped moon with which the story began? Is this, as Jones suggests, Sendak's one "lapse," an unexplainable inconsistency given the circular journey genre (129)? It is a lapse if we take the statement that Max returned "into the night of his very own room" as meaning the same night in which he left. But the language is ambiguous, using the same disorienting blend of time and space as the other journey description. Perhaps it is the same night and the full moon symbolizes the fact that Max is more mature (just as, some argue, he is physically bigger) when he returns. Or it could symbolize the plenitude of restored relations with his mother. But perhaps this is a different night, and Max has returned home, Gulliver-like, older and to a place subtly changed during (or because of) experiences that may not be "just" fantasy. More radically, maybe like Memmi's colonizer he only fantasizes the return home. At this point, however, the book threatens to disintegrate into postmodern ontological indeterminacy, and is probably best left alone.

In creating a paradigmatically colonial story, Sendak presents his readers with a time-honoured narrative of empowerment. Yet while he draws on attitudes and structures associated with discredited modes of colonialist and racist thinking, it would be wrong to accuse Where the Wild Things Are of being a nefariously colonialist or racist book. For one thing, its scenario and its creatures are too fanciful to support referential links with any
actual imperial power structures or colonized peoples. For another, Sendak blurs and disrupts all the hierarchical binaries he invokes. His use of the grotesque, and his portrayal of Max’s dominion as ambiguous, ambivalent, and temporary, disrupt the very self-other distinctions the book may seem on the surface to reinforce.

Moreover, now that we have begun to understand, through the work of Bhabha and others, the degree to which such binaries were always already destabilized in “ambivalent” colonial power structures, psychologies, and discourses, it may also be time to theorize the connection between colonialism and the psychology of young children. David Sibley’s recent book Geographies of Exclusion provides a brief but fascinating account of the origins of exclusionary thinking in psychoanalytic theories of object relations. As proposed by Melanie Klein and others, the child’s developing ability to distinguish the self from objects leads to a fear of mixing or merging with the “other”—including the mother (3-11). From this fear, Sibley says, a wide range of excluding practices can be traced, including racism, abjection, urban segregation, and the division of the world into “civilized” and “primitive” spaces. Max the ambivalent imperialist is also a child still very much on an object-relations continuum—still working out his relations with the other and the mother. A full exploration of the connections between colonialism and object-relations theory lies beyond the scope of this article (and the competence of this writer). However, it seems fair to say that Max’s fantasy of simultaneous distinction from and identification with the other is true not only to colonialism, but also to childhood.

WORKS CITED


