“Slavery was a long, long time ago”:
Remembrance, Reconciliation and the Reparations Discourse in the Caribbean
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Memory of slavery in the Caribbean is no sporting matter. Nearly one hundred seventy years since general emancipation in the English-speaking sub-region, the immediacy of the recollection of slavery still angers many in the regional community. It also hinders movement toward ethnic reconciliation, and serves to sustain the identity consciousness that energizes the rapidly emerging reparations movement. In addition, the polarizing politics of post-modern economic globalization that insists history step aside to make room in the popular imagination for a mythical level playing field, daily drives daggers into the heart of the idea that ethnic reconciliation and reparations constitute a unitary idea.

British Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott recently discovered the extent to which passions can flare when he visited Jamaica in May 2007 and spoke to a public audience at the University of the West Indies. The speech was hosted by the National Bicentennial Committee on Slavery, and Prescott, when pressed on the controversial issue of an official apology for slavery from his government, stated that such an action was not necessary and that Britain was concentrating its efforts on shaping an Africa policy to facilitate economic development on the continent (Oostindie; Mamdani; Gilroy). He seemed as shocked by the reactions of the crowd as by the identities of those who reacted with rage. Jamaican Member of Parliament Mike Henry, incensed by this response, stormed out of the meeting and described Prescott’s manner as “disrespectful” and “condescending.” “How is it that you were prepared to pay the slave owners but not willing to compensate the slaves?” Henry asked. “We all know what happened and how we feel about it, so why should we entertain this British official on our front lawns without him being prepared
to discuss this matter which is of such heart-wrenching concern to us?” he asked of the irate majority (“MP Walks Out”).

It is no easy matter for citizens and public officials to negotiate the possibilities inherent in the Caribbean’s future. For most of the Caribbean population thinking towards the future requires an intense struggle to come to terms with the pressures that continue to weigh on public memories and to continue to resist any impulse to gloss over these chilling memories of slavery. Slavery is a legacy shouldered daily by millions of blacks who toil for little in the blazing heat of an impoverished paradise. Sharply contradictory images of reality continue to generate intense criticism and acrimonious dialogue. “Hell on earth” may just be a biased insider image of postcolonial society held by the historically disenfranchised visa seekers to America, but it is as legitimate as the notion of the region as an exotic traveler’s paradise.

The Caribbean has remained at the center of postmodernity’s big-business culture, as is evident in the tourism revenues that are the backbone of many Caribbean economies. In the seventeenth century, Enlightenment appetites called forth sugar and slavery; today monopolistic Norwegian cruise ships ply its sparkling blue waters (Bryce; Pietevse and Parekh). But nothing has exposed the inheritances of history in the contemporary world as completely as the visitation of the imperially designed international cricket tournament, the World Cup, which took centre stage from March to May in 2007. Islanders’ tentative entry into the twenty-first century is not associated with a deep engagement with the burning issues of the Internet age. On the contrary, the first decade of the millennium ushered in two seemingly ancestral discourses: the outstanding, unanswered questions about sugar and slavery continue to haunt collective memory, while the business of commercial cricket and the centrality of its relation to citizenship began a new chapter in the history of the region’s exploitation. In 2007, two hundred years after the abolition of the slave trade (but not the abolition of slavery), the British were first out of the blocks doing what the British are well known for—protecting exposed flanks from approaching threats. The government in London launched a nationwide series of events, defined as a celebration of high political morality, to mark the
bicentennial of British Parliament’s outlawing of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans it had sanctioned since the early seventeenth century (Farrell; Jordan; Tibbles). By means of early declaration of intent the British government sought to define the limits of the debate on abolition and to shape its discursive content. It was a skillfully executed, self-serving program meant to deflect mounting calls for serious discussions about reparations that could lead to positive parliamentary policy. Instead, politicians led communities down a triumphal path that sought to secure a moral pride of place for a Parliament that acted only when it was convenient. But even Prime Minister Tony Blair had to dismiss the voices of some academics and cynics who were heard uttering that British imperial society had benefited more than any other from the crime of slave trading and enslavement, and that on this score the self-righteous should take note.

It “simply wasn’t cricket,” some Englishmen would say, an expression that speaks to the politics of avoidance and concealment where openness and transparency should have been the order of the day. The business of the Cricket World Cup constituted a grand jubilee for West Indians who, since Emancipation, have grown to love the imperial game with great passion. Hosting the event was a great West Indian moment, and was granted enthusiastically, if with some hidden reticence, by the game’s global governing body. Following the previous World Cup held in South Africa in 2004, the international Cricket Council contracted the West Indies Cricket Board to host the Cricket World Cup in the Caribbean in March and April 2007.

The desire to manage the event successfully within spanking new stadia that were custom built as monuments to the excellence generations of cricketers have achieved, soared above the matter of slavery in the corridors of politics and the networks of capital. Sport and slavery had collided, and the clash for public attention, and financial resources, ensued. Communities went to words with themselves; divided to the vein they quarreled about the value of matters from the past, and the worth of cricket investments in the future. Public opinion shapers asked whether it was nobler in the mind to build heritage sites to the memory of ancestors who perished in watery graves or to construct
multi-purpose sports facilities to assure revenue streams for generations to come (“Mixed World Cup Fever”; Coupar).

These debates seemed to stimulate the public imagination. On one side, local advocates of the bicentennial project pitched in with the argument that the Act of Abolition on March 25, 1807, was the first and most significant event in the protracted program of dismantling the slavery system. It was, they argued, a crucial blow against the crime of slavery that had struck at humanity’s moral confidence over two long centuries. They wanted, however, to hear little from those who called for reparations, and even less from cricket officials. Nothing was as important as the spiritual moment in which moral politics appeared to have transcended, finally, the power of profit, thereby closing the darkest road modern man had journeyed.

Batting at the other end was the cricket fraternity. It keenly presented its case and rallied its allies around the notion that the Cricket World Cup was the greatest single commercial project ever to be undertaken by the region. For this reason, they argued, it would be an abandonment of reason to engage in activities that would lower cricket’s ranking on the Caribbean agenda. Slavery, they said, was long dead and buried, and reparations discourse would only serve to resurrect its ghost. Easily moved to irritation, the cricket lobby claimed vanguard standing in shaping the future of a region too easily encouraged to fall back on its troubled history. For them, remembering slavery and seeking reparations is all fine and well, but not at the expense of attracting international investments. Cricket, they said, is not a sporting matter; it is very serious business.

International allies of the local cricket fraternity, mostly based in London, suggested that winning the rights to host the global sports event and the delivery of a successful product required West Indians to present a united management mentality that was warm and welcoming. Explicit in this suggestion was the notion that paying too much attention to the emotive and racially divisive sins of slavery was bad for business. It would hurt the host in the pocket, reduce the social prestige of the championship, and promote a negative image for the region within the global business environment. Communities across the Caribbean
region were urged to think big rather than feel folly, and to settle their minds on the relative importance of slavery remembrance in comparison to the grasping of rare economic opportunities. Expenditures were enormous. The Government of Barbados spent some US$75 million on the World Cup project, primarily to construct a new stadium in order to host the final game in April 2007. Popular opinion has been that this was a necessary and worthwhile investment. The World Bank, however, consistently argued that the Caribbean governments were overspending on the project to the detriment of weak, fragile economies.

The two projects were conceptually contradictory although their common historical root was obvious. It was a form of sibling rivalry. The lineage of both converged on the landscape most easily recognized as the sugar-cane plantation that had consumed with little care the energies of countless enslaved persons, and served as incubator of the region’s cricket culture. Cricket was not considered a blood sport, but it held together communities of far-flung Englishmen’s voices more tightly than language ever could. The English defined themselves as a distinct ethnicity, not by virtue of words or mastering the science of slave trading, but by playing a game they alone understood, or cared for.

Two hundred years ago in the towns where these cricketing cane producers transacted commerce, slave trading was easily the biggest and most profitable business. As these towns prepared to implement the cricket project in the lead up to the World Cup, there remained the same expectation that Cup revenues would fill taverns’ tills and merchants’ coffers. Sugar cane and cricket shared a common relation to a heritage and environment now marketed to English tourists as cultural cousins. Linked by a chain of historical events, sons of former slaves and London financiers joined hands to corner the sports tourism market in an eager bid to remove themselves from the stain of enslavement and memories of slave merchants (Beckles, Development and “Whose Game”).

The University of the West Indies lobbied local and international officials of the Cricket World Cup in order to establish itself as a secondary venue and strategic planning partner. To mark the bicentennial moment, meanwhile, the British Government, in collaboration with the University of Hull, established a research center named “The
Wilberforce Institute for Study of Slavery and Emancipation.” It was
officially launched at No. 10 Downing Street, under the distinguished
patronage of Mrs. Cherie Blair, First Lady of the State. With the spirited
acronym, WISE, it is expected to emerge as a site of scientific research
and philosophical reflection on the subject of slavery and its abolition.¹

However, at no stage during the conception of WISE was research
on reparations for slavery as a crime against humanity considered a pri-
ority. The British government had turned its face against any form of
reparations policy and got its way in ensuring university academic re-
search agendas did not treat aggressively with the matter. One com-
ment, joking but also serious, noted that had this not been the case, the
institute launched instead would have been “The Wilberforce Institute
for the Study of Slavery, Emancipation and Reparations” (WISER), an
altogether more appropriate acronym given the legacy issues currently
confronting British society.

West Indian governments did not ask for, nor did they receive, any
financial support from the British government in hosting the Cricket
World Cup, branded by local organizing committees from Jamaica in
the north to Guyana in the south as the “best and biggest ever.” Fifth to
host the 27-year-old spectacle, West Indian governments looked to Asia,
China, and India mostly, to provide grants and cheap loans in order to
finance a US$360 million infrastructure development. Construction of
internationally competitive facilities sprung up on the backs of Asian
workers, while advocates for slavery reparations looked to the British
government to respond, even if only with empty words, in order to heal
the wound and break the silence inflicted by the most efficient slave ex-
plotation machinery modernity had known.

On both sides of the Atlantic, however, reparations discussions sur-
rounded the efforts of both the cricket and the bicentennial projects. A
concerted effort was made by a radical minority in the Caribbean to es-

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games as a sports spectacle. Cricket, so it seems, represents the region’s finest example of the “up from slavery” ideology that defines aspects of the African diaspora (Beckles, *A Nation Imagined*; *The First West Indies Tour*).

The WISE project, on the other hand, initiated by university faculty, but surrounded by a host of pro-reparation voices, mostly in grassroots non-governmental organizations, is not committed to revealing to an undereducated British public how national wealth extracted from slavery should be classified as unjust enrichment. This public, long cut off by school curriculum from knowledge about the Caribbean carnage, remains protected by a media that sees no value in dredging up the past or exposing skeletons in the concealed closets of castles and mansions. Within this context the most entrenched opponents of reparations in Great Britain, those unwilling to accept the criminality of slavery, seem unaware of the magnitude of the slave trade business. In academia, at least, the numbers game—head counting the Africans shipped—seems temporarily settled, and this has served to focus attention on the other issues in the discussion, particularly reparations.

It is obvious that the magnitude of any form of reparations settlement would have to be related to the size of the crime. There is increasing acceptance of the calculation that some fifteen million enslaved African people were shipped to the New World. Also, the lives of over thirty million were disrupted by the trade throughout the continent. It has been accepted for some time that one quarter of those shipped into captivity perished at sea. Slavery was an unprecedented human tragedy. All western European nations were participants with varying degrees of management success and profitability. The Portuguese were the largest single shippers, while the English profited the most by the slave trade (Eltis, *Rise and Transatlantic*; Curto). This trade in persons fed the most barbaric system of human bondage the world had seen. Africans were reduced by slave relations to the legal status of non-humans. It was the first time in recorded history that societies were built on the premise that persons were property, chattel, and real estate, with all the attendant features of modern monetary assets. As non-humans, enslaved Africans were subject to special laws for their public governance. They
had no right to life; their existence as social beings was at the pleasure of owners whose rights over them were effectively unlimited (Beckles, *White Servitude* and “A Riotous Lot”; Taylor).

No other ethnic group was subject to this system of bondage on an ongoing basis. Persons classified as “white” could not be enslaved. Chattel enslavement was considered a universal violation in western Europe. Although British workers were integrated into the labour market by means of several forms of coercion, from seasonal contracts to ten-year forms of indenture, slave-like forms of social organization had been gradually dismantled during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For the English, then, the African encounter led to a re-establishment of a system long removed from popular culture. In order to consolidate African enslavement it was necessary, therefore, to first classify the enslaved as non-human—that is, outside the parameters of ideas about human rights already common to civil society (Kussmaul; Barrowman; Rowan). The success of this strategy is evident in Britain’s profitable and “legal” involvement in the slave trade for over two hundred years. Perhaps more insidious, though, is that strategy’s relevance to contemporary reparations discussions. At the United Nations Inter-governmental Conference on race and xenophobia held in Durban, South Africa, in 2001, the stated official position of the British government was that slavery was not a crime against humanity because it was legal at the time. Therefore, its officials suggested, the question of reparations does not arise (Beckles “Case for Reparations”). Metropolitan and colonial governments did legalize slavery. Of course, the Africans, who constituted over seventy-five percent of the colonial population, were not consulted.

The Slave Laws, as they were called, that classified enslaved Africans as non-human, were conceived and implemented within a global moral environment that accepted labour bondage of various sorts but that had turned its back on the process of legal dehumanization of workers. And, although there was widespread opposition in England at the outset to chattel slavery, it was marginalized and silenced by the power of the participatory State and its commercial allies.

The criminality of slavery was finally settled during the Nuremberg War Trials into the activities of the German Nazi State. The court de-
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fined crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country.” Since then international law has restated that there is a global morality in respect of slavery and that it is no defense to illustrate its legality within national law. The Holocaust was legal in the sense that the German Legislature had approved the actions enforced by the judiciary. The entire world, however, had rejected such notions of legality (Munford; Bergmann). It is ironic that the Republic of Haiti, the first sovereign Caribbean State, was also the first nation in modernity to pay reparations within the context of slavery. When the country secured its independence in 1804 from France after a bloody revolutionary war, no slave-owning European country officially recognized its status. The United States of America, a slave-based nation, joined in the stance of non-recognition as an act of solidarity with France. The French insisted upon the payment of reparations from the new rulers for the loss of property rights in Africans, livestock, plantations, and other forms of property. The refusal to pay this reparation meant that Haiti was excluded from the international community by means of trade embargoes and diplomatic isolation (Servant).

In 1825, however, as the fledging, struggling revolutionary nation celebrated the twenty-first anniversary of Independence, the government took the decision to make reparations payments to France in exchange for its official recognition. A team of French assessors arrived in Haiti to value property lost by French subjects, including 450,000 enslaved persons. The value of assets was computed at 150 million gold francs. By treaty, Haiti agreed to pay this sum to the French government. Payment began immediately, and was not completed until 1922. The enslaved community itself received no reparations; neither did the indigenous peoples who were decimated by French and Spanish colonialism on the island (Beckles “Global Politics”).

Historically the concept of reparations has dealt with themes such as peace and justice, reconciliation and harmony. It has focused on how to settle with the sins of the past and move on to a better life. Philosophically, it is rooted in the notions of forgiveness and atonement.
The idea of repairing the damage caused by historic wrongs confronts the process of colonial exploitation and enslavement. In instances where reparations have been paid the evidence suggests that payment has benefited those who suffered shame as victims as well as those who experienced guilt as perpetrators of crimes against humanity. As a moral and political action it breaks the silence that followed the crime and allows for human liberation (Robinson).

The competitive, recriminatory nature of global economic and political relations, however, has meant that reparations tend to take place within the context of hostile legal tribunals rather than as a result of ethical discourse and moral adjudication. In most cases existing legal thinking in countries that enforced enslavement has struggled to accept the criminal nature of historical wrongs. As a result, reparations movements have been ignored by ruling elites until such time that public consciousness has reached maturity on the issue.

The British government continues to reject the notion that slavery in its colonial societies was a crime against humanity. In a rather peculiar way it seeks to counter the issue of historic criminality by stating that were chattel slavery practiced today it would be a crime against humanity, a truly strange reversal of logic. The purpose of this argument is to confuse the legal understanding of chattel slavery by including it in modern forms of bondage that exist today in Africa and elsewhere in the former colonized world while maintaining the idea of its legality prior to 1832. In this way, global human rights forces would focus on these States while ignoring the historic enslavement of Euro-America (Young).

At Durban, the States of Nigeria and Senegal joined the “West” in opposing the call for reparations championed by delegates from the Caribbean and other parts of the African diaspora. The President of Nigeria, General Obasanjo, seemed more concerned that reparations discourse in respect of England could foster inter-ethnic domestic tension within the fragile Federation. The slave trade, like any major crime, required the participation of some locals, a process that makes the crime more rather than less hideous. The fear that ethnic groups labelled as collaborators would be targeted by victimized groups is a genuine one
which cannot be treated lightly within the context of African domestic politics. President Wade of Senegal, not concerned overtly with the potential internal tensions facing Nigeria, seemed intimidated by the possibility of a hostile French reaction. He imagined reparation to be an antagonistic rather than conciliatory process, and he stated: “What we want from Europe is an apology but we do not want to engage in any discussions about reparations. An apology will close the door and close it forever.” He rejected the notion of reparation conceived in monetary terms, and urged instead greater direct European investments in African countries (Gifford, ch. 21).

Of course, European, specifically British, investment in Africa has a long history. The first English slave trading organization was the Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa; it was established in 1663 by the Restoration monarch, Charles II. This company was soon dissolved and replaced in 1672 by the greater and more intensely capitalized Royal African Company, under the chairmanship of the Duke of York, Charles’s brother and future King James II. The prospect of vast wealth was the vision of investors in the stock of slave trading companies. In the case of the Royal African Company, the list of shareholders is a “who’s who” within the extended family of royals and their aristocratic supporters. Created to supply 2000 enslaved Africans annually to Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Island, it generated considerable profits to the royal family that found expression in the modernization of rural estates and the constructions of castles and mansions. The Company’s corporate secretary was equally well known: he was the distinguished philosopher of liberty, John Locke (Thomas; Donnan; Pike; Davies). Legal opinion suggests that the British State has a principal concern with protecting the royal family from reparations litigation.

The most effective strategy still used by the British government to thwart reparations advocates and protect the royal family is the argument that colonial slavery is far too remote to be subject to recuperative legal procedures. It happened a long, long, long time ago, their legal experts suggest, and cannot be subject to redress. International law, however, provides that in the case of crimes against humanity there is no statute of limitation. In any event, jurists have suggested that modernity
Hi l a r y  M c D .  B e c k l e s
does not recognize one hundred and fifty years as remote. Caribbean families still endure the memories of great grandparents who were born in slavery.

Credit should go to Lord Gifford, first to place the case for reparations in respect of enslaved blacks in Africa and the Caribbean before the British Parliament. On March 14, 1996, he filed a reparations motion in the House of Lords asking the British government to acknowledge its crime. The Lords, led by Lord Wilberforce, a great-great-grandson of William Wilberforce (what irony!), rejected the motion on grounds that the experience was a long, long, time ago and that no one was alive to constitute a plaintiff in case of litigation. The guilty party, he said, was not clear because there had been African complicity. Slavery was evil, and shameful, he said, and the British government should continue to confront its legacies everywhere they are seen, but reparation was not an appropriate strategy (Gifford).

When the bicentennial moment moved debate on reparations from the streets and colleges into Parliament in March 2007, there was no substantive shift in its line of legal and political reasoning, except that this time both Houses of Parliament were occupied by black members whose remarks differed little from their white colleagues. They spoke about the need for moral atonement, and suggested that financial instruments such as debt relief and fair trade were better options for State policy. Greater attention was paid to contemporary wrongs, such as forms of cross-border slavery, female sexual mutilation, and child soldiers in Africa. Every conceivable challenge facing black States was debated while the illegality of chattel enslavement and the call for reparations were pushed to the margins.

Lord Morris of Handsworth, a black Jamaican and Chancellor of the University of Technology in Kingston, who had distinguished himself as a British trade union leader and educator, stated: “Well, what a remarkable thing it is that I, a descendant of slaves, am now speaking in the House of Lords on this motion.” “In my judgment,” he said, “we ought to do something in reparation,” but we all recognize the difficulty involved and the insurmountable nature of the challenge (Hansard Lords). Baroness Amos, also a West Indian, shared the view that the matter was
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legally too complex and beyond reasonable procedure. Jamaican Diane Abbot, speaking in the House of Commons, supported the notions of complexity, difficulty, and historical remoteness (Hansard Commons). Nothing was made, however, of the 1995 case in which Queen Elizabeth II signed a bill that enabled reparations to be paid to New Zealand’s Maori people who were subject to genocidal action and land appropriation by British colonizers in 1863. The Maoris received land settlement and substantial monetary compensation from the British Government. The travails of the French case for reparations seemed even more bizarre. In 2000 the French Government reaffirmed its political position that colonial slavery was a crime against humanity and made a formal apology for its involvement. It did not expect that any of its former colonial citizens or states would legally seek reparation as a consequence. In January 2004, however, President Aristide of Haiti, on the two-hundredth anniversary of national independence, officially called upon the French Government to repay the 150 million francs illegally extracted from his country. The current value of this sum was computed at US$21 billion (“Haiti Wants”). It was the first time that a European government had received a formal request from a Caribbean government for reparations in respect of colonial crimes. A month later, Aristide was deposed, largely by means of the invasion of his country by a coalition of French soldiers and American marines. Aristide’s successor, the interim Prime Minister Gerard Latortue, hurriedly put in place by the occupying military authorities, immediately withdrew the claim, and described it while doing so as a criminal action not intended to benefit the proud, independent people of Haiti (“Haiti Drops”).

And yet, the question of the wealth produced by the slave trade and slavery will not disappear. In 2005, a group of British scholars and financial experts were asked to answer the question: “If the British were to pay the two million enslaved blacks in the Caribbean a retroactive wage, fixed at the lowest level of an English field worker for 200 years, plus a sum for their lost assets in Africa and trauma inflicted, what would be the sum of the settlement?” The figure suggested by the team came to 7.5 trillion pounds, more than three times the 2005 current GDP of Britain. The figure reflected the value of slave labour to British economic
growth, and illustrates how a small island economy on the outskirts of Western Europe was able to emerge the major global economic force in the nineteenth century (Inikori; Smith).

Despite these compelling calculations, from the mid-twentieth century a conscious effort has been made to minimize the role of the slave system in providing the capital that nurtured and transformed the British economy during the period described as the Industrial Revolution. This has been a necessary strategy to support the argument that the British State has no obvious or compelling moral obligation to an Empire now dismantled and re-classified as impoverished developing states. Sir Winston Churchill, the iconic British Prime Minister, whose grandfather held considerable West Indian investments, laid bare the facts as he understood them in 1938:

Our possessions of the West Indies, like that of India ..., gave us the strength, the support, but especially the capital, the wealth, at a time when no other European nation possessed such a reserve, which enabled us to come through the great struggles of the Napoleonic wars, the keen competition of commerce in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and enabled us not only to acquire the appendage of possessions which we have, but also to lay the foundation of that commercial and financial leadership which, when the world was young, when everything outside Europe was undeveloped, enabled us to make our great position in the world. (qtd. in Robinson 17)

The contemporary British government, no longer prepared to discuss this historical relation to the Caribbean, has successfully bypassed the reparations issue and is hoping to exit the bicentennial year without any major challenges from its historical past. Success in this regard has been a masterful expression of statecraft in defusing what seemed at the outset an enormous legal challenge. The Cricket World Cup also came and went; a few comments notwithstanding about high ticket prices for locals and their inability to carry food and music into stadia, the global media were more concerned with the alleged murder of the English coach of the Pakistan team, Bob Wolmer, in a Kingston hotel. That too
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seemed a storm in a teacup when the official medical report confirmed that he had died from natural causes.

The reparations discourse, however, is unlikely to go away, and is expected to intensify in the next decade. Former colonial governments have recognized the liberalized global trade regimes that continue to sustain the unequal commodity markets so carefully crafted against them under colonialism. The trade rules brought alive by the World Trade Organization have created an uneven playing field for Caribbean exporters. Their sugar industry is as uncompetitive in the new trade regimes as it is possible to imagine, and the banana industry has gone bananas as American corporations operating in the Caribbean have cornered the European Union market. The Cricket World Cup is due to return to the Caribbean in 2025. This time around there might very well be an England versus West Indies final, played against the backdrop of an agreed reparations settlement.

Notes
1 Professor David Richardson of Hull University heads the WISE project; already it has established a prominent presence in the research network on slavery and emancipation.

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