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Whose Knowledge is it Anyway? Epistemic Injustice and the Supervisor/Supervisee Relationship

ABSTRACT
Higher education often acts as a bridge to society, preparing people for future social, political, and economic roles. For many academics, social justice and social inclusion are areas of research interest and teaching expertise. As such, institutions of higher education are well placed to foster reflection on social justice, through research and teaching, and thereby impact the wider society as students take up their roles within it. Yet, higher education itself should be subject to critique from a social justice point of view. Our aim in this article is to provide one such critique. We will focus on PhD research supervision, and in particular the supervisor/supervisee relationship. We will argue that the hierarchical nature of supervision can give rise to injustice. We will use the concepts of epistemic injustice and epistemic power as explanatory tools to clarify what is at issue within dysfunctional supervisor/supervisee relationships. Throughout, we will make use of the mythological story, “The Salmon of Knowledge,” to unpack the hierarchies involved in knowledge acquisition/creation. Finally, we will conclude by noting the space within the scholarship of teaching and learning wherein critique of the structures within higher education from a social justice point of view occur, and where there exist potential gaps in this scholarship.

KEYWORDS
research supervision, supervisor/supervisee relationship, epistemic injustice, hierarchies

INTRODUCTION
Higher education often acts as a bridge to society, preparing people for future social, political, and economic roles. For many academics, social justice and social inclusion are areas of research interest and teaching expertise. As such, institutions of higher education are well placed to foster reflection on social justice, through research and teaching, and thereby impact the wider society as students take up their roles within it. Yet, higher education itself should be subject to critique from a social justice point of view. Our aim, in this article, is to provide one such critique. We will focus on PhD research supervision, and in particular the supervisor/supervisee relationship. In this relationship, the hierarchical nature of supervision can give rise to injustice. We will use the concepts of epistemic injustice and epistemic power as explanatory tools to clarify what is at issue within dysfunctional supervisor/supervisee relationships.

To frame our arguments, we will use empirical findings, though it is worth noting that we do not aim to contribute to the empirical study of the supervisor/supervisee relationship. Rather, we aim to produce a conceptual analysis of the supervisor/supervisee relationship, whereby we offer a framework (epistemic injustice) through which certain aspects of the relationship (as shown in the
empirical literature) can be understood in a novel way. In the next section of this paper, we will begin the depiction of the supervisor/supervisee relationship. As will become apparent, our focus will be on the hierarchical structures often underpinning this relationship. Before proceeding to this empirically informed description of the relationship, we will introduce a mythological story (“The Salmon of Knowledge”) about a relationship between a sage and his pupil. The mythological story acts as a bridge between the empirical understanding of PhD supervision to the conceptual analysis of epistemic injustice, drawing attention to the hierarchies that may underlie the supervisee experience. We will conclude by noting the space within the scholarship of teaching and learning (SoTL) wherein critique of the structures within higher education from a social justice point of view occur, and where there exist potential gaps in this scholarship.

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND SALMON FISHING IN IRELAND

“The Salmon of Knowledge” is an Irish mythological story, which is part of The Boyhood Deeds of Fionn. According to the tale, Fionn (later the Finn) was engaged in learning poetry, under the tutelage of poet and sage Finn Eces. When Fionn first encounters Finn Eces, the poet has been on the river Boyne for seven years, watching and waiting for a particular salmon. It had been prophesied that the poet would eat the salmon, and afterwards “nothing would remain unknown to him.” When the salmon is found, Fionn is ordered to cook the fish, with Finn Eces issuing the demand that Fionn refrain from eating any of it. Fionn does as he is bid, but while cooking the fish, he burns his thumb on the fat from the salmon and reacts by placing his thumb in his mouth to cool it. In so doing, Fionn acquires the knowledge sought by Finn Eces. Finn Eces responds to this error by inviting Fionn to eat the fish, as “Finn is thy name, my lad,” said he, “and to thee was the salmon given to be eaten, and indeed thou art the Finn”; thereby acknowledging Fionn’s rightful position as knower. From thenceforth, “whenever he put his thumb into his mouth and sang through teinm laída then whatever he had been ignorant of would be revealed to him.”

In the following section, we will discuss the supervisor/supervisee relationship using empirical studies, meta-analyses, and systematic reviews to show that this relationship can impact a supervisee’s experience of supervision. The mythological story above will be used as a bridge from this empirical understanding of the experience of supervisees and the supervisor/supervisee relationship to the conceptual analysis of epistemic injustice. The aim in using this myth is to draw attention to a particular aspect of the supervisee experience: the experience of hierarchies.

IS BEING SUPERVISED LIKE FISHING FOR SALMON?

Meta-analyses and systematic reviews repeatedly find that doctoral students report significantly higher stress levels compared with population norm data (Hazell et al. 2020; Okoro, Owojori, and Umeokafor 2022; Satinsky et al. 2021). These meta-analyses and reviews cite the supervisor/supervisee relationship as both being a protective factor and/or a risk factor in the context of mental health. For example, Hazell et al.’s (2020) meta-synthetic findings “suggested toxic DR-supervisor (doctoral research supervision) relationships characterised by powerlessness and neglect, as well as relationships where DRs felt valued and respected—the former of these being associated with poor mental health, and the latter being protective” (26).

Moreover, surveys of research students repeatedly tell a story of bullying, harassment, abuse, and exploitation (Jacob, Kuzmanovska, and Ripin 2018; Lasser et al. 2021; Woolston 2019). For example, a global PhD survey administered by Nature found that 20% of respondents experienced bullying, and 57% of those reported feeling unable to discuss their situation without fear of personal repercussions; a 2019 survey of postgraduate research students in the UK found that 38% of
participants cited “learning and support” as in need of improvement, and 46% of those students referred to “various supervision-related issues” (Williams 2019).

While anxiety and depression are potential outcomes of a “toxic” supervisor/supervisee relationship “characterised by powerlessness and neglect” (for example 36% of the participants in the Nature survey reported seeking help for anxiety or depression caused by their studies), attrition rates are also noteworthy. It is estimated that 33–70% of those who start their PhD never finish (Jones 2013; van Rooij, Fokkens-Bruinsma, and Jansen 2021), while one-third of a sample of doctoral students had at some point intended to drop out (Castelló et al. 2017).

The drivers of this situation are multifaceted and complex. In this paper, we will focus on one aspect of “toxic” or dysfunctional supervisor/supervisee relations. Using our Finn/Fionn analogy, we will examine the hierarchical relationship between supervisor and supervisee that enables exploitation, and we will unpack the elements of this exploitation that specifically relate to epistemic injustice.

The first thing to note about our analogy is that Fionn is not allowed to fish. Fionn is not facilitated to engage in his own project of catching knowledge for himself. Instead, he must work on Finn’s command as a part of Finn’s attempt to gain the salmon of knowledge. This incursion of the supervisors’ aims and values into a student’s project will be familiar to many research students. Löfström and Pyhältö (2020 identify this intrusion of a supervisor’s views and values and to the narrowness of the perspectives allowed the student’ as a breach of respect for autonomy insofar as such behaviour might ‘compromise the students’ opportunities to develop their research ideas and researcher identity. This incursion can become increasingly heavy-handed when students are asked to jettison their own work to benefit the research of others (including their supervisor). For example, students have reported being overworked through being asked to assist in other people’s research as opposed to concentrating on their own theses (Löfström and Pyhältö 2014).

Relatedly, in Finn’s pursuit of knowledge, Fionn is used as a tool for Finn’s own benefit rather than a student to be mentored and encouraged towards autonomous knowledge acquisition/creation. Fionn may cook the fish for Finn; he may prepare Finn’s path to knowledge acquisition/creation, but he may not partake of that knowledge himself. Here Finn benefits unfairly from Fionn’s labour. Unfair benefit accrued by supervisors through the work of their supervisees will be a recognizable situation to many research students. So called “gift” authorship is rife in academia. Gift authorship or “guest authorship,” “honorary authorship,” “gratuitous authorship,” et cetera is the inclusion on publication bylines of colleagues who have done little or no work in the conceptualization or development of a scientific project (Jones, McCullough, and Richman 2005). A recent survey of tenured and tenure-track faculty at the top 100 research universities in the United States found that gift authorship was perceived to be the most prevalent form of authorship fraud within universities (Reisig, Holtfreter, and Berzofsky 2020).

Doctoral education has been conceptualised as a journey that students navigate with the support of the research community (González-Ocampo and Castelló 2019). Research has repeatedly shown the supervisor/supervisee relationship to be impactful across a number of success indicators (Barnes, Williams, and Archer 2010; González-Ocampo and Castelló 2019; Halse and Malfroy 2010; Jones 2013; McAlpine and Amundsen 2012). Moreover, the supervisor/supervisee relationship can be supportive, challenging, and warm. Good supervision can increase supervisee satisfaction with doctoral studies and improve the quality of the doctoral programmes. As an example of this, one
participant in a survey of 1,173 PhD students from across different Spanish universities (González-Ocampo and Castelló 2019) responded:

The most positive experience was not a specific situation; it has been all the work with my supervisor. It has helped me gradually acquire academic competencies, to increase my methodological knowledge, and to have a broader understanding of reality. This has given me a more mature position in the world. . . .

Nevertheless, within the Spanish study, research students mentioned more negative than positive experiences (González-Ocampo and Castelló 2019). Moreover, when negative experiences did occur, dropping out of a PhD program may seem more appealing than attempting to repair the supervisor/supervisee relationship.

In addition to the studies cited above, a recent survey showed that the majority of targets of academic bullying were graduate students or postdocs, with an overwhelming proportion of participants reporting either experiencing (84%) or witnessing (59%) abusive supervision, or both (49%) (Moss and Mahmoudi 2021). When bullying did occur, targets (64%) were most likely to use avoidant tactics (not reporting and relying on family/friends for support) due to fear of retaliation (61%). Those that did report the abuse (29%) reported unfair and biased (58%) outcomes.

SEEN BUT NOT HEARD

Epistemic injustice is the study of fairness as it relates to knowledge. Miranda Fricker introduced the term, stating that “there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice” which is a wrong done to someone in their capacity as knower (2009, 1). Fricker identified two such wrongs: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.

Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to assign a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s testimony. Fricker refers to this form of injustice as an “identity prejudicial credibility deficit” (28). This means that negative stereotypes of a particular social group (for example women) are generalised in such a way as to count against the credibility of a speaker. Fricker uses the example of Marge Sherwood in The Talented Mr Ripley (Highsmith 1992) to exemplify testimonial injustice (9). When Marge voices her concern that Dickie may have been murdered, another character (Dickie’s father, Herbert Greenleaf) discounts her claim by stating, “Marge, there’s female intuition, and then there are facts.” Here Greenleaf’s generalisation of “negative stereotypes of a particular social group” (women’s inability to “deal in facts”) is used to discount Marge’s testimony. Marge, in her capacity as knower, is accorded an unjust credibility deficit, or in Fricker’s terminology she suffers an “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit.” This position applies to Marge because she has:

1. Attempted to convey knowledge
2. Her audience discounts her testimony
3. Her testimony is discounted in virtue of Marge’s social identity (woman)
4. The relationship between Marge and her audience (men) is one of social power (Kusch 2009)

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts a speaker at a disadvantage when trying to make sense of their social experiences. Victims of this sort of epistemic injustice are “unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their social experiences” (Fricker 2006, 150). Social institutions favour the powerful. This implies that the powerful will understand their experiences appropriately and can draw on these understandings to make sense of their social world. In contrast, “the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social
experiences through a glass darkly” (148). Fricker uses the example of Carmita Wood, a Cornell employee who had been subject to unsolicited and unwelcome sexual attention while at work. Wood’s work environment became so stressful that she filed for unemployment benefits, but when the claims investigator asked her why she had left her job, Wood was unable to come up with words that could describe the toxicity of her work environment. There was no shared language with which to understand Wood’s experience. Wood’s case was influential in the genesis of the term “sexual harassment.”

The framework of epistemic injustice offers a powerful lens to analyse relationships within the context of higher education. Institutions of higher education are sites of education, and as such, open to the concerns of epistemic injustice (Kotzee 2017). In fact, from citation practises (McCusker 2019) to governance structures that prioritise funding, rankings, assessments, student numbers, etc. (Blackmore 2020), the framework of epistemic injustice is a remarkably useful tool for critiquing academic practice. In what remains we will use the framework of epistemic injustice to examine the sorts of supervisor/supervisee relationship discussed in the above sections.

CAN SALMON FISHING BE A MATTER OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE?

We believe that the sort of wrong done to Fionn (and so by analogy supervisees) is distinctively epistemic. In effect, Fionn is wronged in his capacity as knower. Now, that is not to say that Fionn’s case assimilates neatly under Fricker’s framework of epistemic injustice. With respect to testimonial injustice, Fionn is not trying to convey knowledge, nor is his testimony discounted. On the other hand, when it comes to hermeneutical injustice, it is not immediately obvious that Fionn is at a disadvantage when trying to make sense of his social experiences due to a lack of interpretative resources. Fionn’s case could be understood as one of “distributive unfairness in respect of epistemic goods such as information or education” (Fricker 2009, 1). Here, it is the distribution of knowledge that is at issue, as opposed to Fionn’s positioning in the epistemic world.

We believe that the analysis of the sorts of wrongs and injustices delineated above as merely distributive does not adequately account for the harm done to Fionn (and many supervisees). It is in virtue of his lower position within a hierarchy that Fionn is denied the opportunity to fish; by analogy it is in virtue of a supervisee’s positioning within the hierarchies of academia that they are often exploited, harmed, and ignored. It is the supervisee’s quest for knowledge within a systematically unjust environment which enforces and justifies prejudicial stereotypes and roles.

In the language of epistemic injustice, supervisees are awarded a credibility deficit because of their membership of a particular group (novices). One way of understanding these harms as issues of epistemic injustice is through the idea of “epistemic power.” In a recent PhD dissertation on the topic of epistemic injustice, Machteld Geuskens (2018) offered a theory that extends Fricker’s account to interpret epistemic injustice as centrally concerned with regulating epistemic power, where epistemic power is:

one’s ability to exert epistemic influence, that is, one’s ability to influence what comes to be regarded as knowledge and who qualifies as authoritative. It is the ability to influence what others believe, think and know. As it is a “power-to” it may be used to enable or disable others from exerting such influence, i.e. epistemically empowering or disempowering others. (147)

Epistemic power is a twofold capacity (Archer et al. 2019). First, having epistemic power implies the ability to influence what others believe, think, or know; second, epistemic power implies
the ability to enable and disable others from exerting epistemic influence. If epistemic injustice is the inappropriate use (or regulation) of this power, then it is easy to see how the harms mentioned above can be understood as the outcome of epistemic injustice. In our salmon story, Finn uses his power to disable Fionn from engaging in the tasks necessary to pursue knowledge. Finn acts as an impediment to Fionn’s quest for epistemic influence. Similarly, supervisors can impede the epistemic influence of their supervisees in many ways. A brief review of internet forums and subreddits dedicated to graduate research reveals common grievances about supervision. Supervisors can unduly influence the direction of a supervisee’s research, forcing the supervisee to accord with a supervisor’s own work and research (Chelsea 2012). A supervisor can prevent a supervisee from completing and submitting their thesis (Martie_28 2010). A supervisor can exploit the supervisee as “cheap labour” thus limiting the time and energy they have for their own research (Milly_Cat 2011). A supervisor can “steal” a supervisee’s research and data and present it as their own (u/stressednhappy 2013), thereby adding to their own epistemic power, or a supervisor can demand “gift authorship” (user1231233278 2019), again using the supervisees work to increase their power while diluting the epistemic power of the supervisee.

We believe that the hierarchical dynamics within universities, mirrored in the supervisor/supervisee relationship, enable these injustices. Finn is the expert, Fionn the novice hoping to one day deserve the expert’s respect and attention and thereby be granted admission into the folds of the academy of sages and poets himself. Fionn must “pay his dues” to be admitted into the academy of poets. His exploitation is a form of “due-paying,” showing that he may be worthy of sage status within the hierarchy. In many instances, supervisees may fail or refuse to pay their dues to the supervisors’ standards. In many academic environments, the supervisor wields almost all the power over the supervisee as they pay these “dues.” Correspondingly, many supervisees hold little power within the academic hierarchy and are dependent on the academic community, in particular their supervisors, for support and validation. As the empirical literature in preceding sections shows, a good supervisor can “make” an academic career, while a bullying or exploitative supervisor can “break” a supervisee. The traditional expert-novice pedagogical relationship has been criticised within the literature as representative of academic supervision (Hemer 2012) and as a reflection of the power imbalances inherent in the academic environment that sustain these harms (Cohen and Baruch 2022; Vähämäki, Saru, and Palmunen 2021).

There is another aspect to this account of supervisor/supervisee relationships that could act as a potential area of epistemic injustice and harm: the self-propagation of epistemic injustice through epistemic harm. The epistemic power of the supervisor means that supervisors can affect the production of academic knowledge in far reaching, systemic ways. Supervisors can use this power to champion supervisees whose work accords with their own, enabling these supervisees’ epistemic influence and thereby influencing the direction their field may take into the future. Moreover, abusive supervision can “trickle down” (Mawritz et al. 2012; Moss and Mahmoudi 2021), meaning that academics can emulate the abusive supervision they observe in their own supervisory styles. On the flip side, the harms of epistemic injustice affect attrition rates of supervisees. The potential knowledge these supervisees may contribute is lost when they leave academia, together with the loss of their epistemic influence and status as knower. Thus, the misuse of epistemic power can affect the academic system, propagating harmful practices and the loss of epistemic influence and knowledge into the future.
THROWING THE SALMON BACK AND SHARING THE KNOWLEDGE: THE POTENTIAL OF SOTL TO REMEDIATE

Universities are often accused of being “left wing bastions” (van de Werfhorst 2020), where minds are coddled (Lukianoff and Haidt 2019) and freedom of expression policed to avoid triggering sensitivities (Filipovic 2014). The advancement of social justice has been articulated as an explicit aim of the university (Harkavy 2006). Yet, when it comes to research supervision, the reality can be less a coddling of minds than an exploitation of (epistemic) power. All is not lost. The university has within itself a space to reflect on teaching and learning, acknowledge unjust (epistemic) power relations and transform learning experiences; thereby supporting supervisors, supervisees, and advancing disciplinary knowledge creation.

This intellectual space is the scholarship of teaching and learning. As an established field of enquiry with articulated definitions, aims, scope and methodologies, SoTL is emergent. It is the inquiry into student learning in higher education, which informs the practice of teaching by communicating findings publicly (Hutchings and Shulman 1999). SoTL is intertwined with ethics and social justice. Proponents of SoTL highlight the field as context-sensitive and promoting scholarship that implies moral and pedagogical imperatives (Gilpin and Liston 2009; Huber and Hutchings 2005; Huber and Morreale 2002; Hutchings 2002; Shulman 2002). SoTL practitioners seek to illustrate the discipline as transformative, whereby teaching and learning can be reconceptualised as “a shared endeavour that transforms not only teaching and learning but our relationship of one to another and of ourselves to our world” (Gilpin and Liston 2009).

Yet there would seem to be a weak link within SoTL, and it is this link that needs strengthening if SoTL is to make space for critiquing the supervisor/supervisee relationship as a matter of epistemic justice within the university. While SoTL practitioners speak of the “transformative” power of education to “reconstruct and reinvent a more equitable social order” (Astuto, Clark, and Read 1994, 23; Gilpin and Liston 2009), this power is usually wielded outwards towards society outside the university. For example, Huber and Hutchings (2005) describe the teaching commons as linked to life in contemporary democratic society, while Booth and Woollacott (2018, 543) speak of the societal domain of SoTL which focuses on “the demands and needs of society and how higher education is addressing those needs.” Moreover, SoTL theorists have often noted the “societal domain” of SoTL is undertheorized (Leibowitz and Bozalek 2016) and works that explicitly reference social justice and SoTL are relatively limited in number (Behari-Leak 2020; Leibowitz and Bozalek 2016; Liston and Rahimi 2017; Rowan 2019).

If the societal domain of SoTL is “under-theorized,” research in one subdomain of that category is scant indeed. There exists research on teaching for social justice, pedagogies within the university that promote justice within the classroom and/or larger society, (Hill et al. 2018; Moje 2007; Park and Kitching 2020) and literature on promoting equity and access (Luckett and Shay 2020). Yet the literature on the university itself as a locus of (in)justice is very sparse. There are notable exceptions to this. For one thing, there exists reflection on the transformative potential of SoTL in this context, as well as acknowledgment of the neglect of this potential. As Carolin Kreber (2013, 5) states, SoTL “has not adequately taken up the bigger questions of social justice and equality in and through higher education.” More pertinently, research by Brenda Leibowitz and Vivienne Bozalek (2016) contends that social justice theorizing within SoTL can include reflection and reflexivity on “the kind of research that is adopted by academics, and the principles for professional development and learning of the academics themselves” (112). Leibowitz and Bozalek use Nancy Fraser’s account of participatory parity alongside a “pedagogy of discomfort” as a “challenging means to advance
awareness of justice and injustice amongst academics” (109). This work is an excellent example of how SoTL can be utilised to identify and remediate structural inequalities. Yet, we believe that there is still work to be done in reflecting on the very structures that give rise to the issues that we (supervisor/supervisee harms) and Leibowitz and Bozalek (matters of ethnicity and identity) identify. Particularly relevant in this context is work done by Catherine Manathunga (2007), who, on critiquing the move to view supervision as mentorship, argued that “describing supervision as mentoring is a neoliberal attempt to smooth over the jagged edges of power that are inherent in supervision and its engagement in the (re)production of disciplinary subjects” (210).

Universities are rife with injustices, from the examples of exploitative supervision mentioned above to post-PhD precarity (Flynn 2020), racism (Law, Phillips, and Turney 2004), sexism (Skewes, Skewes, and Ryan 2019), and ableism (Powell 2021), to name a few. As SoTL practitioners, we believe that it is incumbent on us to fully investigate the structures enabling these inequalities before we concentrate on pedagogies for social justice. Throughout this paper we have explored the idea of epistemic injustice as a framework for understanding issues described in the empirical literature on supervision. The upshot of this exploration is that there is a distinctive kind of injustice at play in the exploitative examples of supervision, and that this injustice is structural and relates to the misuse of epistemic power enabled by the academic context (systematically unjust hierarchical systems benefitting the more [epistemically] powerful actors). We believe SoTL is a powerful vehicle to advance a thorough investigation of higher education as a locus of social (in)justice. Once we identify injustices within higher education, scholars of teaching and learning could question the motivating factors behind these injustices. We believe the framework of epistemic justice could be utilized in understanding the structural nature of these injustices as particular to academic life far beyond the supervisor/supervisee relationship discussed here.

CONCLUSION

Transformation is built into SoTL, which sees itself as a catalyst to reconstruct a more equitable social order (Astuto, Clark, and Read 1994, 23). Yet, there is a risk of hypocrisy. We need to put our own house in order before we can heal the world. We have argued that SoTL is well placed to clean house; SoTL can be used to identify injustices and remediate them. One of the first steps in this process is asking “why?” Why are these injustices prevalent within higher education? We examined this question in the context of PhD research supervision and argued that the framework of epistemic injustice can be used to understand what underlies exploitation and (epistemic) harm in this context. As we have noted, the drivers of inequality within higher education institutions are multifaceted and complex. Nevertheless, we believe the framework of epistemic injustice could provide SoTL practitioners with a magnifying lens through which to understand the sorts of injustices experienced and perpetrated by academics and thereby inform systematic approaches to remediating them.

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NOTES

1. We use “higher education” and “university” interchangeably. This is in part a response to the literature (for example, the philosophy literature will often use “university”), yet when the term “university” is used that is not to imply that the argument is inapplicable to other institutions of higher education.

2. The focus on PhD supervision is, in part, pragmatic. The literature on research supervision within higher education primarily focuses on PhD supervision.

3. Note that although there exist different models of higher education supervision, at the core there exist relationships of supervision (be that between a supervisee and a single supervisor or supervisory team). It is this relationality that we will explore. As such, this relationship can be viewed as proximal.

4. In the spirit of appropriate acknowledgement of knowledge creation, we would like to thank Catherine O’Mahony for the suggestion of “The Salmon of Knowledge” as an analogy to supervisor/supervisee relationships. In turn, we believe the analogy was suggested to Catherine O’Mahony by Marian McCarthy. For McCarthy’s original work on the subject of “The Salmon of Knowledge” in the context of teaching and learning, refer to McCarthy (2002). It should also be noted that there exist various interpretations of the story. The aim of this paper is not to argue for one interpretation over another, but rather to use the story to unpack certain issues within the supervisor/supervisee relationship.

5. Teinm laída is an incantation used by poets in early Ireland. It was thought of as a way of acquiring hidden or prophetic knowledge (MacKillop 2004).

6. Note that Fricker moves away from the idea that unfair distribution of epistemic goods cannot be termed harms that are distinctively epistemic. For a discussion of the progression of Fricker’s ideas concerning distributive epistemic injustice, see Geusken 2018, 137–40.

7. This transformative power can also be turned inwards towards individual learning contexts and relations. For example, Booth and Woollacott (2018, 543) identify a “moral/ethical domain” of SoTL, which “involves the moral mandate on institutions of higher learning to provide high quality education for students; to keep abreast of what this means in the context of a changing world; and to seek to understand and act in the students' best interests and for their developmental needs.” Yet the idea we are pursuing lies between the ethical and the societal domain identified by the authors. We aim to address institutional hierarchies within...
the university that pertain to epistemic justice. The focus is on the systematicity of unjust relations. Clearly systematic epistemic injustice will result in ethical breaches, but there is a distinction between the ethics (perhaps more akin to epistemic harms) and the system of epistemic injustice.

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www.reddit.com/r/AskAcademia/comments/1nu922/my_advisor_is_trying_to_steal_my_work/.


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