The suggestion that *Kim* can be approached as an ethnography immediately raises a question about Kipling's status as an ethnographer. As James Clifford observes in his introduction to *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, ethnographic writing normally is governed by generic determinations and "is usually distinguishable from a novel or a travel account" (6). Clifford nonetheless acknowledges that ethnography "is an emergent interdisciplinary phenomenon" that "blur[s] the boundary separating art from science" (3). The ethnographer, for Clifford, is a text-maker whose work ineluctably requires "expressive tropes, figures, and allegories that select and impose meaning as they translate it" (7). The textual practices of ethnography and literary art thus are potentially compatible. If *Kim* is not an ethnography in the purest sense, it includes ethnography; it evidences an ethnographic project. The India of *Kim* is clearly not exotic back-drop or *trompe l'œil* conforming more to the urges of imagination than to the exigencies of cultural documentation and representation. This text provides ample evidence of what one might call the ethnographic impulse, the writerly drive to grasp and document cultural realities. If, as Arnold Krupat suggests, ethnographers most fundamentally, most crucially, are the "producers of data for the understanding of other worlds" (80), then Kipling must be granted a certain status as an ethnographer.

More specifically, one can consider Kipling an *imperial* ethnographer. Invariably, as George Marcus avers, "closely observed cultural worlds are imbedded in larger, more impersonal systems" (166), are written and must be read in integral relation to a
determining "context of historical political economy" (167). Ethnographies, writes Clifford, "are systems, or economies, of truth. Power and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot fully control" ("Introduction" 7). One should read Kipling's representation of India, therefore, in terms of the implicit and explicit relations it establishes with British imperialism in India. In this essay, I will show, first, how Kipling's ethnographic practices enact and confirm imperial power-knowledge and, subsequently, how the organizing figure of the hybrid boy both enables and problematizes the project of imperial ethnography.

The ethnographic impulse manifests itself in *Kim* in a variety of ways. The novel's opening scenes, which serve admirably to orient the action and to introduce the principal themes, occur in and around "the Wonder House," the famous museum of ethnology in Lahore. Kim's subsequent relationship with a Tibetan lama has significant ethnological implications, as do his relationships with Mahbub Ali and Hurree Chunder Mookerjee. Both Colonel Creighton, the "unofficial" head of the novel's imperial spy network, and Hurree Babu are ambitious ethnographers. Moreover, this linkage between spying and scholarship is neither arbitrary nor coincidental. Ethnology and ethnography are crucial elements within the British intelligence project. As Kim learns from Lurgan Sahib, careful attention to ethnological data, down to its most minute details, is the key to success for an imperial agent: it enables Kim to become a master of cross-cultural disguise—enables him, that is, to stage an ethnology "in person," to embody and enact an ethnography.

Implicit and explicit linkings of knowledge and power, of ethnology and imperial practice, occur throughout Kipling's novel. Such linkages manifest themselves at the very outset, in the encounter between the Red Lama and the curator of the Lahore Museum. Indian culture is presented as a British possession. Although Kipling pictures eager peasants "hurrying up to the Wonder House to view the things that men made in their own province and elsewhere" (4), the Lahore Museum, as Kim duly informs the inquisitive lama, is "the Government's house" (6). All those seeking knowledge of India—including, of course,
those who are natives of India and, as such, producers of its culture—must consult British holdings and solicit the explanations of a “white-bearded Englishman” (7), the curator-Sahib.

Encouraged by Kim, the lama enters the museum and immediately confronts imagery attesting to the precedence and the enduring pre-eminence of Western cultural achievements in relation to those of the East; in conformity with the principles enunciated by Said in *Orientalism*, the British ethnological museum at Lahore presents the newcomer with “derivative” Oriental masterpieces, which strive to recapture an earlier, more masterful, Western artistry: “In the entrance-hall stood the larger figures of the Greco-Buddhist sculptures done, savants know how long since, by forgotten workmen whose hands were feeling, and not unskilfully, for the mysteriously transmitted Grecian touch” (6). The superiority of the European, however, most tellingly is a matter of knowledge. “Savants know,” Kipling’s text assures us, virtually everything there is to know of the so-called “mysterious” East. The curator (clearly to be numbered among these “savants”) produces a “huge book of photos” containing images of the lama’s own lamasery. He knows the details of the life of “the Excellent One,” which are represented by the museum’s carvings and also in abundant books—learned works in “French and German, with photographs and reproductions” (8). To questions concerning “Oriental” cultures, the curator can answer with authoritative simplicity: “It is written. I have read” (9). If his knowledge finds its limit with respect to “the River of the Arrow,” whose waters promise “freedom from the Wheel of Things” (10), his knowledge of the Wheel itself, that is, of the sociocultural life of the subcontinental world, seems to comprehend both generalities and minutiae—an implication that is confirmed by his parting gift to the lama, the spectacles of European manufacture that bear the promise of a clearly detailed, far-reaching “envisioning” of the material, phenomenal world. Thus, in his novel’s opening movements, Kipling represents an amply documented “Orient” whose sociocultural realities are securely encompassed by a European knowledge *imperium*. The museum passages posit an “Orient” that is not “mysterious” but objectively known, an accountable “Orient” whose concrete elements can be located and delineated, authoritatively organized and represented.
The Orientalist and “orientalizing” propensity, which situates “the East” in meaningfully subordinate relation to “the West” (see Said, 49-73), persists throughout the text of *Kim*. Kipling’s narrator repeatedly makes generalizing and authoritative statements regarding Oriental character and custom: Orientals, for example, possess a penchant and a talent for fabrication and duplicity—Kim can “lie like an Oriental” (23), that is, spontaneously, unscrupulously, elaborately, and well; “Asiatics,” the reader is told, “do not wink when they have out-maneuvered an enemy” (24). Most typically and most significantly, however, such Orientalist statements address issues of temporality: as Mahbub Ali comes to clear awareness of the pressing nature of an intelligence mission, one is instructed that “even an Oriental, with an Oriental’s views of the value of time, could see that the sooner [the information] was in the proper hands the better” (22); as Kim and the lama enter a benighted yet crowded train station, the narrator affirms that “[a]ll hours of the twenty-four are alike to Orientals” (26). Particular, Oriental relationships with time are also made evident when the narrator observes that “one anna in each rupee” is “the immemorial commission of Asia” (27), when he describes a dispirited, frustrated Kim, who abandons plans for concerted action and “[falls] back, Oriental-fashion, upon time and chance” (106), and when he details the movements of Mahbub’s caravan, which breaks camp “[s]wiftly,—as Orientals understand speed,—with long explanations, with abuse and windy talk, carelessly, amid a hundred checks for little things forgotten” (142).

This last account of an Oriental-style breaking of camp deserves special attention insofar as it contrasts sharply with an earlier description that calls attention to the wondrous speed and efficiency with which the Maverick regiment sets up camp:

The plain dotted itself with tents that seemed to rise, all spread, from the carts. Another rush of men invaded the grove, pitched a huge tent in silence, ran up eight or nine more by the side of it, unearthed cooking-pots, pans, and bundles, which were taken possession of by a crowd of native servants; and behold the mango-tope turned into an orderly town. . . . (81)

In this passage, Kipling represents the efficient use of time—the everyday practice of the time-mastering European, “the rou-
Kipling's “Kim”

...time of a seasoned regiment pitching camp in thirty minutes” (82). Oriental time, comprising “the easy, uncounted Eastern minutes” (188), thus is to be understood in relation to an alternative model, always implicit; ambling, undifferentiated Oriental time contrasts with European time, which is apportioned, regimented—quite literally pressed into service. Just as clearly, European time is the time of imperial enterprise, the time that enables the Mavericks, together with their duly marshalled “native servants,” to “invade” the virgin mango grove and to make of it, in 30 precisely measured minutes, “an orderly town.” Considered in relation with the narrator’s statements on Eastern temporality, the Mavericks’ pitching of camp offers itself as a representative staging of a grander spectacle, the productive mastering of a timeless “East” by a time-binding “West.”

To specify and to characterize Oriental temporality from a Western perspective, of course, is to make an ethnographic distinction, one that clearly is not lacking in significant sociopolitical implications. In Kipling’s text, the “allochronism” of ethnographic discourse (Fabian 32ff.), which constitutes a strategic difference between the time of the observed, cultural other and that of the Western observer, does not serve merely to affirm, once again, the superiority of European cultural paradigms. It reveals also something of the method and the means by which that illusion of superiority is secured and maintained. As Clifford notes, the power to represent cultural realities often has rested on the Western writer-observer’s claim to a special capacity to apprehend time “objectively.” The traditional discourse of anthropology “speaks with automatic authority for others defined as unable to speak for themselves (‘primitive,’ ‘pre-literate,’ ‘without history’)” (Clifford, “Introduction” 10). Kipling’s India is represented as being “without history” in the sense that it is submitted to what Clifford calls “synchronic suspension” (“On Ethnographic” 111). As Ronald Inden observes in his Imagining India, the “India” represented by Western Indologists is a place of longstanding cultural stasis—a stasis Kipling renders in predominantly temporal terms. In Kipling’s Wonder House, India’s different “times” are presented in spatial contiguity, compartmentalized in such a way that a “time” or “period” constitutes not
a distant and distinct past but rather another (supplementary, adjacent, equally "present") manifestation of an eternal, essentially unchanging "India." Precise historical information exists, but apparently is of little importance: "Savants know how long since" the Greco-Buddhist sculptures were fashioned by "forgotten workmen." What is important is that the sculptures manifest another aspect of "India"—as do the contemporary regional handicrafts of an adjacent hall—and that they contribute to a broadly inclusive, largely transhistorical reading of "India."

As Talal Asad notes, deeply embedded in the traditions of Western anthropology is the tendency to transform the "notion of culture . . . into the notion of a text—that is, into something resembling an inscribed discourse" (141). Kim, in this respect, presents an interesting case in point. The ethnologically, historically informed gaze, which is exercised most saliently by Kipling’s narrator, does not restore history to the Indian scene but rather employs the "historical sense" to perceive and confirm the effective absence of a dynamic history. The timelessness of Kipling’s "India" allows for its treatment as a text, as an assembly of signifying elements whose order is necessary, invariable—fixed, as it were, for all time. To deprive India of a dynamic historical temporality is to exclude the very possibility of innovation and change. It is to create an India whose cultural manifestations are prescribed, written in advance, an India that ceaselessly recites itself: "All India," Kipling assures his readers, "is full of holy men stammering gospels in strange tongues; . . . dreamers, babblers, and visionaries: as it has been from the beginning and will continue to the end" (32; emphasis added). Ostensibly, Kipling does not remake India as a text so much as he writes out a reading of the text that always-already is India. For all that it is multifaceted, the cultural object of study is perceived as ordered and stable, as a kind of museum-text to which one can return, again and again: as it was, so it shall be. The elements of the cultural text can be located, specified, classified, with the assurance that locations, specifications, and classifications are not susceptible to historical contingencies. Such "synchronic suspension," as Clifford argues, "effectively textualizes the other, and gives the sense of a reality not in temporal flux, not in the same ambiguous, moving histori-
cal present that includes and situates the other, the ethnographer, and the reader” (“On Ethnographic” 111). Under the eye of the skilful and informed observer, the bustle and flux of India—its “happy Asiatic disorder” (64)—becomes its pageantry, its spectacular, strangely ceremonious representation of itself.3

The narrative process of *Kim* reinscribes in its own way the kinds of methods and procedures that characterize the Great Game and affirms, as does the Great Game, that India, in all of its diversity, can be known and controlled. Kipling’s ethnologically informed narrative serves to organize and reproduce a “vast mass of ‘information received’” (21), corresponding with what Phillip Wegner calls the “mapping and cataloguing” initiatives of the Game, and thus contributing to the production of “a utopian figure of India—an India where conflict, disorder, and finally historical change have been eliminated” (143). In Kipling’s India, as is confirmed in Kim’s final return to life, the ordering consciousness of the trained observer can always “lock up anew on the world without.” Everything will “[slide] into proper proportion.” Meanings and purposes will be revealed: “Roads [are] meant to be walked on, houses to be lived in, fields to be tilled, and men and women to be talked to.” Everything will be shown to be “real and true” and “perfectly comprehensible” (282).

Although Kim’s consciousness ultimately is presented as a site of perfect knowledge, one must nonetheless recognize that the boy most typically functions as something of a rogue element within the controlled and controlling knowledges deployed in Kipling’s novel. Within the timeless, changeless pageantry of India, Kim consistently discovers and enacts the new and the unprecedented. Kim drums his heels upon the austerely symbolic Zam-Zammah, keeps company with fakirs, catches forbidden glimpses of “the women’s world” behind the purdah, roams the bazaar, and kicks a holy cow in the nose (while dressed as a low-caste Hindu boy!). As the little “Friend of all the World,” Kim freely traverses discrete social spaces, exchanges castes and creeds, scrambles categories, obscures distinctions. His antic life, on first consideration, seems to challenge the adequacy of the ethnological science that the Lahore Museum displays and the Great Game puts into practice.
One should not conclude, however, that the boy has no productive role within Kipling's imperial ethnographic project. As Inden argues, the image of India as meticulously distributed cultural stasis does not reflect inherent social forms and structures but is rather a sense-making imposition of the categories and concepts of Western Indology, which produce a deeply determined, essentialized India informed by "the mind of Hinduism" (85ff.) and ordered upon archaic, supposedly fixed and unchanging stratifications of "caste society" (49ff.). Kim's gay liberty is constituted as exceptional and thus contrasts with, and sets in relief, an Indological "India" of self-imposed social stricture and constraint. India is imaged in *Kim* as doubly controlled—by imperial authority and its sustaining power-knowledge, certainly, but also by codes and taboos of "Indian culture." In the figure of Kim, Kipling discovers the means of representing a free-wheeling "experience" of Indian culture, one that is characterized by unrestricted access and mobility yet does not significantly unsettle the image of India as a discretely ordered multiplicity, as a static society of fixed (and therefore fully knowable) social forms. The boy's irreverent transgressions remind us of the boundaries that inscribe Indological India. Kim provides a subjective and fully participatory perspective that does not perturb and contradict so much as it supplements and completes the objective knowledge contained in archives, artefacts, documents, and maps. He creates the possibility of maintaining the "delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity" (Clifford, "Introduction" 13) that a thoroughgoing ethnography is expected to produce.

Evidently, then, the election of Kim as the central, organizing character of an ethnographic fiction is by no means arbitrary. Indeed, the marvellous boy recommends himself in a variety of ways as an enabling figure for an imperial ethnography of British India. As I have shown, Kipling's narrative discourse rearticulates and reinforces an Orientalist representation of India as part of a timeless, eternal East, as a place that is somehow outside history. It is the business of the Great Game, moreover, to secure India from the perturbations of history: illegitimate princely alliances must be nipped in the bud; Russian incursions must be stopped
at the frontier. Not so surprisingly, a boy plays an important role in this Great Game. Spaces like the India of *Kim*, spaces outside of history, seem to solicit the figure of the boy, even as this figure solicits such spaces. One may recall, in this regard, the “Neverland” of J. M. Barrie’s *Peter Pan*, or the island of the Crusoe myth, which is appropriated for boys in R. M. Ballantyne’s *The Coral Island*. In the popular imagination of Victorian Britain, it would seem that the “boy” is situated outside of history, at least in the sense that he is not in it yet. As Jacqueline Rose observes in *The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction*, the child of Victorian imaginings insistently is envisioned as “a pure point of origin” in relation to language and the social (8). The child—or, as in the present case, the boy of imperial fictions—therefore is presumed to have an intuitive, unmediated, “natural” relation with his world. The boyish presence thus de-historicizes, de-politicizes. The boy provides an alibi of disinterestedness, operating as an embodiment of what Krupat calls “the putatively innocent eye of the observer,” an eye that early ethnographers such as the highly influential Franz Boas (a contemporary of Kipling) did not doubt or question, an eye that could (and should) function without the aid of “aprioristic theory” (Krupat 89-90).

Also at issue in the analysis of Kipling’s work is an effect of cultural and subjective “hybridization,” to employ Homi Bhabha’s useful concept. In evaluating the hybrid Kim’s place within his various cultural contexts, difference and opposition must be understood in cultural (as well as political) terms, not as static and absolute but rather as active, transformative agencies. The value of the hybrid boy, as an instrument for imperial ethnography, is evident in the intersubjective realm, where he serves to mediate cross-cultural colonial relations. Occupying a middle ground between the (adult, male, European) colonizer and the (adult, male, non-European) colonized, a boy like Kim has no stable identity; his subject position—always in flux—can never be reliably assigned. Alternatively, Kim is identified both with the colonizer and with the colonized. European by birth, he is called upon to represent imperial authority. Yet he is very much subject to that authority—as is his counterpart, the “colonial native,” whom the discourse of colonialism insistently represents as a
“child.” The figure of the boy has a function akin to that of the “median category” described by Said in his Orientalism. The “median category,” Said suggests, “allows one to see new things . . . as versions of a previously known thing.” And yet, “such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things” (58-59). As a site of knowledge that is somewhat charted and familiar, the “median category” allows the Orientalist, or the anthropologist, or the ethnographer, to apprehend and to negotiate radical difference. It constitutes a familiarizing displacement: the relatively familiar “Near East” mediates the confrontation with the “Far East”; similarly, the familiar figure of the boy mediates the confrontation of the imperial subject with the potentially uncanny colonial other. One establishes a putative control over this other by envisioning him as a kind of child. This supposed affinity, between the child and the colonial subject, begins to account for the atmosphere of mutually acknowledged peerage characterizing Kim’s relations with subcontinental adults—with fellow Great Gamesters, Mahbub and Hurree, and with the lama, who paradoxically is Kim’s master and his dependent.

Of relatively unfixed, indeterminate identity, the boy is highly susceptible to “indigenization.” (Mowgli with his wolves and Tarzan with his apes represent variations upon this theme.) The boy, however, suffers little from the stigma generally associated with “going native.” The adult colonizer who “goes native” is beyond recuperation—ruined, lost. One may consider Conrad’s Kurtz or, for that matter, Kim’s father—renegade soldier, bazaar loafer, opium addict. The indigenized boy, on the other hand, is taken in hand, recruited, disciplined, and schooled. Unlike the man, the boy does not betray and abandon a European selfhood—he has yet to acquire one. Just as the wolfish Mowgli is not yet human, so Kim, the boy of the bazaar, is not yet European. The boy’s true nature and identity are secured, however, by the invocation of an essentially racialist notion of the relationship of nature to nurture, a notion Jean-François Gournay names “l’intangibilité de l’inné” (389)—the intangibility of the innate. As the narrator assures his readers on the first page of Kim, Kim is
“English” and “white.” The boy of imperial myth lives and moves within a circular teleology: he progresses towards a true character already inscribed in his origin. More important, however, once he has been reclaimed, once he has been adequately, if not entirely, disciplined and subjected, the indigenized boy is an invaluable tool: Kim’s continuing access to subcontinental culture and society enables him to provide imperial power with a view from the inside. Access to the insider perspective, observes Clifford, can provide an ethnographic project with “new angles of vision and depths of understanding” (“Introduction” 9).

Upon cursory consideration, Kipling’s articulation of his ethnographic project in close relation to a hybrid boy seems to resolve the kinds of questions raised in James Clifford’s The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, a deconstructive analysis of the history of Western ethnographic practices. Such questions include the following: How can the supposedly objective outsider effectively and accurately observe a culture? On the other hand, if ethnographic practice entails involvement or even immersion, how then can the ethnographer reliably represent an “otherness” in which he or she is deeply implicated? Is one then a participant or an observer? Does not involvement seriously compromise ethnographic authority? Kipling’s answer to all of these troubling queries is Kim, the indigenized white boy who is able to mediate the ethnographer’s relationship with the “otherness” of India.

In relation to India, the cultural object of study, Kim is offered as an insider/outsider, as the principal agent but also as the spectacular, highly engaging, preferred object of the cross-cultural gaze. Speaking in specifically ethnographic terms, Kim has a function akin to both that of the “participant observer” and that of “native informant.” By recognizing the dualities that inform his role, one can begin to appreciate how the hybrid boy may complicate as well as enable an imperialist ethnographic representation of the cultural other. As the fieldworker who participates and observes, Kim clearly is aligned with British imperial authority, that is, with the power that represents. As the native informant, however, Kim tacitly or implicitly is aligned with the objects of power, with those who are represented. Situ-
ated on both sides of imperialism's power divide, Kim is an ambivalent figure, a site where imperial power is deployed, but also, at least potentially, a site of resistance.

Certainly, the process of Kim's initiation to imperialism's Great Game reveals the boy's capacity to resist, at least partially, the power that plays upon him. During his inaugural mission, Kim dutifully delivers Mahbub Ali's message to Colonel Creighton, then proceeds to spy upon the Colonel and to eavesdrop upon his highly confidential conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Armed Forces. The impetuous boy subsequently relates what he has seen and heard to a crowd of eager Indian listeners. Still later, the schoolboy Kim periodically slips out of the confines of St. Xavier's, to visit his lama or simply to indulge in the pleasures of the town. Disregarding the plans Creighton has made for him, the fledgling agent disappears without a trace during his first three-month school holiday. Kim's accession to the status of full-fledged agent is marked by an esoteric and unauthorized Indian rite of passage: the boy becomes a "Son of the Charm," a member of a secret organization within the secret organization of the Great Game. This exclusively Indian clan, invented by Hurree Babu, is "strictly unofficeal" and, if one can trust Hurree's word, Creighton is entirely unaware of it (182). Kim's insider status, his intimate knowledge of the Indian scene, makes him both a valuable and an uncertain imperial agent. His insider knowledge provides him, moreover, with the means to ensure that his terms are respected; as he warns Mahbub Ali, "a most beautiful land is this of Hind. . . . Into it I will go again if Mahbub Ali or the Colonel lift hand or foot against me. Once gone, who shall find me?" (146).

One must acknowledge nonetheless that neither Mahbub nor the Colonel are greatly worried by Kim's errant escapades (insofar as they are aware of them). The Pathan horse dealer concludes that the colt has spirit; the colonial administrator that the insolent boy has "some resource and nerve" (142). In the end, as both of these senior players correctly surmise, Kim will play the Great Imperial Game and play it well—even if it means endangering Teshoo-lama and compromising the holy man's quest for salvation and enlightenment. Similarly, Kim, as I have suggested,
proves to be a very serviceable ethnographic agent, processing ethnological data ever more thoroughly and efficiently, staging "in person" various Indian cultural "identities," generally enabling imperial power to manoeuvre within and to manipulate the cultural contingencies of British-Indian colonial encounter.

The ethnographic apparatus of *Kim*, however, clearly is not constituted by the hybrid boy alone, but by the relationship between the boy and the narrator. It is the narrator's indispensable function to document the boy's thoughts, feelings, and actions, to gaze upon the boy in the imperial "contact zone"—in "the space of colonial encounters" (Pratt 6)—and to shape the reading both of the boy and of the India he experiences. The narrator of *Kim* is not disengaged from the actions he records. Although something less than an obstreperous presence, this narrator nonetheless manifests himself as a personality, as one who guides affective and imaginative responses and actively assists the sense-making process of his reader.

The narrative enunciation of *Kim* evidences both authoritative detachment and sympathetic engagement. In the novel's first sentence, the narrator refers to "the old Ajaib-Gher—the Wonder House, as the natives call the Lahore Museum." Here, the narrator speaks knowingly yet maintains his authoritative distance, offering first the vernacular name, then immediately translating it and marking it as "native." What "the natives" call the "Ajaib-Gher," the narrator calls the Lahore Museum. Quite clearly, he knows more and better than they do. On the second page, however, the narrator introduces "the big blue and white Jadoo-Gher—the Magic House, as we name the Masonic Lodge." As before, the vernacular name, then the translation—but to whom does this "we" refer? Certainly, "we" know the Masonic Lodge is the Masonic Lodge, and therefore one can assume that "we" are not "natives." The group with which the narrator identifies would seem to be the acclimatized "Anglo-Indian" community. What is noteworthy here is the suggestion that this ostensibly European group prefers to use the vernacular names for things, even for such "un-Indian" things as the Masonic temple. The narrator who represents the hybrid boy identifies himself not with the home-bred English—who, as the Sahiba
will later announce, are "worse than the pestilence" (76)—but with a partially hybridized group whose characteristic habits and attitudes have been inflected by experience of India.

The opening passages of *Kim* raise the question of cultural difference or, more precisely, of cultural differentiation, not only in relation to Kim but also in relation to a "we" proposed as the site of narrative enunciation. Although different from "the natives," this "we" shares a language with them. Yet, as one soon learns, the accessing and ordering of cultural difference in the world of *Kim* cannot be achieved by means of a singular idiom shared by "natives" and partially assimilated colonizers. The opening proposition—that "the natives" call the museum the "Ajaib-Gher"—is a misleadingly simple statement, which presents an ultimately untenable envisioning of "native" homogeneity: the Indian populous, which may concur in designating the museum as a "Wonder House," would nonetheless use a plurality of terms to name it. Kipling's text, as it develops, registers a multiplicity of competing codes—English, Urdu, Hindi, Punjabi, Pushtu—none of which is clearly constituted as definitive and authoritative. English, of course, predominates, but it is not so much a language of preference as one of necessary, if often partial and imperfect, translation. Kipling's narrator not only acknowledges but employs a multiplicity of linguistic codes. His narration stages in a variety of ways the heteroglossia of British India, a heteroglossia that must undermine the early, too-easy rendering of the readily negotiable binary of "we" and "they," of Anglo-Indians and colonized, subordinate "natives."

The language of *Kim* is necessarily hybrid; yet—this must be stressed—it is more hybrid than it needs to be. The narrator chooses to use a variety of "alien" terms, not all of which are marked as such by italics, many of which are not provided with accompanying English translation. Certainly, the narrator's easy familiarity with subcontinental languages tends to support his claim to ethnographic authority. Authority, however, is not the only issue. As I have suggested, the narrator betrays a taste for subcontinental vocabulary and inflection. He uses many foreign terms not once (to show he knows them) but repeatedly. He retains untranslatable puns: "Thy man is rather yagi (bad-
tempered) than yogi (a holy man)” (13). He retains curious instances of hybridized English, such as “tikkut” and “te-rain.” The dialogue the narrator-ethnographer records generally is rendered in a formal, highly figurative, archaic English, a stylistic decision that tends to situate speech and action in the timeless realm of fable, certainly, but also one that foregrounds the act of translation. By mimicking the forms and figures of subcontinental languages, the dialogue recalls that English is very rarely the spoken language of the world of Kim.

The narrator, moreover, does not sharply and consistently distinguish his own voice from that of his characters. Upon the lama’s first appearance, for example, one reads,

[Kim] stopped; for there shuffled round the corner, from the roaring Motee Bazar, such a man as Kim, who thought he knew all castes, had never seen. He was nearly six feet high, dressed in fold upon fold of dingy stuff like horse-blanketing, and not one fold of it could Kim refer to any known trade or profession. (4)

The following brief passage ushers in the novel’s final movement: “Towards evening, when the dust of returning kine made all the horizons smoke, came the lama and Mahbub Ali, both afoot, walking cautiously, for the house had told them where [Kim] had gone” (283). The narrator’s discourse, as evidenced in these passages, is like the dialogue he records: it is richly (at times extravagantly) figured, faintly archaic, syntactically idiosyncratic.

The language of Kim fails to create for the narrator a singular and separate position of synoptic transcendence. Unquestionably, the totalizing voice of ethnographic (and imperial) authority asserts itself when the narrator offers peremptory statements upon the Orient. And yet, this same narrator, on occasion, records with dispassionate equanimity outlandish manifestations of the Indian folkloric imagination, as if rendering yet another cultural fact: “A churel is the peculiarly malignant ghost of a woman who has died in child-bed. She haunts lonely roads, her feet are turned backwards on the ankles, and she leads men to torment” (138). When Kim and the lama take to the Grand Trunk Road, the narrator notes an encounter with “a troop of long-haired, strong-scented Sansis with baskets of lizards and
other unclean food on their backs" (71). One might assume, according to colonialist stereotype, that all “natives” are “strong­scented.” In terms of British food standards, furthermore, lizard would be distasteful and disgusting rather than “unclean”—a term that would sound quite pentateuchal and archaic to the modern, metropolitan, English ear. A change of identification, positionality, and perspective is evident here, a change that takes a more extreme form when the narrator speaks of “the English”—“the careless, open-spoken English folk” (148)—as if referring to an alien group, or when he alludes, with bland disparage­ment, to “the dull fat eyes of . . . Sahibs” (118). Evidently, “the English,” as much as, if not more than, “the natives,” find their position in the “they” of narrative enunciation.

The narrator, as one would expect, keeps very close to the eponymous hero of Kipling’s text. The alluring presence of Kim provokes and, in a sense, justifies the shifting of the narrator’s position, away from authoritative, informed detachment and towards sympathetic involvement. The narrator is quick to suggest that he, like Kim, is one of those who prefer to speak in the vernacular. Like Kim, he confronts subcontinental folklore with the casual imperturbability of an insider. For the narrator, as for Kim, the Sansis are specifically and notably “strong-scented.” For both of them, a cultural hygiene that pronounces lizards “unclean” is familiar, commonplace. For both, “the English” constitute a more-or-less antipathetic, alien group. Clearly, the narrator identifies with Kim and strives to demonstrate that he has access to Kim’s experience, that he can see the world through the boy’s eyes. It is most notably in delineating the relationship between the narrator and the hybrid boy that Kipling articulates and negotiates what Zohreh T. Sullivan describes as his “fantasy of integration between the oppositional roles of colonizer and colonized and of the master who rules and the child who desires” (148).

Ethnographically speaking, once again, the narrator and Kim, at least upon cursory examination, seem to enjoy a fairly work­able, complementary relationship. The two together reproduce the two faces of the ethnographer as participant-observer. The first face, as outlined by Clifford, is that of the child in the process
of discovering and learning; the second is that of the knowing adult-initiate who later writes the experience (*Predicament* 40). Clifford, however, characterizes this dyadic paradigm as a "fable of rapport," observing that the crucial transition, the progress from the child's often intense experience to the adult's "confident, disabused knowledge" is generally an achievement of style, a ruse of the finished text (40-41). The question to be asked of Kipling’s narrator, then, is the same as that which Clifford asks of the ethnographer who involves himself in the culture he studies: “If ethnography produces cultural experiences through intense research experiences, how is unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account?” (25). Clifford finds that intensive involvement with the culture of study invariably undermines the ethnographer’s capacity to maintain stable, coherent positionality as a subject of discourse: the ethnography of involvement tends to be composed, as is *Kim*, from "a series of discontinuous discursive positions" (33).

*Kim* reproduces the paradigmatic adult-child dyad of cross-cultural knowledge-gathering and writing and in so doing destabilizes its enunciative process. The knowing adult, rather than establishing his authoritative distance and difference, alters his subject position in response to the charming child. The more fully hybridized *Kim* enjoys powers of access and pleasures of involvement that the narrator can only experience, as it were, vicariously. For this narrator, *Kim*, evidently, is both an object of imaginary identification and a site of desire. *Kim* provides an appealing image of freedom, of plenitude, of "being" not yet fully regimented in and by the Symbolic; as Abdul JanMohamed observes, *Kim* inhabits "a world of pure becoming... Endowed by the narrator with special talents, he can do anything and become anybody" (97). Yet, at the same time, *Kim* may be said to represent the narrator’s lack-of-being; the boy ostensibly experiences, lives, what the narrator merely observes and documents. The anthropologist Stephen Tyler notes that “ethnography can perform a therapeutic purpose in evoking a participatory reality,” but he emphasizes that “non-participatory textualization is alienation—‘not us’—and there is no therapy in alienation” (128). If it is true that the narrator’s representational mastery
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presupposes a certain degree of detachment or objectivity, it is also true that the figure of Kim tends to situate the experience of India elsewhere, outside and beyond the narrator’s ken. Yet, by aligning himself with Kim, by sporadically identifying with him, the narrator-ethnographer therapeutically restores himself, at least momentarily, to a subject position where knowledge and fulsome experience come together. The narrator must therefore vacillate between seeing and being, between the site of authoritative, “objective” (but ultimately alienated) representation and the site of the restorative but unruly experience of involvement and cross-cultural identification.8

Quite apart from ethnographic considerations, however, the relationship between the adult who represents and the child who is represented is curiously and complexly fraught. In The Case of Peter Pan or: The Impossibility of Children’s Literature, Jacqueline Rose argues that Freudian psychoanalysis, with its discovery of the unconscious, radically problematizes the traditional envisioning of the chronology of a human life. The unconscious undermines the claim to a stable, coherent identity, a unified self emerging out of a history it somehow transcends. After Freud, therefore, it becomes impossible to envision childhood merely as a temporary stage of the passage from infancy to adulthood. On the contrary, asserts Rose, “childhood is something in which we continue to be implicated and which is never simply left behind. Childhood persists. . . . It persists as something which we endlessly rework in our attempt to build an image of our own history” (12). This quest for coherent personal history and identity necessarily entraps us in a mirror-maze of representations—representations of the stable self that supposedly, wishfully, we are, and representations of the child we were. The adult therefore cannot speak of or for the child from a position of representational mastery, because the boundary that separates the child from the adult is not clear-cut. Re-examined in the light of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious, this boundary is no longer obvious.

The question of representation in Kim, however, is complicated further by the fact that the figure of the child is intimately linked with representations of the colonial subject-ethnography’s other. Two figures are caught up in a complex
metonymy: to invoke the child is to invoke the colonial subject and vice versa. It is important, however, to recognize that the two terms are not equivalent, that their relation tends to be metonymic rather than metaphorical. The play of similarity and difference characterizing their relation is precisely what allows the two terms to function within a discourse of domination: each term can be used to mediate and manage, to render meaningful and comprehensible, the ethnographic speaking subject’s relation with the other. The speaking subject, however, also can be drawn into the play of similarity and difference. The doubly complex—Rose might say, doubly impossible—ambition enacted by Kipling’s text is to attempt, from the point of view of the adult, to represent the child and to attempt, as an involved ethnographer, to represent imperialism’s cultural other. In his relation both with the child and with the cultural other, the narrator’s claim to representational mastery is deeply compromised. In both cases, the boundary between the representing subject and the represented other reveals itself to be tenuous, uncertain. And, of course, the metonymic linkages between the two objects of representation redoubles the complexity of the undertaking, making it all the more difficult to manage.

Elucidation of these last points requires a return to the text of Kim, a close consideration of Kipling’s project in process. Following an extensive and confidential discussion on the topic of the Great Game, Kim and Hurree Chunder Mookerjee take leave of each other: “Hurree Babu stepped back a pace or two into the crowd at the entrance of Lucknow station—and was gone. Kim drew a deep breath and hugged himself all over” (184). What, one must ask, is the affective content of Kim’s gesture of self-hugging? Adequate evaluation of that content demands, in my view, an appreciation of its ambivalence: the gesture is informed by joy and anxiety. Both of these affects are registered by Kipling’s text, which evokes, first, Kim’s “glad rapture” (184), then, shortly after, “a sudden natural reaction” (185), the boy’s self-questioning and sense of self-alienation.

Certainly, Hurree is a potentially unsettling individual, as his sudden uncanny disappearance testifies. He is a very slippery character—or rather “oily,” to use Kipling’s own often-repeated
adjective. The surface, the boundary, of his person is slick, elusive, ungraspable. His is a liminal body, a liminal selfhood: here Hurree melts into a crowd; elsewhere he stows about his body the various elements of a large intelligence trove, then transforms his entire aspect and demeanour, his very identity, while passing through a doorway. And if a certain joyful freedom attends the experience and the experimentation of such liminality, it associates itself with “glad rapture,” a sudden melding of self and other. It may be apt to speak, therefore, of joyful self-loss, or of jouissance, an extreme, excessive pleasure that challenges and disrupts any claim to coherent self-sameness. Manifestations of Hurree’s uncanny, liminal selfhood challenge any secure division between self and other, any secure sense of an insular, individualized identity. Even the hybrid boy, who also knows the ecstatic pleasures of shape-shifting, becomes anxious. Kim, at this point a graduate of St. Xavier’s, has been schooled to a bounded British sense of self. As Hurree observes, an unsupervised “half year of leave” is necessary “to make [Kim] de-Englishised” (184).

In the act of hugging himself, Kim discovers keys to his identity, which serve, at least momentarily, to reassure him: “The nickel-plated revolver he could feel in the bosom of his sad-coloured robe, the amulet was on his neck; begging gourd, rosary, and ghost-dagger . . . were all to hand, with medicine, paint-box, and compass, and in a worn old purse belt embroidered with porcupine-quill patterns lay a month’s pay” (201). Kim’s process of self-seeking immediately returns him to his “props”; he can recover himself only by taking stock of his personal possessions, of his weapons, cultural curios, scientific tools, money—the little bits of identity that others have given him. Kim is the product of an eclectic bricolage; his identity, it seems, can never be more than contingent. Self-hugging, then, performs a “suturing” of self, a joyful self-possession, as if to say, “Yes! it’s all mine, and I can hold it all together!”—and, at the same time, an anxious self-seeking, a questioning of self, “Am I really here? Am I the sum of these various parts?”

Kim now re-poses the question he has posed before: “Who is Kim—Kim—Kim?” The narrator chooses, once again, to impli-
cate himself in Kim’s subjective process: “A very few white people, but many Asiatics, can throw themselves into amazement as it were by repeating their own names over and over again to themselves, letting the mind go free upon speculation as to what is called personal identity. When one grows older, the power, usually, departs, but while it lasts it may descend upon a man at any moment” (185). The liminal identities of the adolescent and the colonial subject thus are brought into close association: the “power” of profound self-questioning pertains to “many Asiatics”; it usually diminishes or disappears “when one grows older.” The narrator nonetheless implicates himself in Kim’s bewilderment: maintaining a contemplative, almost confessional tone, he pushes to the limit his tacit claim to knowledge of Kim’s interiority, implicitly affirming a personal, experiential understanding of the boy’s crisis of identity. More than this, his reflections serve to generalize the import of Kim’s question, opening up a radical interrogation of the concept of stable, definable selfhood—“what is called personal identity.” Thus, in relation to Kim, Kipling poses the question of personal and cultural identity within a multicultural, imperial context, and then leaves the question unresolved. The recurring question—“Who is Kim?”—is, must be, the crucial question of *Kim*, which employs the boy, in a variety of ways, to mark cultural distinctions and to posit identities upon and in relation to those distinctions. Yet to ask “Who is Kim?” or, as the question is finally posed, “What is Kim?” (282), is to recall the radical and multiple indeterminacies that attend cultural hybridization in the contact zones of the empire. An enigma resides at the core of Kipling’s ethnographic project; it is this enigma, the hybrid boy, that provides the project with its energizing, enabling figure.  

As Sara Suleri astutely remarks, moreover, Kim’s marvellous, enigmatic boyhood is unresolvable, unsurpassable. She suggests, “Kipling supplies a casual but crucial anticipation of the collapsibility of Kim” (127), fatefuly linking the richness of Kim’s gifts with the brevity of their duration: “[Kim’s] quickness would have delighted an English master; but at St. Xavier’s they know the first rush of minds developed by sun and surroundings, as they
know the half-collapse that sets in at twenty-two or twenty-three” (Kipling 124; qtd. in Suleri 127; emphasis added). For Suleri, the figure of Kim “become[s] the image of the colonizer, but one that is elegiacally mourned in the passing of its prematurity” (129); the text of *Kim* becomes “an allegory of colonial education” (130), a life-education discovering “that in its adolescence is its end” (131). Kim’s unimaginable “maturity,” like that of the empire he is called upon to represent, therefore must be interminably deferred. The predicament implied by Kim’s truncated *Bildung*, his insuperable adolescence, mirrors the problem of imperial consolidation, the problem of an empire that has not discovered—that may never discover—its appropriate coming of age.

Kipling’s *Kim* thus mutedly but unmistakably gives voice to what Clifford has called the ethnographic “allegory of salvage.” Such allegory, Clifford argues, “translates experience into text,” capturing and recording the furtive moments of cultural “life,” writing itself against (and yet in tacit or explicit acknowledgment of) the ineluctable transience of “words and deeds” (115). Typically, therefore, the ethnographer laments “the vanishing primitive” his text records, announces “the end of traditional society” and the ineluctable disappearance of “the other [who] is lost, in disintegrating time and space, but saved by the text” (112). Typically, too, such ethnography is informed by the assumption that “the other society is weak and ‘needs’ to be represented by an outsider (and that what matters in its life is its past, not present or future)” (113). The pertinence of the allegory of salvage for the reading of *Kim*, which the close analysis of its adolescent protagonist most tellingly confirms, is also suggested by the novel’s frequently fond and nostalgic tone and by its detailed evocation of a remembered world—the India of the 1880s, the India that, at the time of *Kim*’s appearance in 1901, its author had not witnessed for ten changeful years. Moreover, the text presents occasional, explicit inscriptions acknowledging India’s historical transformation: the narrator remarks upon “the mixture of old-world piety and modern progress that is the note of India to-day” (11) and records various manifestations of “India in transition” (239). And indeed, as I noted earlier, the Great
Game endeavours to preserve a timeless, changeless India; its relation with India is energized by an allegory of salvage.

Yet the India of *Kim*, as the salient presence of the Great Game confirms, is not so much archaic India as it is India under the Raj. It is the Raj during a period Percival Spear has characterized as "The Imperial Heyday" (145ff.) that Rudyard Kipling seeks to capture, to preserve against the inevitable violence of time. *Kim*, despite the considerable sustenance it offers to the imperial "illusion of permanence" (Hutchins), announces in its ethnography the passing of the Raj. Its assiduous efforts in the realm of cultural description assert a knowledge *imperium*, yet at the same time evidence an anxious desire to grasp and retain fugitive cultural realities; its narrative ultimately "occurs to confirm the precariousness of power" (Suleri 23). If Kipling's *Kim* is an ethnographic text that, in Clifford's terms, can "effectively implicate readers in the complex subjectivity of participant observation" (*Predicament* 33), it also involves imperial subjectivity and authority in the compromising complexities of cross-cultural confrontation and negotiation. The text ultimately confirms Tyler's "first law of culture, which says that 'the more man controls anything, the more uncontrollable both become'" (123).10 Kipling's Indian empire and his wondrous hybrid boy exceed and elude the controlling, containing grasp of imperial and ethnographic authority; both escape towards what, from Kipling's historical perspective, is an unforeseeable, unrecognizable future. *Kim*, once considered and evaluated as ethnography, reads as the Raj's celebratory swan-song.

NOTES

1 In accordance with Saidian scholarship, the quotation marks enclosing the word "Orient" are intended to mark it as a concept and to question it as a designation of a cultural actuality or locale. Having thus noted the dubiousness of "Orient" and "Oriental" as terms of cultural description, I will henceforth omit the quotation marks.

2 In "*Kim* and Orientalism," Williams isolates Orientalist "knowledge" as an "adjunct of colonial control," which, in Kipling's text, most often takes "the form of bold syntheses, universal norms, invariant truths about Orientals" (41). For Williams, "foremost among such truths is that of the duplicitous, perpetually untruthful Oriental" (42); I, however, stress Kipling's production of "truths" about Oriental time.
Of course, Kim, as reader-observer, plays a key role in the textualization of Indian culture. As Mohanty notes, Kim's training requires that he develop a "specific faculty of perceiving unities and differences as interpretable social facts," that he become "a competent and reliable reader of texts, ultimately, in fact, of society as text" (317–18).

Bhabha's concern with the ambivalences of colonial discourse and the consequent hybridity or liminality of colonial subjectivity informs much of his criticism, but it is most clearly and thoroughly presented in "Signs Taken for Wonders." He writes:

If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization rather than the noisy command of colonialist authority or the silent repression of native traditions, then an important change of perspective occurs. It reveals the ambivalence at the source of traditional discourses of authority and enables a form of subversion, founded on that uncertainty, that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention. (154)

Cultural hybridity (which saliently is represented in the figure of Kim) thus emerges for the postcolonial critic as "a problematic of colonial representation and individuation" (156).

The treatment of Teshoo-lama provides an instructive case in point. From his first appearance a thematics of childhood attaches to the character. He is pictured as "helpless" (5), unable to make his own way in the world—in need of direction, incapable of effectively providing for his fundamental need for food. He promptly manifests guilelessness (a childish trait with which the precocious Kim is not burdened) and a capacity for wonderment. Explicit inscriptions of the child-figure soon follow: the lama presents the curator with a note of introduction bearing "clumsy, childish print" (7); touring the museum, the holy man is "delighted as a child at each new trove" (8); "Simply as a child" (13), the old man delivers his begging-bowl to Kim; he discusses future projects with his new-found disciple, speaking as "hopefully as a child" (34).

The deployments of race and ethnicity I note here clearly reflect what Satya P. Mohanty characterizes as the "racialization" of intercultural relations under the Raj, the production of an essentializing, hierarchizing discourse of race that "narrates conditions of political and ethical possibility" (314). It is only in the context of such racialization that Kim's "Englishness" and "whiteness" can be asserted in the face of the concurrently acknowledged peculiarities of his acculturation.

Judith Plötz notes in Kim the foregrounding of "linguistic 'code switching,'" affirming that the "India of Kim is not a babel but a harmony of many voices" (115) and that "Kipling's single Kim idiom contains all the differing codes" (116). While I would not contradict either statement, I would observe that neither acknowledges the narrator as a character who speaks various voices and participates in various codes. To consider the narrator as a character-speaker complicates considerably the issue of "code switching."

My focus here is on the narrator's relationship with Kim. I do not posit Kim as a pure site of being—and belonging—an untenable position insofar as Kim's engagement in the Great Game seriously compromises his insider status with respect to Indian culture and involves him in the same subjective dilemmas I now ascribe to the narrator.

As Plötz points out, "[b]y a genial touch 'Kim' means who in Turkish, so that 'who' is 'Kim' and 'Kim' is 'who.'" However, the unfortunate boy, "necessarily self-unknowing, 'knows no Turki'" (114). This canny reader's translation of "Kim" (a translation that neither the boy nor any other character within the text seems capable of performing) further encrypts the mystery of identity.
Colonel Creighton, to and through whom a vast amount of ethnological and political information flows, comes very close to an imperial restatement of Tyler's "first law": "The more one knows about natives the less one can say what they will or won't do" (111).

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