Educational theorists have shown increasing concern over the need to ensure that citizens exercise values that consider the relevance of contributing even contradictory perspectives. Nussbaum (2004) has concentrated specifically on the contribution that literature provides in developing the moral imagination, a concept that is linked to the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship. This article reevaluates this particular position by examining the foundational role that value plays in Schwab’s (2004) vision of eclectic inquiry. An initial value attachment to a perspective or theory is seen by incorporating examples from outside the context of curriculum deliberation as a catalyst that stimulates effective eclectic inquiry in the face of criticism or contradiction. Following the recent work of Egan (1997), I argue that these value attachments can be initiated in an educational setting not simply by integrating more art classes, but by determining and isolating the essence of a value attachment to a novel and applying this interactive framework to all areas of study. Stimulating value attachments thus serves as a precursor to eclectic inquiry and contributes more significantly to the development of the moral imagination.

Introduction
I recall a conversation I had recently with a friend about religion in education. True to reputation of the subject as a potential powder keg, the conversation began to grow heated. The argument was about whether religion should be taught in schools, an old and familiar subject, and my friend was adamantly against it, finally exploding and blurting out something along the lines of, “All religions contradict one another anyway and are chiefly responsible for the majority of the evil in the world!” Now whether or not this is true, I lamented, and still lament, the fact that my friend could not recognize any value at all in

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any of the world’s major religions. The point to be stressed in terms of this article is not whether religion is a valuable contributor to someone’s life and should be taught in schools, but that an eclectic inquiry considerate of the relevance of perspectives cannot be pursued under such dismissive conditions.

In order to introduce the role of value in eclectic inquiry, I begin by examining Schwab’s (2004) vision of the eclectic in the realm of curriculum deliberation. Eclectic inquiry acts as a safeguard against the vitiating qualities of indoctrinated theories by relying on the uneasy focus of contributing perspectives to the problem at hand. I then move away from the context of curriculum deliberation and consider eclectic inquiry in action in the realm of personal reflection and deliberation, examining specifically the role that value plays in this process. As a tool for developing the moral imagination, an attachment of value will be seen as providing the foundation for eclectic inquiry open to the value and relevance of fellow citizens’ contributing conceptions of the good. This attachment is inspired by our interaction with the arts, as Nussbaum (2004) has often shown, but is not exclusively localized in the arts. Following the recent work of Egan (1997), I explore how the vital production of value attachments as a foundation on which to develop and structure the moral imagination can be initiated by pinpointing and extracting the framework of our interaction with the arts, particularly the novel, and applying it to all areas of an expansive curriculum in order to ensure that value is recognized. This can be done without integrating novels into other areas of study, which may seem more like an interdisciplinary approach to education, but by using literary devices such as the use of characters, setting and dramatic themes to inspire a sense of value in learning and consequently provide a foundation for eclectic inquiry.

Eclectic Inquiry in the Context of Curriculum Deliberation
The eclectic arts, as defined by Schwab (2004) in 1969, are “the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a body of problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to the problem in a different way” (p. 103). In Schwab’s essays on the “practical,” he advocated an approach to curriculum development inquiry that is sensitive to the value or relevance—the “usable focus”—of diverse theories. Alexander (2003) described Schwab’s contribution as follows.

Instead of picturing education as the application of psychological and sociological laws to pedagogy, Schwab suggested a process of curriculum deliberation in which developmental psychologists, learning theorists, sociologists of contemporary society, and subject matter experts would debate alternative conceptions of what and how to teach. (p. 383)

Following Schwab’s definition of the eclectic, the debate between the alternative conceptions should focus on how each diverse theory is relevant to the problem at hand. This openness to the relevance or value of the alternative theories or conceptions, however, depends on an initial affiliation or personal value attachment to the original theory subjected to critical analysis. Otherwise, as I argue below, eclectic inquiry cannot proceed.

In commenting further on the need for eclectic inquiry in curriculum development, Schwab (2004) warned of the dangers of concentrating on a single theory to the point of that theory becoming doctrinaire.
A curriculum based on theory about individual personality, which thrusts society, its demands and its structure, far into the background or ignores them entirely, can be nothing but incomplete and doctrinaire, for the individuals in question are in fact members of a society and must meet its demands to some degree since their existence and prosperity as individuals depend on the functioning of their society. In the same way, a curriculum grounded only in a view of social need or social change must be equally doctrinaire and incomplete, for societies do not exist only for their own sakes but for the prosperity of their members as well. In the same way, learners are not only minds or knowers but bundles of affects, individuals, personalities, earners of livings. They are not only group interactors but possessors of private lives. (p. 108)

Our limited vision through our dedication to one theory devalues this theory by lifting it to the height of doctrine. Schwab added: “Hence, a focus on only one not only ignores the others but vitiates the quality and completeness with which the selected one is viewed” (p. 108). If one ignores other viable theories, the resources that one can access in the face of tensions and anomalies become limited, and the applicability of the single theory due to this isolation suffers as a result. A single theory of curriculum development is deprived of the valuable insight that the eclectic can provide.

In the context of curriculum development, contributing theories enhance our deliberative resources; they combat the isolative quality of a limited single perspective on which we may base our decision-making process, and this is the crux of eclectic inquiry into educational methods, means, and aims. However, this enhancement comes not at the expense of discarding one’s own view (or any single view, for that matter) as merely relative, irrelevant, or functionally anathematic in the face of criticism, but as part of an eclectic whole that contributes to a wider knowledge base from which one can gain a heightened sense of collective value; or what Schwab (2004) would term an uneasy focus. This recognition of the value of the single theory despite apparent contradiction is a necessary prerequisite for effective eclectic inquiry. Otherwise, the original theory may be dismissed and replaced, resulting in the alternative conception becoming doctrinaire, and as a consequence, eclectic inquiry will have been stultified and the newly indoctrinated theory, as Schwab suggested, becomes itself vitiated.

In response to a blind acceptance of a single theory, Schwab (2004) noted, one must adopt an openness that welcomes further contributions to the knowledge base, not at the total expense of the original single theory, but rather in union with the contributing theories. “What remains as a viable alternative,” he suggested, “is the unsystematic, uneasy, pragmatic, and uncertain unions and connections which can be effected in an eclectic” (p. 109). A meeting with a contradictory theoretical perspective may at first disturb one to a dismissal of that perspective, hence the uneasiness of critical reexamination due to the faith in the all-encompassing value of the original theory. But effective eclectic inquiry sorts out the “uncertainty” of the union between doctrine and contradiction by integrating both into the deliberative process and recognizing the pragmatic value in each.

Recognizing first the value of the single theory or perspective precedes the further consideration of any disturbing contradiction and the subsequent ecle-
tic inquiry that incorporates it; thus in anticipation of a dialogue of perspectives, the essence of the moral imagination, education can engender this foundational value recognition and attachment. The ensuing argument of this article focuses mainly on an elaboration of this point, exploring the importance of fostering such attachments in education. The initiatory process of developing emotional attachments to subject matter, thus solidifying delineations of limited value, precludes an inquiry that is considerate of contributory, even contradictory, theories: theories that heighten the original sense of value by widening its application to ever-expanding perspectives.

In the light of the above references to eclectic inquiry, it may be advantageous to turn to examples of the eclectic in action beyond curriculum deliberation and analyze the role that value plays in this process in order to clarify the overall thesis. If an attachment of value is seen to precede eclectic inquiry, then strategies to develop this recognition should be addressed in education. Eclectic inquiry, beyond curriculum deliberation and applied to the realm of personal and public reflection and deliberation, may have moral implications as far as tolerance or openness to value pluralism in a multicultural society is concerned, and so the value imperative becomes even more pressing as an aspect of moral theory and philosophy. As Alexander (2003) has also noted, Schwab’s writings on the practical and the eclectic suggest a research program in moral education that blurs some of the distinctions between the social sciences and the humanities and that renewed respect to the roles that literature, the arts, history, philosophy, and theology can play in examining pedagogy, policy and curriculum. (p. 384)

Any inquiry that is open to alternative and contradictory theories—while respecting the inherent value in a long-held doctrine—has limitless applications. The kind of usable focus and uncertain unions of alternative or contradictory perceptions that Schwab (2004) addressed is as applicable to personal self-reflection and deliberation as it is to curriculum theory. The collected theories or perspectives that one has to work with when confronting any problem in life contribute to the wide range of possible solutions that one can use as deliberative resources affecting the ultimate action of choice. Isolation, on the other hand, can easily lead to extremism and all its consequent tensions, as indoctrinated theories limit accessible options when one is faced with uncertain situations. In both cases—curriculum deliberation and personal self-reflection—value plays an important role as a catalyst to eclectic inquiry. As I show in the following section, an attachment of value may serve to negate isolation and extremism, or even moral relativism, suggesting, as Alexander (2003) noted, a research program that establishes a connection between the eclectic and moral education.

The Eclectic in Action, Beyond Curriculum Deliberation

The fallibility of our limited theories when adopted as doctrine can easily be discerned when one is confronted with a critical viewpoint from another perspective. The argument that I pursue in this section is about the suggestion that this encounter with criticism is merely the beginning of inquisitive reflection. It should not, in other words, serve to debunk and render irrelevant the viewpoint that has been exposed for its fallibility. Neither should it be cause for conflict that leads to a stubborn refusal to accept the criticism as something
worthy of consideration and applicable to the established doctrine. The value of both the doctrine and the contradiction must be recognized, but not in the spirit of moral relativism. Rather, following Schwab (2004), it is the contribution of the criticism, or contradictory perspective, incorporated into a reexamination of the original theory, that provides a wider view of the subject. The eclectic in action, therefore, takes into account the value of the theory in question, but reinterprets it as a contributing aspect as opposed to a complete representation of truth. This subsequent inquiry finds value in contributions without either discarding one’s own theory or clinging stubbornly to the infallibility of that theory in the face of criticism.

In the above section I introduce Schwab’s (2004) notion of eclectic inquiry as it pertains to curriculum deliberation. In this section I introduce examples of eclectic inquiry used in reference to everyday life and emphasize the importance of value attachments. Education, I argue, can capitalize on engendering a sense of value as a precursor to eclectic inquiry; but before pursuing further consideration of this point, it is important to understand exactly how an attachment of value facilitates eclectic inquiry by incorporating examples from beyond the context of curriculum deliberation.

Consider the situation recounted by Booth (1988) in the introduction to his book *The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction*, which displays an archetypal example of eclectic inquiry following confrontation with a contradictory perspective. Booth dedicates the book to the late Professor Paul Moses, a colleague of his, stating that it was Moses’ crossing the line by refusing to teach *Huckleberry Finn* in his classroom because he viewed the work as racist, harmful to him and his students, that began Booth on his reflective journey. Booth by this time is an established scholar and a lover of canonical fiction, but once confronted by Moses’ interpretation is forced to consider the fallibility of the object of his unwavering affection. The initial shock of this unexpected indictment causes Booth to lament, “the shoddy education that left poor Paul Moses unable to recognize a great classic when he met one” (p. 3). But his subsequent reflection leads him on a journey exploring the ethical nature of fiction, which results in *Company*. This uneasy reflection and subsequent inquiry in reaction to the contradictory perspective offered by Moses is an important point worthy of further consideration. Booth did not stop short at the claim made by Moses and could not dismiss the validity of the criticism, and the subsequent inquiry caused him to reconsider many long-held beliefs and come to terms with their fallibility, but not their lack of value. In fact we may say that Booth’s refusal to let go of the original value attachment made it impossible for him to deny and not explore the validity of Moses’ criticism in order to justify his long-held appreciation of the value of the novel.

Perhaps we can note that Booth (1988) had three choices after his initial angered response to the contradictory perspective given by Moses: (a) dismiss his colleague’s comments completely and snicker at his impoverished sense of great literature, stubbornly holding onto the unquestioned infallibility of such a writer as Mark Twain and such a text as *Huckleberry Finn*; (b) take Moses’ comments to heart completely and discard all faith in something that has kept a place in his mind as a beautiful example of human creativity, recognizing its inapplicability to modern contexts and leaving it in the closet and the past as an insignificant relic; or (c) revisit the contents of the novel with Moses’ insight.
still resonating in his mind and take an ethical stand emboldened by this new perspective. It is to our eternal gratification that Booth chose the third option and recorded his quest in the ensuing book. Eclectic inquiry could not have ensued under the restraints of choices (a) and (b). What exactly made Booth choose the third option?

First, let us assume for the sake of argument that Booth’s (1988) initial angered reaction to Moses’ comment was the result of an education that left no room for questioning any untouchable aspect of an accepted canonical text: what can perhaps be labeled a traditional education, one that instilled an infallible sense of value in a literary work. Still, Booth’s subsequent reflection and his writing of Company show that his inquisitive mind—perhaps owing to this same education displaying the characteristics of a critical or “progressive” education—could not rest until he had justified the work in the light of this unexpected contradictory perspective. The point is that there had to be some sort of attachment to the work beyond empty tradition, an attachment that only Booth could attempt to articulate. From Booth’s example, we can learn the importance of recognizing the value, but not the infallibility, of a novel that remained fixed as an entity immune to critical examination. Moses’ contributing theory and Booth’s reexamination in the light of this criticism resulted in a reflective journey that took into account the value of both theories as they affected practical deliberation. Both perspectives became relevant and valuable contributions to the problem at hand, in this case the interpretation and ethical quality of the text. In other words, the value of the traditional response was not undermined by the critical reflection, and neither was the critical reflection discouraged or stunted by the approbation of value. This kind of inquiry exemplifies the eclectic in action, preceded by the recognition of initial value, in the realms of both educational research and personal deliberation. Without the initial value attachment, eclectic inquiry cannot proceed.

I expand further on Booth’s (1988) ultimate choice. The infallible value that Booth attached to the novel in question is reconsidered in the light of Moses’ criticism, but not abandoned as relative; and a heightened understanding is Booth’s reward for his reflective inquiry. In Schwab’s (2004) vision of eclectic inquiry, the collected theories enhance a greater understanding of the subject at hand, and the value of our own contributions is inextricably linked to the greater value of the accumulated knowledge base. The point of this anecdotal example is that value must first be realized if such an eclectic inquiry as Booth’s in response to a contradictory perspective is to be pursued at all. Furthermore, if the eclectic is to be effective in both educational research and personal deliberation, it is imperative to ensure that the effort, indeed the eagerness, to accumulate alternative theories is engendered, and instilling an initial sense of value becomes the foundation on which this engendering can occur. In other words, the initial sense of value attached to the text in question, as in the Booth example, was the stimulus to reexamination—to eclectic inquiry—that caused Booth to justify his long-held attachment in the light of a contradictory, anomalous perspective that he could not ignore. If there had been no personal attachment to the novel in the first place, dismissal of Moses’ contributing theory or perspective due to this lack of concern for an affront to a depthless value attachment would have impeded eclectic inquiry. Similarly, without an attachment of value beyond tradition, Booth could have easily adopted Moses’
perspective as a new doctrine in place of the old, and eclectic inquiry as championed by Schwab would have again been defeated. But perhaps another example extracted from a literary context is needed to underline further the importance of welcoming contributing contradictory and/or critical perspectives as equally relevant and valuable, but not at the expense of the original theory or value attachment itself.

Greene (2001) has long noted the importance of recognizing the interpretational quality of literature and the arts. In her collection of Lincoln Center Institute Lectures on aesthetic education entitled Variations on a Blue Guitar, Greene states how, “We have to attend to the members of other cultures, to see how they read the materials of their own cultures, and how they interpret the material of ours” (p. 184). Greene uses examples of African novelist Achebe’s reading of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Edward Said’s reading of Albert Camus’ The Plague in reference to the latter, pointing out how “the Arabs who died of plague are, compared with the Europeans in the book, all nameless and faceless” (p. 182). This reading, serving as a contributing theory or contradictory perspective, may initiate the same response for lovers of Camus’ work as it did for Booth and result in the same enlightening inquiry. But as with Booth, the eclectic inquiry cannot begin without consciousness of the ultimate value of the initial attachment to the story, manifest in this case in the loyalty one has to the novel. The subsequent reaction to the contradictory perspective depends on this recognition of value. If faith in, or personal attachment of value to, the initial single perspective is absent, the criticism will be rendered meaningless. For either the initial perspective in the light of the criticism will be dismissed as relative, or the criticism itself will be dismissed for the same relativity because the value attachment was not there to begin with in either case and no inquiry will ensue. The recognition of value and attachment to the text, however, as in the above examples, negates either option. In the light of the contradictory perspective, Booth ventures (as may lovers of Camus’ work) into the realm of eclectic inquiry in an attempt to justify the sense of value in a larger context: once again, as a contribution to and not a complete or comprehensive representation of truth or universal value.

The value of one’s attachment, in this case to the story, genre, or even writer, is a precedent, and further critical examination builds on this initial attachment. It is problematic to believe that if someone claims that their value system is right, it is tantamount to claiming that everyone else’s is wrong; but in reality, the claim should be that the value system is not right, but valuable. A value attachment subjected to critical analysis initiated by a contradictory perspective is less easy to dismiss and as a consequence fuels eclectic inquiry.

Here I reestablish the three points examined above in broad and general terms. First, Schwab’s (2004) vision of eclectic inquiry in reference to curriculum deliberation stresses the importance of recognizing the relevance and value of contributing even contradictory theories to the knowledge base as a way of battling the isolating and subsequently tension-inducing qualities of indoctrinated theories of education. Second, this sort of inquiry is equally applicable to instances of personal reflection and deliberation outside the realm of educational theory. Third, eclectic inquiry depends on an initial personal attachment of value that acts as a stimulus to reexamining this attachment in the light of contradictory perspectives. Finally, as I elaborate in the following
section, in order for education to develop the capacity for eclectic inquiry that is sensitive to value pluralism, even in a multicultural society, this sense of value that acts as a catalyst should be engendered. Below I examine how this can be done by incorporating the framework of the arts as an educational tool in an effort to stimulate an emotional and/or imaginative response to subject matter that mimics the attachments that Booth (and hypothetical fans of Camus) displayed in their particular texts, thereby paving the way for effective eclectic inquiry. I also address briefly how this value attachment and its role in eclectic inquiry can aid in the development of the moral imagination.

**How Do We Nurture This Value Recognition?**

If we use the novel or art as an example of how value attachments encourage eclectic reinterpretation in the face of contradictory perspectives, as I do above, we can draw an analogy between this encounter with the arts and a learner’s encounter with the curriculum in order to isolate what exactly makes someone assign such an attachment of value. If education can stimulate value recognition and attachment as exemplified by the arts in reference to all areas of study, then there is more opportunity for establishing the foundation for eclectic inquiry. I say as exemplified by the arts because using art as an example is not to imply that the integration of more art classes in our educational institutions is the only way to promote a value attachment that leads to an eclectic inquiry or the development of the moral imagination. The solution is not as simple, I believe, as adding more art classes to public school curricula. The solution lies, rather, in envisioning an approach to curriculum development that extracts from the arts a framework that encourages imaginative engagement with all subjects, stimulating general value recognition and attachment that precedes, or paves the way for, eclectic inquiry and also the development of the moral imagination. I build on these points below.

The nurturing of value recognition begins first with establishing a connection to the subject at hand, much like the personal connection one experiences when encountering a work of art; as with Booth (1988) or the hypothetical lovers of Camus’ work. Once this initial interaction is established, an attachment based on value can remain present in the learner in anticipation of a subsequent encounter with a contradictory perspective. So the task involves identifying the allure of the novel in order to extract it and apply it to all areas of study. For example, an attachment to a novel involves relating to characters, setting, dramatic themes, and/or dialogue; we are provided with a context. A connection is established that inspires us personally and emotionally, and it is this value attachment that must be initiated before one can defend, or at least care about, any contradictory perspective that initiates a reexamination in the light of criticism in the spirit of the eclectic. The interaction with the novel becomes our template for initiating value attachments to subject matter in order to plant the seeds for the moral imagination: incorporating the essence of eclectic inquiry. Yet a nagging question begs attention: why not just integrate more art classes? This way one can learn to exercise the moral imagination through interaction with various narratives and also gain sensitivity to varying interpretations and perspectives that provide the foundation for eclectic inquiry. I briefly address this question.
Nussbaum (2004) has shown throughout much of her work how interactions with the arts, particularly the novel, exemplify the sort of imaginative engagement with varying perspectives that fuels the moral imagination. This interaction also paves the way for the negotiation of cosmopolitan values (Nussbaum, 1997; also, for an enlightening discussion focusing on educating for cosmopolitanism or world citizenship rather than democratic or national citizenship, see Waldron, 2003). For example, in a recent online essay celebrating the qualities of liberal education and the stimulation of the narrative imagination, Nussbaum (2004) states that the capacities for imaginative and emotional understanding “are developed by literature and the other arts” (para. 17). She adds, “courses in literature and the arts can impart this ability in many ways, through engagement with many different works of literature, music, fine arts, and dance” (para. 18). Finally, in a compelling and convincing defence of the arts, Nussbaum states,

Works of art can be chosen to promote criticism of this obtuseness, and a more adequate vision of the unseen. So we need to cultivate our students’ “inner eyes,” to use a phrase of Ralph Ellison’s. This means carefully crafted courses in the arts and humanities, which bring students into contact with issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and cross-cultural experience and understanding. This artistic instruction can and should be linked to the “citizen of the world” instruction, since works of art are frequently an invaluable way of beginning to understand the achievements and sufferings of a culture different from one’s own. (para. 18, emphasis added)

This type of imaginative interaction is exemplified by the arts, but it is not necessarily located entirely in the arts. The act of reading a novel or poem, viewing a painting or sculpture, or listening to a piece of music inspires us emotionally, touches us personally; it promotes our sense of value. But this type of interaction can be found outside the arts in our interactions with people, landscapes, theories, and concepts. For those not inclined or exposed to the arts, alternate strategies to foster moral/value foundations need to be addressed. This is the first point of contention.

In other words, the arts do not and should not have an exclusive hold on all things imaginative: metaphor, rhythm, imagery, and so forth. Value is not an exclusively artistic tendency. Take one example, metaphor, and examine it outside an artistic context. Metaphor is used in all circumstances and everyday encounters whether we are art lovers or not. Johnson (1993) notes, “Our most fundamental notions of action, purpose, rights, duties, personhood and so forth are irreducibly metaphorical, so that any moral theory in our tradition will necessarily appropriate some set of basic metaphors for such concepts” (p. 76). Note, as Johnson also does in his work, phrases such as “Traffic was a killer” or “Cry me a river”; just a sample of how we use metaphor every day in everyday situations that do not depend on our encounters with the arts. Our imaginative engagement with the world around us can be enhanced by our interacting frequently with the arts, but art does not hold a monopoly on the imagination; rather, it celebrates it. In delegating value exclusively to the arts—as an artistic tendency alone—the opportunity is being neglected to use other areas of study like mathematics and the sciences to produce value attachments. Rather than lifting the arts to lofty heights, the essence of our interactions with the arts can be extracted and applied to all aspects of curriculum and life.
In short, the arts can develop our imaginative impulses and familiarize us with the eclecticism of interpretation, but the arts also remain one aspect of an expansive curriculum. The type of interaction with the arts that attaches a sense of value to a theory that precedes a Booth-like inquiry can be applied to other areas of study, and we can gain much by exploring the possibilities of this extraction and application.

Nussbaum (1997) offers a compelling case for the arts as a tool for developing the moral imagination. Yet further problems are associated with an exclusive concentration on the arts as a means to this end. Questions inevitably arise as to what constitutes art and which novels should be integrated into the classroom to further the cosmopolitan agenda while battling the hegemonic tendencies of certain canonical texts: tendencies that Moses was quick to point out (problems associated with what constitutes art and the integration of novels as pedagogical tools are explored more deeply in Jollimore & Barrios, 2006). In order to avoid these problematic issues, an alternative can be devised that capitalizes on the essence of the interaction without reference to a specific literary text. Such an alternative bypasses distractions and tangential philosophical queries about the incorporation of certain texts from dominant cultures. Value attachments, in other words, can be fostered and nurtured otherwise than simply integrating more art classes and also introducing the problems that arise from their integration.

So How Do We Do It?
In the spirit of Schwab’s (2004) eclectic, I attempt to isolate the “uneasy, pragmatic, and uncertain unions and connections” between certain educational theories in order to initiate discussion about the importance of recognizing the value of one’s accepted theory as something that precedes eclectic inquiry in the face of a contradictory perspective in the realms of both curriculum deliberation and personal reflection. Using two examples from Booth (1988) and Greene (2001), I attempt to note the importance of the personal attachment itself as something valuable, but not infallible that precedes eclectic inquiry. If this sense of value is absent, I argue, how can the reflective inquiry exemplified by Booth occur in either domain? Either the contradictory perspective will be ignored as a further example of moral/theoretical relativity and reexamination in the spirit of the eclectic will be avoided, or the perspective may be adopted as a viable alternative to replace an interpretation that had no value base to begin with, evident in its easy dismissal in favor of a new doctrine. In either case, the eclectic examination of contrasting and convergent multiple theories as equally viable contributors to a problem cannot proceed.

Finally, I explore the possibilities of integrating more art classes as a way of initiating value attachments in anticipation of the practice of eclectic inquiry and the development of the moral imagination. The problems associated with art and literature and the related misplacement of the onus of value exclusively on the arts is turned aside in favor of extracting the essence of our interaction with the arts with the intention of applying it to the rest of the curriculum. Much research has already been conducted toward this end, and I explore Egan’s (1997) work specifically in this final section.

Egan (1997) has concentrated for several years on developing a theory that uses the framework of the narrative and other characteristics historically ap-
plied to the arts in all areas of education. In his book *The Educated Mind: How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding*, Egan proposes that we stimulate kinds of understanding by harnessing the potential of what he refers to as our *cognitive/cultural tools*. These tools are partly derived by our cultural inheritance of oral language and literacy and are stimulated by narrative, metaphor, and rhythm among many other “artistic” devices. He distinguishes five kinds of understanding that are experienced in stages from infancy to adulthood: Somatic, Mythic, Romantic, Philosophic, and Ironic, and tries to show that “each kind of understanding results from the development of particular intellectual tools that we acquire from the societies we grow up in” (p. 4). Without delving too deeply into the core of Egan’s argument, I end this discussion by using examples from his book on how to stimulate these kinds of understandings in a classroom by using the framework of our interaction with the arts, and not the arts exclusively, in order to initiate a sense of value in students as they interact with subject matter beyond the arts in anticipation of effective eclectic inquiry.

In reference to Mythic understanding, for example, Egan encourages the use of binary opposites, where one might “introduce in the first grade a narrative history of the world structured on the opposition between freedom and oppression, knowledge and ignorance, or security and fear” (p. 42). These abstract concepts, already familiar to any child grounded in a literate culture, become educational tools that introduce history imaginatively to the child. The narrative is brought out of the context of the novel or story and applied to the study of history by using characters, plot lines, and dramatic themes. No novels are used specifically in this example; rather, the framework of the novel is integrated into the lesson plan, and the student interacts with the subject matter as one would interact with a novel.

Another example is the use of images. As Egan notes,

> When teaching about flowers, one could imagine emerging from the cold ground, pushing toward the light, bursting with a kind of ecstasy in the warmer air, turning with passion toward the sun, feeling the rush of sap, then experiencing the horror of the returning cold, and shrivelling back under ground. (p. 62)

The use of a literary device such as imagery, and not literature specifically, provides a context for learning about science that is imaginative and emotionally evocative like a novel. The learner’s initial connection with the subject matter, in this case science, captures his or her imagination and forges an attachment similar to that of encountering for the first time a life-altering novel. In short, he or she has established a value connection or attachment. Although this, of course, does not guarantee that the student will engage in eclectic inquiry, it ensures that the foundation of value is at least initiated. As theories begin to be developed and adopted by learners, the initial emotional response and sense of value attached to the subject matter—or the world around them as a whole—remains intact. If no initial attachment of value is engendered in education, eclectic inquiry and the moral imagination have no foundation on which to build, and learners are left to the uninterested adoption of perpetually vitiating indoctrinated theories. Or, perhaps more likely, they will find value attachments elsewhere that serve as their critical foundation, exposing them to
the manipulations of advertising companies and the media, leading to the cultivation of further vapid, nihilistic perspectives.

A further example can be drawn from Egan’s (1997) study of romantic understanding, where he suggests exploring the limits of reality, much like reading *The Guinness Book of World Records*: “A characteristic of Romantic understanding … is its ready association with transcendent human qualities, or human qualities exercised to transcendent degree” (p. 90). When studying the Industrial Revolution, for example, learners can associate “with the energy and ingenuity of its heroes, such as Isambard Kingdom Brunel or James Watt” (p. 90). Not only is the subject matter examined, but also the heroic qualities of the characters who are related to these areas of study: scientists, mathematicians, authors. Again, captivating the interests of the learner by capitalizing on the framework of our relationship with a novel extracts the practice from the context of the art class and applies it to the curriculum as a whole. In this case, the characters behind historic eras, scientific revolutions, or technological advances are brought to life, portrayed as heroes transcending limits, once again initiating an encounter with the subject matter and the world that encourages value recognition in the sense of connecting imaginatively, emotionally, and intellectually with the topic, a format that is inspired by our encounters with the arts, particularly the novel, but that is not dependent on the arts. The foundation for the moral imagination in its inchoate state is established in anticipation of critical inquiry.

The ultimate goal, if one could call it that, of achievement in Egan’s (1997) development of kinds of understanding is what he refers to as Ironic understanding. Ironic understanding, notes Egan, “requires expanding our sympathies and sensitivities even to those who seem quite unlike us” (p. 171). The similarities to the general conception of the moral imagination are striking. Egan goes on to write, “instead of identifying ourselves in terms of some excluded groups who are unlike ‘us,’ and who consequently can be treated with less sympathy, less sensitivity, less humanity, we will seek to include wider and wider groups within the category of ‘us’” (p. 171). Maintaining an attachment of value while also widening one’s perspective in the face of a contradiction of that sense of value (reevaluated as limited) contributes further options to complex problems that demand an eclectic inquiry dependent on value recognition.

Eclectic inquiry, as I show, does not mean perpetually adopting fashionable doctrines at the expense of abandoning original attachments to perspectives, beliefs, or theories. This can only happen if there is no value attachment to begin with. By the time Ironic understanding is achieved, a strong value foundation can be established that supports eclectic inquiry, welcoming opposing and contrasting value systems that enlighten one’s understanding of the world. In education the imperative becomes promoting a sense of value period as a necessary precursor to critical reflection and eclectic inquiry.

**Conclusion**

The role of value in eclectic inquiry is precedent. A recognition of value in the singular form precedes a negotiation of values in the plural form. In order for critical reflection to proceed effectively in the spirit of Schwab’s (2004) vision of eclectic inquiry, there must be a foundational recognition of value that expands
into an uneasy focus on the relevance of all contributing, even contradictory, theories to the problem at hand. This principle applies to the realms of both curriculum deliberation and personal reflection: the latter in the spirit of the moral imagination. Without value recognition that is exemplified by a personal, emotional attachment to a novel, as in the examples of Booth and readers of Camus, eclectic inquiry is (at the most) supplanted by the perpetual adoption of indoctrinated theories. Education can better engender an initial sense of value as a precursor to ensuring effective eclectic inquiry by using the framework of the novel and applying it to all areas of study. Not only through the arts can the moral imagination be developed, but also through a vision of education that is value-sensitive, providing a context for learning in areas such as math, science, and history. Eclectic inquiry or critical reflection are baseless without attachments of value to act as catalysts.

As a final note, the recommended need for this kind of revitalization of the curriculum as a means of establishing a value foundation does not prescribe an atavistic strategy for reincorporating an authoritarian, traditionalist, canon-centered education that indoctrinates impressions of indisputable value to theories or texts. Rather, it emphasizes the usefulness of eclectic inquiry as a reflective and deliberative tool that has at its root an initial value attachment. A critical pedagogy, therefore, depends on establishing the value foundation as a frame of reference. The idea of value is foundational, but not an infallible doctrine in its own right.

References