Decolonizing the Map: 
Post-Colonialism, Post- Structuralism and the Cartographic Connection

GRAHAM HUGGAN

We're not going to get away from structures. But we could do with some lithe, open, agile, portable structures, some articulating structures . . . we can't all go the same place . . . we have to go together in different directions.

ROBERT BRINGHURST, Pieces of Map, Pieces of Music

The problem with maps is they take imagination. 
Our need for contour invents the curve, our demand for straight lines will have measurement laid out in bones. Direction rips the creel out of our hand. To let go now is to become air-borne, a kite, map, journey . . .

THOMAS SHAPCOTT, “Maps”

The fascination of Canadian, Australian and other post-colonial writers with the figure of the map has resulted in a wide range of literary responses both to physical (geographical) maps, which are shown to have operated effectively, but often restrictively or coercively, in the implementation of colonial policy, and to conceptual (metaphorical) maps which are perceived to operate as exemplars of, and therefore to provide a framework for the critique of, colonial discourse.¹ The exemplary role of cartography in the demonstration of colonial discursive practices can be identified in a series of key rhetorical strategies implemented in the production of the map, such as the reinscription, enclosure and hierarchization of space, which provide an analogue for the acquisition, management and reinforcement of colonial power.² My initial focus in this paper, however, will be on a further point of
contact between cartography and colonialism, namely the proce-
dures, and implications, of mimetic representation.

Mimesis, besides providing a theoretical basis for cartographic
practice, based now as throughout much of the history of cartogra-
phy on the possibility of producing a plausible reconstruction of a
specific geographical environment, has proved through the ages to
be a cornerstone of Western culture. Although the viability of
mimetic representation has been repeatedly contested at least since
the time of Plato, mimesis has consistently provided a means of
promoting and reinforcing the stability of Western culture. Yet,
as theorists of colonialism such as Homi Bhabha and Edward Said
(among others) have shown, mimesis has also historically served
the colonial discourse which justifies the dispossession and sub-
jugation of so-called “non-Western” peoples; for the representa-
tion of reality endorsed by mimesis is, after all, the representation
of a particular kind or view of reality: that of the West. In this
context, the imitative operations of mimesis can be seen to have
stabilized (or attempted to stabilize) a falsely essentialist view of
the world which negates or suppresses alternative views which
might endanger the privileged position of its Western perceiver.
Edward Said has related this view to the “synchronic essentialism”
which he envisages as characteristic of Orientalist and other forms
of colonial discourse. Said emphasizes, however, that the apparent
stability of colonial discursive formations has been placed under
continual threat both by historical forces which disrupt or at least
challenge the discursive system adopted and applied by the domi-
nant culture (or cultural group), and by internal inconsistencies
within the system itself. These inconsistencies, claims Said, are
brought to light when the system is imposed on cultures perceptibly
different from that of the dominant.

Supporting Said’s claim, Homi Bhabha identifies colonial dis-
course as an agonistic rather than an antagonistic mode whose
effect is not to reinforce colonial authority but rather to produce
a form of hybridization which mimics that authority. Bhabha cor-
respondingly distinguishes between mimesis as an apparently
homogeneous system of representation and mimicry as the articula-
tion of a desire for a “reformed, recognized other . . . as the subject
of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (“Mimicry”
Colonial discourse, Bhabha goes on to suggest, is the site of a clash between the Western desire for a uniform self and the need to define that self against reformed “others” which, although produced in the self’s likeness, are never quite the same; the result is a double articulation in which “the representation of a difference... is itself a process of disavowal” (“Mimicry” 126). The destabilizing process set in motion by colonial mimicry produces a set of deceptive, even derisive, “resemblances” which implicitly question the homogenizing practices of colonial discourse. Mimicry also invokes a wider challenge to the authority of colonial representation by redefining the desire of the colonial powers to “fix” its own position as a form of “fixation,” an obsession which, manifested in the fetization of the other (through the workings of stereotype, discriminatory classification, etc.), confirms the fear that the supposedly normative values of the colonizer will come to be challenged, and eventually displaced, by the colonized. Thus, argues Bhabha, there is an ambivalence written into colonial discourse through which the informing colonial presence is “split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation as repetition and difference” (“Signs” 93).

I have dwelt on this — inevitably oversimplified — paraphrase of Bhabha’s theory because it seems to me that the shortcomings of the discursive system he describes are strikingly similar to those of the map, itself split between its appearance as a “coherent,” controlling structure and its articulation as a series of differential analogies. In this context, cartographic discourse can be considered to resemble colonial discourse as a “narrative in which the productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a reformed and recognized totality” (DC 156). Yet cartographic discourse, I would argue, is also characterized by the discrepancy between its authoritative status and its approximative function, a discrepancy which marks out the “recognizable totality” of the map as a manifestation of the desire for control rather than as an authenticating seal of coherence. The “uniformity” of the map therefore becomes the subject of a proposition rather than a statement of fact; moreover, this proposition comes to be identified with the “mimetic fallacy” through which an approximate, subjectively reconstituted and historically contingent model of the
"real" world is passed off as an accurate, objectively presented and universally applicable copy. I stated before that the "reality" represented mimetically by the map not only conforms to a particular version of the world but to a version which is specifically designed to empower its makers. José Rabasa’s critical reading of Mercator’s seventeenth-century Atlas, for example, reveals historical links between the “reality” represented by Western world-maps and a privileged Eurocentric organization of geographic space which “institute[s] a systematic forgetfulness of antecedent spatial configurations” (6). Corroborating Rabasa’s thesis, Gayatri Spivak uses the more recent example of the cartographic reinscription of India by the British raj to illustrate the colonizer’s “necessary yet contradictory assumption of an uninscribed earth” (133). This assumption, claims Spivak, “generates the force to make the [colonized] native see himself as other” (133); but as she implies in her use of the word “contradictory,” the desire to appropriate, secure and perpetuate the position of an other or others manifested in the regulatory operations of cartographic discourse and, by analogy, in the stabilizing rhetoric of colonial discourse, neither guarantees the effectiveness of colonial rule nor ensures the coherence of the discursive system which underwrites it. To return to Rabasa’s reading of Mercator, the apparent coherence of cartographic discourse is historically associated with the desire to stabilize the foundations of a self-privileging Western culture. But this coherence is then contradicted by what Rabasa calls “blind spots” in the map which, brought to light in a rigorous deconstructive reading, identify the map’s supposedly “universal” mode of representation as a set of rhetorical strategies which reinforce the prelocated authority of its European makers. Furthermore, these blind spots reveal flaws in the overall presentation of the map which allow it to be read in alternative, “non-European” modes; what passes for “universal” history therefore remains undecidable not “on account of a theoretical deconstruction of teleology and eschatology, but due to an everpresent deconstruction of Eurocentric world views by the rest of the world” (12).

Rabasa’s application of a deconstructive methodology to the critique of European colonialism suggests that a working alliance may be formed between deconstruction as a process of displace-
ment which registers an attempted dissociation from a dominant discursive system and decolonization as a process of cultural transformation which involves the ongoing critique of colonial discourse. To explore more fully the implications of this alliance, I shall devote the next section of the paper to a brief commentary on three concepts which suggest the applicability of post-structuralist “positions” (Jacques Derrida’s term) to the critique of colonial discourse: these terms are, respectively, structure, simulacrum, and displacement.

The most succinct discussion of the first of these concepts is in Derrida’s seminal essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” His claim is as follows:

Structure, or rather the structurality of structure . . . has always been neutralized or reduced [in Western science and philosophy] by a process of giving it a centre or referring to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this centre was not only to orient, balance and organize the structure, but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the centre of a structure permits the play of its elements within the total form . . . [but] the concept of a centred structure, although it represents coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science, is contradictorily coherent. (“Structure” 279)

Derrida’s postulation of the “contradictory coherence” of a discursive system reliant on the concept of a “centred structure” recalls Bhabha’s reading of the ambivalence of colonial discourse; it also undermines the claim to coherence of cartographic discourse by revealing that the exemplary structuralist activity involved in the production of the map (the demarcation of boundaries, allocation of points and connection of lines within an enclosed, self-sufficient unit) traces back to a “point of presence” whose stability cannot be guaranteed. The “rules” of cartography, both those which function overtly in the systematic organization of the map and those which are implied in the empowering methods of its production, are duly discovered to pertain to a desire for control expressed by the power-group or groups responsible for the articulation of the map. This desire, however, is controverted by insufficiencies both within the assembled structure and, by implication,
within its controlling agency, which is discovered to have laid false claim to the fixity of its own origins and to the coherence of the system it orients and organizes. In this way, cartographic discourse can be seen to play an exemplary role not only in the demonstration of the empowering strategies of colonialist rhetoric but in the unwitting exposure of the deficiencies of these strategies. The “contradictory coherence” implied by the map’s systematic inscription on a supposedly “uninscribed” earth reveals it, moreover, as a palimpsest covering over alternative spatial configurations which, once brought to light, indicate both the plurality of possible perspectives on, and the inadequacy of any single model of, the world. Thus, Swift’s famous derision of those seventeenth-century European cartographers who “in their Afric-maps with savage-pictures fill[ed] their gaps” neatly complements Rabasa’s deconstructive analysis of Mercator’s (contemporary) Atlas, which highlights conspicuous gaps, absences and inconsistencies in the presented text as a means of exposing flaws in the wider discursive system it exemplifies. A similar argument can be brought to bear on conceptual maps; as Kevin Hart observes in his gloss on Derrida, “all maps seek to be both complete and consistent but . . . in each case these are hidden gaps of one kind or another . . . [which] occur because each thinker takes either the material world or the conceptual world to be an instance of full presence; and, as Derrida argues, there can be no such thing: what seems to be a plenitude of presence is always already divided against self” (110). The issue is thus not whether deconstruction can somehow provide a “better” map but the eventual problematization of “any discourse which proposes itself as an exact map of reality” (113).

Derrida’s implied critique of cartographic exactitude involves a reassessment of the relation between structure and simulacrum. The goal of structuralist activity, explains Roland Barthes, is to reconstruct an object in such a way as to manifest the rules of its functioning . . . structure is therefore a simulacrum of the object, but a direct interested simulacrum, since the imitated object makes something appear which remained invisible or . . . unintelligible in the natural object . . . the simulacrum is intellect added to object, and this addition has an anthropological value, in that it is man himself, his history, his situation, his freedom, and the very resistance which nature offers to his mind. (214-15)
Here again, cartography can be seen to exemplify structuralist procedure. A simulacrum of the world (or part of it) is produced through the participation of the intellect in the abstract reorganization of its “natural object”: the external environment. But this participation is never neutral; thus, turning Barthes’ terms against himself in a characteristically deconstructive ploy, we can identify the “anthropological content” of the map not just in the history, but in the interested history of man. So in Eurocentric maps such as Mercator’s, to retain the working example, what the “imitated object” (the map) “makes appear” in the “natural object” it reconstructs (the world) is the anterior presence of the West, which is consequently revealed as the common denominator for the exemplary structuralist activity involved in the production of, and vouchsafing the “coherence” of, the map. A deconstructive reading of the Western map, on the other hand, is one which, focusing on the inevitable discrepancy between the “natural” and the “imitated” object, displaces the “original” presence of the West in such a way as to undermine the ideology which justifies its relations of power. This operation of displacement is tantamount to a “decolonization” of the map, where decolonization entails an identification of and perceived dissociation from the empowering strategies of colonial discourse (including, for example, a rejection of its false claim to a “universal” history). The result is a dismantling of the self-privileging authority of the West which also suggests that the relations between the “natural” and the “imitated” object which inform the procedures of cartographic representation are motivated by the will to power and, further, that these relations ultimately pertain neither to an “objective” representation nor even to a “subjective” reconstruction of the “real” world but rather to a play between alternative simulacra which problematizes the easy distinction between object and subject. In this sense, Barthes’ distinction between the “natural” and the “imitated” object is jeopardized from the outset because the metaphorical activity involved in the imitation of an object presupposes a stability and, to use Derrida’s term, a “fullness of presence,” which that “original” object does not possess. Thus, the process of displacement engendered by deconstruction can be seen as one which disrupts the neat distinction between oppositional terms by
emphasizing the instability of both the terms themselves and the structural relation between them. The relevance of this disruptive process to the practice of cartography is considerable; for not only is the metaphorical resemblance between the map and the reality it purports to represent invalidated, or at least called into question, by the displacement of the ontologically stable relation between the "original" and its "copy," but this proposed resemblance is discovered to be the product of an ideological imposition which traces back to an identifiable rhetorical bias. This bias is related by Derrida to the metaphysics of presence which he associates with Western logocentrism, but as Bhabha, Said and Spivak, among others, have illustrated in their analysis of the figures of colonial discourse, it must always be situated within its specific cultural and historical context.

Thus, as Jonathan Culler has observed, the disruptive manoeuvres involved in deconstructionist activity shift emphasis from a conceptual opposition based on binary logic to an ideological imposition where that logic is used to justify, maintain and re-inforce a specific socio-political system based on rigidly defined relations of power (150). The usefulness of deconstruction in exposing and undermining systems of this kind suggests that, rather than being perceived as a decontextualized theory which leads to a form of political quietism through its deferral of the decisions which might engender social change, a form of philosophical anarchism through its insistent refutation of "standard" wisdoms (Hulme; Felperin), or a paradoxical reinforcement of Western authoritarianism through its disguised relocation of, rather than its alleged dislocation of, Western ontological and epistemological biases, deconstruction can, by contrast, be considered as a contextualized praxis which enables the exercise of cultural critique and, in particular, the exposure of and resistance to forms of cultural domination. The rest of this paper concerns itself with a particular aspect of this praxis, namely the ironic and/or parodie treatment of maps as metaphors in post-colonial literary texts, the role played by these maps in the geographical and conceptual de/reterritorialization of post-colonial cultures, and the relevance of this process to the wider issue of cultural decolonization.
The prevalence of the map topos in contemporary post-colonial literary texts, and the frequency of its ironic and/or parodic usage in these texts, suggests a link between a de/reconstructive reading of maps and a revisioning of the history of European colonialism. This revisionary process is most obvious, perhaps, in the fiction of the Caribbean writer Wilson Harris, where the map features as a metaphor of perceptual transformation which allows for the revisioning of Caribbean cultural history in terms other than those of catastrophe or complex. Throughout his work, Harris stresses the relativity of modes of cultural perception; thus, although he recognizes that a deconstruction of the social text of European colonialism is the prerequisite for a reconstruction of post-colonial Caribbean culture, he emphasizes that this and other post-colonial cultures neither be perceived in essentialist terms, nor divested of its/their implication in the European colonial enterprise. The hybrid forms of Caribbean and other post-colonial cultures merely accentuate the transitional status of all cultures; so while the map is ironized on the one hand in Harris's work as a visual analogue for the inflexibility of colonial attitudes and for the "synchronic essentialism" of colonial discourse, it is celebrated on the other as an agent of cultural transformation and as a medium for the imaginative revisioning of cultural history.

More recent developments in post-colonial writing and, in particular, in the Canadian and Australian literatures, suggest a shift of emphasis from the interrogation of European colonial history to the overt or implied critique of unquestioned nationalist attitudes which are viewed as "synchronic" formations particular not to post-colonial but, ironically, to colonial discourse. A characteristic of contemporary Canadian and Australian writing is a multiplication of spatial references which has resulted not only in an increased range of national and international locations but also in a series of "territorial disputes" which pose a challenge to the self-acknowledging "mainstreams" of metropolitan culture, to the hegemonic tendencies of patriarchal and ethnocentric discourses, and implicitly, I would argue, to the homogeneity assumed and/or imposed by colonialist rhetoric. These revised forms of cultural decolonization have brought with them a paradoxical alliance between internationalist and regionalist camps where the spaces
occurred by the "international," like those by the "regional," do not so much forge new definitions as denote the semantic slippage between prescribed definitions of place. The attempt by writers such as Hodgins and Malouf to project spaces other than, or by writers such as Van Herk and Atwood, to articulate the spaces between, those prescribed by dominant cultures or cultural groups, indicates a resistance to the notion of cartographic enclosure and to the imposed cultural limits that notion implies. Yet the range of geographical locations and diversity of functions served by the map metaphor in the contemporary Canadian and Australian literatures suggests a desire on the part of their respective writers not merely to deterritorialize, but also to reterritorialize, their increasingly multiform cultures. The dual tendencies towards geographical dispersal (as, for example, in the "Asian" fictions of Koch and Rivard) and cultural decentralization (as, for example, in the hyperbolically fragmented texts of Bail and Kroetsch) can therefore be seen within the context of a repositioning of the traditional "mimetic fallacy" of cartographic representation. The map no longer features as a visual paradigm for the ontological anxiety arising from frustrated attempts to define a national culture, but rather as a locus of productive dissimilarity where the provisional connections of cartography suggest an ongoing perceptual transformation which in turn stresses the transitional nature of post-colonial discourse. This transformation has been placed within the context of a shift from an earlier "colonial" fiction obsessed with the problems of writing in a "colonial space" to a later, "post-colonial" fiction which emphasizes the provisionality of all cultures and which celebrates the particular diversity of formerly colonized cultures whose ethnic mix can no longer be considered in terms of the colonial stigmas associated with mixed blood or cultural schizophrenia. Thus, while it would be unwise to suggest that the traditional Canadian and Australian concerns with cultural identity have become outmoded, the reassessment of cartography in many of their most recent literary texts indicates a shift of emphasis away from the desire for homogeneity towards an acceptance of diversity reflected in the interpretation of the map, not as a means of spatial containment or systematic organization, but
as a medium of spatial perception which allows for the reformulation of links both within and between cultures.

In this context, the “new spaces” of post-colonial writing in Canada and Australia can be considered to resist one form of cartographic discourse, whose patterns of coercion and containment are historically implicated in the colonial enterprise, but to advocate another, whose flexible cross-cultural patterns not only counteract the monolithic conventions of the West but revision the map itself as the expression of a shifting ground between alternative metaphors rather than as the approximate representation of a “literal truth.” This paradoxical motion of the map as a “shifting ground” is discussed at length by the French post-structuralists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. For Deleuze and Guattari, maps are experimental in orientation:

The map is open and connectable in all its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, re-worked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on the wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. (Deleuze and Guattari 12)

The flexible design of the map is likened by Deleuze and Guattari to that of the rhizome, whose “deteritorializing lines of flight” (222) effect “an asignifying rupture against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure” (7-9).

As Diana Brydon has illustrated, Deleuze and Guattari’s association of the multiple connections/disconections of the rhizome with the transformative patterns of the map provides a useful, if by its very nature problematic, working model for the description of post-colonial cultures and for the closer investigation of the kaleidoscopic variations of post-colonial discourse (Brydon). Moreover, a number of contemporary women writers in Canada and Australia, notably Nicole Brossard and Marion Campbell, have adapted Deleuze and Guattari’s model to the articulation of a feminist cartography which dissociates itself from the “oversignifying” spaces of patriarchal representation but through its “deteritorializing lines of flight” produces an alternative kind of map characterized not by the containment or regimentation of
space but by a series of centrifugal displacements. Other implicitly “rhizomatic” maps are sketched out in experimental fictions such as those of Kroetsch and Baille (in Canada) and Bail and Murnane (in Australia) where space, as in Deleuze and Guattari’s model, is constituted in terms of a series of intermingled lines of connection which shape shifting patterns of de- and reterritorialization. In the work of these and other “new novelists,” the map is often identified, then parodied and/or ironized, as a spurious definitional construct, thereby permitting the writer to engage in a more wide-ranging deconstruction of Western signifying systems (one thinks, for example, of Nicholas Hasluck’s sly negotiation of the labyrinths of the legal system in The Bellarmine Jug or of Yolande Villemaire’s playful critique of the semiotics of Western culture in La Vie en prose). If the map is conceived of in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms as a rhizomatic (“open”) rather than as a falsely homogeneous (“closed”) construct, the emphasis then shifts from de- to reconstruction, from mapbreaking to mapmaking. The benefit of Deleuze and Guattari’s model is that it provides a viable alternative to the implicitly hegemonic (and historically colonialist) form of cartographic discourse which uses the duplicating procedures of mimetic representation and structuralist reconstitution as strategic means of stabilizing the foundations of Western culture and of “fixing” the position (thereby maintaining the power) of the West in relation to cultures other than its own. Thus, whereas Derrida’s deconstructive analysis of the concepts of “centred” structure and “interested” simulacrum engenders a process of displacement which undoes the supposed homogeneity of colonial discourse, Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatic map views this process in terms of a processual transformation more pertinent to the operations of post-colonial discourse and to the complex patterns of de- and reterritorialization working within and between the multicultural societies of the post-colonial world.

As Stephen Slemon has demonstrated, one of the characteristic ploys of post-colonial discourse is its adoption of a creative revisionism which involves the subversion or displacement of dominant discourses (Slemon). But included within this revisionary process is the internal critique of the post-colonial culture (or cultures),
a critique which takes into account the transitional nature of post-colonial societies and which challenges the tenets both of an essentialist nationalism which sublimates or overlooks regional differences and of an unconsidered multiculturalism (mis)appropriated for the purposes of enforced assimilation rather than for the promulgation of cultural diversity. The fascination of post-colonial writers, and of Canadian and Australian writers in particular, with the map topos can be seen in this context as a specific instance of creative revisionism in which the desystematization of a narrowly defined and demarcated “cartographic” space allows for a culturally and historically located critique of colonial discourse while, at the same time, producing the momentum for a projection and exploration of “new territories” outlawed or neglected by dominant discourses which previously operated in the colonial, but continue to operate in modified or transposed forms in the post-colonial, culture. I would suggest further that, in the cases of the contemporary Canadian and Australian literatures, these territories correspond to a series of new or revised rhetorical spaces occupied by feminism, regionalism and ethnicity, where each of these items is understood primarily as a set of counter-discursive strategies which challenge the claims of or avoid circumscription within one or other form of cultural centrism. These territories/spaces can also be considered, however, as shifting grounds which are themselves subject to transformational patterns of de- and reterritorialization. The proliferation of spatial references, crossing of physical and/or conceptual boundaries and redisposition of geographical coordinates in much contemporary Canadian and Australian writing stresses the provisionality of cartographic connection and places the increasing diversity of their respective literatures in the context of a post-colonial response to and/or reaction against the ontology and epistemology of “stability” promoted and safeguarded by colonial discourse. I would conclude from this that the role of cartography in contemporary Canadian and Australian writing, specifically, and in post-colonial writing in general, cannot be solely envisaged as the reworking of a particular spatial paradigm, but consists rather in the implementation of a series of creative revisions which register the transition from a colonial framework within which the writer is compelled to
recreate and reflect upon the restrictions of colonial space to a post-colonial one within which he or she acquires the freedom to engage in a series of "territorial disputes" which implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the relativity of modes of spatial (and, by extension, cultural) perception. So while the map continues to feature in one sense as a paradigm of colonial discourse, its deconstruction and/or revisualization permits a "disidentification" from the procedures of colonialism (and other hegemonic discourses) and a (re)engagement in the ongoing process of cultural decolonization. The "cartographic connection" can therefore be considered to provide that provisional link which joins the contestatory theories of post-structuralism and post-colonialism in the pursuit of social and cultural change.

NOTES

1 I shall adopt here Peter Hulme's definition of colonial discourse as "an ensemble of linguistically based practices unified by their common deployment in the management of colonial relationships" (Hulme 2). For a more detailed account, see the opening chapter of Hulme's Colonial Encounters.

2 For an excellent summary of these strategies, and of the relations between cartographic and colonial practices, see J. B. Harley's essay in Cosgrove and Daniels (eds.).

3 For a development of this argument, see Mihai Spariosu's introduction to Mimesis in Contemporary Theory.

4 The argument is taken up and expanded in Christopher Board's essay in Chorley and Haggett. See also Philip and Juliana Muehrcke's discussion of the limitations of and distortions within cartographic representation, and Wright's early, but still relevant, essay.

5 For an investigation of the multiple implications of the term "displacement," see the essays in, and particularly Mark Krupnick's introduction to, the collection Displacement: Derrida and After.

6 Although I am taking issue here with the excessively negative tenor of Hulme's, Felperin's and Tiffin's recent critiques of the neo-hegemonic assumptions behind Franco-American deconstruction, I would support their general thesis that applications of deconstructionist — and other post-structuralist — methodologies should take account of the ambivalent position of post-structuralist theory within self-privileging Western cultural institutions, and, in particular, of its apparent elevation to the status of a new orthodoxy.

7 For a fictional rendition of this argument see Harris's novella Palace of the Peacock. Many of the essays in his collection Explorations deal indirectly with maps as metaphors within the wide framework of a "revisioning" of Caribbean (and other post-colonial) cultural history. For essays which explore the implications of Harris's theories for post-colonial writing, see Slemon and Tiffin.
8 Cf. McDougall’s comments on Hodgins in “On Location: Australian and Canadian Literature.”

9 Cf. Grace’s essay on Atwood in Grace and Weir.

10 See Brydon’s critique of colonial ethnocentrism in “Troppo Agitato”; see also Dennis Lee’s “Cadence, Country, Silence” for a discussion of the problems involved in writing “in colonial space.”

11 See also Barbara Godard’s introductory essay “Mapmaking” in the collection Gynocritics; and Benterrak, Muecke and Roe’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari within the context of a post-colonial (more specifically, Aboriginal) critique of Western territorial imperatives.

12 The relevance of counter-discursive formations to post-colonial writing is discussed at length in the essays by Slemon and Tiffin. For a definition of counter-discourse (adapted by Slemon and Tiffin), see Terdiman.

13 The terms is Michel Pêcheux’s; for a discussion of its implications for post-colonial writing, see Slemon and Tiffin.

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